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ABSTRACT
32 IN ’44: A MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY OF 
SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION AT PORTSMOUTH NAVY YARD DURING
WORLD WAR II
By
Rodney Keith Watterson 
University of New Hampshire, May 2007
After averaging the completion of less than two submarines a year in the 1930s, 
the Portsmouth Navy Yard completed an astonishing thirty-two submarines in 1944.
The yard’s outstanding performance during World War II was the product of a highly 
motivated work force and a management team that thrived in a decentralized wartime 
shipyard environment. Employing aggressive and innovative management techniques that 
included employee empowerment, small teams, and mass production techniques to the 
extent that they could be applied to submarine construction at the time, the shipyard 
delivered submarines at unprecedented rates.
There were downsides to the shipyard’s crowning achievements during the war 
that included landfills contaminated with toxic industrial waste, increased pollution of the 
Piscataqua River, and lost wetlands. In addition, the greatly increased employment and 
military presence at the yard brought challenges to local communities that struggled to 
increase housing, infrastructure, and services to accommodate the increased numbers of 
new residents. Not the least of these struggles included efforts to curb prostitution and an 
alarming increase in venereal disease. While wrestling with these day-to-day problems
xii
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during the war, local communities feared an uncertain, and possibly economically 
disastrous, postwar future should peace bring dramatically reduced employment or 
closure of the yard.
This dissertation looks at both sides of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s war years: the 
tremendous upside wherein remarkable submarine production records were achieved that 
brought economic prosperity to the area, and the downside that saw significant 
environmental abuse and sociological turmoil as communities adjusted to the problems 
that accompanied a Navy boomtown. A preliminary review places the yard in context 
with important national and international events between the wars to set the stage for an 
analysis of how the shipyard achieved 32 in ’44, and the consequences of that success.
xiii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“The enemy has struck a savage, treacherous blow. We are at war, all of 
us: there is no time now for disputes or delay of any kind. We must have 
ships and more ships, guns and more guns, men and more men -  faster 
and faster. There is no time to lose. The navy must lead the way. Speed 
up -  it is our navy and your nation.”1
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox 
11 December 1941
As seawater poured through the flood gates into Dry Dock #1 in the early morning 
hours of 27 January 1944, Fred White was more than a little concerned about the 
launchings planned for that afternoon. White was the shipyard’s Master Rigger, 
responsible for the men who would be handling the mooring lines later that day when the 
shipyard would become the first shipyard to launch three submarines simultaneously. The 
launchings of Ronquil, Redfish, and Razorback would be accomplished by floating the 
partially completed submarines off their blocks in Dry Dock #1. The pressure hull 
cylinders had been welded together, making the submarines watertight, but much work 
remained to be done alongside the pier. White was concerned because the three 
submarines were jammed into the dry dock with little separation and it was the 
responsibility of White and his line handlers to insure that the submarines did not damage
1 Secretary o f  the Navy Frank Knox ALNAV Dispatch to all Naval Stations o f  11 Dec 1941. 
National Archives and Records Administration, Waltham, Massachusetts, Record Group 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f  Nations with 
Reference to War and Peace.” Hereafter NARA Waltham, RG 181.
-  1 -
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each other as they floated free of the blocks. Three 1,800 ton submarines, moving about 
unrestrained in close quarters, could do considerable damage.
White’s workday would only be half over with the 1:00 pm triple launching. A 
fourth, and more traditional, launching was scheduled for 2:30 pm that same afternoon 
when the Scabbardfish would be released to slide down Building Way #4 into the 
Piscataqua River. The fourth launching would set another record for the most submarines 
launched by a shipyard on the same day. Before the year was over, these four submarines 
would be included in the record setting thirty-two submarines that the yard completed in 
1944. No United States shipyard before, or since, has built so many submarines in one 
year, hence the title of this dissertation, 32 in ’44.
White had observed daily the side-by-side construction progress of Ronquil, 
Redfish, and Razorback in Dry Dock #1 since their keels had been laid on the same day, 9 
September 1943, just four and one half months earlier. Since that time, the submarines 
had grown in size and gradually filled the dock until only a few feet separated the hulls. 
At the points of least separation, one could almost step from hull to hull. White and the 
other civilian managers had already convinced Yard Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas 
Withers that this should be the first, and last, triple simultaneous launching from a dry 
dock at Portsmouth Navy Yard. Having pushed the envelope this one time, the managers 
were convinced that working conditions were too tight and the risks too great to attempt 
to build and launch “three at a time.” This was no easy decision because the managers at
2 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
3 The 32 submarines completed at Portsmouth Navy Yard in 1944 included one, USS Lionfish 
(SS298), that was towed from Cramp Shipbuilding Company in Philadelphia to Portsmouth Navy Yard 
after it was 45 % completed. USS Manta (SS299), also towed from Cramp Shipbuilding after 45% 
completed, was finished at Portsmouth in January 1945.
- 2 -
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Portsmouth Navy Yard prided themselves on innovative submarine building techniques 
and a willingness to accept considerable risk for the sake of increased production.
Figure 1: Redfish, Ronquil, and Razorback Building in Dry Dock #1. Courtesy 
of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
To further complicate matters at the triple launch, Commandant Rear Admiral 
Withers had invited a number of dignitaries to fill the stands at the head of the dry dock 
to witness the record setting event. Those dignitaries included the Mayor of Portsmouth, 
Charles M. Dale, who would be elected Governor of New Hampshire before the year was 
out. Extensive media coverage had also been arranged to insure that the shipyard received 
due credit for its record-setting accomplishments. Fred White was one of the managers 
tasked to insure that the launchings were problem free and that the publicity received was 
all positive. Hopefully, the only breakage that day would be the traditional champagne 
bottles with which the sponsors would christen each hull.
- 3 -
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Figure 2: Triple Simultaneous Launching of Redfish, Ronquil, and 
Razorback. Courtesy of Milne Special Collection and Archives Department, 
University of New Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
The submarines were sponsored by two wives and two daughters of senior officers at the 
shipyard. One of the sponsors was Hazel Grant Davis, the wife of Captain Henry F.D. 
Davis, the Industrial Manager, who was ultimately responsible for all submarine 
construction at the yard. The ladies were appreciative, and deserving of the honor, as 
were the other forty women who had performed the same ritual at the yard since the war 
started.
Attending an outdoor ceremony at the shipyard in late January might have been a 
cold, snowy, miserable experience. The attendees at the triple launch, however, got a 
reprieve on the weather. It was a cool, cloudy day with temperatures reaching the low 
forties in the afternoon. The ladies, bundled in warm, stylishly tailored coats and pill box 
hats, looked a little out of place in the stands at the head of the dry dock. Submarine
- 4 -
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pressure hull sections and frames for the next submarine to be built were stacked all 
around the dock, huge cranes moved back and forth, and hundreds of industrial workers 
and sailors moved about doing their jobs. The scene also included offerings from the 
shipyard band.4
Despite Fred White’s concerns, the triple launching went well, and the slide of the 
Scabbardfish into the river was equally successful. Torpedoman Third Class Dan 
Maclsaac watched the triple launching from the side of the dry dock that afternoon with a 
few other crewmembers of the USS Redfish. He recalled that the three sponsors carefully 
smashed the champagne bottles on the bow of the three submarines at precisely the same 
time to preserve the purity of the advertised triple simultaneous launching.5 Rear Admiral 
Withers had obviously alerted the highest levels of the Navy of the planned launchings 
because, later that same day, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal sent a congratulatory 
message to the yard. Secretary Forrestal wrote, “In the launching of four submarines in a 
single day, the Portsmouth Navy Yard sets another record in the submarine program.”6 
Indeed, Portsmouth had set other submarine production records before this one and 
would go on to establish even more records before the war was over.
4 The description o f the scene is reconstructed from several sources including interviews with 
participants Fred White and Dan Maclsaac; the Portsmouth Herald o f  26 Jan 1944, “Portsmouth Will 
Launch 4 Submarines Tomorrow;” 1; 27 Jan 1944, “Portsmouth Launches 4 Subs, Hits World Record,” 1; 
and 28 Jan 1944, “4 New Subs Launched for World Record,” 1. Figures 1 and 2, showing the three 
submarines in dry dock before and after the launching, also provide details o f  the scene.
5 Interview with Dan Maclsaac, 9 Nov 2006, at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum.
6 Secretary o f  the Navy James Forrestal letter o f 27 Jan 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Subject: Commendation from Navy Department. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), 1925-56, Box 18, Folder S-6, “Launching General, Jan 
1944-47.”
- 5 -
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The quadruple launching on 27 January 1944 was a microcosm of events at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II. Innovative and creative management 
combined with a dedicated and very capable workforce to set submarine production 
records that brought great credit and recognition to the shipyard. This study tells the story 
of how Portsmouth Navy Yard was able to achieve remarkable production performance 
which transformed the shipyard and the surrounding communities. Sixty years later, those 
transformations continue to influence many aspects of life in the seacoast area.
However, there were downsides to the shipyard’s crowning achievements during 
the war. The by-products of greatly increased production included landfills contaminated 
with toxic industrial waste, increased pollution of the Piscataqua River as the result of the 
dumping of raw sewage and shop waste effluents, increased accident rates, and lost 
wetlands. In addition, the greatly increased employment and military presence at the yard 
brought challenges to local communities that struggled to increase infrastructure and 
services to accommodate the increased numbers of new residents while adjusting to the 
sociological problems that accompanied a Navy boomtown. Not the least of these 
struggles included efforts to curb prostitution and an alarming increase in venereal 
disease. While wrestling with these day-to-day problems during the war, local 
communities feared an uncertain, and possibly disastrous, postwar future should the 
inevitable peace bring dramatically reduced employment or closure of the yard.
This dissertation presents both sides of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s war years: the 
tremendous upside wherein a remarkable workforce set submarine production records 
and the downside that saw significant environmental abuse and citizens’ apprehension 
about their rapidly and radically changing communities. Both sides are presented with an
- 6 -
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overarching theme that emphasizes the shipyard and community transformations that 
occurred as the result of activity at the yard during Word War II.
After averaging the completion of less than two submarines a year in the 1930s, 
the Portsmouth Navy Yard completed seventy-nine submarines between 1 July 1940 and 
1 July 1945.7 Similarly, the shipyard employed an average of about 2,000 employees per 
year in the 1930s and grew to employ a peak of 20,465 in November 1943. Figure 3 
shows the dramatic increase in employment and completed submarines during World 
War II.8
Figure 3: Employment & Submarines Built





938 19401930 1932 1934 1936 1
I Civilian Employment
942 1944 1946 1948 1950
Submarines Built
This study argues that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s outstanding performance was the 
direct result of a highly motivated workforce and innovative management techniques that 
thrived in the World War II naval shipbuilding environment. A key conclusion is that the
7 Portsmouth Herald, 19 Jul 1945, “Yard is Tops in Sub Production,” 1.
8 Figure 3 is constructed from shipyard employment numbers and submarine construction records 
in Cradle o f  American Shipbuilding, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: Government Printing Office, 1979, 76- 
83.
- 7 -
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management of Portsmouth Navy Yard, either by design or necessity, employed 
successful industrial management practices that were forty years ahead of their time. 
These practices included employee empowerment, special small teams, and mass 
production techniques to the extent that they could be applied to submarine construction 
at the time.
The naval shipbuilding environment during the war was highly decentralized and 
characterized by loose Navy Department oversight of navy yards, especially those that 
were performing well. This environment existed because the newly created Bureau of 
Ships was overwhelmed with other matters and unable to effectively oversee navy yard 
operations. Newly created in June 1942, the Bureau of Ships was quickly consumed with 
the administrative burden of organizing a rapidly expanding bureaucracy while 
mobilizing civilian industry to support an accelerated shipbuilding program. Left with 
little or no corporate oversight in an expanding market, and very much to its own devices, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard excelled.
On one level of study, Portsmouth Navy Yard’s remarkable performance can be 
attributed to superior leadership, massive hiring, extensive facility upgrades, effective 
training programs, innovative production techniques, and an intelligent and highly 
dedicated workforce. Another level of analysis shows that each of these attributes 
contained its own set of challenges. The massive hiring added large numbers of women 
and untrained employees to the shipyard workforce. The training programs were 
constantly disrupted by Selective Service recruitment of the younger and more physically 
qualified. The facility upgrades, funded nearly instantaneously in 1940 after a decade of 
neglect and minimal investment in shipyard infrastructure, were quite extensive and
- 8 -
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potentially disruptive to the accelerated submarine construction schedules. Finally, with 
only five building ways at the start of the war, the desired building rates could be 
achieved only if submarine hulls were forced off the building ways very early in the 
construction schedule to free the ways for the next keels. Submarines were launched at 
unprecedented rates and much of the work normally done on the building ways was 
completed pier side. Necessity was very much the mother of invention as the shipyard 
turned a shortage of building ways into an advantage by developing and optimizing 
techniques to build submarines side-by-side in the newly constructed dry dock and 
building basin.
Portsmouth Navy Yard did have two distinct advantages over the other navy yards 
during World War II. First, unlike the seven other navy yards (Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Bremerton, and Mare Island) that dealt with multiple 
ship types and disruptive repair and overhaul work, Portsmouth Navy Yard was able to 
specialize in the design and construction of submarines. The yard’s ability to focus and 
streamline its resources and energies into one line of work during the war was the logical 
extension of the navy’s efforts to develop the yard’s submarine design and construction 
capabilities during the 1920s and 1930s to provide competition to private industry.9
9 Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to streamline resources and energies to the construction o f  
submarines is an integral part o f this study’s argument. Up front it is acknowledged that Portsmouth Navy 
Yard did considerable other work during the war. However, to a large extent, that work was minimal 
compared to other yards and did not compete with the priorities o f  new construction, as was the case at 
other shipyards. According to Philip N. Guyol, in addition to completing 82 submarines between 1940 and 
1945, the yard also completed 3 torpedo testing barges, 7 pier caissons, 3 100 ton floating cranes, quantities 
o f electrical fixtures, and about 700 boats, including wherries, motor whaleboats, motor launches, and fast 
torpedo retrievers. Guyol also notes the manufacture o f aluminum stretching machines for the aircraft 
industry, the manufacture o f  240 mm gun-recoil mechanisms, and the repair o f 26 American, 3 British, 1 
Free-French, 6 Italian and 4 German submarines, and 34 other vessels o f various kinds between 1941 and 
August 1945. Many o f  these submarine and ship repairs were done at the beginning and end o f the war 
leaving the middle years o f  the war free for streamlining for new construction. Phillip N. Guyol,
Democracy Fights: A History o f  New Hampshire in World War II (Hanover: Dartmouth Publications,
1951), 162.
- 9 -
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Portsmouth’s second advantage was its small size, in comparison to the other 
navy yards. Despite expanding six fold between 1940 and 1943, Portsmouth was the 
smallest navy yard in March 1943. At that time, Portsmouth Navy Yard had 20,465 
employees and the other seven navy yards averaged 38,377 employees.10 A small 
shipyard with a specialized mission and a well defined, though constantly increasing, 
workload had a distinct advantage over larger shipyards with a workload of multiple ship 
types and frequent emergent work. Still, it is a credit to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s 
management and employees that they were able to capitalize on these advantages and 
exceed all performance expectations. By consistently exceeding the Navy’s expectations, 
the shipyard was assigned increased orders for submarines and allowed to specialize in 
new construction.11
This study also addresses the consequences of the shipyard’s increased production 
during the war. The first and most obvious consequence is the contribution made by the 
Portsmouth submarines to the winning of the war. Portsmouth-built submarines sank 434
19enemy ships totaling about 1.7 million tons. This represents about one-third of the
leaving the middle years o f the war free for streamlining for new construction. Phillip N. Guyol, 
Democracy Fights: A History o f  New Hampshire in World War II (Hanover: Dartmouth Publications,
1951), 162.
10 Navy Department, SOSED (Industrial Manpower Section) letter o f 1 May 1943 to Distribution 
List. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., RG 38, Naval Operations General 
Correspondence, Box 151, Folder NY 1, 1 July 1942 to 30 Jun 1943. Hereafter NARA College Park.
11 Electric Boat Company in Groton, Ct. was also a small private shipyard that specialized in 
submarine construction during World War II. In general, Portsmouth built submarines much more quickly 
than Electric Boat at a slightly higher cost. See Chapter V for a more complete comparison o f Portsmouth 
and Electric Boat costs.
12 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II (Annapolis: United 
States Naval Institute, 1949), 527-565. This work accounts for enemy tonnage sunk by individual 
submarines. The 1.7 million tons is the author’s count for Portsmouth-built submarines. Another source, 
John D. Horn, “Submarines and the Electric Boat Company,” (A.B. Degree, Princeton University, 1948), 
89, provides the following summary o f sunk tonnage by shipyard: 80 Electric Boat submarines sunk 
1,990,454 tons (38.5%), 69 Portsmouth submarines sunk 1,607,016 tons (32.8%), 22 Mare Island
-  1 0 -
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1 Ttonnage sunk by United States submarines during the war. In September 1943, at the
height of the war in the Pacific, the percentage was even higher. In a congratulatory letter
to the shipyard, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral F.J. Horne, noted that:
The Secretary of the Navy revealed that the Japanese had lost one-third of 
their available tonnage up to 3 September 1943, and that seventy-seven 
percent of that tonnage loss was sunk by our submarines. Of the submarines 
contributing to these sinkings, forty percent were built by your Navy Yard.
This is, indeed, a record of which you can be proud.14
Portsmouth-built USS Kingfish (SS 234), completed on 20 May 1942, was credited with
the sinking of an enemy ship, a Japanese freighter off southern Kyushu,15 on 1 October
1942 just thirteen months after her keel had been laid. When other shipyards were having
difficulty delivering submarines in thirteen months, Kingfish had been built, steamed half
way around the world, and sunk Japanese shipping.
In its 27 August 1945 issue, the shipyard’s newspaper, The Portsmouth Periscope,
celebrated the yard’s wartime accomplishments with considerable pride:
The war is over! And the part that Portsmouth played in the war is something that 
every loyal workingman can look back on with a feeling of pride .. . The 
Portsmouth submarine fleet was the scourge of the famed Japanese merchant 
ships. From the very darkest days of the war, Portsmouth started to swing at the 
little yellow men who had pulled the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.. .  They rained
Submarines sunk 988,357 tons (22%), and 19 Manitowoc submarines sunk 494,737 tons (9.6%). Horn 
cited the source for these totals “Figures courtesy Electric Boat Company.” Thus, two independent 
accounts credit Portsmouth-built submarines with about 1.7 million tons o f enemy tonnage sunk, 
representing about one third o f the total tonnage sunk.
13 Ibid. Graph inside back cover shows 5,329,000 tons o f enemy shipping sunk by U.S. 
submarines.
14 Chief o f Naval Operations, Admiral F.J. Home, letter o f  26 Apr 1944 to Commandant 
Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA College Park, RG 38, Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 
1182, Folder NY1, 1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
15Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 175.
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If one can look beyond the emotion and racially charged language of the moment, the 
Periscope was accurate in its reporting that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance had 
contributed significantly to the winning of the war.
Another consequence of wartime operations was the physical transformation of 
the shipyard, most noticeably the addition of significant acreage, by filling channels 
between nearby islands and reclaiming wetlands and shoal waters. Land reclamation and 
the connecting of islands to increase the size of the shipyard during the war continued a 
consistent practice throughout the history of the shipyard from its establishment in 1800. 
The physical transformation of the yard during the war included the construction of a 12 
acre fitting out pier, a dry dock, a building basin, and the upgrade and expansion of 
numerous shop buildings and facilities.
There were other, and sometimes less noble, consequences of Portsmouth Navy 
Yard operations during the war. On the positive side, women gradually assumed positions 
of increased responsibility and played an increasingly important role as the war 
progressed. Politically, another Portsmouth prewar condition, strongly entrenched male 
dominated Republican government, was overturned with a Democratic victory in 
November 1944 that included the election of the first female mayor in the state of New 
Hampshire. This study argues that the greatly increased population, and military 
presence, during the war caused unsettling conditions in Portsmouth that may have 
contributed to the Democratic victory.
The Portsmouth-Kittery economy was greatly stimulated by the defense dollars 
that poured into the shipyard. Commerce thrived, the standard of living was raised, and
1958, Sweetser Family Papers, Milne Special Collections, University o f  New Hampshire Library, Durham, 
N.H.
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considerable building of housing and community infrastructure resulted. The 
communities also benefited from the federal and state sponsored industrial training 
programs that dramatically reversed a prewar shortage of skilled workers in the area.
On the negative side, the exploding employment and industrial activity at the 
physically constrained shipyard aggravated the existing inadequate sewage and industrial 
waste-disposal system. These inadequacies, readily apparent during the war, continued 
after the war and contributed to Portsmouth Navy Yard being declared a Superfund 
clean-up site in 1993. The EPA studies that led to the Superfund status rarely extended 
back earlier than 1945 for lack of evidence. This study does provide pre-1945 evidence of 
the environmental impact of activity at the shipyard during the war. Other negative 
effects associated with the dramatically increased population at the shipyard included 
increased industrial accident rates and increased communicable disease rates, with an 
unusually high incidence of venereal disease among the enlisted military population at 
the shipyard. With regard to the latter, this study highlights the Navy’s attempts to deal 
with the problem in-house, the Navy’s periodic efforts to pressure Portsmouth city 
officials to rid their town of disease carrying prostitutes, and the city’s reluctance to 
acknowledge the existence of same.
In summary, this study tells the story of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s remarkable 
production accomplishments during World War II, describes the shipyard’s management 
practices and production methods that led to those accomplishments, and highlights 
important environmental and community consequences that transformed the shipyard and 
the surrounding communities. The story is prefaced by placing Portsmouth Navy Yard in 
the context of broader national and international events of the 1920s and 1930s, including
- 13-
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disarmament conferences, neutrality acts, the Great Depression, and New Deal recovery 
programs. These events set the stage for Portsmouth Navy Yard’s World War II story to 
unfold as it did.
As suggested by the subtitle, A Management and Environmental Study o f  
Submarine Construction at Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II, this study 
addresses three primary themes; local history, industrial mobilization, and the 
environmental consequences of industrial mobilization. What contributions does this 
dissertation make to these three primary themes?
As for local history, this work adds considerably to the limited analytical history 
that has been written about the Portsmouth Navy Yard and the city of Portsmouth during 
World War II. Early shipyard histories include Walter H. Fentress’ Centennial History o f  
the United States Navy Yard at Portsmouth, N.H. (1876), Rear Admiral George Henry 
Preble’s History o f the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. (1892), and Captain 
David S. Boyd’s Continuation o f Preble’s History o f the United States Navy Yard, 
Covering the Years 1878-1930. Portsmouth Navy Yard, like most naval activities, wrote 
World War II administrative histories. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s World War II self- 
history is a compilation of various department inputs that records events at the shipyard 
during the war in great detail. All of the above works are a wealth of data and
•  • 17information, if short on analysis and criticism.
17 Walter E.H. Fentress, Centennial History o f  the United States Navy Yard, at Portsmouth, N.H. 
(Portsmouth: M. Knight, 1876); George Henry Preble, History o f  the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, 
N.H. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1892); David F. Boyd, “Continuation o f Preble’s 
History o f the United States Navy Yard, Covering the Years 1878-1930,” typescript with handwritten 
corrections and additions, Maine Room, Rice Public Library, Kittery, Me.; Administrative History:
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More recent works include a shipyard publication, The Cradle o f  American 
Shipbuilding (1979), Robert H. Whittaker’s Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard in Old 
Photographs (1993), Richard E. Winslow Ill’s Portsmouth-Built: Submarines o f the 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (1985), Constructing Munitions o f  War: The Portsmouth 
Navy Yard Confronts the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (1995), and “Do Your Job ”: An 
Illustrated Bicentennial History o f the Portsmouth Naval Yard, 1800-2000 (2000), and 
Nelson Lawry’s Portsmouth Harbor’s Military and Naval Heritage (2004).18 These 
works are rich in pictures and anecdotes. Suffice it to say that events at Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard, since its establishment in 1800, have been well chronicled by local historians in 
works written for a popular audience.
The above works touch, but briefly, on World War II activity at the yard. Richard 
Winslow Ill’s bicentennial history, “Do Your Job,” provides the most discussion of 
activity at the yard during the war. Even then, when covering 200 years of history, 
Winslow could only afford to devote 20 of 250 pages to the World War II period. In the 
bibliography for “Do Your Job, ” Winslow wrote, “For those who elect to follow me in 
pursuing this topic [Portsmouth Navy Yard], I recommend research at the Naval 
Historical Center [Washington Navy Yard],. . .  National Archives [College Park, M d.],.
. .  and the National Archives in Waltham, Massachusetts.” This dissertation, unlike the
Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II (Portsmouth Navy Yard: Government Printing Office, 1946), 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me.
18 The Cradle o f  American Shipbuilding (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: Government Printing 
Office, 1979); Robert H. Whittaker, Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard in Old Photographs (Dover N.H.: 
Allan Sutton, 1993); Richard E. Winslow Ill’s, Portsmouth-Built: Submarines o f  the Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard, (Portsmouth, N.H.: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985), Constructing Munitions o f  War: The 
Portsmouth Navy Yard Confronts the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (Portsmouth: Portsmouth Marine Society,
1995) and “Do Your Job ”: An Illustrated Bicentennial History o f  the Portsmouth Naval Yard, 1800-2000 
(Portsmouth: Portsmouth Marine Society, 2000); Nelson H. Lawry, Glen M. Williford, and Leo K. Polaski, 
Portsmouth H arbor’s Military and Naval Heritage (Portsmouth, N.H.: Arcadia Publishing, 2004).
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other shipyard histories, is based on extensive research at all three of those archives, 
especially NARA Waltham.
This dissertation differs from earlier works in that it is the most extensive and 
detailed treatment of any period of history at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. Having the 
luxury of concentrating on a rather short period of history, it is able to place more 
emphasis on context, analysis, and synthesis than the others. Specifically, this dissertation 
digs deeper than the others to explain, not just what happened, but why events unfolded 
as they did during the war. In addition, great effort is made to analyze Navy Department 
and internal shipyard developments between the wars that positioned the yard to excel as 
it did during World War II.
How does this dissertation add to Portsmouth and New Hampshire histories? 
Neither has been shortchanged by historians, especially colonial Portsmouth. However, 
World War II home front histories of both are surprisingly scarce. Philip N. Guyol’s 
Democracy Fights: a History o f New Hampshire in World War 7/(1951) is a 
comprehensive history of the state’s economic, industrial, and military involvement in the 
war that may have intimidated others from revisiting the subject.19 Barbara McLean 
Ward’s Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The Grocer and the Consumer on 
the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II, is a collection of essays primarily
90depicting day-to-day life in Portsmouth and Strawbery Banke during the war. It draws 
extensively on Portsmouth War Records to recreate the Portsmouth social and cultural
19 Philip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights: a History o f  New Hampshire in World War II (Hanover: 
Dartmouth Publications, 1951).
20 Barbara McLean Ward, Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The Grocer and the 
Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II (Portsmouth: University Press o f New  
England, 1994).
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scene during the war with emphasis on home front sacrifices. Both works credit 
Portsmouth Navy Yard with making a huge economic and social impact on Portsmouth 
and other local communities during the war. However, neither Guyol nor Ward chose to 
examine the interface and interactions between the shipyard and local communities 
during the war in any significant detail.
In summary, Portsmouth Navy Yard histories to date have, for the most part, been 
chronicles rich in facts, photographs, and anecdotes with limited analysis of the World 
War II period, and little attempt to reach beyond the boundaries of the shipyard. On the 
other hand, New Hampshire and Portsmouth World War II histories have reflected home 
front happenings to the exclusion of events on the yard, except to note the impressive 
bottom line production accomplishments that contributed to the social and economic 
transformations of local communities. In addition to a comprehensive analysis of 
operations at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war, this dissertation bridges the gap 
between the shipyard and community lacking in previous works.
The industrial mobilization theme takes the form of a comprehensive case study 
of how wartime mobilization was implemented at one industrial facility, the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard. Few similar case studies of World War II mobilization exist.
World War II mobilization studies usually present top-down views from 
Washington D.C. where decisions were made and policies were implemented. Keith E. 
Eiler’s Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort 1940-45 (1997) 
describes the national mobilization story. Robert Connery’s The Navy and Industrial 
Mobilization in World War 7/(1951) and Connery and Robert Albion’s Forrestal and the
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Navy (1962) tell the mobilization story at the Navy Department level.21 Few studies of 
World War II industrial mobilization reach down to the internal workings of an industrial 
activity, let alone a navy yard, to analyze the shopfloor implementation of mobilization. 
According to one mobilization historian, “Perhaps, because the war is such a towering 
subject of historical inquiry, few works on wartime industry concretely discuss war work 
itself.”22 This dissertation does discuss war work in great detail by examining the day-to- 
day shopfloor decisions and waterfront operations of Portsmouth Navy Yard.
The few mobilization studies that do reach down into shipyard operations focus 
on commercial shipbuilding, not submarines. Frederic C. Lane’s Ships for Victory (1951), 
the comprehensive study of shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World 
War II, focuses on commercial ships and private shipyards. Lane’s impressive work 
spans a wide range of mobilization subjects from U.S. Maritime Commission policy and 
administration to discrete events at a few selected shipyards. A more recent work, 
Christopher James Tassava’s Ph.D. dissertation “Launching a Thousand Ships: 
Entrepreneurs, War, Workers, and the State in American Shipbuilding, 1940-45 (2003)” 
analyzes the implementation of mobilization policies from a corporate and private 
shipyard level. Tassava also focuses on the U.S. Maritime Commission and San 
Francisco Bay Shipyards run by Kaiser and Bechtel to analyze how relationships between 
the federal government and private contractors led to remarkable building rates of 
commercial ships, especially Liberty ships. Marilyn Johnson’s The Second Gold Rush:
21 Keith E. Eiler, Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort 1940-45 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997); Robert Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951); Robert Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal and the 
Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
22 Christopher James Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships: Entrepreneurs, War, Workers, and 
the State in American Shipbuilding, 1940-45,” Ph.D. Diss., Northwestern University, 2003.
- 18-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Oakland & the East Bay in World War 7/ (1996) also examines commercial shipbuilding 
in the San Francisco Bay Shipyards. The limited literature on World War II shipbuilding 
mobilization has concentrated on private industry and commercial shipbuilding on the 
West Coast.23
The overall history of submarine construction has been well covered by Gary 
Weir’s technical and industrial analysis of submarine construction in his two works, 
Building American Submarines 1914-1940 (1991) and Forged in War: The Naval- 
Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940-1961 (1998).24 Weir’s 
work, especially Forged in War, focuses on the technological development of submarines 
and the building of the necessary relationships between the Navy and private industry 
that accommodated that development. Weir discusses submarine construction at all 
shipyards, including Portsmouth Navy Yard. However, Weir’s emphasis is on the 
technological development of United States submarines and not the performance of any 
one particular shipyard during a specific period. This dissertation draws heavily on 
Weir’s work to set the background and context for Portsmouth Navy Yard’s production 
success during the war.
Two unpublished histories of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s primary competitor during 
the war, Electric Boat Company, discuss events at that shipyard during World War II. 
They are John D. Horn’s “Submarines and Electric Boat Company (1948),” and an
23 Frederic C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951); 
Christopher James Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships,” Ph.D. Diss., Northwestern University, 2003; 
Marilyn Johnson, The Second Gold Rush: Oakland & the East Bay in World War II (Berkeley: University 
o f California Press, 1996).
24 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940 (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical 
Center, 1991) and Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine 
Construction, 1940-1961 (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1993).
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unpublished typescript on file at the Navy Department Library, National Historical 
Center by an unknown author, “History of the Electric Boat Company, 1899-1949.”
These histories of Electric Boat Company are chronicles of the company’s achievements
'ye
that are short on analysis and criticism. However, they provide benchmarks against 
which to measure the operations and performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard.
All of this is to say that studies of shipyard mobilization for submarine 
construction during World War II are limited. Furthermore, the few comprehensive 
studies of shipyard mobilization that do exist deal primarily with commercial 
shipbuilding on the West Coast. This detailed study of the World War II mobilization for 
submarine construction at an East Coast navy yard adds a new dimension to a limited 
volume of work. This dissertation highlights similarities between the innovative efforts of 
Portsmouth Navy Yard to streamline production for the rapid construction of submarines 
and the efforts of private West Coast shipyards to do the same for the accelerated 
construction of Liberty ships. However, unlike World War II mobilization studies of 
private shipyards, where government orders were received and ships constructed with 
little deviation from contractual plans, this study of a government yard presents evidence 
of a continuing cooperative dialogue between the yard and the offices of the Chief of 
Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy that often resulted in policy decisions 
favorable to maximizing submarine production while, at the same time, insuring a 
maximum shipyard effort to include the latest design features on new submarines as 
dictated by wartime feedback and experience.
25 John D. Horn, “Submarines and the Electric Boat Company,” A.B. Degree, Princeton 
University, 1948 and “History o f  the Electric Boat Company 1899-1949,” Unpublished Typescript. Navy 
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
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This dissertation argues that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s outstanding performance 
during World War II was the product of a highly motivated work force and a 
management team that thrived in a decentralized wartime shipyard environment. All three 
had to work together to achieve success. In addition, the war provided an overarching 
crisis filled environment that rallied both employees and management to the common 
objective of increased production to defeat the enemy. So then, what part of the 
shipyard’s success was due purely to the stimulation of war, and what part was due to the 
other factors, including enlightened management practices and well trained, skillful 
employees? That question, of course, is impossible to answer. Undoubtedly the threat of 
war heightens an individual’s performance and 20,000 heightened performances can 
produce extraordinary results. The performance of organizations in threatening 
environments is a study unto itself, well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it 
to say that management scholars have argued that leaders of threatened organizations, in 
conjunction with employees having an increased awareness of the need for organizational 
changes, are often able to successfully transform their organizations through efforts that 
include increased flexibility, decentralized problem solving and decision making,
9 (\increased productivity, and innovation. All of these factors, and more, will be amply 
illustrated in the case of Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II.
One of the reasons for Portsmouth Navy Yard’s success during the war was its 
ability to thrive in a decentralized shipbuilding environment. In 1940, decentralization 
was gaining in popularity in private industry but had not achieved the widespread 
application that it would find after the war. At the turn of the century, American industry
26 Carole K. Barnett and Michael G. Pratt, “’’From Threat-rigidity to Flexibility: Toward a 
Learning Model o f  Autogenic Crisis in Organizations,” Journal o f  Organizational Change Management, 
Vol. 13, No. 1,2000.
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was gaining in popularity in private industry but had not achieved the widespread 
application that it would find after the war. At the turn of the century, American industry 
was characterized by little product diversification and strong central management 
structures. With the development of the automotive industry, diversification of product 
increased, the need for professional managers increased, and decentralization began to be 
the management model of choice to manage numerous product lines. This was especially 
true at General Motors where William C. Durant instituted a high degree of 
decentralization, albeit, not well coordinated. In the early 1920s, Alfred Sloan improved 
the General Motors decentralized model by creating a coordinating office of staff 
specialists and general officers. The Sloan model became the standard for decentralized 
industrial management for years to come. However, decentralization had not been 
implemented by a high percentage of companies prior to World War II. Reporting the 
results of a late 1950s management study of sixteen major firms in the chemical, 
electrical, and automotive industries, management historian Alfred C. Chandler wrote, 
“Twelve [firms] have come since 1921 to such a decentralized structure. Eight [firms] 
have done so since 1940.”27 Debate about optimal industrial management structure was 
put on hold during the 1930s as concern about the availability of work took precedence
over concerns about worker productivity. As World War II began, no management
28philosophy prevailed for how best to organize for maximum production. Wartime 
mobilization accelerated the move towards decentralization.
27 Alfred C. Chandler, Jr., “Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis,” in James P. 
Baughman, ed., The History o f  American Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), 
212 and 242.
28 See Alfred D. Chandler. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History o f  the Industrial 
Enterprise (Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1962) for a thorough discussion o f the evolution o f
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Frederick C. Lane, Christopher Tassava and others have noted that wartime 
urgency demanded loose organizational structure and decentralization of the commercial 
shipbuilding industry. According to Tassava, it was decentralization that freed Bechtel 
and Kaiser to build “breathtaking” numbers of commercial ships, especially Liberty 
ships.30 This dissertation extends the importance of decentralized operations and loose 
corporate oversight to the achievements of Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. In 
Portsmouth’s case, with the newly created Bureau of Ships overwhelmed with other 
responsibilities, the yard was released to operate, not just decentralized from the Bureau 
of Ships, but as independently as possible. It the process, Portsmouth Navy Yard 
achieved its own “breathtaking” results.
Prior to the war, management optimization and productivity were more often 
associated with the correct corporate organizational wiring diagram than workplace 
practices and employee motivation. Just as wartime urgency drove decentralized 
operations throughout the shipbuilding industry, greatly increased production schedules 
and enlightened leadership drove a move to employee empowerment and self-managing
industrial corporate organizations and practices during the first half o f the 20th century. Also applicable are 
Chandler’s The Visible Hand, The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977) and Scale and Scope: The Dynamics o f  Industrial Capitalism Business (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1977); David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800- 
1932: The Development o f  Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984); Thomas K. McCraw,.ed., The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a 
Historical Theory o f  Big Business( Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); Alfred D. Chandler, and 
Herman Daems, eds. (Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise o f  the Modern 
Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). The last work notes that 
“Professionalization began, in fact, as a strong demand appeared for managers to oversee production, 
marketing, financial, and other specialized activities. . .  some o f the nation’s most prestigious universities- 
among them Harvard, Dartmouth, . . .  set up schools or courses o f business administration to train 
managers . .  . during the first two decades o f  the twentieth centuiy, national professional associations . .  
.were established,” 34.
29 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r  Victory, Christopher Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships: 
Entrepreneurs, War, Workers, and the State in American Shipbuilding, 1940-45.”
30 Christopher Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships,” 1.
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Peters’ works, while lacking in academic rigor, spawned a management culture that 
rushed to implement employee empowerment, self-managing small teams, and other 
programs to advance employee participation and decision making in the workplace.31 The 
concept gained popularity throughout the 1990s as the key to increased productivity, 
quality, and worker satisfaction.32 By the late 1990s, the concept had expanded from 
self-managing teams to self-managing organizations where “There are no clear cut 
divisions between those who manage and those who are managed. Rather, everyone in 
the enterprise community is viewed as having full membership status, with a real share of 
the voice, and with a legitimate right to fully participate in the management of his or her 
own work.”33 While Portsmouth Navy Yard certainly was not a self-managing 
organization during the war, it did reap great benefits from the small independent work 
teams that roamed the waterfront doing their jobs with little or no supervision.
In time, as more and more companies empowered employees, numerous studies 
have debated the concept. Studies by Chris Argyris, Bradley L. Kirkman, Benson Rosen 
and others have confirmed the value of the concept when sincerely implemented with
31 Thomas J. Peters, In Search o f  Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best Run Companies (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1982); A Passion fo r  Excellence: The Leadership Difference, New York: Random 
House, 1985; Thriving on Chaos: Handbook fo r  Management Revolution (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1994); 
Liberation Management: Necessary Disorganization for the Nanosecond Nineties (New York: A.A. Knopf, 
1992). Peters’ first work, In Search o f  Excellence (1982), advanced the principle that increased 
management trust and confidence in employees would lead to increased production. Several works later, 
Peters had progressed to the belief that “The self-managing team should be the basic organizational 
building block,” Thriving on Chaos (1994), 297.
32William C. Byham, Zapp: The Lightning o f  Empowerment: How to Improve Productivity, 
Quality, and Employee Satisfaction (New York: Harmony Books, 1990); Thomas A. Potterfield, The 
Business o f  Employee Empowerment: Democracy and Ideology in the Workplace (Westport, Ct.: Quorum 
Books, 1999).
33 Ronald E. Purser and Steven Cabana, The Self Managing Organization: How Leading 
Companies are Transforming the Work o f  Teams fo r Real Impact (New York: Free Press, 1998).
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total dedication and commitment throughout the corporation.34 Argyris, in particular, 
argues that anything less is a recipe for disappointing results. According to Argyris, 
superficial implementation of employee empowerment can bring more problems than 
progress. In normal peacetime industry, the creation, cultivation, and maintenance of the 
proper corporate environment are critical factors to the success of employee 
empowerment programs. At Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II, there was no 
need to create and cultivate an environment to promote employee empowerment. Such an 
environment already existed. All shipyard managers and employees were focused on one 
goal, the acceleration of wartime production. Commitment and dedication towards that 
end permeated the entire shipyard. Employee empowerment was not a management 
option, it was a necessity recognized and endorsed by all hands.
Studies by Mark Fenton-O’Creevy and others argue that the success of self 
managing teams hinges on the support of middle management and that roadblocks are 
experienced in companies where middle management resists employee empowerment for
-5C
selfish reasons including concern for managerial job loss or management delayering. 
Wartime urgency and near unlimited job security insured no such selfish resistance by 
middle management at the Portsmouth Navy Yard.
34 Chris Argyris, “Empowerment: The Emperor’s New Clothes,” Harvard Business Review, 
May/June 98, Vol. 76 Issue 3, 98-105; Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, “Beyond Self-Management: 
Antecedents and Consequences o f Team Empowerment,” The Academy o f  Management Journal, vol. 42, 
no. 1 (Feb., 1999). This study concluded that “More empowered teams were more productive than less 
empowered teams and had higher levels o f customer service, job satisfaction, and organizational and team 
commitment.” Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, “Employee Involvement and the Middle Manager: Evidence from 
a Survey o f Organizations,” Journal o f  Organizational Behavior, vol. 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1998), 67-84.
35 Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, “Employee Involvement and the Middle Manager: Evidence from a 
Survey o f Organizations,” 67-84.
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Studies, especially those by Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, have shown 
that the benefits of successful self-managing work teams greatly exceed the initially 
sought improvements to productivity, quality, and worker satisfaction. It has been 
shown that, as self-managing work teams gain experience and success, confidence, 
commitment, and even greater success follow. In addition, commitment to the concept, 
team, and organization increases. And employees develop a willingness to accept more 
responsibility for innovation on the job, improved customer relations, harmonious 
employee-management relations, accountability for results, and continuous improvement 
in production. In effect, a cascading flood of good things happen when employees are 
well trained, trusted, empowered, and set free to do their jobs. A seemingly never ending 
stream of successes typified Portsmouth Navy Yard operations during the war. Many of 
the positive and highly desirable organizational attributes described above were included 
in those successes. This dissertation augments the body of work that argues that 
employee empowerment, sincerely implemented with commitment and dedication, 
contributes significantly to outstanding production and other highly desirable corporate 
goals.
Any study of World War II mobilization necessarily includes discussion of 
women in the workplace and this dissertation is no exception. Studies by Ruth Milkman 
advance the accomplishments of women during the war while lamenting the 
defeminization of industry after the war. Milkman accuses management of restructuring 
postwar industry along the lines of prewar industry, where the workplace was 
characterized by gender inequality. Other studies, including those by Shema Berger
36 Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, “Beyond Self-Management: Antecedents and 
Consequences o f Team Empowerment.”
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Gluck, look at the same wartime experiences by women and conclude that “Women’s 
wartime experiences played a vital role in that process of redefinition [women’s 
definition of themselves] -  the reverberations of which are still being felt today.”37 On 
the other hand, Alice Kessler-Harris and Claudia Goldin find little to suggest that the war 
was a turning point for women. Rather, Kessler-Harris argues that the advances made by 
women during the war “reflect continuity with previous attempts by some women to 
break out of traditional roles.”38 Specifically, she noted that the labor force participation 
rate for married women in the age group twenty to fifty steadily increased from the early 
1900s through World War II and well into the postwar period.39 According to Kessler- 
Harris, women entered the workforce in large numbers during the depression and that 
trend continued throughout the war. Specifically, “older married women contributed most 
of the increase that occurred among female workers”40 during the war years. Goldin also 
found that “married, rather than single women were the primary means of bolstering the 
nation’s labor force”41 during the latter stages of the war and post-war period through 
1950. Based on the above noted continuity, Kessler-Harris argues that war was “less a
37 Ruth Milkman, Gender at Work: The Dynamics o f  Job Segregation by Sex during World War II 
(Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 1987); Shema Berger Gluck, Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, the 
War, and Social Change (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987); Deborah Ann Hirshfield, “Rosie also 
Welded: Women and Technology in Shipbuilding during World War II,” Ph.D. Diss., University of 
Califormia, Irvine. 1987; Karen Anderson, Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations and the Status o f  
Women during World War //(Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1981).
38 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f  Wage-Earning Women in the United States 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 278.
39 Ibid., Figure 5.1, 131.
40 Ibid.
41 Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History o f  American Women 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 153.
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milestone for women than a natural response” to the call for patriotism, lucrative jobs, 
and husband’s absences.42
This dissertation finds some level of agreement with all these studies. The 
significant wartime accomplishments by women at Portsmouth Navy Yard are well 
documented along with the dramatic decrease of women employees with the return of 
servicemen and the great postwar reduction in employment. At the same time, the 
political accomplishments of women in the city of Portsmouth, during the latter stages of 
the war, redefined women’s definition of themselves and the role that they would play in 
the city’s political scene for the rest of the twentieth century and beyond. Finally, as 
argued by Kessler-Harris and Goldin, wartime employment of women at the yard was 
more a passing event greatly motivated by patriotism, better pay, and the availability of 
jobs vacated by departing servicemen than a turning point of lasting consequence.
Unlike progress made by women in the workplace during the war, which has been 
the subject of considerable debate, worker empowerment during the war appears to have 
received less study than deserved. Other shipyards and industries must have shared 
wartime environments and experiences similar to those at Portsmouth Navy Yard that 
were so conducive to increased worker responsibilities. Yet, little has been written 
exploring the wartime contributions of worker empowerment. Studies of management’s 
postwar abandonment of the wartime production advantages experienced as the result of 
women in the workplace should probably also include the abandonment of worker 
empowerment. Perhaps, as Gluck argues for women in the workplace, worker 
empowerment was part of a worker redefinition process that, despite the temporary step-
42 Ibid., 299.
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back after the war, provided the genesis for later resurrection and even greater fulfillment 
of employee potential.
The environmental theme explores the consequences of wartime mobilization at 
the yard on natural resources, health, and community. In general, the environmental 
theme validates the lack of awareness and concern noted by others for industrial practices 
that severely affected the natural environment and caused significant health issues prior 
to the postwar environmental enlightenment. The community portion of the 
environmental theme takes the form of a shipyard boomtown case study.
Writing of the effect of wartime industry on California’s environment, Roger W. 
Lotchin says:
Wars obviously drain the physical and mental resources of a nation.. .  It 
voraciously consumed scrap iron and iron ore for ships, tanks, trucks, and 
weapons, huge amounts of copper for ammunition and communications wire,
.. Immense quantities of petroleum ..  lumber to house 16 million service 
men [in California] . .  Pollution accompanied this depletion.. .  war workers 
nearly overwhelmed the sewer capacities of several California arsenals.. . 
polluted their ocean beaches.. .  The conflict almost exhausted San Diego’s 
water supply.. .  areas became the sites for the marvels of ship production, 
only to be just as rapidly abandoned in 1945 to rust, rot, and desuetude.43
Portsmouth had much in common with the California shipyards. Sewer capacities were
overwhelmed, federal housing projects sprang up overnight, water supplies were
challenged, and immense quantities of raw materials were consumed in the production of
submarines -  and pollution.
Few attempts have been made to assess or quantify the environmental 
consequences of the shipbuilding boom during World War II. With the curtailment of
43 Roger T. Lotchin, ed., “Introduction: World War II in the Golden State,” The Way We Really 
Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 2000), 9.
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record keeping for the sake of production, there is little quantitative evidence of industrial 
pollution during the war at Portsmouth Navy Yard, and probably most other shipyards. 
There is also a notable lack of awareness or concern about shipyard industrial pollution 
during the war found in the testimony of former shipyard employees or the shipyard’s 
annual inspection reports. Andrew Hurley noted in Environmental Inequalities, his 
postwar study of Gary, Indiana, that U.S. Steel employees were initially reluctant to 
report pollution concerns for fear of job loss.44 This dissertation finds a similar lack of 
reporting at the shipyard during the war but fear of job loss was certainly not the reason. 
Rather, it appears that industrial pollution was simply not recognized or judged worthy of 
notice relative to other more important concerns, especially wartime production.
Some historians argue that World War II not only put a fresh and slowly
developing public interest in environmental issues on hold, but caused those issues to be
suppressed after the war. According to Sarah S. Elkind:
Although the United States went into the Depression with relatively broad 
definitions of the public good, it came out of the Second World War nearly 
obsessed with growth and security. Dissension on either of these two topics 
became increasingly difficult until the modern environmental movement 
defined new crises and challenged the hegemony of industrial growth.45
While Elkind was addressing the advent of postwar offshore drilling in California, her
observation has equal application to the building and overhaul of submarines at
Portsmouth Navy Yard. Growing public concern, in the late 1930s, about industrial
sewage pollution of the river and bay was overwhelmed, during the war, with an
44Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, 
Indiana, 1945-1980 (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1995), 149.
45Sarah S. Elkind. “Public Oil, Private Oil: The Tidelands Controversy, World War II, and Control 
o f the Environment,” The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War. Roger W. 
Lotchin, ed. (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 2000), 137.
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obsession for growth and security. Growth and security concerns continued to reign 
supreme after the war, until the modem environmental movement reversed priorities.
Locally, late in the war, a growing concern about the pollution of local waters was 
pioneered by Dr. C.F. Jackson of the University of New Hampshire. Dr. Jackson’s 
Biological Survey o f Great Bay, New Hampshire (1944) included pollution levels of the 
Piscataqua River and the Great Bay that make it clear that additional studies and better 
postwar controls were needed over shipyard and community discharges to the bay and 
river.46 Despite Jackson’s early work, as argued by Sarah Elkind, interest in the pollution 
of local waters waned in light of overriding postwar interests. Fred Short’s Bibliography 
o f Research on the Great Bay Estuary and Adjacent Upland Region (1989) shows a lack 
of postwar studies of local water quality and pollution. Such studies break down by 
decade as follows, 1940s (1 [Jackson’s study]), 1950s (0), 1960s (9), 1970s (29), and 
1980s (39).47 The postwar studies and discharge controls recommended by Dr. Jackson, 
while slow in coming, were nevertheless an eventual byproduct of the unconstrained 
wartime waste discharge practices of Portsmouth Navy Yard, and the surrounding 
communities, that are described in this dissertation.
This dissertation bolsters Samuel P. Hays’ contention in Beauty, Health, and 
Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 1955-1985 that up until the 
mid-twentieth century “Sources responsible for air and water pollution as well as solid 
waste had long since dumped their waste on the most readily available land, into nearby
46 C.F. Jackson, A Biological Survey o f  Great Bay New Hampshire by the Marine Fisheries 
Commission (Durham: University o f  New Hampshire, 1944).
47 Frederick T. Short ed., Biography o f  Research on the Great Bay Estuary and Adjacent Upland 
Region (Durham: University o f  New Hampshire, 1989).
-31 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
streams, or into the air.”48 Hays maintains that, beginning in the 1930s and extending up 
to the early 1960s, the state public-health agencies were impotent and ineffective in their 
efforts to regulate sewage discharge into streams, and industrial discharges were of little 
concern until after World War II. This dissertation presents official correspondence 
between the shipyard and the states of Maine and New Hampshire immediately prior to 
the war that illustrates the impotency and ineffectiveness of those states’ efforts to 
regulate sewage and industrial discharges into streams.
Lorraine McConaghy’s “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, A Small 
Town during World War II” discusses the disastrous pollution of Lake Washington by 
boom shipyards in the Seattle area that contaminated local water supplies.49 Like the local 
histories discussed at the outset of this section, McConaghy’s study does not cross the 
community-shipyard interface to examine the industrial practices that caused the 
pollution of Lake Washington. This study does examine the practices of Portsmouth 
Navy Yard that contributed to an increase in the pollution of the Piscataqua River, 
specifically the discharge of raw sewage and untreated industrial effluents. There is little 
doubt that Portsmouth Navy Yard subscribed in spades to the waste disposal philosophy 
described by Samuel P. Hays, namely, until mid-century waste was dumped to the most 
readily available stream, relying on dispersion to be the solution to pollution.
Another major environmental sub-theme is the loss of wetlands as the result of 
shipyard expansion during the war. Ann Vileisis, Nancy Seasoles, and others have
48 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 72.
49 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, A Small Town during 
World War II,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly vol. 80, 1989,42-51.
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written extensively about the loss of America’s wetlands and the environmental 
consequences of uncontrolled land reclamation projects.50 Seasholes argues that 
Boston’s growth was the result of “its original location on a small confined location [that] 
the town did not want to abandon when it began to grow rapidly and the fact that the 
landform was surrounded by large areas of shallow water that could be easily filled.”51 
Like Boston, when Portsmouth Navy Yard needed to grow rapidly at the start of the war, 
it also took advantage of the shallow waters that surrounded the island shipyard and 
renewed its long history of land reclamation.
Similar to industrial pollution, the environmental consequences of wetlands 
reclamation, was little appreciated until after World War II. Since that time many studies, 
including local studies of the Great Bay Estuary by Fred Short, have confirmed the 
ecological value of the marine life nutrients contributed by eel grass and other marsh 
growth. Likewise, Short and others have emphasized the importance of controlling 
reclamation projects to guard against the loss of those nutrients.52 The consequences of
50 Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A History o f  America’s Wetlands. 
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1997); Nancy Seasholes, Gaining Ground: A History ofLandmaking in 
Boston, (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2003) and Walking Tours o f  Boston’s Made Land (Cambridge Ma.: 
MIT Press, 2006); Ivan Valiela, Deborah Rutecki, and Sophia Fox, “Salt Marshes: Biological Controls of  
Food Webs in a Diminishing Environment, “Journal o f  Experimental Marine Biology & Ecology; Mar 
2004, Vol. 300 Issue 1 /2 ,1 3 1 -1 5 0  and “Theorizing Land-Cover and Land-Use Change: The Case o f  the 
Florida Everglades and it Degradation,” Annals o f  the Association o f  American Geographers, Jun 2004, 
Vol. 94 Issue 2, 311-328.
51 Nancy Seasholes, Gaining Ground: A History ofLandmaking in Boston, 2. Boston’s original 
peninsula o f 487 acres is now surrounded by about 500 acres o f  reclaimed land. Boston and its environs 
now include about 5,250 acres o f  reclaimed land. Seasholes says that “Boston probably has more made 
land than any other city on North America.” 2.
52 Fred Short et al., Bibliography on the Great Bay Estuary and Adjacent Upland Region 
(Durham, N.H.: University o f  New Hampshire / University o f  Maine Sea Grant College Program, 1989); 
The Ecology o f  the Great Bay Estuary, New Hampshire and Maine (Durham, N.H.: Jackson Estuarine 
Laboratory, University o f New Hampshire, 1992); Eelgrass in Estuarine Research Reserves Along the East 
Coast, U.S.A. (Durham, N.H.: Jackson Estuarine Laboratory, University o f New Hampshire, 1993); and 
Eeelgrass as an Indicator o f  Nutrient Over-Enrichment in Estuaries: A Final Report, (Durham, N.H.: 
Jackson Estuarine Laboratory, University o f New Hampshire, 2003).
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wetlands reclamation, like industrial pollution, were under appreciated during the war. 
This dissertation provides further evidence of unrestrained wetlands reclamation, in the 
name of progress, that characterized the era.
Many accounts have been written about wartime experiences in small towns
STacross the United States. Fewer accounts have been written analyzing shipyard 
boomtown experiences and transformations. In general, shipyard boomtown histories 
reflect the struggles of communities to cope with rapidly changing economies, 
infrastructure, and environmental degradation. Boomtown Portsmouth, N.H. experienced 
similar struggles.
The shipyard boomtown studies that have been written, like shipyard mobilization 
studies, have been limited to West Coast commercial shipyard towns. McConaghy’s 
“Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington” examines the economic, political, 
environmental, and social transformation of a small shipyard boomtown.54 Kirkland’s 
wartime experience was so severe that community leaders rejected a continued shipyard 
or military presence after the war. Portsmouth leaders, on the other hand, were committed 
to maintaining as much of the increased shipyard employment as possible to insure the 
continued postwar economic viability of the seacoast area. On a larger geographic scale, 
Marilyn Johnson’s The Second Gold Rush: Oakland & the East Bay in World War II
53 Clarence Andrews, “Sheldon, Iowa during World War II,” Palimpest 70 (1989), 146-165; 
Lonnie E. Maness, “A West Tennessee Town and World War II,” West Tennessee Historical Society 
Papers, 110-119; Perry Duis and Scott LaFrance, We've Got a Job to Do: Chicagoans and World War II 
(Chicago: Chicago Historical Society, 1992); Miller, Marc Scott, The Irony o f  Victory: World War II and 
Lowell, Massachusetts ( Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1988).
54 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, A Small Town during 
World War II,” 42-51.
- 3 4 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
argues that new war defense industries, including commercial shipbuilding, sparked a 
mass migration to the Bay Area that resulted in lasting social, cultural, and political 
changes.55 On an even grander scale, Gerald Nash and Roger Lotchin have shown how 
federal spending during the war transformed the entire West Coast by generating 
unprecedented economic growth and prosperity.56 Studies of communities transformed by 
wartime mobilization have been primarily focused on the West Coast. This analysis of a 
New Hampshire shipyard boomtown is an exception to the rule.
One of the social consequences of boomtown developments near military 
installations during wartime is typically an increase in prostitution and venereal disease.
In his classic history of venereal disease, A Magic Bullet, Alan M. Brandt described the 
military’s wartime efforts to limit the trade, and control the disease, by pressuring 
communities to clean up establishments specifically targeted by the military as highly 
suspect centers of prostitution and likely distribution centers for venereal disease. The 
Portsmouth experience during the war, especially the aggressive efforts by the U.S. Navy 
to force Portsmouth officials to rid the city of prostitutes, would make a good case study 
for Brandt’s social history of venereal disease. The remarkable developments that 
accompanied the introduction of the magic bullet, penicillin, as a treatment at the
55 Marilyn S. Johnson, The Second Gold Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II.
56 Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact o f  the Second World War 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Gerald D. Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the 
Economy (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1990); Roger Lotchin, “The Historians War or the Home 
Front War?: Some Thoughts for Western Historians,” Western Historical Quarterly vol 26, No 2, (Summer 
1995), 185-196; Roger W. Lotchin,. ed. The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great 
War (Chicago: The University o f Illinois Press, 2000).
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shipyard hospital in January 1944, also track well with Brandt’s presentation of this 
dramatic breakthrough in venereal disease control.57
Many World War II boomtown histories have relied extensively on interviews 
with citizens and soldiers who were there. This dissertation incorporates the personal 
testimony of a number of retired shipyard employees and one veteran who worked at the 
yard during the war. Sadly, the most knowledgeable source of information for this 
dissertation, ninety-six year old Fred White, passed away a few months after being 
interviewed. This dissertation is far richer for the contributions of White and the others 
who consented to be interviewed. It is painfully obvious that it will not be too many years 
before personal testimony will no longer be available as a primary source for World War 
II histories.
This dissertation, advertised as a study of submarine construction at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard during World War II, is obviously a multilayered treatment that spans a 
number of disciplines, themes, and sub-themes. Mobilization, which is frequently 
presented as a straight line event that kick-started industry and won the war, was far more 
complex and multi-directional. Mobilization set in motion strong forces that not only won 
the war, but swept across the nation and reverberated through all levels of society, 
transforming lives and communities in the process. This dissertation is an account of 
these mobilization forces as they passed through Portsmouth Navy Yard and the seacoast 
area.
57 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f  Venereal Disease in the United States 
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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CHAPTER II
BETWEEN THE WARS
“The working force at the Portsmouth Yard has been unusually steady 
and the result has been an excellent product at reasonable cost. . .  The 
ability of the Portsmouth Yard to meet its completion dates has in recent 
years been amply demonstrated by the excellent and unique record 
established of meeting every contract date of delivery.”1
Rear Admiral W.G. DuBosn Chief Bureau of Construction & Repair 
Rear Admiral H.G. Bowen Chief Bureau of Engineering
Joint letter of 10 August 1938
The expertise in submarine design and construction that characterized Portsmouth 
Navy Yard at the start of World War II can be traced back to the U.S. Navy’s 
dissatisfaction with the submarine acquisition process that it had experienced prior to, 
and during, World War I. During that period of early submarine development, private 
submarine builders Electric Boat Company and Lake Torpedo Company controlled the 
design of submarines with little or no input solicited, or accepted, from the U.S. Navy. 
According to naval historian Gary Weir, “The relationship between private shipbuilders 
and the navy before 1914 was essentially that of vendor and customer in the classic 
sense.”2 This relationship continued during World War I, causing the Navy to look for
1 Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f  10 Aug 1938 to 
Secretary o f  the Navy. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, 
Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
2 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines, 1914-1940, 5.
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alternatives. The fleet wanted to define the operating capabilities and technologies that 
went into their submarines instead of buying what happened to be on the shelf.
Captain Andrew I. McKee, Planning Officer at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the
war, wrote an article on submarine development in 1945 for Historical Transactions
1893-1943, a 50th anniversary special publication by the Society of Naval Engineers and
Marine Architects. McKee described the process by which the Navy used Portsmouth
Navy Yard to wrest control of submarine design from the private yards:
As the first step in familiarizing its personnel with submarines and their 
designs, an order was placed in June 1914 for the building of the L -8, to the 
design of the Lake Torpedo Company, at the Navy Yard Portsmouth, N.H.
Two years later, the 0-1, of the Holland type, was ordered built at 
Portsmouth to the design of the Electric Boat Company. Late in 1916, the 
Navy Department decided that Portsmouth had acquired enough experience 
in its work on these two ships to be trusted with the development of the 
working plans for a third design, the preliminary design of which had been 
prepared by the Navy Department, and [the Navy Department] placed an 
order for one submarine, the S-3, at Portsmouth. At the same time, orders 
were placed for the S-l with Electric Boat and the S-2 with the Lake Torpedo 
Company.3
In effect, the Navy had set up a design competition between the two well established 
private submarine design shipyards and the newcomer, the Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Within a year the Portsmouth design was judged superior to the Lake design and the large 
order of submarines that the Lake Torpedo Company received in June 1917 was required 
to be built to the Portsmouth design. Electric Boat continued to build to its own design 
throughout the war. However, the company was given no submarine orders after World 
War I until 1933.4
3 A.I. McKee, “Development o f  Submarines in the United States,” Historical Transactions 1893- 
1943 (New York: Society o f  Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1945), 347.
4 Ibid.
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Many thought that the motivations of private shipbuilders had more to do with 
profiteering than providing the fleet with the submarines they needed.5 In short, the U.S. 
Navy felt that it was paying too much for an inferior and ill designed product. Gary 
Weir’s Building American Submarines, 1914-1940 describes how the United States 
Navy, dissatisfied with private industry during World War I, made a commitment to 
strengthen Portsmouth Navy Yard’s submarine design and new construction capabilities 
during the 1920s and 1930s.6 According to Weir, the Navy “utilized available assets to 
develop Portsmouth into a first-class submarine yard” including the assembly of a “fine 
design team.”7 Captain McKee noted in his article in Historical Transactions 1893-1943 
that “For fourteen years, from 1919 until 1933, all the submarines ordered, and there 
were only nine but these were of five different classes, were built to plans prepared by
o
Portsmouth.” With the nation focused on disarmament during the 1920s, Portsmouth 
Navy Yard’s design team had limited submarine design opportunities while Electric Boat 
and other yards had no opportunities at all.
The post-World War I slump in shipbuilding was the death knell for a number of 
private shipyards. According to the Bureau of Ships self-history, “By 1933, only six 
private yards remained in operation: the ‘Big Three,’ Bethlehem, New York, and
5 The excessive profits that many Americans thought private industry had reaped during World 
War I resulted in numerous Congressional efforts to bring the situation under control. According to Robert 
Connery, “In the years between 1918 and April 1942, some 140 bills and resolutions to reduce or eliminate 
profits on war production and equalize the economic burdens o f  war were introduced into Congress.” 
Robert Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 266.
6 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines, 114.
1 Ibid., 114, 60.
8 A. I. McKee, “Development o f Submarines in the United States,” 347. The first Electric Boat 
submarine order after World War I was for the Cuttlefish and it was required to be built to Portsmouth 
plans with only minor departures. The nine submarines are commonly grouped together as the Victory class 
but, as McKee notes, they were, at the time, considered to be five different classes because the 
characteristics varied considerably between submarines.
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Newport News; and three smaller companies, Bath Iron Works, Federal Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Company, and Electric Boat Company.”9 As noted by maritime historian
Frederick C. Lane, “In the lean years from 1922 to 1938 only the very strong
shipbuilding companies were able to keep going.”10 Lane summarized well the state of
shipyards between the wars when he wrote:
Dominating the clatter and seemingly random dispersion of a shipyard, 
guiding the work of its huge cranes, heavy presses, and other special 
equipment were the calculations of highly trained engineers and experienced 
managers. Their practical and theoretical knowledge had to be kept employed 
if the industry was to survive and have in it the possibility of sudden growth 
to meet a new emergency.11
This was precisely the case at Portsmouth Navy Yard between the wars. Naval architects,
marine engineers, and experienced managers were kept employed, to the maximum
extent possible by the U.S. Navy, despite a budget that was severely constrained by
economic depression, politics, and foreign policy. In the end, Portsmouth Navy Yard not
only survived, but also improved its design and production capabilities throughout the
1920s and 1930s. As a result, the yard was more ready than most shipyards for the
industrial mobilization that preceded World War II.
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s fate between the two wars was, to a large extent, 
determined by the U.S. Navy’s commitment to develop it as competition to private 
industry. However, the Navy’s ability to do that was heavily influenced by larger national 
events including disarmament, neutrality, and the New Deal. The first two, in conjunction
9 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 5.
10 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory, A History o f  Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime 
Commission in World War II, 32.
11 Ibid
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with very limited naval appropriations during the Great Depression, restricted the number 
of submarines able to be built and, thus, the submarine design and new construction 
experience that the yard could acquire during the interim war years. New Deal policies, 
especially the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that kick-started the nation’s 
renewed naval shipbuilding program in 1933, including two submarines at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard, were crucial to the yard’s development between the wars.
Other New Deal policies channeled funding to navy yards for the maintenance 
and limited upgrade of shops and facilities, during the 1930s, when naval funding for 
such projects was virtually nonexistent. The Bureau of Yards and Docks’ self-history of 
operations during World War II credits New Deal programs with the accomplishment of 
limited, but important, rehabilitation, modernization, and improvements at navy yards 
during the 1930s:
In the period between 1928 and 1938 only a moderate amount of important 
construction was accomplished at Navy Yards. A large machine shop was 
built at Puget Sound in 1934, a sheet metal and electrical shop was built at 
Norfolk in 1936, and a graving dock was undertaken at Mare Island in 1937. 
However, a considerable amount of work of lesser magnitude was 
accomplished during this period under naval public works appropriations but 
principally through allocations from National Industrial Recovery 
Administration, Civil Works Administration, Works Program Administration, 
and Public Works Administration appropriations for unemployment relief 
during the depression.12
According to that report, the yards would have been “critically unprepared” for World
War II without these programs.
It should be noted, that while Portsmouth Navy Yard benefited from the NIRA 
and other New Deal programs, it was not among the navy yards cited in the above 
quotation as having experienced important construction projects during the 1930s. For the
12 Bureau o f  Yards and Docks, Administrative History o f  World War II, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 169.
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most part, proposed major construction projects at Portsmouth were put on hold during 
the 1930s. This construction lull ended immediately prior to the initial stages of the war 
with the passing of legislation that brought massive facility upgrades to Portsmouth and 
the other navy yards.
Any analysis of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s production during World War II 
requires an understanding of how events between the wars positioned the yard to perform 
as it did. The discussion that follows examines the yard’s pre-World War II history in 
light of the nation’s involvement with disarmament treaties, neutrality acts, and the New 
Deal, in that order.
Submarine Disarmament
The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 began a series of post-World War I 
disarmament conferences and international agreements that restrained United States’ 
naval construction until the eve of World War II. As time went by, the various powers 
involved enforced or ignored disarmament treaty provisions to satisfy their own self- 
interests. The United States, however, remained a strong proponent of disarmament and 
the United States Navy declined dramatically as a result.
From the Navy’s standpoint, the years between the Washington Disarmament 
Conference and 1945 can be divided into periods of decline (1922-1931), awakening 
(1932-36), and rebuilding and expansion (1936-1945). From Portsmouth Navy Yard’s 
standpoint, the yard did not suffer as greatly as other yards during the declining period 
because of the U.S. Navy’s commitment to develop the yard’s submarine design and 
construction capabilities during the 1920s. The relative stability that the shipyard enjoyed
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during the 1920s enabled it to be poised and ready to capitalize on the awakening period 
and thrive during the rebuilding period.
During the 1920s and early 1930s, the United States Congress, initially influenced
by the nation’s predisposition towards disarmament, and subsequently burdened by the
economic realities of the Great Depression, voluntarily restricted submarine building to
below the limitations of any disarmament conference agreements. Thomas H. Healy,
Assistant Dean of Foreign Relations at Georgetown University, summarized the strong
national support for disarmament in a March 1932 address:
There is probably no country in the world where the agitation for world peace
and reduction of armaments has made more headway than in the United
States. The work is being carried on directly or indirectly by some 400
organizations whose total membership may number as many as 15,000,000
persons. Their activities have spread to every nook and corner of the United
States through conventions, the press, special publications, the radio, and 
11every other means.
A consequence of this national commitment to disarmament was the limited building of 
naval ships and submarines and minimal investment in shipyard facilities.
As late as August 1939, the Secretary of the Navy was still strictly controlling the 
earliest acceptable launch dates for submarines under construction, in accordance with 
agreements made at the latest disarmament conference, the disappointing London Naval 
Conference of 1936.14 Thus, the United States continued to comply with debatable treaty 
obligations until late 1939, even as Germany was beginning to march through Europe.
13 Address given by Thomas A. Healy, Ph.D., Assistant Dean and Professor o f Foreign Relations 
at Georgetown University School o f Foreign Service, 3 Mar 1932 at All Souls Unitarian Church, 
Washington, D.C. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central 
Files), Box 24, Folder A14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
14 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f 9 Aug 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 
24, Folder A 14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
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The discussion that follows tracks submarine disarmament efforts from the Washington 
Naval Conference to the brink of World War II.
Submarine numbers and tonnage were not effectively limited by any of the 
disarmament conferences between the wars. The primary participants, Great Britain, 
France, United States, Japan, and Italy, were never able to compromise their self-interests 
to the point that a consensus could be reached on any serious proposal for submarine 
disarmament. Nevertheless, attempts to include submarine disarmament in the various 
disarmament treaties discouraged support for any United States’ submarine rebuilding 
programs prior to the mid-1930s.
The nation’s dedication to naval disarmament started at the Washington Naval 
Conference of 1921. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes astonished the participants 
(United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) with a proposal for drastic 
armament reductions that had the United States leading the way by scrapping thirty 
capital ships totaling 845,750 tons. The treaty limited the world’s capital ships at 500,000 
tons each for the United States and Britain; 300,000 tons for Japan; 175,000 each for Italy 
and France.15
Other treaty provisions included a ten-year capital ship building holiday, tonnage 
limits for specific warships, and bore diameter limits for gun mounts. Unable to reach 
agreement on submarine numbers or tonnage limitations, the conferees made an
15 The capital ships were battleships and battle cruisers. The United States also proposed that Great 
Britain scrap 23 capital ships totaling 583,375 tons and Japan scrap 25 capital ships totaling 448,928 tons.
In addition to actual ships, the proposal covered ships included in all capital shipbuilding programs 
underway or projected. Not commonly appreciated is the fact that the treaty’s well advertised tonnages and 
ratios would not be achieved until 1942. At the outset, in 1922, Great Britain had a decided advantage o f 22 
capital ships and 640,450 tons in comparison to the United States’ 18 capital ships and 500,650 tons,
Japan’s 10 capital ships and 299,700 tons, France’s 10 capital ships and 221,170 tons, and Italy’s 10 capital 
ships and 182,800 tons. George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 286-288.
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
unsuccessful attempt to limit the use of submarines as commerce raiders. The Non- 
Fortification Clause of the treaty obligated the United States and Great Britain to refrain 
from fortifying possessions in the Pacific Ocean while leaving Japan relatively free to 
strengthen its home islands militarily.16
In retrospect, some historians argue that the Washington Naval Disarmament 
Conference of 1921 set in motion events that would ultimately lead, not to world peace, 
but to Pearl Harbor and world war.17 Other historians, like Thomas H. Buckley, maintain 
that the failure was not with the Washington treaties but, rather, a failure “to follow up 
the auspicious detente of pragmatic advantage and reciprocity drawn up in 1921 in
1 0 , ,
Washington.” Political leaders failed to take advantage of the opportunity to solve 
other areas of conflict and, according to Buckley, “With the advent of the Great 
Depression, time ran out.” In American Foreign Policy and National Security Policies, 
1914-1945, Thomas Buckley and Edwin B. Strong argue that those who criticize the 
supporters of the Washington Treaty for giving up naval supremacy, agreeing to non- 
fortification of key Pacific Islands, and failing to achieve more iron-clad promises against 
aggression ignore some basic historical facts. Buckley and Strong maintain that there was 
little or no possibility that Congress would have funded naval construction or island 
fortification, and the Senate never would have approved any iron-clad nonaggression
16 E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, Eds., Sea Power, A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), 480-483.
171bid.
18 Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: 
The University o f  Tennessee Press, 1970), 190.
45
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
agreements.19 Historian Roger Dingman also finds fault with the lack of political follow-
up more than with the treaty itself. According to Dingman:
The Washington naval treaties symbolize an important truth, one that 
transcends the particulars of a half century ago. The truth is this: Arms 
limitation is, above all else, a political process.. .  The success or failure, 
wisdom or folly of arms limitation by international agreement depends, 
above all else, on careful, constantly changing, and correct estimates of the 
domestic political risks and opportunities it presents to one’s own leaders 
and to their prospective negotiating partners.20
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, political leaders in the United States did little
assessing of the risks and opportunities presented by the arms limitation agreements.
Instead, a national commitment to disarmament at any cost seemingly prevailed that led
to the disastrous decline of the United States naval fleet and the loss of international
leverage that may have contributed to more successful disarmament negotiations.
The debate over submarine tonnage limitations at the Washington Naval
Conference saw Great Britain, at one extreme, proposing the scrapping of all submarines
and France, at the other extreme, favoring generous limits that would permit the
construction of large submarine fleets. Great Britain, dependent on high seas trade for
survival, and with recent memories of German submarines devastating their trade during
World War I, wanted to abolish all submarines. At best, Great Britain would settle for
drastic limitations on submarine tonnage. France and Japan, on the other hand,
consistently rejected extreme tonnage limitations in favor of limits that permitted the
building of enough submarines to neutralize their naval inferiority in other areas. These
two irreconcilable views tended to dominate the Washington, and subsequent, naval
19 Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, Jr., American Foreign ands National Security 
Policies, 1914-1945 (Knoxville: The University o f  Tennessee Press, 1987), 69.
20 Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins o f  Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1933 
(Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1976), 218.
46
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
disarmament conferences. The United States, in general, followed Americans’ 
inclinations towards pacification and took a position closer to that of Great Britain than 
the other powers. The United States, however, was more flexible in its position than
Great Britain and was always willing to negotiate, with hopes of limiting the arms race to
• •  01whatever degree was possible at the time.
The Washington Naval Conference concluded with an ineffective supplementary 
treaty designed to limit submarine operations as commerce raiders. The supplemental 
treaty, a poor alternative to the setting of limits on numbers or tonnage, was an attempt to 
restrict submarine warfare, specifically outlawing German practices, through 
international law reinforced by public opinion. However, the proposal was never ratified 
by the French Parliament, removing any obligation for compliance by the other powers. 
Thus, the Washington Naval Conference essentially placed no restrictions on the building 
or use of submarines, and nations were free to engage in unlimited submarine building 
programs.22 The United States, unyielding in its commitment to the spirit of disarmament, 
built only three submarines between the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 and the 
Geneva Naval Conference in 1927. Japan, on the other hand, built thirty submarines
'J'Xduring the same period. Thus, Japan capitalized on the failure of the Washington Naval 
Conference to restrict the building of submarines to greatly enlarge its submarine fleet.
21 See Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936 (Ph.D. Diss., Syracuse University, 
1970) for a complete study o f submarine disarmament
22 Ibid., 92-145.
23 Rep Carl Vinson, Congressional Record, 69th Cong. 2d session, 4 Jan 1927, 1095-96, quoted in 
George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None: The Development o f  Modern Naval Policy (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and Co., 1940), 314.
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At the Geneva Naval Conference (1927), the United States, Great Britain, and 
Japan sought limitations for the auxiliary ships not covered by the Washington Naval 
Treaty. Auxiliary ships primarily included cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The 
submarine discussions centered on tonnage limitations. Finding no support for abolition, 
Great Britain proposed that tonnage limitations be set for the categories of small (under 
600 tons) and large (1000 to 1600 tons) submarines in numbers that favored her existing 
submarine fleet. Once again, the participants could not reach agreement on submarine 
limitations of any description.24 The extent of the U.S. Navy’s submarine building 
between 1924 and 1930 was five V-class submarines, all built at Portsmouth. 
Unrestrained by any treaty limitations, the United States voluntarily restricted submarine 
construction to a rate of less than one submarine a year.
The end result of the haggling and posturing of the five nations actively involved
in the naval disarmament conferences of the 1920s was expansive naval shipbuilding
programs for four of them and a near moratorium on naval shipbuilding for the other, the
United States. Massachusetts Senator David L. Walsh’s Congressional testimony in 1944
in favor of maintaining a strong navy after World War II highlighted the dangers of
repeating the disastrous naval decline of the 1920s:
Following that conference [Washington] and up to January 1, 1929, the great 
powers of the world laid down and appropriated for naval expansion as 
follows: Japan 125 naval vessels; Great Britain, 74 naval vessels, France,
119, Italy, 82: and to the everlasting credit of our own country, the United 
States, exclusive of small river gunboats, l l . 25
24 Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936, 146 -172.
25 Senator David L. Walsh, Chairman o f the Committee on Naval Affairs, “The Decline and 
Renaissance o f the Navy, 1922-1944.” Presented to the 78th Congress, 2nd Session on 7 June 1944. Senate 
Serial No. 10862, Document No. 202. NARA, Waltham, RG 181, PNSY, Box 24, Folder A14-7, 
“Scrapping o f Ships.”
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The overall disarmament scorecard for the 1920s shows the United States Navy 
increasing its fleet by 11 ships while the other negotiating powers increased their fleets 
by 400 ships. Obviously, the other nations had elected to exploit the holes in the treaties 
that permitted unrestrained building of non-capital naval ships like cruisers, destroyers, 
and submarines while the United States did not. The end result was that the United States 
Navy, which had been the largest navy in the world at the time of the Washington Naval 
Conference in 1922, was in total decline by 1930.
At the London Naval Conference (1930) the same five powers that had met at the 
Washington Naval Conference revived many of the same issues that had eluded 
consensus at Geneva three years earlier. The conference concluded with Japan gaining an 
altered 10:10:7 ratio in cruisers as compared to the 10:10:6 ratio in capital ships 
established at the Washington conference. However, only the United States, Great 
Britain, and Japan were signatories to the entire treaty. France and Italy refused to agree 
to any further tonnage limitations in any category and abstained from signing the part of 
the treaty dealing with tonnage limitations of any sort. The ban on capital ship 
construction was extended to the end of 1936 and escape clauses were provided for the 
United States, Great Britain, and Japan should France and Italy reestablish capital
Of tshipbuilding programs deemed threatening by any of the three signatories. Naval 
disarmament had degenerated to a house of cards replete with haggling, distrust, and 
outright refusals to participate.
As for submarines, the conference opened with Great Britain once again 
proposing the abolishing of the submarine as an instrument of war. As expected, France
26 Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936, 173 -204.
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and Japan once again rejected the proposal outright. After further negotiation, submarine 
tonnage for the three signatories was capped at 52,700 tons and the individual submarine 
tonnage was fixed at 2,000 tons. This agreement was a hollow victory for submarine 
disarmament. In the absence of any submarine disarmament restrictions after the 
Washington conference, Japan had launched an ambitious submarine building program 
during the 1920s that greatly increased that country’s bargaining position at the London 
conference in 1930. The end result was that Japan was able to negotiate submarine parity 
with Great Britain and the United States at a level significantly higher than Great Britain 
and the United States would have preferred.27
Meanwhile, Hitler was rising to power and Germany would soon resume its role 
as a naval power. Britain accommodated Germany’s return to power with a bilateral 
naval treaty in 1935 that permitted Germany 35 percent of Britain’s naval tonnage and 45 
percent of Britain’s submarine tonnage. With Britain grasping at any disarmament straws 
offering the opportunity to limit submarine building and France continuing to reject 
submarine limitations, Germany, Italy, and Japan became increasingly aggressive on the 
international stage and contemptuous of all treaties.28 The United States, on the other 
hand, continued not only to honor the London Naval Treaty (1930), but to build 
substantially below treaty limits. To comply with the provisions of the Treaty of London 
(1930) that required the United States to reduce submarine fleet tonnage in excess of the 
52,700 tons limit,29 the United States eliminated overage “S” and “R” submarines. In the
27 George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 343.
28 Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936, 173 -204.
29 United States had 68,700 tons, Great Britain 77,842 tons, and Japan 63,324 tons. George T. 
Davis, A Navy Second to None, 343.
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process, the United States neglected an opportunity to eliminate even more overage 
submarines and build modern replacements up to the 52,700 ton limit. The end result was 
a substantially reduced and aged submarine fleet by the mid-1930s.
The first four years of the 1930’s were particularly lean years for the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard. Employment averaged a little over 1,500, about the same as in 1916 before 
the build up for World War I. During those four years the shipyard built only three 
submarines, the last of the V-class submarines and the last surface combatant the yard 
would ever build, the Coast Guard Cutter U.S.S. Hudson.30 As inactive as the shipyard 
was in the early 1930s, it was fortunate to have been favored with the few contracts it did 
receive. Other yards did not fare as well.
When ex-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed the 
presidency in March 1933, some legislators began to search for ways to reverse the 
decline of the United States Navy and move the fleet, at least, towards the limits of the 
London Naval Treaty. Increased Japanese militancy and national economic needs 
provided what little impetus Roosevelt needed to proceed with substantial naval
T1expansion. The first step in the process was to include, under the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, authorization and funding to increase the navy by 32 
ships, including four submarines. The next year, 1934, saw the passage of the Vinson- 
Trammel Bill authorizing the construction of another 102 ships, including 28 submarines, 
designed to bring the fleet up to the Washington and London Naval Treaty limits by
30 Cradle o f  American Shipbuilding, 76, 78, 80.
31 Japan officially withdrew from the League o f  Nations in March 1933 and announced intentions 
to abandon the naval limitations agreements. In the summer of 1933, it was learned that Japan had 
increased its naval budget by 25% and speculation was strong that a Russo-Japanese conflict was 
inevitable. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 75.
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1942. Having been favored with the V-class submarine building program during the
1920s, Portsmouth Navy Yard greeted the renewed naval shipbuilding programs with an
experienced submarine design team and a stable workforce experienced in submarine
construction. The yard was well positioned to capitalize on the renewed naval
shipbuilding programs of the mid-1930s.
President Roosevelt had to walk a tightrope to insure that his support for a
rejuvenated Navy did not strike a response from the isolationists that would “weaken him
politically and undermine his ability to put across economic reform.”32 According to
historian Robert Dallek:
When Navy Department officials spoke publicly, he urged them to use restraint, 
suggesting that they not overstate the case for a strong Navy, or “hit and assail” 
the professional pacifists, since replies only create a controversy.. .  Moreover, 
when the White House received . . .  letters . . .  opposing the Vincent-Trammell 
bill as wasteful and contrary to America’s professed peace aims, Roosevelt felt 
compelled to explain that the bill authorized the construction of 102 new ships but 
did not appropriate money for them. Congress, he pointed out, would have to do 
this.33
Part of Roosevelt’s balancing act included the assuring of his adversaries to naval 
expansion that his administration would continue to aggressively pursue arms limitation 
at the forthcoming 1935 London Naval Conference with the hope that the naval build-up 
could be moderated. This conference shaped up as a last resort for disarmament as the 
agreements of the London Conference (1930) were to end in December 1936 unless the 
signatories agreed to extend them at a conference in 1935. Moreover, the agreements of 
the Washington Treaty (1922) were also to end in 1936 if any of the adherents disavowed 
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in tonnage with the United States and Great Britain, was set to scuttle any extension of
disarmament plans.34
As suspected, the London Naval Conference of 1935 marked the end of any hopes
for disarmament. Japan’s representatives walked out of the conference when their
demands for full parity in all naval categories were not acceptable to the others and Italy
refused to sign any agreements. According to historian George T. Davis:
The other powers [United States, Great Britain, and France], seeking to salvage 
something from the collapse of the system of naval limitations, agreed on March 
28,1936, to a treaty in which the emphasis was placed on qualitative limitations 
and upon an exchange of information on building progress.. . This meant that the 
three powers would adhere to the type of ship [tonnage, gun diameters, etc.] 
incorporated in the London treaty of 1930, but they would be free to build as 
many as they wanted in each class.35
Thus the three signatories agreed to build submarines with a maximum displacement of
2,000 tons with no treaty limit to the number of submarines that could be built. Even
though the quantitative tonnage limitations of the Washington and London had expired,
an exchange of letters between the United States and Great Britain affirmed adherence to
the principle of parity between the two countries. This agreement created the need for
both countries to keep the other informed of ship building schedules and progress.
Desperately clinging to last resort hopes for disarmament and neutrality, the
United States, Great Britain, and France signed a treaty that naval historian E.B. Potter
said was “so watered down with escalator clauses as to be virtually meaningless.” Potter
added that, “For all practical purposes, all treaty limitations of navies expired December
34 Ibid, 87.
35 George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 367.
36 Ibid., 369.
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31, 1936.”37 Even though treaty limitations may have expired for all practical purposes at 
the end of 1936, the U.S. Navy continued to control the start dates for submarine 
construction at Portsmouth, Electric Boat Company, and Mare Island Navy Yard in 
accordance with the 1936 London Naval Treaty. In August 1939 the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair reminded the shipyards that the keels of Grayling (SS209), 
Grendier (SS219), and Gudgeon (SS211) should not be laid down until 7 October 1939
on
to comply with the treaty. On 1 November 1939, two months after Germany’s invasion 
of Poland, the shipyards were finally advised by the Navy that the 1936 London Treaty 
was suspended and that, “The keels for combatant vessels under construction may
O Q
therefore be laid at any time without a delay.” The United States had complied with the 
ineffective and superficial 1936 London Naval Treaty and limited the rate of submarine 
construction until World War II had actually begun.
Neutrality
The same political climate and national attitude that had encouraged disarmament 
conferences and international peace movements also led to a series of five Neutrality 
Acts between 1935 and 1939 designed to distance the United States from entangling 
events that might lead to another war. Disarmament, while it certainly affected 
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s workload and future, took place on distant stages with indirect 
results. Neutrality, on the other hand, was woven into the day-to-day occurrences of
37 E. B. Potter, Sea Power, A Naval History, 483-484.
38 Bureau o f  Construction and Repair letter o f  9 Aug 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 
24, Folder A14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
39 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter A14-7-3 (RP) o f 9 Nov 1939 to Commandant 
Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence 
(Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
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shipyard and local community life by the late 1930s. On the eve of World War II, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard and the other navy yards were frequently reminded of the 
provisions of the Neutrality Acts and counseled about the importance of compliance. At 
the same time that the yard was being cautioned to observe the neutrality rules, it was 
being directed to mobilize for war. By the summer of 1941, British submarines were 
being overhauled at the yard under the Lend-Lease Act. It was a time of mixed signals, 
secrecy, deception, and confusion.
As things heated up in Europe in the latter half of the 1930s, the United States 
Congress passed a long list of neutrality legislation geared to avoid any international 
involvement that might lead to war. The 1935 Neutrality Act forbade the sale of 
munitions to a belligerent and prohibited Americans from traveling on belligerent ships, 
the 1936 amendment prohibited loans to belligerents, the 1937 Neutrality Act permitted 
sales of non-munitions to belligerents on a “cash and carry” basis only, and the 1939 
Neutrality Act authorized the president to preclude American ships from entering “danger 
zones.” The provisions of the Neutrality Acts grew like topsy in an attempt to cover, with 
paper, every possible event that might lead to war. Neutrality efforts continued right up 
until 13 November 1941 when the Neutrality Act of 1939 was finally repealed.40
Right up until the repeal of the Neutrality Acts, President Roosevelt consistently 
sought, with little success, to modify the acts to increase his executive authority and 
flexibility of implementation. As the war in Europe expanded, the acts prevented the 
President from providing the level of support that Winston Churchill expected and
40 E. B. Potter, Sea Power, A Naval History, 488, footnote 17.
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Roosevelt was inclined to provide. According to historian Robert Dallek, “Antagonism
towards the President and the New D eal. . .  isolationism, Republican partisanship, and
antipathy toward Roosevelt in his own party joined to sink Neutrality reform.”41
Roosevelt was especially sensitive to public opinion and the potential political
consequences of his efforts to curb the Neutrality Acts. In the summer of 1940, concerned
about the November presidential election, Roosevelt packaged war aid to Great Britain
under the more politically agreeable titles of “Destroyers for Bases” and “Lend-Lease.”
The neutrality maneuvering that took place prior to the repeal of the Neutrality
Acts presented a curious and confusing picture to the navy yards. The maneuvering
resulted in a series of Navy Department messages that announced the broadening of the
European conflict, followed immediately by a reminder of the navy’s obligations under
the Neutrality Acts. For example, Portsmouth Navy Yard received the following cryptic
“ALNAV” [All Navy] message from the Secretary of the Navy on 3 September 1939;
“England and France are now at war with Germany, You will govern yourself
accordingly.”42 Two days later another ALNAV provided further guidance on how the
navy yards should “govern themselves accordingly” when it stressed compliance with
President Roosevelt’s recently issued Proclamation of Neutrality:
On 5 September the President signed a proclamation of neutrality as follows 
quote whereas a state of war unhappily exists between Germany and France 
semicolon Poland semicolon and the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and 
New Zealand and whereas the United States is on terms o f  friendship and 
amity with the contending powers and with the peoples inhabiting their 
several dominions . . .  Franklin D Roosevelt President of the United States of
41 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt an American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 190.
42 ALNAV o f 3 Sep 1930. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with Reference to War and 
Peace.”
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America. . .  does hereby declare and proclaim. . .  [the provisions of the 
neutrality laws].43
Choosing his words carefully to keep his options open, the President claimed friendship 
and amity with Germany as well as the Great Britain and its allies in September 1939.
Late 1939 was a time of confusion and mixed signals at the shipyard. The 
beginnings of the war in Europe overlapped with disarmament treaty obligations that, in 
turn, overlapped with the need to comply with the Neutrality Acts that overlapped with a 
declared limited national emergency on 8 September 1939. For example, on 8 September 
1939, when the shipyard was delaying the starts of Grayling and Gudgeon to comply 
with treaty obligations, President Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency that 
called for increased effort and vigilance on the part of the shipyard. The conflicting 
direction must have seemed like a classic case of “hurry up and wait” to the shipyard 
managers.
During this time, the shipyard was a microcosm of the entire country as the initial 
stirrings of the mobilization for war were intermixed with strong sentiments for a 
continued peace. On 1 November, the Bureau of Construction & Repair finally advised 
the shipyards that the London Naval Treaty of 1936 had been suspended and that the 
keels for combatant vessels under constmction could be laid at any time without a 
delay.44 To further complicate matters, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson 
proclaimed on 11 December 1939 that the overtime and Sunday work previously
43 ALNAV 38 & ALNAV 39 o f 5 Sep 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f  Nations with 
Reference to War and Peace.” (emphasis added).
44 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f  9 Nov 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 
24, Folder A14 -7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
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authorized under the President’s Proclamation of a Limited National Emergency was 
revoked because it was no longer needed.45 This period of indecision would continue for 
another six months until the first of the naval expansion acts was passed in the summer of 
1940 and the nation’s course became clearer.
At the same time that he was reemphasizing the current provisions of the 
Neutrality Acts to the Secretary of the Navy and others in the fall of 1939, the President, 
looking for ways to increase aid to Britain, called Congress into special session in an 
attempt to revise the portions of the Neutrality Act dealing with the mandatory embargo 
on the exportation of arms and munitions to foreign states at war. The President’s 
proposed amendment to allow the sale of arms and munitions on a “cash and carry” basis 
had been rejected by Congress that spring and he sought to revisit the subject after the 
outbreak of war in Europe in September. Even with war underway and the President’s 
declaration of a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, the proposed 
amendment met with considerable Congressional opposition. Many Congressmen felt 
that any move away from absolute neutrality was an invitation to war. The amendment, 
however, eventually passed in November 1939 46
As events in Europe rapidly took a turn for the worse in 1940, the Secretary of the 
Navy continued to dutifully report events, as they unfolded, to the shipyards. At times, 
the messages from the office of the Secretary of the Navy appeared to be no more than 
scorecard revisions to keep track of the belligerent nations. On 26 April 1940, the 
message from Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison read, “State of war exists between
45 Secretary o f  the Navy Circular Letter o f  11 Dec 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14 -7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
46 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 51-53.
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Germany and Norway,”47 the 14 May message announced a state of war between 
Germany and Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg,48 and on 10 June the shipyards 
learned that, “Italy has entered war as ally Germany.”49 With any possibility for peace 
slipping away with each passing day, Congress passed the Eleven Percent Naval 
Expansion Act on 10 June 1940 and the Seventy Percent Naval Expansion Act on 19 July 
1940. These huge increases to the size of the fleet included submarine increases of 21,000 
tons and 70,000 tons, respectively, totaling about 61 submarines.50 The passage of these 
acts went a long way towards removing any ambiguous signals the yards had been 
receiving about submarine construction.
The destroyers-for-bases deal announced by President Roosevelt in early 
September 1940 was another important step away from strict neutrality and towards 
providing support to the British. The deal involved the exchange of fifty overage United 
States destroyers with the British for bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda, and 99 year 
leases for bases in the West Indies. Portsmouth Navy Yard initially supported the 
destroyers-for-bases deal in early January 1941 when the yard shipped fifty hose nozzles
47 ALNAV 24 o f 26 April 1940 and SECNAV 29 o f 14 May 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status of 
Nations with Reference to War and Peace.”
48 SECNAV 29 o f 14 May 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with Reference to War and 
Peace.”
49 Chief o f Naval Operations Message o f 10 Jun 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f  Nations with 
Reference to War and Peace.”
50 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940, 9.
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to Philadelphia Navy Yard for use on the destroyers to be “turned over” to Great 
Britain.51
The neutrality issue was highlighted again to Portsmouth Navy Yard officials in 
January 1941 when the Commandant of the First Naval District asked the Commandant 
of the Portsmouth Naval Yard to designate officers to act as boarding officers to 
“welcome” submarines of belligerent nations should they be forced to enter ports north of
C')
Boston. Things changed dramatically between January 1941 when the shipyard was 
prepared to meet, board, and welcome belligerent submarines and May 1941 when the 
Chief of Naval Operations told Portsmouth Navy Yard to anticipate a “continuous 
[repair] workload of one British sub at a time.”
While officials in the yard were dealing with the neutrality issues, so also were 
the citizens of Portsmouth and the surrounding communities. Neutrality enjoyed strong 
support in the Portsmouth area in January 1941. Daily during the late 1930s and early 
1940s the editorial page of the Portsmouth Herald boldly proclaimed “The Herald’s [3 
point] Platform,” the first point of which was “Keep the United States of America out of 
War.” The other two points of the platform were local civic-minded initiatives.
51 Bureau o f Ships letter o f 2 Jan 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, Folder EF13/L9-3, 
“British Empire -  Alterations, Repairs, Overhauls, 1926-42.”
52 Commandant First Naval District letter o f 16 Jan 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, 
Folder A 14-6, “Status o f Nations with Reference to War and Peace.”
53 Chief o f Naval Operations letter o f  14 May 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, 
Folder EF13/L9-3, “British Empire -  Alterations, Repairs, Overhauls, 1926-42.”
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In January 1941, with black-out drills being conducted at the shipyard and in the 
city of Portsmouth,54 and with Great Britain being bombed into oblivion, a poll 
conducted by the Portsmouth Herald showed that 32% of the readers favored no help at 
all for Britain, 18% favored limited help short of war, 28% favored all help short of war, 
and 22% favored all help possibly including war.55 The poll had been conducted as a 
follow-up to President Roosevelt’s fireside chat in late December during which he voiced 
his strong support for Great Britain. Thus, contrary to the President’s convictions, and 
with war seemingly inevitable, 78% of the local citizenry wanted no part of helping Great 
Britain if it might lead to war.
The results of the Portsmouth Herald’s poll differed only slightly from a national 
poll taken the same month. That national poll showed that two-thirds of the respondents 
approved of the Lend-Lease bill that was being debated in Congress at the time.56 If 67% 
of the American people favored aid to Britain under Lend-Lease, then roughly 33% must 
have favored less or no aid to Britain, whereas 32% of the Herald’s readers favored no 
aid at all. Historian David M. Kennedy says that the results of the national poll indicated 
that, “Despite Roosevelt’s studied reluctance to cross all his t ’s and dot all his i ’s, he had 
edged them [the American people] closer to a commitment to aid the democracies, even 
at the risk of war.”57 In January 1941, while the President may have edged the country
54 According to the Portsmouth Herald, the shipyard’s first black-out drill was conducted on 
Sunday, 8 Sep 1940 and the first Portsmouth black-out drill was on Sunday 27 Oct 1940.
55 Portsmouth Herald, “Poll Continues to Show Trend Against British Aid,” 5 January 1940, 1.
56 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929- 
1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 474.
57 Ibid
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towards British support, and war, roughly a third of the country, including the residents
of Portsmouth, were against aid to Britain.
On 18 March 1941, as President Roosevelt continued to show support for Great
Britain, including his signing of the Lend Lease Act on 11 March 1941, the Portsmouth
Herald, in a major departure from its long-time commitment to neutrality, replaced the
anti-war plank in its platform with one calling for “A united effort in behalf of the
Democratic nations to win the war and establish a just and lasting peace.”58 Referring to a
recent FDR address, in which he called for a total victory, the paper reported “After
serious reflection, we sadly have realized that, on Saturday last, President Roosevelt
delivered the funeral oration on the number one plank in our platform and with sincere
regret it is herewith buried.” With that statement, complete with a sketch of a R.I.P.
tombstone, the Portsmouth Herald buried its strong stance on neutrality. On 27 May
1941, the Herald’s editorial went one step further and demanded an end to the neutrality
deception that the president’s administration had been orchestrating.
Let us no longer be deceived by words -  by leases that are more than leases; by 
lending that is more than lending; by patrols that are more than patrols; and in this 
speech by an “unlimited emergency” that is actually war.59
With those words, the Herald’s editor had summarized well United States foreign policy
for the first half of 1941.
The Portsmouth Herald’s burial of its hopes for neutrality in May 1941 was part
of a growing, but reluctant, national movement. Robert H. Connery wrote that “public
opinion was still suspicious of any action which might lead to war” after the President
declared a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939 and “public opinion changed
58 Portsmouth Herald, 18 March 1941,’’This is War,” 4.
59 Ibid.
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slowly” after his declaration of an unlimited emergency on 27 May 1941.60 Harold G.
Vatter says that 1940 and the first half of 1941 “constituted an eighteen month period
during which the vision of inevitable American participation gradually came to replace
the abhorrence toward involvement.”61 The Portsmouth Herald, like the rest of the
country, had held on to hopes for neutrality as long as possible.
Historians agree with the Portsmouth Herald’s assertion the President had been
carefully orchestrating events to move the nation towards war. Thomas H. Buckley and
Edwin B Strong, Jr. wrote:
As the fateful day that was to change the course of history drew nearer, it was 
preceded by an increasingly expert and effective campaign on the part of the 
White House to secure public acceptance for policies that in and of themselves 
could never be popular.. .  Public opinion was being drawn irrevocably to a point 
where complete and total commitment to a two-front war against two incredibly 
powerful adversaries was a foregone conclusion on the morning of December 7,
1941 62
In late March 1941, President Roosevelt took the nation one step closer to war when he 
extended Lend-Lease to include the repair of British vessels in American shipyards.63 
Starting in the summer of 1941, and continuing through the rest of the year, three British 
submarines, HMS Truant, Pandora, and Parthian, and one Free French submarine, 
Surcouf, were overhauled at Portsmouth Navy Yard.64 Curiously, no mention of the 
British submarines appeared in the Portsmouth Herald until 21 September 1941. On that
60 Robery H. Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 52.
61 Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II (New York: Columbia University Press,
1985), 3.
62 Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, American Foreign and National Policies, 1914-1945 
(Knoxville: The University o f  Tennessee Press, 1987), 136.
63 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Ploicy, 1932-1945, 260.
64 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 1.
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date, a front page article, with a Washington dateline, revealed that more than a dozen 
British ships were being repaired in United States shipyards, including the British 
submarine, HMS Pandora, at Portsmouth, N.H. An editor’s note indicated that, “This has 
been common knowledge in Portsmouth for many weeks, but the Portsmouth Herald, in 
co-operation with the Navy Department’s request, has refrained from publishing it.” 
Lend-Lease had been flourishing at Portsmouth Navy Yard for some time before it was 
acknowledged by the local press.
Not mentioned in the article or press release from Washington was the fact that 
the Free French submarine Surcouf was also at the yard at the time. Eleven days earlier,
Figure 4: Free French Submarine Surcouf in Dry Dock #2 (Summer 1941). 
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, 
Durham, N.H.
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on 10 September, seventeen men who “had been working on the bottom of a French 
ship,”65 removing hull paint, were treated at the shipyard hospital for skin and eye 
irritations. If the Pandora’s stay at the shipyard had been common knowledge, the 
Surcouf’s visit must have been even more obvious because it was a huge submarine.
The submarine was the world’s largest with a displacement of 4,000 tons, two eight inch 
guns, an airplane, and “more decks than the average city hotel has floors.”66 Over twice 
the displacement of the fleet-type submarines being built at the navy yard at the time, the 
Surcouf could hardly have transited up the narrow confines of the Piscataqua River to the 
shipyard without being noticed. Yet the Free French submarine was at the yard for a 
couple weeks before it was even mentioned in the press, and then only after authorization 
by the U.S. Navy. Such was the world of secrecy and intrigue that surrounded events at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard in the fall of 1941.
The Portsmouth Herald further lifted the veil of secrecy about foreign submarine 
visits two weeks after the first article when, on 3 October 1941, it published an interview 
with the Commanding Officers of the Surcouf1 and HMS Parthian, the next British 
submarine to be overhauled at the yard. The interview was complete with pictures of
65 Medical Officer Portsmouth Navy Yard memo o f 10 Sep 1941 to the Commandant. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, Folder 
EP13/L9-3 (161), “British Empire, Surcouf 1941-42.”
66 Portsmouth Herald, 3 October 1941, “Parthian Once Sank Italian Sub; Free French Surcouf 
Unlucky,” 1 & 9.
67 The Portsmouth Herald reporter was especially captivated with the Surcouf s acting 
Commanding Officer, Lcdr Louis G. Blaison. When asked if  the Surcouf had sunk any enemy ships yet, 
Blaison replied, “We’ve been unlucky,” meaning they had not yet engaged the enemy. Surcouf's luck 
changed and then went bad. The Portsmouth Herald sadly reported on 18 April 1942 that the Free French 
had announced that the Surcouf with its crew o f 150 men was long overdue and presumed lost.
68 Portsmouth Herald, 3 October 1941, “Parthian Once Sank Italian Sub; Free French Surcouf 
‘Unlucky,” 1 & 9.
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the Parthian in dock at the yard and several of the foreign officers seated around a table 
discussing matters. The article claimed that HMS Pandora was still in the yard but the 
Pandora’s Commanding Officer was suspiciously absent from the interview. Whereas a 
month earlier there were rumors of a British submarine at the yard, in early October the 
local newspaper had front page headlines and pictures that replaced rumor with fact. 
Portsmouth, like the nation, was slowly but surely dropping the pretense of neutrality and 
embracing the Allies.
During the summer of 1941, when Pandora, Surcouf, and Parthian were at the 
yard stretching the boundaries of the neutrality envelope, United States submarines were 
on “Neutrality Patrols” doing the same. On 11 April 1941, President Roosevelt, searching 
for ways short-of-war to aid Britain, for which he could reasonably expect Congressional 
and public support, extended the coastal American security zone into the mid-Atlantic 
and gave patrolling American naval vessels instructions to notify the British about any 
enemy ships or aircraft sighted.69 The next month, the USS Bonita (SSI 65), one of three 
old V-Class submarines that had been towed up from Philadelphia Navy Yard to be 
recommissioned at Portsmouth in the spring of 1941, left the yard for a neutrality patrol 
near Bermuda. According to Dan Maclsaac, the Bonita spent the summer of 1940 on
• 7ftneutrality patrol looking for German submarines to be reported to the British. The 
neutrality patrols, begun in great secrecy, were common knowledge to reporters within a 
few weeks.71
69 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 261.
70 Interview with Dan Maclsaac on 9 Nov 2006 at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
71 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 493.
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By the summer of 1941, disarmament treaties and neutrality sentiments no longer 
constrained production at Portsmouth Navy Yard in any way. The ramp-up of facilities 
was in full swing, employees were being hired at record rates, British submarines were 
being repaired routinely at the yard, and large orders for new submarines were being 
received.72 Twenty years of restrained submarine building would be quickly replaced by 
a submarine building boom unlike anything ever seen before or again at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard.
With mobilization in full gear, and almost as an afterthought, on 13 November 
1941, the House of Representatives voted 212-194 to kill the two-year old Neutrality 
Law. The closeness of the vote speaks to a continuing reluctance on the part of Congress 
and the American people to abandon all hope for the avoidance of war. However, with 
the death of the last of the Neutrality Acts, all the neutrality shell games were over. 
American merchantmen could officially be armed to transport munitions, and eventually 
troops, to Great Britain. British newspapers screamed “The Yanks are Coming” and 
indeed they were.
72 See Chapter III, “Ramp-up for War.”
73 Portsmouth Herald, 14 November 1941, “The Yanks are Coming,” 1.
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The New Deal
As noted earlier, the Bureau of Ships World War II self-history judged New Deal 
programs to be critical to the renewed naval shipbuilding programs and the maintenance 
and upgrading of shipyard shops and facilities during the 1930s. The importance of the 
New Deal programs to the navy yards is obvious from Figure 5 that shows the various 
funding sources available for the upgrade and maintenance of navy yard public works 
during the 1930s.74
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Figure 5 shows that $19.8M were appropriated in 1933 to navy yards for public 
works projects, all from naval funds. In 1934, after the passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, the annual budget increased slightly to $20.3M, but 
$11.4M (56%) of that total were funds appropriated for NIRA designated projects. This 
trend continued throughout the 1930s as NIRA, then the Emergency Recovery Act 
(ERA), and finally Public Works Administration (PWA) funding consistently supplied
74 The graph is constructed from Bureau o f Construction and Repair’s Annual Reports, NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder 
A9-1/EN 7, “Annual Reports Bureau o f Construction and Repair.”
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well over 50% of the annual funding for navy yard public works projects. Despite modest 
navy appropriations for shipyard projects between 1933 and 1939, the navy yards 
experienced a 348% increase in public works expenditures. Also important is the fact that 
public works expenditures more than doubled between 1937 and 1939 thanks to large 
PWA and NRA funding increases. These two New Deal programs helped to pave the way 
for the massive navy yard facility upgrades that followed, in the summer of 1940, when 
the funding floodgates were opened with the 11% and 70% Naval Expansion Acts.
Navy yard public works programs and facilities were neglected between the end 
of World War I and 1934 because of inactivity at the yards. The U.S. Navy was largely 
unsuccessful in gaining appropriations for any significant new ship construction during 
that period. Consequently, there was no need for shipyard facility upgrades.
In October 1931, Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams promulgated a policy 
for the development of navy yards and shore stations that stated, “In general, plans for 
development of Navy Yard and Shore Stations should be based on a Treaty Navy and 
should be capable o f further expansion in time of war.”75 In other words, the navy was 
not building many ships and the limited funding available would not be wasted on 
needless or marginal navy yard facilities. The navy yards were still encouraged to plan 
and develop their contingency plans and wish lists. However, the yards were told that, 
“These plans should remain in the paper state, unless the drift of international affairs 
indicates clearly that a world condition exists, which would, in all probability, draw the
75 Chief o f  Naval Operations letter to the Secretary o f the Navy o f 8 Oct 1931 and Senior Member, 
Board for the Development o f  Navy Yard Plans letter o f 31 Dec 1931. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1,
“Local Development Boards.”
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nc
United States into war [and the fleet needed to be increased].” In 1931, there was not 
yet much of a threat of war and, consequently, funding would not be wasted on facilities 
perceived to be in excess of actual needs. The emphasis was clearly on the avoidance of 
spending scarce federal monies rather than the maintenance of minimal shipyard 
capabilities.
In March 1932, that policy became painfully apparent to Portsmouth Navy Yard 
management when the shipyard’s request for funds for an extension to a highly congested 
structural shop, and the conversion of another shop to a storage building, was denied by 
the Board of Development for Navy Yards. It was the opinion of the Board that, “In view 
of the small workload, which in absence of an emergency appears permanent in 
character, it seems doubtful if justification exists for any extension of facilities at
77Portsmouth at the present time.” After the shipyard had greatly reduced the scope of its
70
request and pleaded its case for less costly upgrades, the project was finally approved 
for $290,000.79 Even though Portsmouth Navy Yard was the only yard building 
submarines at the time, it still had great difficulty getting funding for needed projects 
early in 1932. The situation began to improve in the summer of 1932 when President 
Hoover approved the first federal relief programs and then improved significantly when
76 Ibid.
77 Senior Member, Board for the Development o f  Navy Yard Plans letter o f  24 Mar 1932 to 
Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
78 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Senior Member, Board for the Development of 
Navy Yard Plans o f 7 April 1932. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
79 The Senior Member, Board for Development o f  Navy Yard Plans letter to Commandant 
Portsmouth Navy Yard o f  14 May 1932. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
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Franklin D. Roosevelt, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assumed the Presidency 
in March 1933.
The Emergency Relief and Construction Act, signed by President Herbert Hoover, 
on 21 July 21, 1932 was the precursor of later New Deal programs that would benefit the 
navy yards. The approval of this act was a reversal o f policy for Hoover who typically 
resisted federal relief programs in favor of volunteerism and cooperation with business 
leaders to resolve the deepening economic crisis. Hoover, often blamed for the 
depression, and rarely recognized for his efforts to stem the crisis during the latter stages 
of his administration, received little credit for this act. By the summer of 1932, 
cartoonists routinely caricatured Hoover as a “dour, heartless, skinflint, whose rigid 
adherence to obsolete doctrines caused men and women to go jobless and hungry.”80 
Contrary to his growing reputation as a skinflint, the Emergency Relief and Construction 
Act authorized $1.5 billion in public works and loans up to $300 million to the states for 
relief purposes. The act included an appropriation of $10 million for navy public works 
that created opportunities for federal funding on navy yard improvements that had been 
nearly nonexistent for many years. With hopes of tapping into this funding windfall, 
Portsmouth submitted public works requests totaling $2,770,000 of which $350,000 for 
power and water plant improvements were funded immediately.81 The remaining line 
items of the request became subjects of extensive debate and fragmented approvals under 
subsequent various funding sources.
80 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929- 
1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 91
81 Local Board for Development o f  Navy Yard Plans letter o f 21 Sep 1932 to Commandant First 
Naval District,. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central 
Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, f‘Local Development Boards.”
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The Democratic landslide victory that accompanied FDR’s victory in November 
1932 increased the Democrats’ majority in the House of Representatives from 9 to 100, 
and the loss of 12 Republican seats in the Senate gave the Democrats firm control of that 
body for the first time since 1920. With the economic realities of the early 1930s still 
causing resistance to any proposed increases of naval appropriations, Carl Vinson, the 
Chairman of the House Navy Affairs Committee, led the effort to gain Congressional 
support to include naval construction under the public works provisions of New Deal 
programs. In so doing, Vinson, Roosevelt, and other Navy supporters found a way to cut 
or contain the Navy budget while increasing the nation’s shipbuilding accounts.
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the last of the sweeping reform 
measures implemented during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration, 
passed on 16 June 1933, became the vehicle for increasing naval funding for ships and 
submarines as well as public works. The NIRA was part of the Hundred Days package of 
legislation that included the Emergency Banking Act, Agriculture Adjustment Act 
(AAA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). David M. Kennedy 
wrote that, “Taken together, the accomplishments of the Hundred Days constituted a
O '}
masterpiece of presidential leadership unexampled then and unmatched since.”
The NIRA provided for federal regulation of maximum hours and minimum 
wages in various industries, recognized the right of industrial workers to organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, created the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) to reform and regulate American industry, and created
82 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 139.
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Public Works Administration (PWA) to undertake an ambitious construction program 
of public buildings and infrastructure. Historian David M. Kennedy likened the NRA to 
the chassis of the legislation and the PWA as the “engine, or at least the starting motor”
84that would drive economic recovery. In the President’s own words, “The task [of the 
NIRA] is in two stages; first, to get many hundreds of thousands of the unemployed back 
on the payroll by snowfall and, second, to plan for a better future for the long pull.”85 
Among other things, the act released $200,000,000 for the Navy to start building ships up 
to the limits of the London Treaty of 1930, including two submarines at Portsmouth Navy 
Yard.86 This appropriation provided funds to begin to rebuild the United States Navy that 
had been in decline since the Washington Naval Conference. While the NIRA served the 
Navy well, it was short lived. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, nullified the 
act on 27 May 1935. Figure 5 shows navy yard NIRA funded projects being phased out 
in 1936 with the rise of ERA funded projects.
The initial new construction, authorized under the NIRA, included two aircraft 
carriers, four cruisers, twenty destroyers, four submarines, and two gunboats, a total of 
thirty-two ships. This package represented the “greatest stimulus to the shipbuilding
o n
industry since World War I.” The work was to be roughly split between private 
shipyards and navy yards, increasing the work forces by 14,000 and 12,000 employees
83 Ibid., 131-159.
84 Ibid., 151.
85 Franklin Roosevelt’s Statement on the National Industrial Recovery Act, 16 June 1933 at 
http://www.fdrlibrarv.marist.edu/odnnirast.hml.
86 Michael West, “Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs Committee and 
the Construction o f the Treaty Navy, 1926-1934,” 332.
87 Ibid
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respectively. The number of ships under construction in private shipyards would increase
oo
300% and in navy yards 150%. The NIRA shipbuilding program lifted the shipyards 
out of the shipbuilding doldrums of the 1920s and “greased the skids for the enactment of 
a future comprehensive, multi-year shipbuilding authorization . . .  if it did not in fact 
make such action inevitable.”89 Once the NIRA commitment had been made to put the 
nation’s shipyards back to work, that investment would only make sense if the increased 
workforce could be kept employed with follow-on shipbuilding programs. In the case of 
Portsmouth Navy Yard, the V-class submarine building program had helped maintain 
some semblance of workload and employment stability during the latter half of the 1920s 
and early 1930s. The two NIRA submarines did the same for the mid-1930s until the 
Vincent-Trammel Bill (1934) and its amendments steadily increased naval shipbuilding 
throughout the rest of the 1930s within treaty constraints.
Keeping with the required NIRA split of work between private and navy yards, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard and Electric Boat Company were each awarded two submarines. 
The orders for the Portsmouth submarines, USS Porpoise (SS171) and USS Pike 
(SSI 72), were placed on 19 June 193 3.90 Figure 6 shows the laying of the keel for the 
Pike with a proud banner that reads, “Second Navy Yard Man of War Keel Under NIRA, 
Submarine Pike, Dec. 20, 1933.”
88 Ibid.
%9 Ibid., 341.
90 Production Officer memo o f 15 Jun 1934 to Manager. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A9/A1-3/ENR, “Reports o f Projects 
NIRA to Y[ards] & D[ocks] 1933-35 [Shore Projects].”
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Figure 6: Keel Laying for NIRA Submarine USS Pike. Courtesy of Milne 
Special Collections and Archives Department, University of New Hampshire 
Library, Durham, N.H.
The first man- of-war under NIRA, the USS Porpoise, was commissioned 15 August
1935. The Secretary of the Navy complimented the shipyard on the completion of
Porpoise ahead of schedule:
The Porpoise was authorized and appropriated for under the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, and the Department notes, with pleasure, 
that this vessel is not only the first vessel of this 1933 program to be 
completed but also that it has been completed fifteen days ahead of contract
Q1time. 1
As will be discussed later, the shipyard commenced using a new more efficient sectional 
construction process with Porpoise that contributed to the early delivery. Instead of 
custom building the submarine at one site, sections were preassembled in various
91 Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f 18 Jan 1936 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, 
“New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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locations of the shipyard and transported to the building ways for assembly. The yard 
continued to perfect this process during the 1930s and Porpoise was but one of many 
early completions to follow that enhanced Portsmouth’s reputation for submarine 
construction, insuring a steady flow of new construction contracts into the shipyard.
The NIRA projects at Portsmouth Navy Yard were not limited to Porpoise and 
Pike. They also included power plant upgrades, boiler installations, and repairs to floating 
derricks, cranes, and building ways.92 By December 1933, the shipyard had 650 men per 
day working on NIRA submarine construction and about 40 men per day on other NIRA 
projects.93 The 690 men working NIRA projects represented 43% of the total shipyard 
employment of 1600. Without the NIRA projects, Portsmouth Navy Yard would have 
been forced to release many of its skilled workers.
Another New Deal program, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) program, 
launched on 9 November 1933, was more bureaucratic trouble for the yard than it was 
worth. The CWA was a work-relief program that put 4.2 million people to work by 
January 1934. This labor-only program was administered through state agencies, and 
Portsmouth Navy Yard had the misfortune of having to deal with two different state 
bureaucracies. The shipyard benefited modestly from CWA projects that involved road
92 Manager memo to Commandant o f  14 Aug 1933. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 
May 1940.”
93 See the Industrial Manger’s weekly status reports o f  NIRA manning. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9/A1-3/ENR, 
“Reports o f  Projects NIRA to Y & D 1933-35 [Shore Projects].”
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and railroad track upgrades and general painting during the first few months of 1934.94
Nationally, 12,000 men had been assigned to Navy and Marine Corps stations, but
Portsmouth Navy Yard benefited little from the program before it closed down at all
naval installations in April 1934. According to historian David Kennedy, President
Roosevelt terminated the CWA because of its expense, $200 million a month, and
concerns that “working for the government might become a habit with the country.”95
The Secretary of the Navy’s final report in July 1934 complimented the stations and
shipyards involved with CWA projects because there had been no fatal accidents or
serious injuries despite the fact that many of the men employed had been physically
unqualified and inexperienced in the type of work to which they were assigned.96 The
absence of fatalities or serious injuries was faint praise for this New Deal work program.
The closing down of this program was no great loss for Portsmouth Navy Yard as the
yard needed skilled workers and not just warm bodies.
Later in 1934, the shipyard attempted to add labor to the yard by taking advantage
of relief labor available under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA).
According to historian David M. Kennedy:
With FERA, the federal government took its first steps into the business of direct 
relief, and began, however modestly, to chart the path toward the modern 
American welfare state.. . .  FERA was an emergency body, hastily established 
and rushing without precedent or staff to cope with a vast national crisis. Its 
skeletal Washington office, never numbering more than a few hundred people,
94 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 23 May 1934 to the Assistant Secretary o f  the 
Navy. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 
1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
95 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 176.
96 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy letter o f  16 Jul 1934 to Distribution. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans,
Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
necessarily relied on state and county officials to screen applicants and distribute 
benefits.97
Portsmouth Navy Yard became very familiar with the local officials administering FERA
programs for the states of New Hampshire and Maine. Commandant Rear Admiral C.P.
Snyder, in a letter to the state of New Hampshire, wrote:
It has recently come to the Commandant’s attention that at other Navy Yards 
and Stations there are employed approximately 2,500 relief workers on 
FERA projects. This Navy Yard has had no relief labor since the CWA 
closed down last April.98
The Commandant went on to note several shipyard projects deserving of FERA
assignment. After further investigation, a December 1934 memo from the Public Works
Officer to Commandant Snyder described the torturous process that had to be followed to
obtain FERA workers from the state of New Hampshire:
Certain formalities were necessary before any projects could actually be 
started in the field. It is necessary for Lieutenant Hall to get in touch with 
Colonel Cavanaugh at Concord, who in turn will contact the Navy Yard in 
order to fill out certain necessary papers with regard to projects . . .  before 
work can be authorized. As soon as this is done, it is believed that the 
Colonel in charge turns the matter over to an assistant of Mrs. Wilder who in 
turn authorizes the project and instructs Fort Constitution to furnish us with 
the men required. This necessary red tape will possibly take several days 
before any actual employment can be made at the yard.99
To further complicate matters, it was explained that:
97 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from  Fear, 171.
98 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  20 Nov 1934 to Bernice Wilder, State 
Administrator, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 11 School St, Concord. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, 
Projects, Policies,”PKG #2.”
99 Public Works Office Gaylord Church endorsement o f Lieutenant Junior Grade H.E. Wilson 
(CEC), USN memo o f 11 December 1934 to Commandant, Subject: Interview with Mrs. Abby Wilder, 
State Administrator, E.R.A. -  Regarding work projects for Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l/N l -  “Plans, Projects, 
Policies, PKG #2.”
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50% of current ERA funds are appropriated by the state, 25 % by the 
township where the work is being done, and 25% comes from Federal 
sources. In view of the local participation in the expense of the work, it is 
necessary to obtain the sanction of local authorities before a project is 
authorized as there have been cases where without such prior agreement, the 
township has refused to assume its share of the expenses.100
Unfortunately, all of this complexity and confusion was doubled because the shipyard
had to deal with the state of Maine as well as New Hampshire.
In January 1935, after working with New Hampshire state officials and 
successfully navigating through the obligatory sea of bureaucratic red tape, a project was 
approved for 26,000 man-hours. This project involved men available from the Transient 
Bureau Camp at Fort Constitution and 22,500 man-hours involving 60 FERA men 
assigned through the city of Portsmouth. The New Hampshire FERA projects that were 
approved included the general cleaning and painting of buildings and cleanup of 
grounds.101 Efforts to acquire FERA labor through the state of Maine at that time were 
unsuccessful because, as the state explained in a letter to the shipyard, “The allocation 
allowed the Town of Kittery is not sufficient to put an ERA project in the Navy Yard 
from the state of Maine.”102 It seems the height of inefficiency that Federal regulations 
forced the yard to seek labor support from the town offices of Kittery. It mattered little,
100 Lieutenant Junior Grade H.E. Wilson (CEC), USN memo to Commandant of 11 Dec 1934, 
Subject: Interview with Mrs Abby Wilder, State Administrator, E.R.A. -  Regarding work projects for Navy 
Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 
1, Folder A l/N l -  Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
101 Lcdr H.E. Wilson (CEC), USN memo to Commandant o f  11 Dec 1934. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, 
Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
102 State o f Maine, Emergency Relief Administration letter o f 31 Jan 1935. NARA Waltham RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, 
Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
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however, because the early labor projects under New Deal programs were mostly of a 
housekeeping nature with minimal advantages to the shipyard.
The first weekly report of FERA labor shows 44 men (no women) from the city of 
Portsmouth assigned to cleaning shops and buildings and 15 men (no women) assigned 
from Fort Constitution for cleaning and painting of the interior of shop buildings.103 The 
shipyard reports consistently emphasized that no women were included in any of the 
labor pools. Follow-on reports indicate a peak assignment of 102 men (90 from 
Portsmouth, 12 from Fort Constitution) in April 1934, dwindling to single digits (usually 
6 people) from Fort Constitution during the July to October 1934 time frame. The 
Portsmouth project closed as of 1 July 1935 and the Fort Constitution project closed in 
November 1935 as no further labor was available from those sources.104 The FERA 
program, like the CWA program before it, faded in importance and benefit to the 
shipyard.
The frustrations of dealing with the CWA and FERA programs were many. In 
addition to the bureaucratic red tape of two different states, projects had to be 
continuously reassessed and approved, and the reporting requirements were seemingly 
endless. In addition, after going through all the bureaucratic wickets to gain approval for 
a CWA or FERA labor-only project, the shipyard then had to go back to the Bureau of
103 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 17 Jan 1935 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy 
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
104 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 21 Nov 1935 to Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy 
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
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Yards and Docks for the funds needed to purchase materials for the additional laborers.105 
The necessity to work through two different state bureaucracies often resulted in workers 
assigned to the same jobs in the shipyard having different wage rates. Unlike the NIRA 
funded programs that left the yard responsible for the administration of those funds under 
strict, but manageable, guidelines, Portsmouth Navy Yard’s experience with New Deal 
labor-only programs was initially a frustrating exercise in dealing with bureaucratic 
complexity and the overlapping jurisdiction of agencies.
In addition, as Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder noted in August 1935, 
many worthwhile shipyard projects could not be successfully completed because of a 
shortage of FERA skilled labor. Commandant Rear Admiral Snyder wrote his superior at 
the Bureau of Yards and Docks, in August 1935, that he would “continue to make every 
effort to obtain the required employees for those programs which have not progressed 
satisfactorily,” but doubted “the possibility of obtaining the necessary skilled labor from 
relief rolls in this vicinity.”106
Even when limited skilled labor was available, the shipyard was further frustrated 
by the “ten percent rule” that required that not more than ten percent of a work crew be 
skilled labor. Shipyard skilled labor could be used but, even then, the “ten percent” rule 
still applied. As the commandant noted, many of the shipyard’s potential FERA projects 
required small numbers of FERA labor and the assignment of any skilled labor at all
105 Commandant letter o f 9 Jan 1935 to Chief o f Bureau o f Yards and Docks. NARA Waltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l,  
“Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
106 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  13 Aug 1935 to Chief Bureau o f Yards & Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works 
Progress Administration (WPA).”
81
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
exceeded the ten percent rule.107 The commandant argued, and rightly so, that the rules 
were overly restrictive. In time, rules were relaxed and the New Deal programs that 
followed FERA became much more useful to the shipyard.
The Works Progress Administration (WPA), part of the Emergency Relief Act of 
1935, proved to be a much more manageable New Deal program than the others. Public 
works upgrades were accomplished under WPA projects, not just housekeeping chores. 
Over the next five years the shipyard became much more adept at working with the WPA 
than the previous relief programs, and the WPA administration became much more
10Saccommodating to shipyard needs. As more workers were assigned, they gained 
shipyard experience and acquired on-the-job shop training that made them valuable 
shipyard resources. During 1936, WPA projects included not only labor-intensive work 
like railroad track repairs, demolishing and removing piers and World War I structures, 
and wide-spread painting of buildings, but more technical tasks such as surveying 
subsurface foundations and service tunnels, upgrading electrical distribution systems, and 
improving lighting in the shipyard. By October 1936, the shipyard had 189 WPA workers 
assigned to such tasks and Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Cole was able to report in his 
annual report that “In general, the appearance of the Yard has been improved by this 
work and many needed repairs accomplished.”109 The progress continued and, by April
108 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  29 Aug 1935 to Bureau o f Yards & Docks, 
Subject: Application for Allotment o f Funds under Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, 1935. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress 
Administration (WPA).”
109 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  29 Oct 1936 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks, 
Subject: Emergency Relief Navy Projects for Fiscal Year 1936 — Report o f  Completion. NARA Waltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress 
Administration (WPA).”
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1939, over 500 relief workers were employed and involved in important facility upgrades
to the power plant and other buildings.110 The shipyard also benefited from the WPA
Federal Theater Project that presented at least eight performances at the shipyard between
1935 and the summer of 1938.111
In July 1938, the shipyard provided Congressman George J. Bates (Mass-R), 6th
District, a requested comprehensive list of shipyard EPA, WPA, and PWA projects as
112well as Navy funded projects. That list showed Navy funded projects totaling 
$1,090,000 and EPA, PWA, and WPA projects totaling $1,020,000. The latter included 
improvements to the foundry and power plant, extensions to the electrical manufacturing 
and machine shops, and the building of a general storehouse and steel storage area, all 
important facilities that would be needed for the war effort. There is no doubt that the 
shipyard was getting a lot more accomplished with relief labor and New Deal programs 
in 1938 than it did in 1935.
The importance of WPA and PWA projects to the navy yards began to wane with 
the appropriation of significant public works funds under the Naval Act of 1940. In June 
1939, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Rear Admiral Ben Moreell, advised 
the yards that Fiscal Year 1940 would mark the return of naval funding for shipyard
110 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 25 Apr 1939 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works 
Progress Administration (WPA).”
111 NARA Waltham’s files hold programs and other evidence o f performances on 27 May 1936, 
25 Jun 1936, 9 July 1936,27 Aug 1936,26 Oct 1936 , Jan 21 1937, Feb 4, 1937, 27 Jun 1938 with 
reference to at least one performance in 1935.
112 Commandant Portsmouth Naval Yard letter o f 27 Jul 1938 to Congressman George J. Bates. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, 
Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
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projects and the curtailment of PWA and WPA funding. Moreell further advised that 
“The transfer of part of the WPA force to the building trades shops would undoubtedly be 
desirable to assist yards and stations in carrying out their yard labor responsibilities under
tn
the “Public Works” program.” WPA workers with minimal benefits were eager to gain 
the benefits that came with Civil Service status. However, during 1940, the shipyard 
continued to employ several hundred relief workers per month on various projects of 
importance throughout the yard.114
By January 1941, one had difficulty distinguishing civil service employees from 
relief workers within the shops at Portsmouth Navy Yard. The WPA assigned allotments, 
not workers, to the shipyard and it became an accounting exercise to insure workers were 
charged to the proper WPA budget line items.115 As war approached, and Department of 
Defense budgets increased, the authorized shipyard employment ceiling was raised, and 
many employees moved, as Rear Admiral Moreell had suggested, from the WPA relief 
worker category to Civil Service status.116 Hundreds of skilled relief workers, with 
several years of experience in the shipyard, were hired as permanent shipyard employees 
with a stroke of the pen and no disruption to shop projects or schedules. The WPA 
projects had been excellent on-the-job training for these workers.
113 Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks Rear Admiral B. Moreell letter o f  9 June 1939, Subject:
WPA Construction Program -  FY 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, Box 2, Folder A -l, “Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
114 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 24 Apr 1940 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works 
Progress Administration (WPA).”
115 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  30 Jan 1941 to Chief Bureau o f Yards and 
Docks. NARA Waltham, RG181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, 
“Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
116 Chief Bureau Yards & Dock letter o f 9 Jun 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
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With the start of the war, WPA projects continued to fill an important role in the
117shipyard, employing upwards of 500 workers at times during 1942. At the same time, 
the Navy budgets had kicked into high gear and funding had ceased to be a problem for 
the public works upgrades that were so urgently needed by the shipyard. The 
commandant was able to report with pride to his boss, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards 
and Docks, in March 1942 that public works construction expenditures in the shipyard 
had increased from $331,000 in December 1941 to $521,000 in January 1942, and nearly 
doubled to $1,100,000 in February 1942.118 The New Deal programs had done their job 
and bridged the gap until Congress opened the mobilization funding floodgates.119
Portsmouth Navy Yard Operations (1920-1940)
This section examines events at the shipyard between the wars, with emphasis on 
workload, performance, and management strategy. It was not just the U.S. Navy’s desire 
to develop the yard as a competitor for private industry that placed it in a preeminent 
position of submarine design and construction by the start of World War II. It was to the 
credit of the shipyard’s management and employees that they were able to reward the 
Navy’s favoritism with consistent, superlative performance that reinforced the yard’s 
position as the leader in submarine design and construction. At the same time, it became 
management’s strategy, during the mid-1930s, to optimize the yard’s new construction
117 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 24 Jul 1942 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works 
Progress Administration (WPA).”
118 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  7 Mar 1942 to Bureau Yards & Docks. NARA  
Waltham, RG 181, PNB, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
U9 The war, economic prosperity, and conservative Congressmen brought an end to many o f the 
New Deal programs including the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Works Progress Administration 
which were gone by 1943. Social security, farm price supports, child labor and minimum wage legislation, 
and banking and securities regulation survived as the legacies o f the New Deal. David M. Kennedy, 
Freedom from Fear, 783.
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workload at two submarines a year while attempting to shed as much of the disruptive 
multi-ship repair and overhaul work as possible so that the yard could be streamlined for 
new submarine construction. This streamlining philosophy prevailed during World War 
II and the yard’s remarkable production was the direct result.
According to the Bureau of Ships’ World War II self-history, “At one time or 
another during the period after World War I new construction disappeared from every
190  •Navy Yard except Portsmouth.” This steady new construction workload enabled the 
shipyard to maintain a well trained and stable workforce during the 1920s. Table 1 shows 
the number of employees at each of the navy yards between 1917 and 1929. The percent 
change in employment during that period shows the workforce stability that Portsmouth
191Navy Yard enjoyed over other navy yards.
Table 1: Navy Yards Employees (1917-1929)
1917 1924 1926 1929 % Change
Portsmouth 1650 1600 1950 1700 +3%
New York 6800 3100 2750 3400 -50%
Norfolk 4350 2100 2800 3500 -19%
Philadelphia 3350 3000 2750 3100 -4%
Boston 2950 2050 2600 1550 -47%
Puget Sound 1600 2700 2550 3250 +103%
Charleston 1700 400 450 450 -73%
Mare Island 2900 2350 2450 4350 +50%
Pearl Harbor 0 1050 950 800
120 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 7.
121 Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f  7 Jul 1930 to Commandants Navy Yards. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50 -  Declassified by NARS per 
NCD Project #745085 and by the Navy Department, Box 3, Folder L5-3/NY, “ Navy Yards Inspection o f  
Equipment Machine Tools.”
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The employment levels at Portsmouth Navy Yard stayed remarkably constant from 1917 
to 1929 when other navy yards showed great fluctuation, which would be expected going 
from war to peace. The employment at east coast yards, with the exception of Portsmouth 
and Philadelphia, dropped precipitously, while the west coast yards moved as 
dramatically in the positive direction. Because Portsmouth Navy Yard enjoyed some 
measure of stability during the declining period of the U.S. Navy (1922-31), the shipyard 
was poised and ready to capitalize on the awakening period (1932-36), and then thrive 
during the rebuilding years (1936-1945).
During the early 1920s, the yard fulfilled World War I contracts with the 
completion of eleven S-boats (S-3 through S-13). Portsmouth had fared well in the 
competition with Lake Torpedo Company and Electric Boat. According to the S-Class 
Trial Board:
Aside from all general features of design, a casual inspection shows a great 
difference in the care and thoroughness with which the three plants design 
and work out the details of all interior and exterior arrangements and fitting.
In this respect, there is no great difference in the product of the two private 
plants, that of the Lake Torpedo Boat Company being perhaps somewhat 
better. But the Navy yard (Portsmouth) boats are far superior to the others, 
particularly in the interiors. In the S-3 to S-9 (Portsmouth-built boats) there is 
full evidence of careful design by personnel that know what is best, followed 
by good workmanship, everything being done in a painstaking manner.122
In addition to the high quality of design noted by the trial board, the Chief of Naval
Operations annual report for 1923 reported that, “Analysis of results obtained shows
beyond question that submarines can be more economically and expeditiously overhauled
at Portsmouth than at any other east coast yard within the limitation of size of yard
122 Quoted in Portsmouth Herald, 23 April 1942, “Portsmouth Won Fame with First Sub It Built, 
Has Kept Proud Record,” 1.
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force.”123 Recognition for high quality, low cost, and short building periods reinforced
\
the navy’s plan to develop an in-house submarine design and construction capability at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the 1920s.
Building on the reputation it had earned with the S-class submarines, the yard was 
awarded seven V-class submarines that were delivered between 1924 and 1932. These 
large submarines, the first to be given names of fish, were 381 feet in length with a 
complement of about 100 men and officers. The V-class program expanded the yard’s 
submarine design expertise at a time when the navy was ignoring private industry. This 
workload carried the yard from the S-class program until the award of the two NIRA 
submarines, Porpoise and Pike that began the revitalization of submarine construction in 
1933.
While Portsmouth Navy Yard was assigned more than its fair share of new 
submarine construction in the 1920s, the yard by no means was able to specialize in new 
construction. For example, in 1921, the yard completed one submarine (S-9), launched 
three more (S-l 1,12, and 13), and laid the keels for three others (V-l, V-2, and V-3), but 
the yard also repaired 11 submarines, 10 destroyers, 1 hospital ship, 2 cargo vessels and 1 
Coast Guard ship. Likewise, the yard remained primarily a repair and overhaul yard in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s. The yard worked on 22 submarines and two submarine 
tenders in 1928, six S-Class submarines and three R-Class submarines in 1931, eight S- 
Class submarines in 1932, and 7 R-class submarines and two tenders in 1933.124 Repair
123 David F. Boyd, “Continuation o f  Preble’s History o f  the United States Navy Yard, Portsmouth, 
N.H. Covering the Years 1875-1930,” Maine Room, Rice Public Library, Kittery, Maine.
124 Industrial Manager’s Annual Reports for 1928-1934. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9-1/NY1, “Annual Reports 
Commandant First Naval District 1925-34.” The annual overhaul numbers are for fiscal years beginning 1
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and overhaul work, often chaotic, unpredictable, and difficult to schedule, was a large 
part of the yard’s workload. Given a choice, Portsmouth Navy Yard preferred the 
orderliness and discipline of a submarine new construction program over other work.125
While Portsmouth was receiving favored treatment from the U.S. Navy in the 
1920s, the private submarine construction shipyards, Electric Boat Company and Lake 
Torpedo Boat Company, were neglected by the U.S. Navy and struggled to remain open. 
Electric Boat continued to build submarines after World War I at a reduced rate, to 
complete contracts received during the war, delivering the last submarine in 1925. 
However, the United States Navy awarded Electric Boat no new submarine contracts 
between 1918 and 1931, when it was awarded the USS Cuttlefish. By the time of the 
Cuttlefish award in 1931, Electric Boat employment had dropped to 200 men.126
Electric Boat Company survived during the 1920’s by completing 32 cargo ships, 
which were still under contract at the end of World War I, and taking on miscellaneous 
work including the overhauling of thirty “S” Class submarines, the building of pleasure 
craft, ferries, tow boats, and trawlers, and the construction of four submarines for the
July. For example, the 1928 numbers are for 1 July 1927 to 1 July 1928. The Industrial Manager’s annual 
reports for 1929 and 1930 provide no numbers and only indicate routine repairs accomplished on 
submarines.
125 Navy policy statements for 1934 designated Portsmouth Navy Yard as a submarine 
construction shipyard and emphasized that it was “not contemplated to overhaul vessels at the Yard.” See 
Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Henry Latrobe Roosevelt letter o f 3 May 1934 to Commandant Portsmouth 
Navy Yard, etc. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 1930-1950, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, 
Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.” Despite this policy statement, a lot o f 
overhauls were assigned to Portsmouth Navy Yard. All the other government yards, according to the policy 
statements for each, were to be involved with multiple ship types and workloads.
126 “History o f  Electric Boat, 1899-1949,” Chapter IV, 1-18, Navy Department Library, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
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Peruvian Navy. The Lake Torpedo Company, however, folded in 1924 for lack of 
submarine work.
Submarine construction began to pick up in 1933 when Portsmouth and Electric 
Boat were each awarded contracts for two NIRA submarines. The trend towards 
increased submarine construction continued with the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 that 
guaranteed both yards sufficient submarine new construction for many years in the
198future. The passage of the Vinson-Trammel Act marked a departure from the nation’s 
strong commitment to disarmament and the end of the decline of the U.S. Navy. The 
rebuilding of the fleet was to include submarines, which had survived international 
attempts to limit their use as weapons of war since World War I. When the submarine 
building program was renewed in 1933, Portsmouth Navy Yard had enjoyed fifteen years 
of steady workload and stable employment whereas most of the other yards had 
experienced fifteen years of turmoil. With this in mind, it is not surprising that 
Portsmouth performed well on submarine contracts throughout the 1930s.
There was another important factor that contributed to the revitalized submarine 
construction program. The Navy, after extensive debate during the 1920s about how best 
to employ the submarine in battle, had decided on independent operations similar to the
127 Ibid.
128 The Vinson-Trammel Act provided for a significant increase to the fleet; one carrier, 99,200 
tons o f destroyers to replace overage destroyers, and 35,350 tons o f submarines to replace overage 
submarines. The Act also limited private contractors to a 10% profit for any contract over $10,000. See 
United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, 6. The requirement to split 
construction between private and navy shipyards and the 10% cap on profits stemmed from the deep seated 
conviction by many that World War I had been precipitated by munitions makers as a business venture and 
that the United States federal government had been exploited for exorbitant profits by private industry.
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German wolf-pack operations of World War I, instead of operating as a support element 
of a task force as had been the case for U.S. submarines during that war. Having 
redefined the submarine’s tactical use, naval authorities could agree on the design 
characteristics needed to fill that role. Thus, when the nation’s leaders decided to rebuild 
the fleet, the submarine force had a much better idea of what submarine they wanted to 
build. Designs could be standardized to a certain extent, multiple submarines of the same 
class design could be built, and the opportunities were increased for something other than
• 190custom-built submarines.
It is important to note that the naval officer who is given much of the credit for
this change in submarine tactics, Commander Thomas Withers, is the same Rear Admiral
Withers who commanded Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II. According to
naval historian Gary Weir:
The climax of this dispute [about how best to employ U.S. submarines in 
battle] occurred between 1928 and 1930, when Commander Thomas Withers, 
commanding officer of Submarine Division 4, with the support of the Naval 
War College and the Submarine Officer’s Conference proposed imitating the 
offensive strategy and solo tactics employed by the Imperial Navy during the 
Great War. Only then did the major authorities begin to consider seriously the 
prospect of independent submarine operations and a vessel design suitable to 
the task.130
During World War II, U.S. submarines used the tactics developed by Commander 
Withers and his supporters to win the war in the Pacific. Also during the war, Rear 
Admiral Withers, as Commandant of Portsmouth Navy Yard, played a critical role in
129 In way o f explanation for those unfamiliar with the generic submarine design process, the 
operators o f  submarines provide desired operating characteristics for a future submarine to a technical 
bureau for the development o f  technical specifications. Those specifications are then provided to a design 
shipyard for the production o f drawings or, today, digitized information that can be used for production 
processes. One can not even proceed to the first step, identifying the desired submarine operating 
characteristics, if  the ultimate use o f the submarine is in doubt.
130 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940, 114.
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insuring that the submarines that Portsmouth Navy Yard sent to war incorporated the 
latest design characteristics needed to achieve their missions.
In September 1934, in accordance with existing legislation that required 
government yards to be assigned at least 50% of new construction submarines, the navy 
assigned SSI79 and SSI80 to Portsmouth, SSI81 to Mare Island, and SSI76, 177, and
j  *5 I
178 to Electric Boat. Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson outlined the Navy’s
policy for splitting naval construction between public and private shipyards in a
September 1935 letter:
The policy of the Department in connection with new construction has been, 
in general, to follow the intent of Congress, as indicated in the so-called 
Dillinger Amendment to the cruiser bill. The intent was confirmed by the 
Vinson-Trammell Bill, and the present practice of the Department has been 
and is, in general, to follow a 50-50 division of classes of ships between navy 
yards and private yards.132
In the same letter, Swanson let it be known that he was “not entirely satisfied with the
progress being made on new construction at navy yards” and that it was his intent,
beginning in 1935, to discontinue the 50-50 rule and award new construction to navy
yards on a competitive basis with private shipyards.133 Swanson considered new
construction award policy to be his prerogative because, as he explained, “Beginning
with the next fiscal year, there are no Emergency Funds for the construction of naval
vessels, and the Department’s appropriations will be obtained in the usual manner,
131 Bureau o f Construction & Repair & Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f 15 Sep 1934. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 
27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
132 Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f  16 Sep 1935. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
133 Ibid.
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normally under [the classification of] Increase of the Navy.”134 Secretary Swanson
planned to manage the Navy’s funds in the best interests of the Navy, meaning contracts
would be awarded on the basis of performance.
Portsmouth Navy Yard Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder passed Secretary
Swanson’s challenge to the yard’s employees and urged them to continue to perform in a
manner that would build on the shipyard’s excellent reputation and gain future contract
awards. Snyder took the opportunity to emphasize time over cost, a strategy that
prevailed throughout the 1930s and peaked during the war years:
The essence of a contract is cost and time. There is reason to believe that the 
Navy Department policy favors faster construction over time at slightly higher 
cost if necessary. A shorter construction period indicates increased efficiency and 
economy...  The Navy Department desires speed in construction . .  .It does not 
want excuses.135
Clearly, Commandant Snyder saw a niche opportunity for his shipyard to develop a 
reputation for timely completions that would serve it well in years to come.
Portsmouth Navy Yard was more than up to Secretary Swanson’s challenge but, 
as it turned out, Swanson was premature in his assumption that he could institute pure 
competition between the private and public sector. His plans were foiled because the 
1935 shipbuilding program was an extension of the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 that 
carried the requirement that “the first and each succeeding alternate vessel of each 
category . . .  shall be constructed or manufactured in the government navy yards.”
134 Ibid.
135 Portsmouth Navy Yard Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder memo o f 20 Sep 1935 to All 
Officers and Civilian Supervisors, Subject: The Navy Shipbuilding Program -  Progress of. NARA 
Waltham, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 
27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
136 Quoted in Michael West, “Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs 
Committee and the Construction o f the Treaty Navy, 1926-1934,” 542.
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Even though Swanson was not able to institutionalize pure competition between public 
and private shipyards, Portsmouth Navy Yard management took every opportunity to cite 
the yard’s outstanding performance as evidence of compliance with his mandate for
1 "37improved performance by navy yards.
Having completed Porpoise 14 days ahead of schedule and Pike 17 days ahead of 
schedule, each $550,000 under budget, Portsmouth pushed for the assignment of two 
more submarines under the Naval Appropriation Act of 1937. A 29 April 1936 letter from 
Commandant Greenlee highlighted the shipyard’s commitment to Secretary Swanson’s 
challenge for improved performance and clearly pointed out that Portsmouth deserved the 
work requested, because “This Yard feels that it has fully met the Secretary of the Navy’s 
desires expressed in reference (a) [Swanson’s letter of 16 Sep 1935] for the efficient,
1 38expeditious production of submarines.” In the same correspondence, Commandant 
Greenlee took the opportunity to push for a future workload that was devoid of overhauls, 
heavy with the construction of new submarines, and complimented with important 
submarine electrical work that had direct application to the submarines being built at the 
yard:
137 At the time o f Secretary Swanson’s threat to tie future navy yard awards to performance, 
Portsmouth had two submarines on the waterfront being completed (Porpoise and Pike), two submarines on 
the ways under construction (Plunger and Pollack), and two submarines in the design stage. Commandant 
Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder’s memo o f 19 Sep 1935 made it clear to all shipyard officers and employees that 
future awards would depend on the shipyard’s performance on the four submarines then at the yard.
Snyder further emphasized that, “A continuation o f the present construction program o f two ships 
[submarines] a year is the criterion o f this yard’s success for the future.” NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 
May 1940.”
138 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 29 Apr 1936 to Chief Bureau o f Construction 
and Repair and Chief Bureau o f Engineering. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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The mission of this yard appears to be to build submarines, manufacture 
electrical fittings, and make repairs to submarine [main motor] armatures. It 
is not contemplated that vessels be overhauled at this Yard. This Yard is 
interested in authorization for new construction o f submarines onlyP9
Clearly, by 1936, it was the long term strategy of the management of Portsmouth Navy
Yard to minimize all other types of work in order to protect its growing reputation for
timely, high quality, submarine construction. More importantly, the office of the
Secretary of the Navy supported the shipyard’s desires to exclude or minimize overhauls
in favor of new construction. The budget guidance promulgated by Secretary of the Navy
Charles Edison, on 14 June 1937, indicated, for Portsmouth Navy Yard, that “it is not
contemplated to overhaul vessels at this yard.”140 It was necessary to moderate this policy
of excluding overhauls from Portsmouth Navy Yard in the years immediately preceding
and during the war, however, the fact remains that, in the late 1930s, both the shipyard
and the office of the Secretary of the Navy were dedicated to streamlining the shipyard,
to the maximum extent possible, for the construction of new submarines.
By 1937, Portsmouth Navy Yard scheduled submarine overhauls for shorter 
durations than either Electric Boat or Mare Island, the only other shipyards involved with 
submarine overhauls. As of 1 July 1937, there were four submarines under construction 
at Portsmouth Navy Yard, six at Electric Boat, and three at Mare Island Navy Yard. The 
four Portsmouth submarines had contracted building periods of 27, 30, 30, and 27 
months, individually adjusted to maintain a steady workload and stable workforce. The 
Electric Boat submarines were scheduled for durations that varied from 27 to 34 1/2
139 Ibid  (emphasis added).
140 Secretary o f  the Navy Charles Edison letter o f  14 Jun 1937, Subject: Policy for Industrial Navy 
Yard Budget 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, 
Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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months, averaging 32 1/2 months, and all three Mare Island submarines were scheduled 
for building periods of 30 months.141 In 1937, Portsmouth not only scheduled submarine 
overhauls for shorter durations than the other yards, but the yard went on to deliver those 
submarines on or before the scheduled dates. In a letter dated 13 January 1939, 
Commandant Rear Admiral C. W. Cole alerted the Secretary of the Navy that, “For four 
years [1935 through 1938] the Portsmouth yard has consistently met or anticipated the 
completion dates of its ships under construction.”142 While it is true that the Navy was not 
placing the urgency on short submarine construction durations in 1937 that it would a few 
years later, it was also obvious that Commandant Rear Admiral Cole and the 
management of Portsmouth Navy Yard were dedicated to continuing the yard’s 
reputation as a high performing shipyard that had begun with the early deliveries of the 
NIRA submarines, Porpoise and Pike.
As requested, the Navy assigned Portsmouth Navy Yard an optimum workload of 
two submarines a year from 1934 through 1938.143 Table 2 compares submarine new 
construction assignments at Portsmouth, Mare Island, and Electric Boat Company, the 
only shipyards involved with submarine construction immediately prior to World War II.
141 Annual Report o f the Bureau o f Construction and Repair for 1937. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9-1/EN5, “Annual 
Reports Bureau o f Yards and Docks, 1926-42.”
142 Commandant Rear Admiral C. W. Cole letter o f 13 Jan 1939 to Secretary o f  the Navy. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 20, Folder FS, “Ships 14 Nov 
1925 to 15 Nov 1939.”
143 The Secretary o f  the Navy, impressed with Portsmouth’s performance, assigned two 
submarines, USS Sculpin (SS191) and USS Squalus (SS192) under the 1937 appropriation, two more, USS 
Searaven (SS196) and USS Seawolf (SS197) under the 1938 appropriation, and two more, USS Triton 
(SS201) and USS Trout (SS 202) under the 1939 appropriation.
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Table 2: Submarine New Construction Shipyard Assignments
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Portsmouth . 2 2 2 2 2 3
Mare Island 1 1 0 1 1 1
Electric Boat 2 3 3 3 3
The submarine workload, as required by law, was evenly divided between public and
private yards with Electric Boat getting all the private yard work. Electric Boat had
reestablished itself as the preeminent private submarine yard by the mid-1930s, but with
much less leverage over the Navy than it had enjoyed prior to 1920, as the result of
Portsmouth’s emergence as a submarine design yard. Portsmouth’s increased design
capability was the critical factor in the Navy’s efforts to wrest control of submarine
construction from private industry. According to Gary Weir:
Electric Boat would still play a vital role in the submarine construction 
program, but would now do so within the context of both the Navy’s 
expertise in submarine technology and its substantial design and construction 
capability at Portsmouth. Hence from 1931 to 1940 teamwork with the Navy 
was EB ’ s only option.144
The eve of World War II found Portsmouth Navy Yard filling the lead submarine design 
role that the Navy had envisioned for it at the close of World War I. 145
144 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940, 62-63.
145 Portsmouth Navy Yard’s design role had expanded even more in 1935 when the yard was 
funded for the “preparation and reproducing o f  working and finished plans, ordering materials, preparing 
war plans and booklets o f  general information, planning and clerical work” to support Mare Island Navy 
Yard for the construction o f submarines SS 185, 186, and 187. See Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard 
letter o f 8 Jun 1940 to Commandant Mare Island Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Base General Correspondence, Box 18, Folder S -l, “Design o f Vessels, Specifications, Plans, etc. (1925- 
1947).” Portsmouth Navy Yard continued to expand its role as lead design yard for Mare Island Navy Yard 
such that by 1940 much “Portsmouth procured material” was being pushed to Mare Island for submarine 
construction. Shortly after the war started, Portsmouth provided the same lead yard service for Cramp 
Shipbuilding Company o f  Philadelphia, Pa. to support the submarine contracts that had been awarded to 
that company. See Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 20 Jun 1942 to Cramp Shipbuilding 
Company and Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f no date in 1942 (probably 13 Nov 1942) to 
Cramp Shipbuilding Company. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, Box 18, Folder S -l, “Design o f Vessels, Specifications, Plans, etc. (1925-1947).” Electric 
Boat provided similar submarine design support for Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company in Wisconsin 
during the war.
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In 1937, there was little or no emphasis from the Navy Department on the 
upgrading of facilities that would be needed to achieve shorter building periods. This 
began to change in the summer of 1938, when an enlarged shipbuilding program created 
the need for increased building rates, improved facilities and increased employment. In 
June 1938, the Secretary of the Navy advised the navy yards that, due to increased 
shipbuilding programs, layoffs were undesirable and a substantial increase in 
employment was expected at navy yards, during 1939, which was expected to continue 
until peaking in 1942.146
Responding to the Secretary’s directive, Commandant Rear Admiral C.W Cole 
noted that “this navy yard has reached a very desirable stability of labor employment.”147 
Furthermore, if consideration was being given to increasing Portsmouth’s workload to 
three submarines a year, this rate “could not be effective until after the building ways are 
completed next year.”148 The building ways under construction were needed to replace 
those lost in the Franklin House fire of 1936.149 Although not an active building site when 
it burned, the shipyard’s urgent need for building ways at the onset of World War II
146 Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f  24 Jun 193 8. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 
General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
147 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  10 Aug 1938 to Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy 
(Shore Establishments Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 
1932 to 29 May 1940.”
148 / bid.
149 Increased ship construction during the Civil War and the need for weather protected ship 
construction facilities resulted in "Ship Houses" strategically located on the waterfront so that ships could 
be constructed and launched -  even in the harshest o f  New England winters. The largest Shiphouse was the 
Franklin House, which was one o f  the largest (240’ x 131’ x72’) wooden structures in the United States at 
the time. The shipyard’s first submarine (L-8) was launched from the Franklin Shiphouse in 1917. The 
structure burned to the ground on 10 March 1936 in a few hours in one o f the most spectacular fires ever 
seen in the Seacoast area.
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would have been less critical had the Franklin House been available.150 In the summer of 
1938, when consideration was being given to increasing the yard’s workload from two to 
three submarines a year, that plan had to be put on hold for lack of a building way.
While Portsmouth Navy Yard was completing submarines ahead of schedule, 
other yards were having great difficulty completing ships on time. For example, in 
August 1938, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, in noting the yard’s outstanding 
performance relative to contracted delivery dates, wrote, “The ability of the Portsmouth 
Yard to meet its completion dates has in recent years been amply demonstrated by the 
excellent and unique record established of meeting every contract date of delivery.”151 A 
few months later, Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson wrote that shipbuilding
1 ^ 9delays were “a matter of grave concern” and that the situation was “decidedly 
unsatisfactory.”153 Swanson was especially disturbed about destroyers, under construction 
in navy yards, whose completion dates had been extended to 44 months and were now in 
jeopardy of taking even longer.
Commandant C.W. Cole took advantage of the situation and responded to 
Secretary Swanson’s concern about shipbuilding delays, on 11 January 1939, with a letter 
that advertised Portsmouth Navy Yard’s recent accomplishments, rescheduled three 
additional submarines for early completions, and suggested that Portsmouth should not be
150 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 April 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
151 Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f 10 Aug 1938 to 
Secretary o f  the Navy. NARA Waltham,, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 
1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
152 Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f  30 Dec 1938 to Chiefs o f Bureaus and Continental Shipyards. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 20, Folder FS, “Ships, 
Nov 1925 to 15 Nov 1939.”
153 Ibid.
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grouped with those yards having problems meeting scheduled completion dates. Cole 
noted:
This yard has consistently met or anticipated its completion dates on new 
construction during the past four years.. .  With close attention to detail, 
cooperation of all hands, and Portsmouth Navy Yard’s established skillful 
workmanship, the new dates can be met, and the shipbuilding record 
continued that is unequaled elsewhere in this country.154
During the late 1930s, Commandant Rear Admiral C.W. Cole and his management team
conducted a justified self promotion public relations program that emphasized the yard’s
superior performance and solicited a continued optimum workload of two, or possibly
three submarines a year.
Portsmouth had been on a five year roll of early deliveries when disaster struck 
with the sinking of the Squalus on 23 May 1939. The submarine sank off the Isles of 
Shoals, while on routine sea trials, with the loss of 26 officers and men, when the main 
induction valve failed to close on a dive. While the subsequent investigation failed to 
establish conclusively why the large valve failed to close, operator error was suspected. 
Features were incorporated into future submarine designs to preclude similar operator 
error but, in the meantime, five years of superlative shipyard performance had been 
instantly compromised with the sinking of the Squalus. Thirty-three survivors were 
brought to the surface on 25 May 1939 in a remarkable rescue operation and the 
submarine was eventually raised on 13 September 1939.155
154 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral C.W. Cole letter o f  11 Jan 1939 to 
Secretary o f  the Navy. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 
20, Folder FS, “Ships 14 Nov 1925 to 15 Nov 1939.”
155 For accounts o f  the Squalus recovery see Richard E. Winslow III, Do Your Job: An Illustrated 
Bicentennial History o f  the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 1800-2000 (Portsmouth: Portsmouth Marine 
Society, 2000), 139-140 and Portsmouth-Built: Submarines o f  the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,
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On 9 June 1939, Commandant Rear Admiral C.W. Cole advised the Secretary of
the Navy Claude A. Swanson that any further accelerated completion dates for
submarines under construction at Portsmouth “have been compromised by the sinking of
the Squalus and the large volume of work incident to her rebuilding.”156 While in the
throes of rebuilding Squalus, Portsmouth Navy Yard was requested to define its needs in
order to increase annual production of submarines to three or four annually, with
durations of between twenty-two and twenty-six months.157 Commandant Rear Admiral
C.W. Cole’s response identified the shipyard’s additional needs to include a fourth
building way, increased officer personnel, improved component deliveries from
suppliers, and additional housing for the increasing numbers of civilians and military
personnel. Resuming the yard’s self-promotion program, the commandant once again
took the opportunity to highlight the shipyard’s consistently excellent performance,
despite the Squalus setback:
The force is being increased gradually from the present yard force of about 
3900 to about 4800 to meet the requirements for reconditioning the Squalus 
and the construction of the Marlin which are in excess of the standard
N.H.(Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985), 64-66; Portsmouth Herald,23 May-5 Jul 1939; Nathaniel 
Barrows, Blow All Ballast! The Story o f  the Squalus (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940); Carl LaVo, Back 
from the Deep: The Strange Story o f  the Sister Subs Squalus and Sculpin. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1988) and recorded eye witness testimonies at Cummings Library and Archives, Strawbery Bank Museum, 
Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96 Portsmouth War Records, Box 1, Folder 3. “U.S. Navy Yard.” On 29 June 1941 
with the shipyard ramp-up nearing its peak, the yard had to deal with another submarine sinking. The 
submarine 0 -9  sank off Portsmouth Harbor on a test dive shortly after its arrival from New London, Ct. 
just two years after the Squalus disaster. Unlike the Squalus, recovery operations were impossible because 
the 0 -9  sank in 370 feet o f  water as opposed to the 200 feet o f  water in which Squalus had sunk. Thirty- 
three men were lost on 0 -9 . See Portsmouth War Records, Cummings Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, 
MS 96 Box 1, Folder 19, “Harbor Defense.”
156 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  9 Jun 1939 to Secretary o f the Navy. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “ New  
Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
157 Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f  28 Nov 1939 to 
Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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program of two submarines a year. In addition, the Searaven was completed 
one and a half months prior to her official completion date . .  Seawolf is 
scheduled for a similar advance.. .  Triton and Trout are scheduled for 
completion three months in advance of their scheduled completion dates.. .  
Grayling and Grayback are being scheduled for completion in twenty-two 
and twenty-five months instead of the twenty-five and twenty-nine months 
now officially set as their building period.. .  These modifications of building 
periods are being made to meet the Secretary of the Navy’s directives to 
speed up new construction and also to permit the yard to undertake without 
loss of time, the new enlarged program expected to be authorized by the next 
Congress.158
With the war raging in Europe, Portsmouth was no longer being thought of as a two 
submarine a year shipyard. In early 1940, studies were setting goals of three or four 
submarines a year, still a modest increase over past performance and nothing like the 
production that would follow in a few years.159
By late 1940, the Seventy Percent Expansion Act160 had greatly accelerated the 
Navy’s shipbuilding program, and the Bureau of Yards and Docks was urging shipyards
158 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 28 Dec 1939 to Bureau Construction & Repair 
and Bureau o f Engineering. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, 
Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
159 Portsmouth Navy Yard had made remarkable progress in submarine building techniques and 
processes between 1934 and 1940. The time from the laying o f  the keel to completion had been reduced 
from twenty-six months on the Porpoise to sixteen months on the Seawolf. Most o f  that schedule 
improvement had been gained on the building ways prior to launching, where Porpoise had spent nineteen 
months as compared to ten months for the Seawolf. The submarine must remain on the building ways until 
it is watertight and all the exterior hull and ballast tank construction work is completed, as those areas are 
inaccessible once the submarine is waterborne. The yard’s continuous improvement in the construction, 
preassembly and joining o f pressure hull cylinders during the late 1930s permitted the significant reduction 
in the time needed on the building ways. See Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering 
joint letter o f  16 Mar 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.” On 
16 March 1940, Portsmouth was assigned three submarines under the 1941 appropriation act. All o f  this is 
to highlight the fact that, immediately prior to the war, Portsmouth Navy Yard had been a two-submarine-a 
year yard since 1934 and consideration was being given at the highest levels o f  the navy to increasing 
production to three or four submarines a year -  certainly nothing like 32 in ’44.
160 The Naval Expansion Act o f 19 July 1940 (also known as the 70 Percent Act or Two Ocean 
Navy Act) authorized increasing the fleet by 1,325,000 tons, including aircraft carriers (200,000 tons),
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to pull out all the stops to accelerate the completion of public works projects needed to 
support that accelerated building program. At the same time, there was debate within the 
Navy as to whether the construction of new ships and submarines should be concentrated 
in public or private shipyards. As a general rule, the Secretary of the Navy and the 
technical bureaus, since 1920, had moved in the direction of increasing support for 
submarine construction in public yards so as to regain the production and technical 
control of submarine construction that private industry had assumed during World War I. 
With war on the horizon, the Chief of Naval Operations became increasingly concerned 
about the maintenance of the rapidly expanding fleet, which he considered to be the 
primary responsibility of the navy yards. In April 1941, the fleet overhaul plan of the 
Chief of Naval Operations included the requirement to “Assign submarines in the 
Atlantic for overhaul at the Navy Yards Portsmouth and Philadelphia.”161 The Chief of 
Naval Operations, in a letter to the newly formed Bureau of Ships, made his position 
clear that maintenance and overhauls should have precedence in navy yards and new 
construction should have precedence in private yards.162 Rigid adherence to such a policy 
for submarines would have scuttled many of the new construction initiatives and 
organization that had been put in place at Portsmouth between 1935 and 1940. Despite 
the concerns of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy continued to
cruisers (420,000 tons), destroyers (250,000 tons), submarines (70,000 tons), and capital ships (385,000 
tons). See http://www.historv.naw.mil/faqs/faq59-21 .htm.
161 Chief o f  Naval Operations letter o f  8 Apr 1941 to Commandants Navy Yards, etc., Subject: 
Schedule o f  Proposed Availability for Ships at Navy Yards. NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval 
Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY 166-176.
162 Chief o f  Naval Operations letter o f  10 Oct 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 1941-1943.”
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assign the shipyard unprecedented numbers of contracts for new submarines that required
1the continued development of Portsmouth’s new construction capabilities.
On the eve of entry into the war, in the summer of 1941, the shipyard remained 
protective of its position as a new construction shipyard.164 But British submarines had 
begun to find their way to the shipyard for overhauls, with priorities assigned by the 
Chief of Naval Operations that were ahead of new construction. In September, after 
having experienced a few British submarine visits and while in the throes of a much 
larger work package than expected on the Free French submarine Surcouf, Portsmouth 
prompted the Bureau of Ships to advise the Chief of Naval Operations that “new 
construction is being hurt by maintenance work.”165 The yard took a big step towards the 
new construction specialization it desired, in early 1942, when the last of the British 
submarines left Portsmouth and the United States Navy began deferring submarine 
overhauls to maximize the number of submarines on war patrols. As the result of its own
163 During the early stages o f  the war when Portsmouth was completing Dry Dock #1 as quickly as 
possible with intentions to build two or three submarines simultaneously from that dock, the Chief o f Naval 
Operations expressed concern about the lack o f availability o f  the dry dock should it be needed for 
emergency submarine repairs. It was not until the dock was nearing completion in December 1942 that the 
Chief o f  Naval Operations approved the dock’s use for new construction. See Commandant Portsmouth 
Navy Yard letter o f  7 Dec 1942 to Vice Chief ofNaval Operations. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 1941-1943.”
164 The shipyard was even more convinced o f the desirability o f  new construction work over the 
repair o f  older submarines after recommissioning three old V-type submarines, Bass, Barracuda, and 
Bonita, in September 1940. The submarines had been towed from the moth ball fleet in Philadelphia to the 
shipyard in June 1940. According to the shipyard’s self-history, “These ships were o f  an obsolete design 
and preservation methods at the time o f their decommissioning did not meet present standards. 
Consequently, an exorbitant amount o f  time and money was used in an attempt to repair and modernize 
them.” Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during World War II, 1. Needless to say, this 
type o f work was not consistent with management’s vision o f streamlined shipyard operations for the 
production o f new submarines. Indeed, the nation’s interests, and the shipyard’s efforts, would be better 
served by building new submarines than attempting to refurbish and modernize the outdated V-type 
submarines. That said, some V-type submarines were deployed early in the war.
165 Bureau o f Ships letter to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard o f 11 Sep 1941. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, Folder 
EF13/L9-3, “British Empire -  Alterations, Repairs, Overhauls, 1926-42.”
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self-advertising campaigns and the fortunes of war, the U.S. Navy gave Portsmouth Navy 
Yard large orders for new submarines and the yard acquired the new submarine 
construction specialization that it had long desired.
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CHAPTER III
RAMP-UP
“We have drawn the sword, that sword will not be returned to its 
scabbard until our enemy who would destroy liberty, have been 
themselves destroyed. Under these grim conditions which call forth our 
resolution, our outrage, and our spirit of self-sacrifice we face unafraid 
those dangers that lie ahead.”
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox 
Washington D.C. ALNAV 1 
I January 1942
This is a “nuts and bolts” chapter that accounts for most of the infrastructure 
construction that occurred at the yard during the war. It fits well, chronologically, 
between the prewar issues presented in the last chapter and the next two chapters that 
analyze the shipyard operations during the war because almost all the construction of 
facilities took place immediately prior to, or at the start of, the war. The shipyard’s ramp- 
up of facilities was steep and successful. The shipyard could not have performed as it did 
without the critical upgrades described in this chapter.
The need for the steep ramp-up of facilities can be traced back to the nation’s 
reluctance to shed its strong stance on neutrality during the late 1930s and a general 
belief that preparations for war might, in fact, precipitate war. Historian Robert Dallek 
wrote that “Roosevelt [in late 1939] resisted pressure for substantial increases in national 
defense forces and rapid industrial mobilization.. .  fearful that these actions would
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agitate suspicions about his peaceful intentions and make any neutrality change appear as 
a step towards war”1. In January 1940, when President Roosevelt did seek to increase the 
total national defense appropriation from $1.5 billion to $1.8 billion for the 1941 fiscal 
year, Congress “whittled away, even at that modest sum.”2 In addition, historian David 
M. Kennedy wrote that, “The Nye Committee’s sensational accusations of World War I
profiteering left many corporations gun-shy [as late as January 1940] about accepting
-2
orders for armaments.” Five months later, the fall of France and the Dunkirk evacuation 
motivated the passage of the first of the naval expansion acts that signaled an end to 
Congressional whittling of defense budgets and corporate reluctance to accept armament 
orders.
When pleading for passage of the increased naval appropriation bills in 1940, 
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark warned Congressmen that “Dollars 
cannot buy yesterday.”4 Yet, that is exactly what the nation’s shipyards did during the 
eighteen months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. In an unprecedented burst of 
industrial activity, the shipyards bought back two decades of fiscal neglect with the 
expeditious completion of facilities needed to launch previously unimagined numbers of 
ships and submarines.
Twenty-one million dollars of infrastructure upgrades were authorized for 
Portsmouth Navy Yard between June 1940 and December 1941, and another $1 million 
was authorized for upgrades in January 1942. Of the twenty construction contracts that
1 .” Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and America Foreign Policy, 1932-1945,224.
2 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 431.
3 Ibid.
4 Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morrison, History o f  U.S. Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: 
Little Brown, 15 vols, 1947-1962), 30.
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totaled $22.23 million, only one contract of $32,000 dollars was awarded after December
1942. After two decades of neglect, the shipyard infrastructure was transformed almost
instantaneously as the funding flood gates were opened and contracting rules were greatly
relaxed to accelerate mobilization.
The ramp-up in facilities at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the eighteen months
preceding Pearl Harbor was by no means unique. According to the Bureau of Yards and
Docks World War II Administrative History:
The public works programs at these yards [navy yards], during the last eighteen 
months of peace was concentrated on providing, with the utmost dispatch, the vast 
expansion of facilities for the effective accomplishment of this Herculean task 
[building the two-ocean navy].. . .  When the war came, substantial progress had 
been made by the Bureau and its field forces in the execution of this work, for 
which $350,000,000 had been made available. Many individual projects were 
already complete by December 7,1941, well ahead of schedule. Their early 
availability contributed significantly to the rapid mobilization of the fleet and the 
speedy conversion of merchant vessels taken over by the Navy.5
Large facility upgrades were underway at all navy yards and many private shipyards at
the same time that Portsmouth Navy Yard was undergoing a tremendous expansion of
facilities.6
At Mare Island, the other navy yard building submarines, a large dry dock was 
under construction that would give the yard a total of four dry docks, as well as four 
additional building ways, increasing the total to eight. More remarkably, the shipyard’s 
acreage would increase from 635 acres to 1500 acres, including much reclaimed land,
5 United States Naval Administration in World War II Bureau o f  Yards and Docks Volume I, 172. 
Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
6 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory: A History o f  Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime 
Commission in World War II is a classic summary o f commercial shipbuilding during World War II that 
includes considerable discussion o f the mobilization o f private shipyards. Other mobilization sources 
include Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II and Keith E. Eiler, 
Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort 1940-1945.
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during the war years.7 At the only private submarine shipyard, Electric Boat, expansion 
was also the order of the day. In early 1942, the North and South Yards of the Electric 
Boat plant were expanded and a total of eleven building ways were installed at a cost of 
nearly $5,000,000. A little later, the Groton Iron Works was purchased for the company 
by the Navy and ten more ways were set up. The Navy appropriated $9,500,000 for this 
construction. This new yard, the Victory Yard, was opened July 22,1942.8
Thus, the building boom that Portsmouth Navy Yard experienced in 1941 and 
1942 was duplicated at numerous shipyards on both coasts. As compared to 1933, when 
only six private yards and eight navy yards remained in operation, “By December 1941, 
the number of yards engaged in new construction has expanded to 156 and those 
concerned with conversion and repair had expanded to 76.”9 The story of the Portsmouth 
ramp-up that follows must be multiplied dozens of times to get a sense of the nation’s 
rush to build the long-neglected shipyard facilities that were going to be needed to build 
the fleet that would be needed to win the war.
The national ramp-up escalated with each passing German advance in Europe.
The President declared a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, when 
Germany began aggressive actions in Eastern Europe, an unlimited emergency on 27
1 Ibid, 178.
8 John D. Horn, “Submarines and the Electric Boat Company,” Navy Department Library, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 
92.
9 United States Naval Administration in World War 11, Bureau o f  Ships, Navy Department Library, 
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center,
Washington, D.C., 132.
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May 1941 as events in Europe heated up even more, and, of course, war began on 7 
December 1941. This twenty-seven month period was a time of great turmoil and 
transition as the nation turned, somewhat reluctantly, from neutrality and hopes for world 
peace, to full mobilization for war. It was also a time of great change and adjustment in 
the Navy Department and the navy yards.
The fall of France in June 1940 accelerated the move towards naval rearmament.
The 11 per cent Naval Expansion Act was signed on 14 June 1940 and a month later the
70 per cent Naval Expansion Act was signed on 19 July 1940.10 To further complicate
matters, the leadership of the Navy transitioned midway between the two Naval
Expansion Acts. On 11 July 1940, Frank Knox became the Secretary of the Navy and, a
month later, James Forrestal became Under Secretary of the Navy.11 Thus, this period
brought new naval leadership and a surge of new contracts for naval ships and facilities
unlike anything ever seen before. Historian Robert Connery wrote:
In the pre-war years of peace the Navy’s chief problem was to obtain dollars 
with which to purchase manpower, munitions, ships, and bases. . . When the 
war came, and even to some extent before December 7, 1941, Congress voted 
huge sums of money without question. The House of Representatives, in one 
instance during the war, passed a 32 billion dollar appropriation bill in twenty 
minutes without debate and without a single question from the floor.12
10 The Naval Expansion Act o f  14 June 1940 (11 Percent Act) authorized increasing the fleet by
242.000 tons. See http://www.navalhistorv.netAyW2USN194006.htm. The Naval Expansion Act o f  19 July 
1940 (also known as the 70 Percent Act or Two Ocean Navy Act) authorized increasing the fleet by
1.325.000 tons including aircraft carriers (200,000 tons), cruisers (420,000 tons), destroyers (250,000 tons), 
submarines (70,000 tons), and capital ships (385,000 tons). See http://www.historv.naw.mil/facis/faq59- 
21.htm.
11 Robert Dallek says that President Roosevelt “brought Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, two o f  
the country’s most pro-Allied Republicans, into his Cabinet as Secretary of War and Secretary o f the Navy, 
respectively. Replacing the two most isolationist members o f  his Cabinet, Harry Woodring and Charles 
Edison, the appointments were not only a fresh demonstration to London of Roosevelt’s intentions, but also 
an attempt to create a bipartisan consensus for all aid to Britain short o f war and strengthen his bid for 
another presidential term.” Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and America Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 
232.
12 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 293.
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The accelerating pace of naval mobilization continued in 1941 as the nation’s 
shipbuilding and other industries were flooded with orders for armaments. According to 
Connery:
The year 1941, opening with the Battle of Britain, proved to be a challenging 
one for the United States Navy. Hundreds of millions of dollars had been 
voted by Congress in 1940 for a vast Naval expansion program.. . The new 
year was to test whether the Navy’s administration organization would be 
able to turn these dollars into weapons of defense.13
Understanding how Portsmouth Navy Yard coped with this challenge, and ramped up so
quickly to turn dollars into submarines, requires an understanding of how the shipyard
analyzed its needs and turned the sudden funding bonanza into the facility and personnel
resources needed for increased production.14
The ramp-up of facilities and employment started seriously in the summer of 1940 
and continued well into 1942. After 7 December 1941, a fear of enemy attack 
accompanied the increased activity and building at the yard. On the day before Christmas 
1941, the Industrial Officer, Captain H.F.D. Davis, reminded his employees that any 
attack would most likely come on a Sunday or holiday so workers should be especially
13 Ibid.
14 Gary Weir notes in “Mobilization, Expansion, Integration Building American Submarines 1940- 
43,” Naval Historical Center’s http://www.historv.naw.mil/colloquia/cch5d.htm that “The same summer 
[1940], the Navy Department responded to increased demand by building upon the foundation o f vast 
experience available at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Electric Boat. To amplify the Navy’s effort at 
Portsmouth, the Bureau o f Ships (BUSHIPS) expanded the services at Mare Island Naval Shipyard and 
reintroduced Cramp Shipbuilding o f  Philadelphia to submarine construction. Both o f these yards would 
take technical direction from Portsmouth.” Becoming the lead Design Yard for Mare Island and Cramp 
Shipbuilding during the war entailed another ramp-up o f design and technical resources that is beyond the 
scope o f this study.
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vigilant on those days.15 The Commandant likewise reminded his managers in February 
1942 that, “The Axis Governments have used bombs ranging from 100 to 3000 pounds in 
their attacks on England,” and, consequently, “vessels in the yard should be berthed 
singly if possible, and as widely dispersed as feasible, commensurate with dock space 
available and repair facilities along the docks.”16 In the early months of the war, it was 
uncertain at best if the rapidly expanding war in Europe could be contained to that 
continent and the Atlantic Ocean. It was in this highly charged and threatening 
environment that Portsmouth Navy Yard set out to achieve unprecedented submarine 
production.
Facilities Ramp-up
In December 1939, just two years prior to Pearl Harbor, the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair asked Portsmouth Navy Yard to identify what additional 
facilities, if any, would be needed for the yard to build three or four submarines annually,
• • 17for a total of eighteen, finishing in 1946. Portsmouth’s response cited the need for a 
fourth building way, a vastly upgraded machine shop, and other miscellaneous needs, 
including the continuation of the conversion of the shipyard from DC to AC power.18 
Until 1940, the shipyard was supplied with direct current electrical power only. The
15 Industrial Officer memo o f 24 December 1941 to Shop Masters. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC Pkg #6, “Orders 
to Shop Foremen.”
16 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard John D. Wainwright memo o f 5 Feb 1942 to Manager and 
Captain o f the Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 18, 
Folder S-7, “Docking -  General.”
17 Chief o f  Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f 28 Nov 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth 
Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), 
Box 1, Folder A1/Y1, PKG 1, “Local Development Boards.”
18 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  28 Dec 1939 to Chief Bureau o f  Construction and 
Repair. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, 
Folder A l/Y l, PKG 1, “Local Development Boards.”
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conversion to AC was needed to more efficiently supply the greatly increased electrical 
loads that accompanied the increased facilities. Funding was quickly provided to get 
started on these upgrades and, in June 1940, Portsmouth was authorized to construct eight 
submarines with building periods ranging from 21 to 38 lA months. The activity at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard increased in the summer of 1940, but production expectations for 
the yard remained low compared to the building rates that would be achieved just two 
years later.
The increased activity at the yard in the summer of 1940 was highlighted by a 
presidential visit on Saturday, 10 August 1940. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox were escorted by 10 motorcycle officers of the New 
Hampshire State Police, and a dozen others of the Maine State Police, in a parade of 31 
cars from the Portsmouth train station to the shipyard, where the presidential party met
Figure 7: President Roosevelt Touring Yard (August 1940). Courtesy of 
Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
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briefly with the commandant, department heads, and others, followed by a short tour of 
the yard. During the tour, several stops were made to inspect work, ships, and shops, but 
the President did not leave his car. The President is shown greeting his son upon his 
arrival at the shipyard in Figure 7. At the completion of the tour, the President boarded 
his barge Potomac, which had docked at the yard the previous evening, and sailed for the 
Boston Navy Yard. The President boarded his yacht just 55 minutes after he had arrived 
at the train station and just 40 minutes after passing through the shipyard main gate. The 
President did not see much shipyard activity during the expedited visit because the yard 
had been closed at 7:30 am that Saturday morning to all but selected employees and 
visitors.19 As short as it was, the visit was an important reminder to shipyard employees 
that the Navy’s expectations of them were on the rise. In August 1940, the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard was the recent recipient of orders for eight submarines, millions of dollars for 
facility upgrades, and a visit from President Roosevelt. The ramp-up had started, but few 
at the time appreciated where it would lead them.
In October 1940, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks urged the navy 
yards to take all measures possible to accelerate the completion of the public works 
projects in view of “the recent developments in the international situation.”20 With the 
fall of France, it looked like it was only a matter of time until Great Britain was invaded. 
Navy yards were told, “Even if those facilities are only partially completed or if the 
design and construction are not to the usual Bureau standards, it is more important to
19 The details o f the President’s visit are from the Portsmouth Herald, 10 August 1940, “Crowds 
Line Streets to Greet Chief Executive,” 1, and an untitled one page summary o f the visit held at NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 20, Folder EE “President’s 
Visit, 1940.”
20 Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f  7 Oct 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 1930-1950.”
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have them available than it is to spend the additional time which might have to be
21expended in order to achieve a strived for, but impossible, perfection.” Contractors 
were to be given “considerable latitude for the exercise of their judgment” and permitted 
to “proceed without the detail of inspection which the Bureau ordinarily exercises.” 
Empowerment of contractors and a willingness to sacrifice quality of product for timely 
project completion were critical to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to undertake and 
complete massive upgrades to facilities while simultaneously increasing the rate of 
submarine production.
By the spring of 1941, Congressman Carl Vinson of Georgia, and other national 
leaders who recognized the inevitability of war, moved to appropriate funds to increase 
shipyard employment and upgrade shipyard facilities. Vinson, Chairman of the Naval 
Affairs Committee, queried the yard in March 1941 about its capabilities, problems with 
material deliveries, and needs, in order to accelerate delivery dates by twenty percent. 
Industrial Manager Captain H.F.D. Davis wrote, in response, that material deliveries were 
under control, a third building way had been completed in August 1940, and the fourth
9“}building way was nearing completion. Furthermore, Davis reported that the yard had 
studied “the possibility of laying down one or two more temporary ground ways between
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Industrial Manager H.F.D. Davis letter o f  15 Mar 1941 to Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman 
o f Committee on Naval Affairs. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3, “General Building Program, PKG # 3.” The yard first 
identified a need for additional building ways shortly after the Franklin Shiphouse had burned to the ground 
with its two building ways on March 10, 1936. See Manager memo o f 9 Nov 1936. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box l,JFolder A l/Y l, “Local 
Development Boards PKG #1.” The fact that these two building ways were not replaced until the spring of 
1941 is a good example o f  the minimal investment in needed facilities that characterized Portsmouth Navy 
Yard during the 1930s, prior to the prewar appropriation windfalls.
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the present ways” should they become necessary. Congress wanted to accelerate 
submarine building rates and Portsmouth Navy Yard was already looking for ways 
(pardon the pun) to exceed expectations.
The First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, approved August 
25, 1941, appropriated $160 million for equipment and facilities for the repair and 
conversion of ships and increased the appropriations for the construction of new ships 
from $5,000 million to $8,000 million.24 The next month, the Secretary of the Navy 
approved Portsmouth Navy Yard’s request for $7,662 million for facility upgrades that 
included a new fitting out pier ($1.5 million) and power plant upgrades ($1.5 million). 
The approval process that brought the $7.6 million to Portsmouth was the height of 
bureaucratic efficiency as the necessary approvals that normally took weeks, if not 
months, to obtain were gotten from the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, and Secretary of the Navy in four days. There appeared to be no end to the 
Congressional commitment to fund upgrades to shipyard facilities or the Navy’s 
commitment to expedite those funds to the yards. Both the commitment and funding 
would moderate greatly a year later when an urgent need developed to funnel critical 
materials and other resources directly to weapons and armament rather than facilities. By 
that time, however, Portsmouth Navy Yard was well on its way to becoming a 
transformed shipyard.
The power plant upgrades authorized in the fall of 1941 accelerated the 
conversion of the shipyard from DC to the much more efficient AC power. The increased
24 Senior Member, Shore Station Development Board letter of 19 Sep 1941. NARA Waltham,,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A1/Y1, Pkg 1, 
“Local Development Boards.”
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electrical loads, as the result of all the added new facilities, made it absolutely necessary 
that the electrical conversion be given high priority. This conversion started before the 
war, continued during the war, and remained incomplete in some areas at the end of the 
war.25 The second major project, the fitting-out pier, involved reclamation of 12 acres of 
shoal water and wetlands on the corner of the shipyard directly across the river from 
Strawbery Banke. This project would become a critical piece of the plan that permitted 
the remarkable increase in building rates during the war.26
Figure 8: New Fitting Pier Under Construction (1942). Courtesy of the Milne 
Special Collections, University of New Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
25 Public Works Officer memo o f 19 May 1947 to Commandant Portsmouth Naval Base. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L-5, “Inspection 
Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
26 Bureau o f Yards and Docks Administrative History o f  World War II Operations, Navy 
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D .C ., 175.
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The new fitting out pier was an enormous undertaking right in the middle of the 
increased activity needed to accelerate production. Figure 8 and a comparison of Figures 
A-l and A-2 in the appendix, maps of the yard in 1939 and 1945 respectively, gives one 
an appreciation of the size of the new fitting out pier. Neither the fitting out pier nor the 
land on which it was built appears in Figure A-l (1939). The twelve acre pier can be seen 
jutting out in the lower left hand corner of Figure A-2 (1945). The portion of the pier 
closest to the Portsmouth side of the river was created by filling in Pumpkin Island Shoal. 
Without the new fitting out pier, there would have been Vastly insufficient pier space to 
complete the post-launch work required on the increased numbers of submarines that 
were being forced off the ways to make room for the next submarine keel to be laid. The 
new pier accommodated up to a half dozen submarines in various stages of construction 
as they stepped through the completion process from launch, to dock trials, to 
completion.
Prior to the construction of the new fitting-out pier, the submarines were 
completed at a much smaller pier, known as the “flatiron pier,” near Dry Dock #2. In 
October 1941, about the time that the new pier was authorized, the superintendent of the 
flatiron pier was alarmed because the submarines at the pier had increased from two to 
four and work was not getting done for lack of manpower. He proposed that the pier 
workforce be doubled to 1,010 men and that the submarines remain on the building ways 
longer to minimize the work that had to be done at the pier.27 This, of course, was just the 
opposite of the “push ‘em off the ways” strategy that carried the yard to production 
records a few years later. But, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the four building ways were
27 Ship Hull Superintendent, Flatiron Pier memo o f 22 October 1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A 1-3, “General 
Building Program, PKG # 3.”
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launching submarine hulls faster than the flatiron pier space and workforce could handle 
them. Had it not been for the new spacious fitting-out pier, and the capability to more 
efficiently sequence the post-launch to completion process, the yard would never have 
been able to achieve the building rates it did.
Robert Connery notes that “In the dark days that followed Pearl Harbor many 
Americans must have realized how fortunate was the decision to begin the expansion of
78the fleet in 1940.” Portsmouth Navy Yard certainly shared in that good fortune. 
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the shipyard, with many facility upgrades already in 
progress, sought further improvements to increase building rates. A month after Pearl 
Harbor, the shipyard requested, and subsequently received, an additional $2 million in 
projects that included the construction of a shallow shipbuilding basin in which two 
submarines at a time could be constructed, the fifth building way, a Sub-Assembly 
Erection Shop extension at the shipbuilding ways, and a Utility Building at the new 
fitting-out pier.29 All of this shipyard activity, and more to follow in 1942, was greatly 
facilitated by the First War Powers Act of December 1941 that permitted contracts to be 
negotiated rather than awarded through the time consuming competitive bidding process.
In January 1942, the shipyard began work on the fifth building way in the 
building shed and a 50 feet extension of the roof and crane runways to accommodate a
28 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II. 135.
29 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  29 Jan 1942 to Bureau of Yards and Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, 
Folder A l/Y l, Pkg 1, “Local Development Boards.”
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sub-assembly erection shop.30 The first was a relatively inexpensive $75,000 project, but 
the second was a $1,100,000 major construction project designed to further refine 
Portsmouth’s sectional construction process that had first been used on the NIRA 
submarines in 1934. Fred White, Master of the Rigger and Laborer Shop during the war, 
recalled working on submarine keels on the building ways while engulfed in sparks from
*3 1
the welding on the roof of the building shed. It is a credit to the shipyard that such large 
projects were successfully and expeditiously completed in conjunction with a greatly 
increased submarine construction rate.
By December 1942, the shipyard had created a number of opportunities for
increased production. The five building ways were launching submarines at an
unprecedented rate, the new fitting out pier and increased workforce had progressed far
enough to keep up with the submarines being launched, and the new building basin was
in operation. With plans to launch submarines after only four months on a building way,
the existing seven ways could produce an annual building rate of twenty-one submarines
per year. However, shipyard management had bigger plans:
Our goal is 30 ships per year; this rate is to be reached by July or August
1943. Our obvious requirement is more building ways. At least 2 and 
preferably 3 ways will be needed by April [1942] in order to come any where 
near meeting the schedule.32
30 The Senior Member Shore Station Development Board letter o f 11 Jan 1942 to Secretary o f the 
Navy and Secretary o f the Navy letter of 14 Jan 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N 15-8, “Slips and Basins.”
31 Oral interview with Fred White on 3 April 2006 at his home in New Castle, N.H.
32 Portsmouth Navy Yard Memo (unsigned) of 1 Dec 1942, Subject: Use o f  Dry Dock #1 for 
Building Submarines. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence 
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, Pkg #4.”
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The shipyard had two options to obtain the additional building ways. Two side launching 
ways could be built at one of the berths in four or five months for about $90,000, or the 
new dry dock that had been designated by the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Naval 
Operations for use in case of emergencies could be used, instead, for construction of two, 
or possibly three, submarines at the same time. The yard had started planning locally for 
the building of multiple submarines in Dry Dock #1 shortly after Pearl Harbor.34 This 
local plan, presented in detail in the next chapter, was somewhat controversial because 
the new dry dock was authorized by the Navy Department for other purposes. Suffice it 
to say, at this point, that the yard’s performance during the war would have been average, 
at best, if this new dry dock had not been used for construction of submarines. In the next 
chapter, these efforts are presented as a case study to illustrate the shipyard’s aggressive 
management style and willingness to assume risk for the sake of production and 
increased contribution to the war effort.
***
In June 1942, the need to direct all available funds and critical materials to the 
fleet caused Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to require increased control and scrutiny
i f
of requests for shipyard facility upgrades. In November 1942, Secretary Knox further 
shut down facility construction by establishing firm guidelines that permitted 
consideration of only the most urgent needs. According to Knox:
331bid.
34 Ltjg Arnold memo o f 12 December 1941 to Hull Superintendent. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 ,” General 
Building Program, Pkg # 3.”
35 Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f  25 Jun 1942 to All Shore Activities. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N23-5, “Acetylene 
and Oxyacetylene.”
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The rapid diminution in available and prospective supplies of raw materials 
and equipment and the vital need for conserving these and our critical 
manpower, dictate a drastic reduction of new facilities, both in prospect and 
in process, so that the maximum of men, material, equipment, and 
transportation resources may be utilized for the more important instruments
r- 36of war.
In December 1942, the Secretary of the Navy sent his special representative, Admiral 
Claude C. Bloch, to all continental naval districts with the message that “we are scraping 
the bottom of the bucket” and that drastic conservation measures were needed to support 
the war effort. The Admiral specifically highlighted the need to limit facility construction 
to only that absolutely necessary so that more of the navy’s funds could be channeled to 
fleet production:
The increased demand for construction on shore by all departments, both 
military and civilian, as well as by the states, counties, municipalities, and 
private parties, has gone on apace. Recently, statistical data has been 
prepared which shows that the construction program desired for the calendar 
year of 1943 amounts to thirty-two billion dollars. The entire production 
capacity of this country for war implements is only estimated to be seventy- 
five billion dollars. Therefore it can readily be seen what a tremendous 
burden the construction program would impose on our war implement 
production. Drastic measures are in order to reduce the construction so that 
production of our war implements may proceed unimpaired.37
By the end of 1942, when the navy moved to drastically cut back on facility projects,
Portsmouth Navy Yard had already received the infusion of facility improvement
appropriations it needed to transform itself into a modem shipyard.
36 Secretary o f  the Navy Frank Knox letter o f  4 Nov 1942 to All Naval Activities. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder 
N23-5, “Acetylene and Oxyacetylene.”
37 Commandant First Naval District letter o f 4 Nov 1942 to All Activities, First Naval District. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, 
Folder A3-2 “General Management 1932-1940.”
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As noted earlier, the facility boom at Portsmouth Navy Yard in 1942 was not 
unlike what was happening at many shipyards across the country. According to maritime 
historian Frederick C. Lane, “Before 1942, in spite of some temporary steel shortages, 
shipbuilding was limited mainly by shipyard facilities. But by June or July of 1942,
in
facilities got ahead of steel.” Facilities had also gotten ahead of steel and other 
contractor supplied material and components at Portsmouth Navy Yard by late 1942. 
Facilities were being completed, employment was increasing, and, most importantly, 
quality submarines were being delivered to the United States Navy. On Christmas eve, 
1942, Commandant Rear Admiral Withers announced with considerable pride to his 
management team that, “A Portsmouth boat has just reported operating 210 days out of 
245 since completion.. .  inflicting damage on the enemy just 492 days after the keel was 
laid.” Portsmouth employees could indeed reflect with considerable pride on their 
accomplishments during the first year of the war.
Off-Yard Growth
Despite the massive ramp-up in facilities, the physically constrained island 
shipyard was left with an urgent need for more industrial space to fulfill its mission. The 
acquisition of 12 additional acres of industrial space, with the creation of the new fitting 
out pier, has already been described. Another 12 acres were claimed when the shipyard 
was joined to Jamaica Island to create an ordnance storage facility.40 A discussion of the
38 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 343.
39 Commandant T. Withers memo o f 24 Dec 1942 to Heads o f  Division, Masters, Senior Office 
Supervisors. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central 
Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, Pkg #4.”
40 Portsmouth Navy Yard’s expansion during the war pales in comparison to Mare Island Navy 
Yard’s growth from 635 acres in 1940 to 1500 acres in 1945, primarily through wetlands reclamation.
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Jamaica Island acquisition, the creation of an electrical shop in Somersworth, N.H. that at 
its peak employed as many people as the shipyard did in 1939, the use of a large gypsum 
plant in Portsmouth as an extension of the shipyard’s machine shops, and various other 
off-yard endeavors will complete the discussion of the ramp-up of facilities at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard.
In early 1941, the Bureau of Ordnance directed Commandant Wainwright to 
investigate the possibility of purchasing Jamaica Island for the purpose of ammunition 
storage. The twelve acre island was a stone’s throw from the northeast corner of the 
shipyard island, across a shallow inlet. The island is not even shown on Figure A-l, the 
1939 map of the yard, but is shown with considerable development on the upper right 
comer of Figure A-2, the 1945 map.
Commandant Wainwright contacted the owner, Dr. W.B. Johnston, in January 
1941 to inquire if he was interested in selling the island.41 Negotiations took place over 
most of that year. Things had progressed far enough by October 1941 for Wainwright to 
provide the Bureau of Ordnance an estimated price of $327,000 for the ordnance storage 
facilities that included $30,000 to purchase the island.42 Negotiations continued until the 
Judge Advocate General’s message of 7 December 1941 announced “Johnston option 
[$25,000] Jamaica Island accepted today.”43 The deal for the purchase of Jamaica Island
41 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 14 Jan 1941 to Dr. W.B. Johnston. NARA  
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, “Lands.”
42 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 10 Oct 1941 to Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, 
“Lands.”
43 US. Naval Message from the Judge Advocate General Washington D.C. o f  7 Dec 1941 at 0013 
to Navy Yard Portsmouth N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, “Lands.”
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had been completed just a few hours before the Japanese dropped bombs on Pearl 
Harbor.
Post-purchase developments associated with Jamaica Island will be covered later 
in this study. The landfills and shoal water reclamation projects that tied the island to the 
shipyard, and extended the shoreline on the back channel, were major contributors to the 
contamination problems that plagued the yard in the 1980s and ultimately caused the yard 
to be declared a Superfund site.
The rapid, and extremely successful, relocation of the shipyard’s Electrical 
Manufacturing Shop in early 1942 to a vacated plant in Somersworth, N.H. is one of the 
more impressive shipyard accomplishments during the war. The need for the facility was 
dictated by the expansion of naval orders for electrical fittings44 from $175,000 per 
month in 1940 to $1,900,000 per month in 1943. Accordingly, shop employment 
expanded from a prewar average of 400 to a peak of 3,600 in the winter of 1943 45
During the 1930s, Portsmouth Navy Yard had gradually been assigned most of 
the navy’s workload for the manufacture of ship and submarine electrical hull fittings. As 
this workload grew, the shipyard was forced to farm out some portions of the work to 
local contractors. Immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau of Ships 
proposed a 100% increase in Portsmouth’s workload to keep up with the rapidly
44 Electrical fittings are the mechanical connectors that accommodate the passage o f  electrical 
cables through watertight bulkheads and tanks. Needless to say, they find widespread application on 
submarines.
45 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 43.
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expanding shipbuilding programs authorized by Congress.46 Convinced that the shipyard
would have to find accommodations off-yard to meet the greatly increased demands for
electrical fittings, the Commandant wrote the management of Nashua Manufacturing
Company in January 1942:
This Navy Yard is confronted with the necessity of obtaining additional shop 
space in which to carry on its program of manufacture for National Defense..
. An inspection has been made of the Great Falls Manufacturing Company’s 
Mill Plant at Somersworth, NH, which it is understood is owned by your 
company.. .  The reinforced concrete building of flat slab construction, 
known as No. 2 Cement M ill,. .  .which forms part of the above property 
seems well adapted for our purpose. . .  Will you lease or sell the building?47
The shipyard quickly negotiated terms with the Nashua Manufacturing Company, and
with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy received funding from the
Bureau of Ships on 30 January to proceed with the purchase of the building.48 Once
again, there was no bureaucratic delay. The shipyard had advanced from initial problem
definition to problem solution in less than two months.
Portsmouth Navy Yard records indicate that the move of the shipyard’s Electrical 
Manufacturing Shop to the plant at Somersworth was accomplished so efficiently that 
“no machine was out of production for more than an 8-hour shift.”49 According to the
AA
Bureau o f Ships letter o f 29 Nov 1941 to The Division o f Contract Distribution, Office of 
Production Management. NARA. Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence 
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-1, “Developments.”
47 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Nashua Manufacturing Company o f 10 Jan 1942. 
NARA. Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, 
Folder A l-1, “Developments.”
48 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy letter o f  23 Jan 1942 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard 
and Bureau o f Ships U.S. Navy Dispatch o f 30 Jan 1942. NARA. Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-1, “Developments.”
49 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 20.
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shipyard’s self-history, operators cleaned their machines at the end of a shift and each 
machine was then transported the eighteen miles to Somersworth where it was located on 
a prearranged spot, complete with temporary electrical power, and made ready for use 
one shift after having been unplugged in the shipyard. By all accounts, the transfer 
occurred with minimum disruption to production.
The number of employees at the new plant quickly climbed to 3,750 men and 
women, more than double the original 1,546 men in the shipyard. The one hundred 
percent increase in workload forecast by the Bureau of Ships was more than realized.50 
The facility performed with impressive results during the war until 1945 when, having 
served its purpose, it was made available for disposal by 30 June 1946.51
In order to further relieve overcrowded conditions in the shipyard shops, the 
shipyard leased buildings owned by the Atlantic Gypsum Products Company in 
Portsmouth, in December 1943, for the manufacture of machined parts and assemblies. 
Without the gypsum plant, the yard would have been forced to do considerable assembly 
work in areas outside the shops, with minimal protection from the weather. The plant 
consisted of 60 acres, 13 buildings, and numerous docks for nine railroad spurs.52 Used as 
a shipyard during World War I, this complex also served the nation and Portsmouth Navy 
Yard well during World War II. The Navy released control of the plant in late 1945 so 
that the National Gypsum Company could receive its first shipload of gypsum rock from
50 Ibid.
51 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter of 9 Apr 1946 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder N l-13,
“Lands Somersworth.”
52 Portsmouth Herald, 3 Dec 1943, “Navy Takes Over Gypsum Plant to Make Sub Parts,” 1.
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Nova Scotia, in late October 1945, in preparation for reopening the plant a few months 
later.53
By the summer of 1940, it was obvious that Kittery needed to greatly increase 
available housing for the thousands o f new workers at the yard. In August 1940, 
Commandant Rear Admiral Wainwright wrote to the Board of Selectmen, Kittery, Maine, 
to inquire about the availability of land to accommodate the building of defense housing. 
Wainwright explained that “The Navy Department has authorized the construction of 
four hundred units to house married and enlisted men and civilian employees attached to 
this Navy Yard.”54 Land was made available on the outskirts of Kittery just outside the 
new shipyard entrance, Gate #2. The project, known as Admiralty Village, was nearing 
completion when the war started. In fact, on 8 December 1941, the shipyard reported that, 
“The construction work at the Naval Housing Project now being done under lump sum 
contracts is nearing completion.”55 Also, in December 1941, the Federal Works Agency 
authorized $125,000 for a sewage disposal plant for Admiralty Village.56 Other federal 
housing projects that followed later in the war, on the Portsmouth side of the river, will 
be discussed later when analyzing the transformation of Portsmouth.
53 Portsmouth Herald, 18 Oct 1945, First Shipload o f Gypsum Rock in Over 2 Years Arrives at 
Local Plant,” 1.
54 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Board o f Selectmen, Kittery, Me o f 16 August
1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, 
“Lands.”
55 Commander Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  8 Dec 1941 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L24, “Housing 
Development.”
56 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  10 Dec 1941 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Folder L24, “Housing 
Development.”
128
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Finally, at the same time that the shipyard officials were negotiating for the 
purchase of Jamaica Island, negotiations were also taking place for the purchase of the 
land necessary to provide another entry point, and bridge access, to the yard from 
Kittery.57 In May 1941, Commandant Wainwright recommended that the land be 
purchased for $15,000 and construction started shortly thereafter on the second access 
gate for the shipyard.58
Employment Ramp-up
At the same time that the shipyard was being transformed geographically and 
structurally, thousands of new employees were being hired. It began slowly in October 
1939 when navy yard ceilings were eliminated.59 Prior to that time, the shipyard was 
obligated to obtain the authorization of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to exceed 
3600 employees. On 2 August 1940, as the funding flood gates were being opened, the 
shipyard reported that employment levels had increased to 5,843, with plans to further 
increase to the 6,440 employees required to complete the assigned workload of eight 
submarines. Always looking for ways to do better, the yard volunteered that a building 
rate of six submarines a year could be sustained, without additional facility upgrades, 
with a further increase to 8,400 employees and by taking advantage of local commercial
57 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 30 Dec 1940.to Chief Bureau o f Yards and 
Docks. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, 
“Lands.”
58 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks o f 17 May
1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, 
“Lands.”
59 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 2 Oct 1939 to Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy 
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A1-2/NY, “Government Policies.”
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firms for selective farm-out work. Figure 3 shows the employment ramp-up that peaked 
at 20,465 in November 1943.
The rapid growth in employment was not without problems. In February 1941,
Hull Superintendent F.A. Tusler made the following observation regarding the recent
rapid increase in employment:
During the past year or more the Yard has taken on a large number of new 
men, the training of whom differs widely. It is believed that these men can be 
adequately trained if placed with older men who are familiar with the w ork..
. It is recognized that old men with a large amount of submarine experience 
are more valuable than green men, even though competent mechanics. ..
Helpers and helper-trainees who have been rated up to mechanic must 
necessarily be placed on tasks with which they are familiar.60
Tusler’s comments, about the value of older men with submarine experience, illustrate
well the importance of having been able to maintain a satisfactory workload and a core
workforce during the late 1930s.
The increasing numbers of employees, and pace of work, left some wondering 
where events were leading the shipyard. Hull Superintendent Tusler, suspicious that the 
boom in employment might be short lived, expressed concern that employment levels and 
work hours would quickly return to previous levels after the existing emergency had 
passed:
There seems to be little question that until the present program is completed, 
there will be little difficulty in maintaining steady employment in the Yard. 
However, when this emergency is over, there is no question that the Yard will 
be unable to maintain its present degree of employment and very drastic 
reductions in force will be necessary.61
60 Hull Superintendent F.A. Tusler memo to Production Officer o f  3 Feb 1941. NARAWaltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 26, Folder A 19, 
“Conferences, Congresses, and Conventions.” Tusler’s memo was in response to the Industrial Manager’s 
request for items in preparation for his appearance before the Naval Subcommittee o f  the House 
Appropriations Committees concerning navy yard work.
61 Ibid.
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Hull Superintendent Tusler’s prediction concerning drastic reductions in employment, 
after the crisis had subsided, was indeed accurate. However, he need not have concerned 
himself about post-crisis unemployment in February 1941. Employment would more than 
double in a few years and the crisis would last for the next four and one half years. In 
February 1941, Tusler and his fellow shipyard workers had little appreciation of what the 
next several years held in store for them.
Ramp-up of Submarine Orders
Starting in the summer of 1940, orders for new submarines also started to increase 
rapidly. On 26 August 1940, the shipyard was told by superiors to, “Increase new 
construction activity until a maximum output of six submarines a year is attained.”62 One 
year prior to Pearl Harbor, the shipyard was increasing its building rate from two to six 
submarines a year, still very modest indeed when compared to the building rates that 
would be achieved a few years later.
In the spring of 1941, Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the Naval Affairs 
Committee, queried the yard about the possibility of accelerating the completion dates for 
the submarines, then under contract, by twenty percent. Industrial Manager Captain 
H.F.D. Davis responded with a schedule of accelerated delivery dates for 14 submarines;
9 to complete in 1942 and 5 to complete through 1 August 1943. The yard would 
ultimately complete 21 submarines in the same time frame. The accelerated ramp-up in 
production, planned in the spring of 1941, bore little resemblance to what actually
62 War Plans Officer memo o f 26 August 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A16-11, “National Defense.”
63 Industrial Manager H.F.D. Davis letter o f  15 Mar 1941 to Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman 
of Committee on Naval Affairs. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, Box 2, Folder A 1-3, “General Building Program, Pkg # 3.”
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happened in the first year and a half of the war. It is a credit to management and 
employees of the navy yard that they could adjust so rapidly to changing conditions.
In January 1942, the shipyard’s ramp-up was in full gear. While the yard was 
moving rapidly towards acquiring the infrastructure needed to increase production, much 
was left to be completed before dramatic increases in production could be realized. In 
addition, the yard was heavily burdened with miscellaneous work, including overhauls of 
British submarines which detracted from the increased building of submarines. On 2 
January 1942, Commandant Wainwright reported to his superiors that one British 
submarine had been completed on 1 January 1942 and another was scheduled to be 
completed on 22 January 1942. In addition, newly constructed submarines USS Drum 
(SS228) had been completed on 24 December 1941, USS Grayback (SS 208) was on sea 
trials, and USS Flying Fish (SS229) was on dock trials.64 The three submarines under 
construction were progressing toward completion on comfortable schedules that 
minimized mutual interference, and competition, for shipyard resources.
Maximum building rates would require the assumption of more schedule risk and 
the multiple processing of submarines on other than a single file basis. A reduction of 
repair work, both foreign and domestic, and sufficient new construction facilities to 
permit simultaneous, and parallel, construction processes would also be necessary if  
Portsmouth Navy Yard was to achieve greatly accelerated production rates. And this is 
exactly what happened as the year unfolded.
64 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 2 Jan 1942 to Chief o f  Naval Operations. NARA 
College Park, Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence of the CNO / Secretary o f the Navy
1940-1947, RG 80, Box 442, File L9-3/NY—L9-3/NY1.
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Portsmouth Navy Yard’s “can-do” attitude, and demonstrated performance, 
during the early stages of the war quickly led to increased Navy Department orders for 
submarines that continued through June 1943. Table 3 shows submarine orders between 
June 1940 and June 1943. The fourteen submarines ordered in 1940 were the direct result 
of the 11 % Naval Expansion Act passed in June 1940 and the 70% Naval Expansion Act 
passed in late July 1940.
Table 3: Portsmouth Navy Yard Submarine Orders (1940-1943)65
Submarines Order Ouantitv Date of Order
SS228-235 8 June 1940
SS275-280 6 Sept 1940
SS285-291 7 Dec 1941
SS308-312 5 Apr 1942
SS381-410 30 June 1942
SS417-424 8 Feb 1943
SS298-299 2 Started at Cramp Shipbldg,
completed at PNY
SS475-515 40 June 1943
106
The next forty-two submarines ordered were part of the flood of contracts issued during 
the first six months of the war, in a frantic effort to further accelerate war production.
During the three months prior to Pearl Harbor, the Navy awarded 1,625 contracts 
for purchases that exceeded $50,000 each that totaled $1.47 billion dollars. During the 
three months after Pearl Harbor, 2,917 similar contracts were issued that totaled $5,327 
billion.66 Portsmouth Navy Yard shared in this ordering frenzy. The large number of 
advance orders for submarines permitted the bulk ordering of material, and the
65 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 1.
66 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 269.
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development of disciplined repetitive work procedures, that would be critical to the mass 
production of submarines.
Between the summers of 1940 and 1942, Portsmouth Navy Yard ramped-up for 
war. Portsmouth’s situation was not unlike that at the other navy yards and private 
shipyards. The increased naval construction bills during the late 1930s had revitalized the 
yards with work and increased employment, but it was not until the summer of 1940 that 
the naval expansion legislation provided the funding needed for the urgently needed 
shipyard infrastructure upgrades. The navy yard infrastructure building bonanza occurred 
simultaneously with massive increases to employment and previously unimagined orders 
for large numbers of new ships and submarines. At Portsmouth Navy Yard, the 
successful integration of these new facilities and personnel resources into the day-to-day 
shipyard operations, with minimal interference to production schedules, was an extreme 
challenge to the mettle of management and employees.
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CHAPTER IV
MANAGEMENT & EMPLOYEES
“Admiral Withers was a man whom everybody liked because he let everyone do 
their job.”1
Fred White
Portsmouth Navy Yard Master Rigger and 
Laborer during World War II 
3 April 2006
“The workforce at Portsmouth is especially high grade. Top civilian supervisors are 
alert, intelligent, and obviously proud of their Yard.”2
Booz-Allen Industrial Survey 
6 November 1944
The performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war will be analyzed under 
the four categories shown in the titles of the next two chapters, Management, Employees, 
Methods, and Measurables. At this point, it is well to revisit a question posed earlier. 
What part of the shipyard’s success was due purely to the stimulation of war, and what 
part was due to other factors? That unanswerable question recognizes the special 
environment that existed at the yard during the war, an environment that inspired and 
focused all towards the common goal of increased production. While that environment
1 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
2 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f 6 Nov 1944, Subject: Survey o f  
Industrial Department, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. -  Report No. 2 o f Industrial Survey Division, 8. 
NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence (1940-45), Box 785, Folder 
NY1/A3. Emphasis added.
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may have contributed to heightened performances and an increased willingness to 
embrace organizational change and innovative production methods, favorable 
environments alone do not increase production. However, innovative management 
working with a skilled workforce in an environment ripe for change and cooperation can 
lead to impressive results. And that is what happened at Portsmouth Navy Yard during 
World War II.
Shipyard management, of course, includes military and civilian management. 
However, this management study is skewed towards the naval officers’ management of 
the yard as the senior positions were all held by naval officers and as they were the 
decision makers. However, as those who have served in navy yards know so well, the 
military leadership turns over every few years and it is the civilian management that 
provides the long-term leadership continuity, as well as the industrial and technical 
expertise that defines the yard. Civilian management is given much credit in this study, 
but the fact remains that the preponderance of archival information available about 
shipyard management during the war reflects the decisions, actions, and personalities of 
the senior naval officers.
That said, it should also be noted that the study includes the personal recollections 
of Fred White, a 96 year old shipyard retiree, who held a senior civilian management 
position during the war. White was the Master Rigger and Laborer, and, in that capacity, 
he supervised hundreds of employees and was heavily involved in important waterfront 
industrial events such as keel layings, launchings, dockings, undockings, and submarine 
movements. His testimony is an invaluable contribution to this study. In addition, the 
family papers of a shipyard naval architect, Harold Sweetser, who worked at the yard
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from 1917 until 1958, and articles from the shipyard’s newspaper, the Portsmouth 
Periscope, provide some insight into civilian management at the yard during the war. 
However, there is no escaping the fact that this dissertation deals primarily with the naval 
officer management of the shipyard during the war.
The next two chapters draw heavily from four World War II industrial studies. 
Two of the studies were conducted by independent management consulting firms, under 
the sponsorship of the office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the other two were self- 
assessments by a Portsmouth Navy Yard industrial survey team. Because of their 
importance to this dissertation, a discussion follows providing background and context 
for the studies.3
The first independent survey was a September 1942 survey of four navy yards 
(New York, Philadelphia, Bremerton, and Mare Island) by the firm Industrial Relations 
Counselors Inc. as directed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard.4 The study 
evaluated each yard’s production efficiency and needs. While Portsmouth was not 
included in the survey, the results permit comparisons of Portsmouth to the yards 
surveyed. The second independent study, also directed by the Secretary of the Navy, was 
an assessment of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s Industrial Department completed in late 1944
3
For purposes o f clarification, the four industrial studies will be referred to throughout the rest of 
this study in abbreviated terms as Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December 1941), Portsmouth Industrial 
Survey II (June 1942), Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), and the Booz-Allen Survey (1944).
4 Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. letter o f 8 September 1942 to Assistant Secretary o f  the 
Navy Ralph A. Bard. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence, 1940-1945, 
Box 151, Folder NY1, 1 Jul 1942-30 Jun 1943. Hereafter Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942).
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by the firm Booz-Allen Inc.5 The results of the Booz-Allen study provide an independent 
assessment of the industrial operations of Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war that 
provides balance to the wealth of archival shipyard self-appraisals cited throughout this 
study.
The two above surveys had different purposes. The Industrial Relations 
Counselors Survey of September 1942 was a cursory survey of four navy yards to 
provide feedback to Secretary of the Navy Knox regarding the effectiveness of the 
millions of dollars that had been spent on facility upgrades over the previous two years. 
The nation was in the early stage of a war whose outcome was still in doubt and the 
pressure was on to maximize the capabilities of the navy yards. While the auditors were 
careful not to overly criticize or condemn the efforts of the mobilizing yards, they were 
also quick to point out areas needing improvement to maximize production at each yard. 
On the other hand, the Booz-Allen Survey of 1944 was pointed more towards postwar 
operations than maximizing production to win the war. This survey took the opportunity 
to congratulate Portsmouth Navy Yard for its war record while emphasizing changes 
needed to adjust to the fast approaching reduction in workload and workforce. Of 
paramount concern was a desire to end the crisis management modus operandi that had 
characterized wartime operations and return to more structured and disciplined 
management with emphasis on cost monitoring and control.
The third and fourth studies are Portsmouth Navy Yard Industrial Department 
self-assessments that were issued on 8 December 1941 and 6 June 1942. The 8 December
5 Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy Ralph A. Bard ltr o f 6 Nov 1944, Subject: Survey o f  Industrial 
Department, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. -  Report No. 2 o f Industrial Survey Division. NARA College 
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence, 1940-1945, Box 785, Folder NY 1/A3 .Hereafter 
Booz-Allen Survey (1944).
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1941 report provides an extensive analysis of the yard’s production status and needs to 
achieve increased building rates.6 The 6 June 1942 report provides extensive analysis of 
the yard’s first six months of operations after Pearl Harbor.7 It is a much more refined 
assessment of the yard’s capabilities with a confident prognosis for future success. These 
Portsmouth Navy Yard self-assessments are important keys to understanding much of 
management’s thinking and actions during the war. For this reason, a detailed explanation 
of these two studies follows.
In conjunction with an accelerated shipbuilding program, the Secretary of the 
Navy announced, in September 1941, the inauguration of a shipbuilding competition to 
commence 1 October to evaluate the efficiency of the nation’s commercial and 
government shipyards. Five categories were to be evaluated; work progress, work quality, 
yard improvement, yard spirit, and the overall opinion of the evaluating board of 
officers.8 The first three categories relied on the typical indicators of shipyard 
performance as measured by schedule adherence, inspection records, and test results.
The last two, yard spirit and overall opinion of the board, addressed the intangibles that 
were needed to build mobilization momentum.
6 Board o f Shipbuilding Construction Report o f  8 Dec 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Subject: New Construction -  Progress and Administration to Expedite Work. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l/3 , “Building 
Program, PKG4.” Hereafter Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December 1941).
7 Board o f Shipbuilding Construction Report o f  6 Jun 1942 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Subject: New Construction -  Progress and Administration to Expedite Work. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A 1, “Construction June 1940 to Dec 
1943 .’’Hereafter Portsmouth Industrial Survey II (June 1942).
8 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f  24 Sep 1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder Al-3, “General Building Program, PKG # 
4.”
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The board, with Rear Admiral H. E. Yarnell as the senior member, visited 
Portsmouth Navy Yard on 5 November to kick off the competition.9 Each yard was to be 
evaluated quarterly with awards given quarterly, semi-annually, and annually. The annual 
award for the best shipyard of each group was to be known as the “Victory” award. 
Private shipyards were assigned to one of four regions and all navy yards were grouped 
together for evaluation purposes. The competition, obviously designed to motivate all 
shipyards to review internal capabilities and processes to eliminate waste and improve 
efficiency of operations, had exactly the desired effect at Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
Commandant John D. Wainwright established a well qualified local review board to 
recommend improvements to new construction processes and practices. The board was in 
the final steps of its review on the day Pearl Harbor was attacked and published its initial 
findings the next day, 8 December 1942.10
The board continued to function after the war started and issued an updated report 
in June 1942. The board consisted of six officers under the leadership of the shipyard’s 
Planning Officer, Captain A.I. McKee. The board showed a clear understanding of 
shipyard industrial management and the needs of Portsmouth Navy Yard in particular.
The 8 December 1941 and 6 June 1942 reports are comprehensive reports of fifteen pages 
each that provide a convenient firsthand summary of activity at Portsmouth Navy Yard at 
the start, and during the first six months, of the war. In addition to valuable facts and 
figures, the studies are rich in analysis of the shipyard’s needs and opportunities. The two
9 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Nov 1941, “Adm. H.E. Yarnell Here to Inspect Local Navy Yard,” 1.
10 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral John D. Wainwright memo o f 7 Nov 1941. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, 
Folder A l-3 , “General Building Program, PKG # 4.”
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reports served the intended purpose of kick-starting greatly increased wartime production 
at the yard. While no follow-on reports are extant in the archives, it is obvious that the 
shipyard continued to aggressively pursue and improve upon the recommendations 
contained in these two reports.
A comparison of the tone of the two studies, six months apart, suggests an attitude 
change on the part of the board and shipyard management. The first study (December 
1941) reflects confidence in the yard’s abilities to make the necessary changes to ramp- 
up production to meet expectations, but expresses concerns about the details of that 
transition. The second report (June 1942) takes considerable pride in the yard’s 
demonstrated performance during the first six months of the war and aggressively 
proposes opportunities to not just meet, but exceed, expectations. The first report focused 
on potential production limitations due to local restraints. The second report reflects 
great self-confidence that the shipyard’s performance can be limited only by external 
factors, especially contractors’ abilities to provide timely delivery of components to 
support the yard’s accelerated schedules. However, the board refused to accept schedule 
delays for any reason and recommended ways to work around delinquent contractor 
support.
These two internal shipyard self-assessments of December 1941 and June 1942 
are not self-congratulatory or self-serving. The immediate threat of war, in the first case, 
and the early stages of war, in the second case, had cut through any ulterior motives or 
conclusions. The teams consisted of representatives from various shipyard departments 
who had the same objective, to define those actions needed to enable their shipyard to do 
its part to win the war. While they were advertised as industrial surveys, the teams were
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headed by the Planning Officer, Captain A.I. McKee, who had held that position since 
March 1938. Consequently, he was very knowledgeable of the yard’s practices and 
capabilities. If anything, the reports are more critical of the support departments than the 
Industrial Department, calling for better planning, provisioning of material, and closer 
liaison of the support departments with the industrial scheduling department. In effect, 
the team called for maximum streamlining of all shipyard functions towards submarine 
construction. And that is exactly what happened in the months that followed.
Finally, the next two chapters often refer to various Navy Department bureaus and 
commands to which Portsmouth Navy Yard was responsible, and deals considerably with 
a power struggle within the Navy Department for control of navy yards that can be 
confusing to the reader unfamiliar with naval matters and organization. Figure 9 is a
I
Figure 9: Navy Department WWII Organizational Chart. United States Naval 
Administration in World War II, Bureau of Ships, 1946, Chart 5, “Flow Chart -  
World War II.”
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chart showing the chain of command and organizational flow of responsibilities and
authority from the Secretary of the Navy to the navy yard commandants and shipyard
departments that existed during World War II. This chart will be referred to frequently to
provide context and a clearer understanding of the complex and, sometimes, confusing
organizational structure in which the navy yards were required to operate during the war.
At this point, it is sufficient to note that the leadership of the Navy Department for most
of the war was provided by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox from 11 July 1940 until
his sudden death on 28 April 1944. Knox was succeeded by his Under Secretary and
assistant for procurement and production, James Forrestal (19 May 1944 to 17 September
1947). Two officers held the position of Chief of Naval Operations during the war,
Admiral Harold R. Stark (1 August 1939 to 2 March 1942) and Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King (26 March 1942 to 15 December 1945).
Historian Robert H. Connery notes that, on the eve of World War II, Navy
Department responsibilities for the planning the Navy’s industrial mobilization were
ambiguous and ill defined. According to Connery:
The Chief of Naval Operations, the material bureaus, and the Secretary’s office all 
had some part in planning but their various roles were never clearly defined.
The most serious consequence was lack of aggressive leadership in the industrial 
planning field. There were jurisdictional conflicts to be sure, but theses were not 
nearly as serious as lack of interest arising from divided responsibility.11
Things began to change for the better in August 1940 when James V. Forrestal took
office as the first Under Secretary of the Navy with responsibilities for all material
procurement. Forrestal, in time, did provide the industrial mobilization leadership,
structure, and clarification that the Navy needed. Early in the war, however, the Under
11 Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 31.
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Secretary was still organizing his new office at the same time that the newly formed 
Bureau of Ships was struggling to get its act together.
Figure 9 shows two primary flow paths of authority to the navy yard 
commandants. In the case of Portsmouth Navy Yard, the first path, through the Chief of 
Naval Operations, primarily concerned the maintenance of the existing submarine fleet 
and the care and administration of the sailors and officers who manned those submarines. 
The Chief of Naval Operations set priorities and schedules. The second path, through the 
Under Secretary of the Navy for Procurement and Production, primarily concerned 
matters pertaining to the construction of new submarines, including the oversight of the 
management of the navy yards through the Bureau of Ships. The tension between policies 
for the construction of new submarines and policies for the maintenance and overhaul of 
existing submarines was an essential element of operations at Portsmouth Navy Yard 
during the war. This tension frequently left the yard managers trying to please two 
masters. Management’s ability to walk this political tightrope to the satisfaction of both is 
critical to understanding the yard’s performance during the war.
Management
By the summer of 1942, the success that United States submarines were having in
the Pacific sinking Japanese shipping received considerable press coverage, much of it
advocating increased and accelerated production of submarines. Journalist David
Lawrence urged that emphasis be placed on the building of submarines to close the gap
that the Germans enjoyed in numbers. Lawrence wrote:
Why has the submarine been neglected in public discussions? . . .
Authoritative figures show that on Oct. 10, 1941, Japan had 71 submarines 
and seven building for a total of 78. Germany had 120 in service and 180 
building for a total of 300. The United States had 113 in service and 73
144
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
building for a total of 186... It takes about 11 months to build a large 
submarine nowadays. Can this time be cut by the various speedup formulas 
that have helped us to turn out planes and cargo ships at record production?
Very little is known by the public of submarine construction. There has been 
a great deal of secrecy about it but, with the splendid work being done by 
American submarines in the Pacific, the opportunity for stimulating the 
whole submarine program would seem to be increased by disclosing more 
and more about our offensive operations with the submarine.12
Portsmouth Navy Yard management was in the process of doing much as David
Lawrence was suggesting, speeding up the traditional production rate of submarines by
employing new and innovative techniques. However, it was one thing to casually suggest
the speedup of submarine production and quite another thing to do it.
The transformation of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, from the custom shop operation 
that built two submarines a year in the 1930s to a mass producer of dozens of submarines 
a year by 1944, required a unique industrial environment. This section argues that the 
yard’s success was the result of innovative management directing the efforts of a 
dedicated and empowered workforce in a relatively small shipyard with a sharply focused 
and well defined mission. All of these factors enabled the yard to operate very efficiently 
and thrive in an industrial environment that was characterized by loose corporate 
oversight of navy yards by the Bureau of Ships, leaving the yards free to manage their 
own affairs. In that environment, Portsmouth management developed production 
methods, tailored to the yard’s strengths, that included employee empowerment, special 
teams, risk management, and submarine construction procedures that employed mass 
production techniques to the extent that it was possible to do so at the time. Prior to a 
detailed analysis of industrial methods and practices, it is important to understand the
12 David Lawrence article with Washington date line, undated. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction June 1940- 
December 1943.”
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context of the times, beginning with the situation at the Bureau of Ships and working 
down through the shipyard leadership and management to the waterfront industrial 
operations.
Loose Corporate Oversight of Navy Yards
In comparison to the detailed supervision and guidance imposed by the Naval Sea 
Systems Command on the naval shipyards today, Portsmouth Navy Yard received 
relatively little direction from higher authority during the war. The navy yard’s 
immediate supervisor during World War II was the Bureau of Ships, newly created in 
June 1940. The Bureau of Ships (BuShips) spent a good part of the war in a crisis 
management mode that left little opportunity for the new organization to oversee shipyard 
operations. To a large extent, each navy yard was an entrepreneurial operation whose 
success, or failure, depended on local management decisions and initiative.
According to the Bureau of Ships self-history of operations during the war, “The 
role of the Bureau of Ships in management and supervision of the work in the naval 
industrial establishments had been restricted, in spite of its predominant interest, and had 
been subject to qualifications and limitations.”13 The result was “decentralized, 
independent organizational growth”14 with each navy yard having different 
responsibilities and a variety of procedures to fulfill those responsibilities. The Industrial 
Relations Counselors Survey (1942) commented on the lack of coordination, 
communication, cross-training, and sharing of experiences between navy yards.15 The
13 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 135.
14 Ibid
15 Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), 1.
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Bureau of Ships should have coordinated activities between navy yards and, apparently, 
did not. In essence, each navy yard was left to independently develop and tailor processes 
and procedures to their own individual needs. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to develop 
processes and procedures that took advantage of existing facility and workforce attributes 
proved to be quite exceptional.
The organizational change that left the navy yards lacking in organizational 
oversight during World War II had its roots in a long and tortured history of indecision 
about how best to manage and administer the navy yards. A 1945 survey of current navy 
yard operations, conducted by the Navy’s Organization Planning and Procedures Unit, 
traced that volatile history to over a century of debate about the proper relationship 
between the Secretary of the Navy and the yards, the most efficient relationship between 
the Navy Department Bureaus and the yards, and the optimum internal organization of 
navy yards.16 According to the Bureau of Ships self-history, the genesis of the problem 
can be traced to the post-Civil War alignment of internal navy yard departments to Navy 
Department Bureaus that left a lack of cooperation and a division of loyalties in the navy 
yards:
The origin of many of the difficulties in defining the Bureau of Ships’ role in 
Naval Yards goes back to 1 July 1868 when Secretary Welles extended the 
Bureau system [established in 1842] to the individual yards. In this action 
each bureau [Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Steam 
Engineering, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and 
Bureau of Navigation] was assigned its own department in each yard and was 
permitted to handle its own supplies and materials. Each bureau dealt directly 
with its own department, with the result that cooperation often proved to be
16 Organization Planning and Procedures letter o f 13 July 1945 to Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy 
Ralph A. Bard forwarding “Review o f the Organization and Administration o f Navy Yards and U.S.Naval 
Drydocks.” This survey provides a summary o f the history o f navy yard organization and administration 
with recommendations for improvements. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General 
Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, Folder NY1/A3.
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completely lacking. Although a Commandant commanded each yard, primary 
allegiance of department heads gravitated towards their bureau.17
Each navy bureau received annual Congressional appropriations and, thus, commanded
great allegiance from its corresponding navy yard department upon which it was
dependent for funds. The consequence was navy yard internal departments that were
more loyal to their parent navy bureaus in Washington D.C. than to their commandant at
the navy yard.
The inefficient bureau system continued to be a major problem until a 1938 audit 
report by the firm Booz, Fry, Allen, and Hamilton noted that, “In the gradual evolution of 
the two bureaus [Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering] the 
distinction between ‘hull’ and ‘machinery’ became increasingly obscure.. . This resulted 
in overlapping and duplication of work, inefficiency, and confusion.”18 The inefficiencies 
became so bad that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt intervened and, in a letter of 16 
March 1938 to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, complained of excessive 
delays in the cases of three cruisers under construction at the Philadelphia and New York 
Navy Yards. FDR did note that “The record on submarines is not so bad.” However, FDR 
wrote, “In the case of the cruisers, the Philadelphia Navy Yard and, to a less degree, the 
New York Navy Yard need to be told that the Commander-in-Chief is much 
dissatisfied.”19 Congress became involved and, on 20 June 1940, the 76th Congress 
passed Public Law 644 abolishing the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau
17 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 135.
18 Ibid, 25.
19 Quoted in Ibid., 29-30.
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of Engineering and establishing the Bureau of Ships to consolidate navy yard operations 
under one bureau.20
Figure 9 shows the Navy Department organizational structure after the 
establishment of the Bureau of Ships. While the technical and management responsibility 
for all naval ships and navy yards resided in the Bureau of Ships instead of being split 
between the two feuding bureaus, it should be noted that the Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
Bureau of Ordnance, and Bureau of Supplies and Accounts continued to provide 
direction to the navy yards during the war. However, unlike the earlier, and faulty, 
“bureau system” that undermined the commandant’s authority, there were fewer bureaus 
and they were required to function through the navy yard commandant. The 
establishment of the Bureau of Ships solved some, but certainly not all, of the navy yard 
problems. As late as December 1944, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who 
continued to be frustrated with the inefficient administration of the navy yards, wrote, 
“What I want is some man whose sole job is to examine the functions, to compare
9 1operations and handle difficulties [at navy yards]. We should have one man to go to.” 
Organizational revisions immediately after the war further consolidated these other 
bureau functions under the Bureau of Ships.
The consolidation of navy yard shipbuilding operations under one bureau in 1940 
was a step in the right direction. However, the timing was bad as the new bureau rapidly 
grew from 1,000 to 6,000 employees during the war and never had a chance to organize
20 Ibid., 42.
21 Quoted in Organization Planning and Procedures letter of 13 July 1945 to Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy Ralph A. Bard, Enclosure A, 3c. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General 
Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, Folder NY 1/A3.
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itself, let alone the navy yards, before it was inundated with overwhelming wartime 
responsibilities.22 The Congressional Hearings on further naval expansion, held during 
the spring of 1940, almost simultaneously with the birth of the Bureau of Ships, 
continued the mobilization of shipbuilding that had begun with the outbreak of the war in 
Europe in 1939. The fall of France stirred up demands for further increase in the strength 
of the U.S. Navy and, by July 1940, with the Bureau of Ships celebrating its one month 
anniversary, the 70% Naval Expansion Act was passed, greatly expanding the workload 
of the new bureau:
This rapid increase in the size of the shipbuilding program created a host of 
problems in the administration of the new Bureau’s work. The Shipbuilding 
Program on the books on September 1,1939 was 360,000,000 man-hours; it 
had risen to about 2,250,000,000 man-hours on January 1,1942 and 
3,000,000,000 man-hours by 1 September 1942. Daily emergencies being the 
rule, little time could be devoted to the sort of work that would pay dividends 
only in the long-run.
As noted, the Bureau of Ships did little or no long range planning. Rather, it fought day- 
to-day emergencies and settled into a crisis management mode that left the navy yards to 
fend for themselves. Concerning the Bureau of Ships inability to function effectively 
during this period, industrial mobilization historian Robert Connery wrote, “The Bureau 
of Ships was going through a period of indigestion caused by the amalgamation of the 
Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair and its 
administrative processes were confused.”24 The bad case of indigestion at the Bureau of 
Ships had been the result of an unprecedented glut of shipbuilding contracts.
22 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., Table 5, “Personnel On-board by Months, 1933-45.”
23 Ibid, 201-202.
24 Robert H. Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 74.
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Table 4, which places the establishment of the Bureau of Ships chronologically
with annual naval appropriations for ship engineering, gives one a sense of the
overwhelming workload that the newly created Bureau faced.
Table 4 - Bureau of Ships Naval Appropriations (1935-1944)25 












The Bureau of Ships quickly found that it was responsible for managing budgets that 
were twenty to thirty times larger than the Bureau of Construction and Repair managed 
just a few years earlier.
Recognizing that the Bureau of Ships was overwhelmed with the nation’s
revitalized shipbuilding program, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, in January 1941,
directed the navy yard commandants to operate independently of the Bureau of Ships to
the maximum extent possible:
During the present emergency, it is directed that Commandants of all Navy 
Yards act with the full authority of the Bureau of Ships taking final local 
action to the greatest extent possible.26
25 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., Table 2, “Decline and Renaissance o f the Navy.”
26 Secretary o f  the Navy Frank Knox letter o f 15 Jan 1941 to Chief Bureau o f Ships and 
Commandants All Navy Yards, Subject: National Defense Shipbuilding Program -  Expedition and 
Prosecution o f Work. NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence,
1941-45, NY1 (66-176) toN Y 2 (551-661), Box 1601, Folder NY 166-176.
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Knox further directed that the only technical issues to be forwarded to the Bureau of 
Ships for concurrence, prior to shipyard action, were those deemed necessary by the 
shipyard commandant. This policy, which Knox promulgated to enable the navy yards to 
accelerate production to achieve the ambitious naval shipbuilding programs passed in the 
summer of 1940, became the modus operandi for the duration of the war.
Not only were the orders for new ships growing at an unprecedented rate, but 
changes to those orders were frequently necessary to accommodate changing war plans. 
On one hand, America’s success during World War II was the direct result of an 
industrial flexibility that was able to shift production quickly from one goal to another.
On the other hand, the shifting of workload priorities amongst shipbuilding orders created 
an unmanageable situation for the fledgling Bureau of Ships. According to a Bureau of 
Ships report, “Not one month of the twenty-four under consideration [Jan 1942-Jan 1944] 
passed without the Bureau of Ships receiving at least one directive either ordering a ship 
to be built or canceling others previously ordered.” Chief of the Office of Procurement 
and Material Rear Admiral S.M. Robinson told the Under Secretary of the Navy in July 
1942, “Since the beginning of 1942, the Navy Shipbuilding Program has been in almost 
continuous turmoil.”28 There can be little doubt that, in the summer of 1942, when 
Portsmouth Navy Yard was ramping-up facilities and employment to meet accelerated 
production schedules, it could expect little help from the Bureau of Ships.
21 Ibid.,327.
28 Chief o f  the Office o f Procurement and Material Admiral S.M. Robinson’s memo o f 31 July 
1942 to the Under Secretary o f the Navy. Quoted in full in United States Naval Administration in World 
War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946,201-202. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, 
D.C.
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In July 1942, “at a time when the production and scheduling of the Bureau of 
Ships was, for the first time, beginning to assume some semblance of order, following the 
initial wartime adjustment period,”29 the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to launch the 
North Africa offensive as soon as possible and shipbuilding priorities had to be 
resttuctured to insure the landing craft and support ships would be available to support 
the operation. The Chief of Naval Operations shifted ship construction priorities 
frequently, depending upon the progress of the war, leaving the Bureau of Ships 
struggling to restructure and reassign shipyard workloads.31
War, by its very nature, requires constant reassessments and revisions to plans. 
The Bureau of Ships self-history of World War II, however, attributed the chaotic 
conditions in which it was required to operate to a lack of coordinated advance planning 
between the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Bureau also 
believed that President Roosevelt’s personal involvement in naval matters further added 
to the confusion, “The personal handling of many matters by President Roosevelt was
29 Ibid, 331.
30 Ibid, 333.
31 World War II shipbuilding priorities were assigned on a basis o f A, B, C for the highest priority 
projects and then numerically for the others o f  lower priority. For example, landing craft enjoyed an “A” 
priority in the summer o f 1942 in preparation for the North Africa campaign discussed above. Submarines, 
despite their obvious important contributions to the war effort, never enjoyed a high industrial priority 
during the war. On a priority system ranking o f 1 to 10, submarines were most often ranked 7th with the 
priorities 8 to 10 not used or assigned to “all other vessels.” According to the Bureau o f Ships self-history, 
“Submarines in view o f our comparative strength in the class, received seventh priority and all other vessels 
following.” Perhaps the low assignment o f priorities to submarine construction was also done with the 
belief that the submarine community would produce satisfactory results no matter what priorities were 
assigned, as was certainly the case. One can argue that the national shipbuilding priority system contributed 
to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s independence and stability during the war in that constantly changing priorities 
kept the Bureau o f Ships fully occupied with little time to devote to navy yard operations. At the same time, 
the ever changing priorities kept the non-submarine shipyards in constant turmoil while Portsmouth, in 
comparison, was little affected by changes to priority or workload. See United States Naval Administration 
in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946,Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, 
D.C. 593, Table 40, 599.
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well known and tended to give advantage to the individual who could get to him with his 
case.”32 The end result was a failure to plan in advance that “led to haphazard 
development of requirements” that “made the job of the Bureau much more difficult than
# - jo
it would have been if greater stability had prevailed.”
The need for the newly created Bureau of Ships to come to grips with a vast array
of material procurement issues also distracted the bureau’s attention from the
management of navy yards. The logistics problems associated with the mobilization of
private industry, to provide basic components and equipment for shipbuilding, were
especially taxing to the Bureau of Ships:
Although the most obvious interest of the Bureau of Ships was in the 
expansion of shipyards.. .  its greatest headache centered on the problem of 
upland facilities capable of manufacturing the components and materials 
necessary to keep the shipyards supplied. It is not unreasonable to state that 
the Bureau devoted as much effort to the increase of production capacity in 
supporting industries as to the increase in shipbuilding facilities.34
Again, the Bureau of Ships had pressing needs in several areas of responsibility that kept
it from devoting sufficient attention to the navy yards.
Ineffective leadership also plagued the Bureau of Ships during the hectic summer
of 1942. The first chief of the new bureau, Rear Admiral Samuel Robinson, was widely
respected and especially enjoyed the confidence of Assistant Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal. Historian Robert Albion described Robinson as “wise, shrewd, and technically
32 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
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competent.”35 Forrestal promoted Robinson to head procurement operations for the entire 
Navy in February 1942. According to Albion, “His [Robinson’s] successor [Rear 
Admiral Alexender H. VanKeuren] proved unable to hold in check the disruptive forces 
and ambitions within the Bureau of Ships and it was drifting into ineffectiveness.” 
Forrestal replaced VanKeuren after only eight months in the job, in November 1942, with 
Rear Admiral Edward L. Cochrane. Cochrane proved much more capable and remained 
in the job throughout the war until November 1946.
Looking up the corporate ladder from the vantage point of Portsmouth Navy Yard 
in December 1942, one year after Pearl Harbor, it must have been obvious to shipyard 
management that they were pretty much on their own. The overwhelmed bureau to which 
they reported, and from which they should have received support and guidance, had only 
been in existence for eighteen months and the admiral in charge had just been removed 
for ineffective performance. In would be a while longer before the Bureau of Ships could 
assume any semblance of control over navy yard operations. In the meantime, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard had dozens of orders for new submarines and had to get on with 
the measures necessary to meet those production goals.
Throughout 1943 and 1944, Portsmouth Navy Yard not only met, but greatly 
exceeded, production goals. This was not the case for many shipyards, as evidenced by a 
September 1943 Bureau of Ships letter that noted, “110 of the 342 [ships] actually
35 Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962), 61.
36 Ibid.
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17scheduled for delivery in August did not meet their date.” The letter highlighted the 
need for the bureau to receive more accurate progress reports from the shipyards. Not 
only was the Bureau of Ships unable to actively manage the shipyards, it was also having 
difficulty keeping up to date on the progress of ships under construction at the yards. In 
late 1943, the Bureau of Ships continued in a crisis management mode with many 
shipyards adding to that crisis by failing to meet scheduled completion dates. What little 
attention the bureau could give to shipyards was better directed at the deficient yards and 
not at the better performing yards like Portsmouth Navy Yard.
An exponentially growing and constantly changing shipbuilding program, 
massive material procurement issues, ineffective leadership, and the internal 
administrative burdens of organizing and managing the newly created and rapidly 
growing Bureau of Ships left little time or opportunity for the bureau to effectively 
oversee navy yard operations. For the most part, navy yards were left to their own 
devices to manage their own affairs. Fortunately, in Portsmouth’s case, those devices 
were considerable and well managed.
A Relatively Small Navy Yard
The Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) noted that, “The expanse of 
the waterfront at all Yards [New York, Boston, Puget Sound, and Mare Island] tends to 
retard the transfer of gangs between ships and makes for a more rigid operating situation 
than is normally found in commercial yards.”38 In comparison, Portsmouth Navy Yard 
had a rather limited and compact waterfront area that lent itself to the efficient transfer of
37 Chief Bureau o f Ships Confidential letter o f 18 Sep 1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard 
Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50, Box 3, Folder L6-3, “Progress Reports.”
38 Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), 2.
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teams from submarine to submarine, and a high degree of flexibility not found in the 
other navy yards. Left to its own devices to manage its own workload, the smaller yard 
with the more homogeneous workload would have a much better chance of developing 
successful practices and processes than a larger shipyard with a complex workload. At 
peak wartime employments, Portsmouth was the smallest navy yard and the only one able 
to specialize in the construction of a single type of ship.
The Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) also noted that the industrial 
departments in all navy yards had increased three to four fold in less than two years. The 
three to four fold employment increases would pale in comparison to the peak 
employments reached at each yard later in the war. Table 5 compares civilian 
employment levels at each navy yard on 1 July 1938 with the peak employment reached 
during the war.39
Table 5: Navy Yards Employment (1938 -  WWII Peak)
N aw  Yard 7/1/1938 Peak During WWII Multiple Increase
Portsmouth 3273 20461 6.25
Boston 2860 50128 17.52
New York 6876 69128 10.05
Philadelphia 5636 46454 8.24
Norfolk 5739 42372 7.88
Mare Island 4756 39736 8.35
Puget Sound 3469 32643 9.41
Pearl Harbor 1974 24916 10.69
Terminal Island 15971 (temporary)
San Francisco 17174 (temporary)
Total 35655 384997 10.80
39 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 145.
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The table shows that Portsmouth, one of the smaller navy yards in 1938, experienced 
considerably less growth during the war than the other navy yards. Portsmouth increased 
by a factor of 6.25 while all navy yards increased by an average factor of 10.8. Relative 
to the other yards, Portsmouth’s smaller, specialized, and concentrated workforce had 
better opportunities to optimize production than the other yards. 40 
Well Defined Mission
Earlier it was argued that Portsmouth Navy Yard enjoyed a distinct workload 
advantage over the other navy yards, at the start of World War II, because the U.S. Navy 
had decided to develop the submarine design and new construction capabilities at the 
yard during the 1920s and 1930s. The shipyard exploited that opportunity to the fullest 
through continued outstanding performance. The success of Portsmouth Navy Yard 
during World War II was the direct result of an even more focused and specialized 
workload during the war.
The Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) noted great disorganization 
and confusion in other navy yards and highlighted the production control and scheduling 
advantages that private shipyards, engaged only in the new construction of ships, enjoyed 
over the navy yards surveyed. Those navy yards serviced the fleet with ship repairs and 
overhauls, often of an emergency nature.41 The study reported that the private shipyards 
could build a more orderly and disciplined work environment, whereas the navy yards 
surveyed might have “thousands of employees thrown aboard a single ship to expedite
40 Electric Boat, a relatively small private shipyard, enjoyed advantages similar to those o f  
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. It grew from 2900 employees in August 1940 to a peak o f 12, 466 
employees during the war, a multiple o f only 4.3. Electric Boat also specialized in submarine construction 
like Portsmouth Navy Yard. See Horn, Submarines and the Electric Boat Company, Page V-3 -  V-5.
41 Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), 1-2.
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the work by having men available when and where they are needed, [and] gangs are 
constantly forced to stand by waiting for other crafts to finish up or for servicemen to 
bring up necessary material or equipment.”42 In this regard, Portsmouth Navy Yard 
enjoyed the same advantages as the private shipyards and, for the most part, did not have 
to deal with the chaotic repair and overhaul work environment that characterized the 
inefficient operations at other navy yards.
The Booz-Allen Survey (1944) heaped credit on the yard for its ability to focus 
resources and streamline work practices towards a single objective, the construction of 
submarines. According to the survey, “Any present judgment of the organization, 
administration, and control procedures of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. must give 
great weight to the development of the Yard, subordinating all other considerations to the 
demands of the war effort, into a specialized construction activity for submarines only. 
All operating units have been streamlined for this sole purpose.”43 The U.S. Navy’s goal 
to develop the submarine design and production capabilities of the yard between the 
wars, and the yard’s local strategy of the mid and late-1930s to shed all other work, 
except submarine new construction, had been a resounding success. This strategy, which 
served the shipyard’s interests so well, served the war effort even more. The U.S. Navy 
would have had far fewer submarines than were ultimately needed to win the war in the 
Pacific had Portsmouth Navy Yard not been able to perform as it did early in the war.
42 Ibid.
43 Booz-Allen Survey (1944), 3.
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Table 6 shows the yard’s transition from a preponderance of overhaul work in the
early 1930s to specialized submarine construction during World War II.44 
Table 6: Portsmouth Navy Yard Workload Mix (1931-1945)
1931 1932 1933 1941 1942 1943 1944 Aug1945
Subs Building 1 2 2 4 12 19 32 12
Yard Craft Built 2 1 2 7
Overhauled Subs 7 8 7 2 5 4 10 19
Ships Overhauled 2 2 1 6 16
Yard Craft Repaired 3 1
Subs Ovhld/ Built 7 4 3.5 .5 .42 .21 .31 1.58
Yard Employment 1552 1477 1595 11,142 18,326 20,466 17,102 10,133
During the early 1930s, the shipyard overhauled many more submarines than it built and 
built surface ships and yard craft as well. Although not shown on this table, the shipyard 
built its last surface ship, U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Hudson, in 1934.45 During the boom 
submarine construction years 1942-44, when employment levels were ten times higher 
than the early 1930s, the shipyard overhauled far fewer submarines annually than it did in 
the early 1930s. The ratio of Subs Overhauled / Built clearly shows the streamlining for 
new construction during the war years to which the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) 
referred. With most of the United Sates submarine fleet deployed to the Pacific theater, 
the West Coast shipyards assumed a disproportionate share of the submarine repair and 
overhaul workload, leaving Portsmouth Navy Yard relatively free to concentrate on the 
construction of new submarines.
441930’ s  data is from the Industrial Manager’s Annual Reports. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9-1/Y1 “Annual 
Reports Commandant First Naval District 1925-34.” The 1930s data is a fiscal year summary ending on 30 
June. 1940’s data is from “Portsmouth Naval Shipyard During World War II,” Official Administrative 
History, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Kittery, Maine, 3.
45 Cradle o f  American Shipbuilding. The USS Hudson is listed near the back o f the booklet as the 
last surface ship built at Portsmouth Navy Yard.
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Figure A-3 in the appendix, Portsmouth Navy Yard Manpower Curves by Work
Category (1940-1945),46 shows even more conclusively the streamlining for new
construction. The Manpower Curves show the phasing out of the repair workload (shaded
on Figure A-3) between early 1940 and early 1942. In the second quarter of 1940 the
1,500 men per day expended on repairs approximated that on new construction. By
January 1942, only a few hundred men per day were assigned to repair/overhaul work
and over 6,000 men a day were working on new construction. As can be seen in Figure
A-3, the shipyard’s workload continued to reflect negligible repair work in comparison to
new construction work until the end of 1944. There is no doubt that the shipyard’s
workload was streamlined towards new construction during the shipyard’s glory years
from early 1942 through the end of 1944.
Not only could the shipyard concentrate on one type of work, it was protected
from external changes in priorities for the scheduling of that work. Those shipyards that
handled a mix of ship types and work packages, including repairs and overhauls, were
subject to ever shifting priorities that resulted in the need for frequent short-notice
internal shipyard scheduling revisions. For example, Jeffery M. Dorwart, discussing the
shifting wartime priorities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, described how that yard’s
workload shifted from the construction of battleships, to destroyer escorts, to amphibious
ships, to heavy cruisers, to aircraft carriers:
In 1942, the Navy Department changed building priorities from battleships to 
destroyer escorts for an anti-submarine war in the Atlantic.. .  FDR announced an 
emergency program in April 1942 to build landing craft for North African, 
European, and later Pacific amphibious operations.. .  With victory in Europe 
becoming more certain by 1944, League Island [Philadelphia Navy Yard] turned
46 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., Chapter Ic, Production Graphs.
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to construction of heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers to fight the Pacific War 
against Japan.47
Philadelphia Navy Yard found it difficult to plan for a moving target while Portsmouth 
Navy Yard could continuously improve upon its planning for a stationary target, 
submarines, for the duration of the war.
The Chief of Naval Operations priority system for navy yard work, in order of 
precedence, was overriding priority, first priority, second priority, and new construction 
priority.48 The first three priorities were all related to war damage and urgent repairs with 
each priority subcategorized according to urgency by ship type. Under the new 
construction priority, submarines were generally low on the ship-type list, with landing 
craft, transport ships, and other surface ships often high on the list to support the next 
invasion or coordinated assault. As a result, submarine new construction enjoyed a low 
priority -  on paper. However, the ability of Portsmouth Navy Yard to bulk order material 
more than neutralized any disadvantages of a low priority. While other shipyards were 
whipsawed back and forth with waves of changing priorities, according to the fortunes of 
war, the priorities of Portsmouth Navy Yard never wavered. The shipyard’s charge for 
the entire war remained constant; to build as many submarines as possible as fast as 
possible. The ability to specialize in one line of work was, unquestionably, one of the 
keys to the shipyard’s success during the war.
47 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, The Philadelphia Navy Yard: From the Birth o f  the U.S. Navy to the 
NuclearAge (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 186.
A O
Vice Chief o f Naval Operations F.J. Home letter o f  12 Jul 1943, NARA College Park, RG 80, 
Records o f the Navy Department 1798-1947. Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence o f  the 
CNO / Secretary o f the Navy 1940-1947, Box 897, File L9-3/NY-NY1.
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Once Portsmouth Navy Yard started to deliver new submarines at record rates, 
there was never any serious attempt by the Navy Department to direct other types of 
work to Portsmouth until the end of the war. The U.S. Navy had many material 
procurement problems but getting submarines out of Portsmouth Navy Yard was 
certainly not one of those problems. Rather than attempt to fix what was not broken, the 
Navy left Portsmouth free to continue to do its thing. The Navy did, however, tap the 
shipyard’s expertise and resources to assist Mare Island Navy Yard and Cramp 
Shipbuilding in Philadelphia in their efforts to build submarines. Portsmouth Navy Yard 
was a CEO’s dream. The facility consistently achieved great production and quality with 
little or no investment of time or effort on the part of corporate management.
Effective Leadership
Outstanding leadership is critical to the successful management of any industrial 
operation and Portsmouth Navy Yard was blessed with one of the most respected leaders 
of the submarine community during the war. Rear Admiral Thomas Withers relieved 
Rear Admiral J.D. Wainwright as Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard on 10 June 1942. 
Withers remained in charge of the shipyard until late 1945. His immediate assignment, 
prior to coming to Portsmouth, was as Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet, where 
he had witnessed the attack on Pearl Harbor and directed the first deployment of United 
States submarines in response to the attack.
As an eye witness to the very first minutes of the war, Withers reportedly 
witnessed the first Japanese “sinking” by a US submarine when, on the morning of 7 
December 1941, during the attack on Battleship Row, a machine gunner on USS Tautog
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downed a Japanese plane.49 As Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral 
Withers rallied the twenty-one fleet submarines under his command and sent them to sea 
to “commence unrestricted submarine warfare against all Japanese merchant and military 
units.”50 In an inspirational message to the men of his command shortly after the attack, 
Withers wished them, “Good luck and good hunting, hit ’em hard.”51
Prior to his assignment at Pearl Harbor, Withers had enjoyed a long and illustrious 
career in submarines. After his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1906,
Withers assumed his first submarine command, the USS E-l, in 1914. During World War 
I, he was awarded the Navy Cross for meritorious service and the Cuban and Santo 
Domingo campaign medals for his participation in those operations. After the war, he 
progressed through operational commands of ever greater responsibility including 
Commandant of the New London Submarine Base and Commander Submarine Force 
Pacific Fleet in January 1941.52
In 1928, as Commander Division 4, Withers had advanced the concept that U.S. 
submarines should be used as independent commerce raiders, much as the Germans had 
done in World War I, rather than scouting units in conjunction with fleet or coastal 
defense. As a consequence, he is credited with helping to change the direction of the 
submarine policy of the United States. His concept of independent submarine operations 
required submarine designs with longer ranges, better sea-keeping ability, and improved
49 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in W orld War II, 10.
50 COMSUBPAC message dated December 1941, Subject: Mission Orders, 
www.subsowespac.org/ptc4/cvcle 1 .htm.
51 Ibid.
52 Withers was assigned as Commander Submarine Scouting Force from January 1941 to May 
1942. This command became Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet at the outbreak o f World War II.
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habitability.53 United States submarines, designed and operated as Commander Withers 
envisioned in the late 1920’s, would go on to sink massive amounts of Japanese tonnage 
and play a key role in winning World War II. It was only logical that the Navy would 
assign one of its most innovative thinkers, and an expert in submarine design, to head up 
the expanding submarine design organization at Portsmouth Navy Yard. It was an added 
benefit that Withers’ trusting, low-key management style was just what the shipyard 
needed to fully develop its production potential.
In the summer of 1939, Captain Withers had been a member of the Court of 
Inquiry that convened at Portsmouth Navy Yard to investigate the sinking of the USS 
Squalus.54 This investigation carried on for several months and gave him ample 
opportunity to become familiar with the shipyard. By the time he assumed command of 
the yard in June 1942, Withers had a good understanding of the shipyard and its 
operations. In its coverage of Withers’ change of command ceremony, the Portsmouth 
Herald reported:
A man who has been associated with submarines during the better part of his 
career in the navy, it is expected that the new commandant will create new and 
powerful factors in production at the Portsmouth Navy Yard.55
Indeed, under Withers, the yard would create new and powerful production factors.
Rarely had a newspaper more accurately predicted the future.
53 Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet website, www.csp.navv.mil/admirals/withers.htm.
54 Portsmouth Herald, 19 Jun 1939, front page has a picture o f the Board o f  Inquiry that includes 
Captain Withers.
55 Portsmouth Herald, 11 Jun 1942, “Withers Takes Command o f Portsmouth Navy Yard,” 1.
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Figure 10: Rear Admiral Thomas Withers Greeting Managers, Change of 
Command (10 June 1942). Courtesy of Milne Special Collections University 
of University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
According to a U.S. Navy press release, Withers apparently possessed what later
management schools described as good people skills:
A kindly, soft-spoken officer, Radm Withers gained unlimited support and 
praise from his sailors after leasing the Honolulu Royal Hawaiian Hotel for 
permanent use as a rest Camp deluxe for submarine sailors in port.56
Gary Weir described Withers as “always quiet, and amiable -  but perceptive and
precise.”57 Fred White fondly remembered Withers and confirmed his popularity with
shipyard workers. White said that “Admiral Withers was a much respected man whom
everybody liked because he let everyone do their job.”58
Withers fits the description of a transformational leader as conceived by James
MacGregor Bums in his seminal work, Leadership, and developed extensively in follow-
on works by Bums, Bernard M. Bass, and others. .According to Burns, a transformational
56 Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet website, www.csp.navv.mil/admirals/withers.htm.
57 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940,40.
58 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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leader satisfies higher needs, and the needs of the follower, by engaging the full person of 
the follower to create “a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts 
followers into leaders.”59 Bass adds that transformational leadership is more likely to 
emerge in time of stress and disorganization, and in organizations more open to growth 
and change” during which transformational leaders “delegate as much as they can to their 
subordinates” while providing subordinates “a vision of what they might be able to 
accomplish with extra effort.”60 Indeed, Withers was a visionary leader who satisfied the 
higher need of dramatically increased wartime production, and his subordinates need to 
maximize their individual contributions to the war effort, by creating an environment of 
mutual trust and respect, characterized by extensive delegation of responsibility.
It is not a stretch to assume that Withers exhibited the same trust and confidence 
in his shipyard managers and workers that he had in the submarine officers and crews 
that he sent to war after the attack on Pearl Harbor. With little fanfare, he encouraged 
both to do their jobs independently and aggressively. Rear Admiral Withers’ 
inspirational, low-key leadership and confidence in his managers and employees was 
important to the yard’s success. Under his leadership, managers and employees were 
empowered and encouraged to work more independently than they would have been 
under a more authorative shipyard commander.
Complimentary Leadership Styles
There is a school of thought that teaches that effective organizations often have 
executives with different, but complimentary leadership styles. One crude example is the
59 James MacGregor Bums, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 4.
60 Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: The Free 
Press, 1985, xiv.
167
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“good cop -  bad cop” police interrogator team that might question criminal suspects. 
Onboard naval ships, some think that the Commanding Officer and the second in 
command, the Executive Officer, team best when one is a disciplinarian and the other a 
humanitarian. The top two executives at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war, 
Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas Withers and Industrial Manager Captain H.F.D. 
Davis, had contrasting and complimentary leadership styles.
Prior to discussing leadership attributes, it is important to note that the 
Commandant and the Industrial Manager were members of two different naval officer 
communities. Rear Admiral Withers was an unrestricted line officer and, as such, had 
spent a naval career operating and commanding submarines and submariners. Captain 
Davis, on the other hand, was a restricted naval officer, meaning that he was a specialist 
in a selected field. Davis’s specialty was ship construction. In this capacity, he had spent 
most of his naval career in the shipbuilding industry in charge of industrial shops and 
large numbers of civilian employees. Under the rules at the time, Captain Davis, as a 
restricted officer, could never be promoted to command a ship, submarine, or navy yard. 
Prior to reporting to Portsmouth in June 1940, Davis had been the Planning Officer at 
Philadelphia Navy Yard and, when detached from Portsmouth in June 1944, Davis 
became the Supervisor of Shipbuilding at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at Quincy, 
MA. While Withers was responsible for all facets of operations at the Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Davis was responsible for the Industrial Department and to him goes much of the 
credit for the yard’s successful expansion and outstanding productive performance. At the
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same time, Commandant Withers deserves much credit for giving Davis the freedom to, 
as Fred White put it, “Do his job.”61
Figure 9 shows the three major department heads, all naval captains, which 
reported to the commandant during the war; the Captain of the Yard, the Supply Officer, 
and the Industrial Manager. The Captain of the Yard was primarily responsible for the 
naval personnel attached to the yard and various administrative matters. The Supply 
Officer was primarily responsible for purchasing and managing material. The Industrial 
Officer was responsible for all the shops and industrial operations on the yard. In that 
capacity, he had two other senior naval captains reporting to him; Captain Andrew I. 
McKee, the Planning Officer, and Captain Sidney E. Dudley, the Production Officer.63 
While the Industrial Manager appears to share equal billing with the other two major 
department heads shown on Figure 9, such was not the case in the day to day business of 
the shipyard. On 15 November 1943, when the shipyard employment peaked at 20,445 
employees, roughly 18,000 of those employees worked for the Industrial Manager and 
the remainder were split among the other shipyard departments. The shipyard’s mission 
during the war, to build as many submarines as possible as fast as possible, rested 
squarely on the shoulders of Captain H.F.D. Davis.
Withers was a widely respected, self-assured, unassuming man of few words who 
inspired trust and confidence in his followers. Withers managed with a soft hand, always
61 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
62 Other officers reporting to the commandant included the Medical Officer, the Officer-in-charge 
o f  the Prison, the Officer-in-Charge o f  the Marines, and the Communications Officer.
63 At the start o f the war, the Public Works Officer and the Disbursing Officer also reported to the 
Industrial Manager. “Industrial Department Organizational Chart- 1940.” NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 10, Folder A3/NY1, 
“Organizational Charts for Officer Personnel Under Manager, 1934-43.”
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quick to offer praise for a job well done. Employee morale was always close to the top of 
his priority list. For example, in an August 1943 memo to all shipyard supervisors that 
emphasized the need for efficient use of resources, Withers concluded, “Finally, that the 
‘human relations -  the morale factors’ be made and kept as good as possible.”64 Davis, on 
the other hand, was more of a problem solver than a morale booster. On one occasion, 
when Commander Spiller suggested that employee morale was the Industrial 
Department’s most important problem, Davis suggested that they first confine their 
attention to “concrete management problems” for which they were primarily 
responsible.65 Concrete management problems included the improvement of working 
conditions and the clarification of assignments and priorities. Clearly, Davis was not a 
“touchy, feely” manager. Withers, however, was always sensitive to employee concerns 
and quick to address and resolve any personnel issues. Their management styles were a 
study in contrasts.
Withers’ directives were typically brief, clear, and to the point. He was a big 
picture type of manager, in the style of Ronald Reagan, who set the tone and objectives 
for the organization but left the management of details to subordinates. Industrial 
Manager Captain Davis, on the other hand, was a hands-on manager who reveled in the 
details of his responsibilities. His directives were typically long, if not verbose, with 
considerable explanation and detail to back up his position. Davis kept the waterfront
64 Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas Withers memo o f 28 Aug 1943, Subject: Economy in 
Naval Expenditures. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence 
(Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG 8.
65 Report o f Manager’s Conference o f 21 Jun 1943, Subject: General Programs, Purpose, and 
Specific Problems for Next Meeting. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2 “Genera Management.”
170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
supervisors on edge with his incessant suggestions and demands for improved 
performance.
Captain Davis’ effort in July, 1943 to stress welding as the critical path to 
successful completion of the scheduled twenty-eight submarine program is an excellent 
example of the attention to detail that he typically applied to his work. In a memo to the 
shipyard managers, Davis led the readers through an analysis that started with the fact 
that 71,148 pounds of welding rod had been used on the recently completed SS285 and 
concluded that 2,000,000 pounds of welding rod would have to be laid to complete 28 
submarines in the next year. Following an analysis of sixteen months of personnel gains 
and losses in the Welding Shop, Davis determined that the welders then available would 
have to reduce non-work days and weld at an average rate of 7,126 pounds per day to 
meet the schedule. Noting that this rate was only possible with the full cooperation of all 
the other shops, Davis solicited that support. Such was Captain Davis’ delight in details.66
Another example of Captain Davis’ attention to detail and thoroughness of 
planning involved his efforts to bring order to the personnel disruptions caused by the 
Selective Service process. Those efforts resulted in a precedent setting arrangement with 
the Selective Service, that set a long term release schedule for employees with special 
skills, so that Captain Davis and his managers could anticipate manpower needs and train 
replacements accordingly.67 Davis thrived on such detailed and orderly planning.
Fred White’s assessment of the two leaders, as the result of personal experiences 
with both during the war, highlights their contrasting management styles. While Withers
66 Manager memo o f 13 Jun 1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5 14, “Welding Shop.”
67 See the Selective Service section under Employees in this chapter for further details on the 
Selective Service agreement.
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was respected and well liked, White remembers Captain Davis as “a meddler and a man 
of many ideas that seldom worked.” When pushed for an example of one such idea,
White told the story of a scheme Davis concocted to minimize inefficient use of riggers. 
In fairness to Captain Davis, time lost when needing a rigger and not having one, or 
having riggers stand-by waiting to accomplish a job that ran late, resulted in great 
inefficiency in a shipyard. According to White, Davis sought to minimize that 
inefficiency by having all the riggers assigned to the fitting-out pier assembled in a shack, 
at a central location, to wait for a call for their services that would be made by the 
hoisting of a flag on specially constructed poles alongside each of a half dozen submarine 
berths. While Davis’ idea sounds quite reasonable, White and others were convinced that 
the daily informal communications on the waterfront were more than adequate to 
anticipate the need for riggers. As White recalled, the shack was built, but [lacking the 
enthusiastic support of the riggers] the idea was abandoned before the flagpoles were 
erected.68
While Captain Davis may have been somewhat of an irritant to Fred White and 
the other Shop Masters, there is little doubt that he was a presence and a force on the 
waterfront that kept the industrial pot stirring. If he was a man of ideas that did not 
always work, he was also a man constantly looking for another approach, a novel way to 
get the job done. Imagination and innovation thrive in an organization where the leader 
practices and encourages such thinking. As this study shows throughout, Portsmouth 
Navy Yard had an abundance of both during the war.
68 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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Senior Management Continuity
Both Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas A. Withers and the Industrial Manager, 
Captain H.F.D. Davis, held their shipyard leadership positions for most of the war years. 
Withers held command from 10 June 1942 until November 1945 and Davis served in his 
position from 28 June 1940 until 25 May 1944. As Table 7 shows, the other senior 
managers in critical industrial positions enjoyed similar longevity in their jobs.69 
Table 7: W W II Leadership Continuity at Portsmouth Navy Yard
Position Person Reported Detached Duration (inos.)
Commandant Radm T. Withers 10 Jun 1942 Nov 1945 41
Industrial Mgr Capt. Davis 28 Jun 1940 25 May 1944 47
Production Officer Capt. Dudley Aug 1941 25 May 1944 34
Planning Officer Capt. McKee Mar 1938 20 Jan 1945 82
Hull Supt Capt. Spiller 3 Sep 1941 Jul 1945+ 46+
Machinery Supt Capt. Ambrose 7 Dec 1939 25 May 1944 53
The average tour length for the senior officers who served in the six critical industrial 
management positions in the shipyard was over fifty months. And the officer who held 
his position for the shortest time, Captain Dudley, was promoted within the yard from 
Production Officer to Industrial Manager, replacing Captain Davis on 25 May 1944. 
Likewise, Captain Ambrose was promoted from Machinery Superintendent to Production 
Officer, replacing Captain Dudley on the same date. Such in-house promotions suggest 
that both officers had performed well in their previous assignments and proven 
themselves competent and capable of handling additional responsibilities.
Captain Andrew I. McKee headed up the local team that produced Portsmouth 
Industrial Surveys I (December 1941) and II (June 1942), that set in motion many of the 
concepts that later contributed to the shipyard’s outstanding performance. McKee had
69 U.S. Navy, “Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during World War II,” Official Administrative History, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard, Kittery, Maine, 66-68. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me.
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already served as Planning Officer for 44 months prior to leading that team. With that 
extensive background and experience, he obviously knew the shipyard well and was fully 
qualified to assess its needs and capabilities. Moreover, Captain McKee continued in his 
assignment at the shipyard for another 48 months, during which he was able to monitor 
and implement the changes his team had recommended.
Hardly overshadowed by Rear Admiral Withers and Captain Davis, Captain A.I. 
McKee enjoyed a well deserved reputation as an expert in submarine design. In 1945, 
when the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers published a special 50th 
anniversary edition entitled Historical Transactions, McKee was selected to author an
70article on the history of submarine design. Furthermore, in recognition of his career 
accomplishments, the A.I. McKee award for academic excellence is presented to the most 
deserving officer in each graduating class of the Navy’s Nuclear Power Training Course. 
Rear Admiral Withers was surrounded with a core of competent and experienced 
managers.
As can be seen from Table 7, during the first two years of Rear Admiral Withers’ 
tour as commandant, not a single one of the critical management positions turned over. 
The rock solid stability of a competent management team during the early stages of the 
war, when the shipyard was being transformed from a custom shop to a mass producer of 
submarines, was a significant reason for the shipyard’s ultimate success.
Another critical factor in the yard’s success was the contribution of a dedicated 
and talented cadre of civilian designers and managers. Having highlighted the lengthy
70 A.I. McKee, Captain, U.S.N., “Development o f Submarines in the United States,” Historical 
Transactions 1893-1943 (New York: The Society o f  Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1945).
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Figure 11: Shipyard Civilian Shop Managers during World War II. Fred 
White, the Master Rigger and Laborer interviewed for this dissertation is 
shown in the upper left corner. Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, 
University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
tours of duty of the senior naval officers in the yard during the war, it is appropriate to 
note that the naval officer continuity paled in comparison to the civilian management 
continuity. While forty months was a long tour of duty for a naval officer, it was not 
unusual for senior civilian managers to complete forty years of service at the yard before 
retiring. Indeed, pictures of shipyard employees being presented forty year pins during 
the war and postwar periods were common occurrences in the shipyard newspaper, the 
Portsmouth Periscope. For example, on 16 February 1945, no less than twenty shipyard
71employees were presented forty year pins by Rear Admiral Withers.
71 Robert Whittaker, Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard in Old Photographs, (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1993), 108.
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Harold Sweetser hired on at the yard in May 1917, progressed through various 
draftsman jobs, and retired after forty years of service in 1958 as the Supervisory Naval 
Architect. Likewise, Sweetser’s compatriot, Chief Draftsman Robert Boyd, retired in 
October 1945 after 49 years of service. Another of Sweetser’s friends, Carl Galle, 
promoted to the position of Head Engineer of the yard in October 1951, began his navy 
yard career as a draftsman in 1918 and was promoted to Senior Naval Architect during 
World War II. The shipyard was blessed with many experienced and competent civilian
79employees during the war.
The shipyard would have not had the benefit of the extensive submarine design 
experience of employees like Sweetser, Boyd, and Galle had the Navy not decided to 
develop the submarine design capabilities of Portsmouth Navy Yard after World War I. 
Likewise, had the construction of new submarines at the yard been discontinued for any 
period of time between the wars, these naval architects would probably have been forced 
to seek employment elsewhere. As was noted earlier, all navy yards except Portsmouth 
experienced a hiatus in new ship construction at one time or another after World War I 
and before the rebirth of naval shipbuilding in the early 1930s.
It was no accident that Portsmouth Navy Yard acquired a reputation for high 
quality submarines. Also, it was no accident that the yard was able to incorporate wartime 
feedback into the designs of their new submarines in a timely manner. Navy Department 
industrial strategy created the opportunity to develop submarine design capabilities at 
Portsmouth and naval officer leadership set the objectives during the war. However, most 
of the credit for the yard’s outstanding production accomplishments must go to the yard’s
72 Papers o f  Harold Caswell Sweetser, Portsmouth Navy Yard Supervisory Naval Architect, 1917- 
1958, Sweetser Family Papers, Milne Special Collections, University o f New Hampshire Library, Durham, 
N.H. including Portsmouth Periscopes o f  13 Oct 1945, 8 and 20 Oct 1951,4.
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experienced core of talented civilian designers and skilled shop employees. It was they 
who put drafting pen to paper, welding rods to steel plates, and wrenches to valves.
During the war, Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas Withers and the Industrial 
Manager, Captain H.F.D.Davis, provided strong leadership for an experienced group of 
naval and civilian managers who enjoyed long and successful tours of duty at the 
shipyard. This stable and well qualified management team led an exceptionally motivated 
team of experienced designers and shop tradesmen to tremendous production 
achievements. Portsmouth had the additional advantages of being a relatively small 
shipyard with a sharply focused and well defined mission. This vital, but very specific, 
mission protected the yard from external forces and shifting priorities. As a result, the 
yard’s industrial operations could proceed without interruption, and with no need to 
deviate from the streamlined new construction processes that had been in development 
since the mid-1930s. All of these factors combined to enable the yard to flourish in a 
corporate environment that was characterized by lax oversight when the newly created 
Bureau of Ships was overwhelmed with other responsibilities. Portsmouth Navy Yard 
could not have written a more successful script for success.
Employees
The shipyard’s workforce grew to over 20,000 employees, including over 3,800 
women, during the war. The assimilation of thousands of new employees into the shops 
and offices, and the training of those employees, was an extreme challenge that was 
further complicated by the loss of younger and often more talented employees to the 
Selective Service. Prior to any discussion of innovative management methods that led to
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the yard’s success, it is appropriate to highlight the high quality of the shipyard’s 
workforce, the women’s contribution to the yard’s success, worker training programs, 
and the impact of the Selective Service program. Innovative production methods would
have been for naught had the shipyard employees not been up to the task.
**=1=
It was obvious, from the earliest days of the war, that Portsmouth Navy Yard had 
an unusually patriotic and dedicated workforce. In mid-December 1941, all the
Figure 12: Shipyard Rally at Start of the War (15 December 1941). Courtesy 
of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
employees at the yard signified their intention to work Sunday, 21 December without 
pay. The idea for a payless workday had originated with a few workers after a war rally at 
the shipyard on Monday, 15 December and, within a few days, every employee had
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‘I'X •signed up for the “Gift Day.” Later that week, much to the chagrin of the employees, 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox vetoed the idea because it would violate existing work 
statutes.74 Even though Navy officials would not go along with the idea, the gesture 
spoke volumes about the dedication and unity of Portsmouth Navy Yard employees.
An incident involving a change in shift work hours in April 1942 further
illustrates the cooperative nature of the yard’s employees while, at the same time,
showing that those same employees were willing to exercise the power of labor to affect
management decisions, given management’s need for increased productivity. Shift work
hours had been changed in the spring of 1942 to have the first shift start at 4:00 am
instead of 6:00 am and the other eight hour shifts were staggered accordingly.
Management believed that the new shifts were more productive. However, members of
Ranger Lodge 836, International Association of Machinists, believed that there was no
production improvement, but great inconvenience to workers and families. The
machinists’ aggressive effort to have management reverse the decision was balanced with
a reaffirmation of their support for yard management that appeared on the front page of
the Portsmouth Herald:
We have the utmost confidence in the officers who have been designated by 
the Navy department to administer the policies at this yard and we pledge our 
utmost cooperation with their efforts to build our submarine navy quickly and 
efficiently, but we reserve our inalienable rights to protest any local orders 
that to us seem unnecessary to our country’s war program.75
73 The Portsmouth Herald, 16 Dec 1941, “Navy Yard Workers Give a Day to Aid National 
Defense,” 1.
74 Ibid.
75 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Apr 1942, “Ranger Lodge Machinists Hit Navy Yard Hours,” 1.
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Shortly after the machinists had voiced their displeasure with the new shifts, a shipyard 
wide poll confirmed that a decisive majority of the rest of the employees felt the same 
way. To management’s credit, the old shift hours were restored and the controversy was 
settled.76 Mutual respect and open communications were a hallmark of management- 
employee relations at Portsmouth Navy Yard at that time.
Another example of unusual patriotism and employee-management cooperation 
was the record setting war bond participation of the yard. In November 1942, the yard 
established a national record for war bond participation when 100% of the yard’s more 
than 17,000 employees pledged an average of 13.1% of their gross pay. The previous 
record had been held by Philadelphia Navy Yard at 98% participation and 12.1% of gross 
pay.77 Management had solicited maximum employee support for the war bond campaign 
and the employees responded beyond all expectations. Once the employees realized that 
100% participation was possible, peer pressure and pride drove the final record setting 
results.
Portsmouth Herald coverage of a union banquet in January 1946 offers further
evidence that labor-management cooperation at the shipyard continued at a high level
throughout the war. According to the paper:
Accenting the fine cooperation between labor and management at the 
Portsmouth naval base, more than 300 members of the Ranger Lodge No.
836, International Order of Machinists, and high ranking officials attended an 
installation banquet and program held Saturday at the American Legion 
hall.78
76 Ibid, “Navy Yard Shift Goes into Effect,” 6.
77 Ibid, 9 Nov 1942, “Portsmouth Navy Yard Bond-Buying Record Set as Goal for Hub Drive,” 1.
78 Portsmouth Herald, 14 Jan 1946, “Admiral Lauds Cooperation o f Labor, Management Here, 1.
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Rear Admiral John H. Brown, who had relieved Rear Admiral Withers as commandant a 
few months before, told the gathering that “He could plainly see that the cooperation in 
the yard during the war years was the reason for the success in production and other
70records.”
There is also much evidence that speaks to the quality of the workforce. For
example, the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) emphasized the high quality of the
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s workforce and supervision:
The working force at Portsmouth is especially high grade. Top civilian 
supervisors are alert, intelligent and obviously proud of their Yard.
Intermediate supervision of high quality is in general evidence...  Most of the 
mechanical employees have been recruited from nearby areas, normally non­
industrial. The result is an average of unusually high type of personnel among 
this group.80
Percy Whitney, hired in June 1940 to be a trainee in the shipyard’s apprentice program, is 
a good example of the high quality worker to which the industrial survey refers. Percy 
applied for the apprentice program after attending Bates College for two and one half 
years. Even with two and one half years of college education, Percy recalled that the 
apprentice program entrance exams and classroom training were quite challenging.81 
Eileen Dondero Foley, a painter’s helper at the yard during the war, had graduated from 
Syracuse University with honors prior to seeking employment at the yard.82 With 
intelligent, motivated young men and women like Percy Whitney and Eileen Dondero 
Foley working their way through the shops and training programs at the yard, there is
19 Ibid.
80 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 8.
81 Oral interview with Percy Whitney, 23 Mar 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
82 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 August 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
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little wonder that the Booz-Allen industrial survey team would be highly impressed with 
the workforce.
The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) also noted that, “The supervisory ratio 
is below the prewar standard of one to twelve, which is the exception rather than the rule 
in shipyards.”83 Portsmouth, unlike the other navy yards, did not increase the ratio of 
supervisors to workers to compensate for the addition of large numbers of inexperienced 
employees during the war. Several factors contributed to the low supervisory ratios at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard. The intelligent and self-motivated workforce required less direct 
supervision, specialized training created a pool of independent workers and teams, and 
managers trusted and empowered employees to do their jobs. An intelligent, capable, and 
trusted workforce has less need for supervision.
Minimal supervision is one indicator of worker independence and empowerment, 
but there were others. According to the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), “There has 
been a notable simplification of paperwork and of routine reports. A minimum of 
management and shop conferences are held for coordination of work and dissemination 
of information.”84 The trained, trusted, and empowered workforce had little need for 
paperwork and meetings.
The reduction of paperwork and administrative burdens were standard shipyard 
goals from the earliest stages of the war. Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December 
1941) noted that:
83Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 8. Furthermore, it was noted that Portsmouth had the 
lowest percentage o f  Group IV (b) [salaried] employees o f  all navy yards. In April 1945, Portsmouth’s 
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The practice of holding a shop accountable for over expenditures of estimates 
on a job order practically requires each shop to set up a small accounting 
system and requires a leadingman either to keep cost records or to furnish 
information to a shop clerk for such records. The effort now devoted to cost 
keeping could be better devoted to the supervision of men. It is recommended 
that this practice be discontinued and that all shops be informed that they will 
not in the future be held accountable for the expenditures on any job.85
In effect, shipyard management was saying that the actual accomplishment of work was
far more important than accounting for the cost of doing that work. The decision to free
the supervisors of administrative burdens that distracted from the direct accomplishment
of work can be found throughout all of the local board’s recommendations for production
improvements at the start of the war. A few years later, the Booz-Allen Survey (1944)
critically confirmed the yard’s success in this regard by observing that, “Practically no
regular records are kept of production, whether of individual workers, of shops, or by
jobs.”86 Paperwork reduction and worker independence, both increasingly emphasized as
keys to successful industrial management in the latter half of the twentieth century, were
facts-of-life at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II.
Teamwork, another attribute coveted by today’s industrial managers, was also 
much in evidence at the shipyard during the war. Noting that “A spirit of teamwork and 
of harmonious cooperation was evident at all levels,” the Booz-Allen Survey (1944) also 
observed that the Portsmouth Navy Yard was “unusually free from labor or other
o n
personnel difficulties.” The inspectors noted a very positive and healthy relationship 
between Portsmouth Navy Yard management and employees.
85 Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (1941), 11.
86 Booz-Allen Survey (1944), 11-12.
87 Ibid, 10.
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Orderly and harmonious management-employee relationships were not the case at
many shipyards. The Industrial Counselors Survey (1942) noted extensive confusion and
disorganization at other navy yards:
This rapid expansion has given rise to problems of recruitment, development 
of new sources of labor supply, and training, and these difficulties have been 
intensified by the fact that supervision has been thinly spread, inexperienced, 
and perhaps not sufficiently informed as to policies and procedures. Under 
these circumstances, the ordinary management controls in matters of 
discipline have been increasingly difficult to maintain.88
Portsmouth faced these same challenges of recruitment, training, and supervision. In all
three instances, the challenges were not only successfully resolved, but turned into
strengths.
Labor-management relations were more contentious at private shipyards than the 
navy yards. According to Maritime Historian Frederick C. Lane, the percentage of time 
lost due to strikes during the war years in the U.S. merchant shipbuilding industry versus
OQ
all U.S. industries was as shown in Table 8:
Table 8: Time Lost Due to Strikes during World War II
U.S. Merchant Shipbuilding All Industry
1941 1.26% .32 %
1942 .07 % .05 %
1943 .07 % .15%
1944 .09 % .09 %
1945 .15 % .47 %
After an initial onslaught of serious shipyard strikes in 1941, during which nearly 
250,000 man-days of production were lost, time lost due to strikes in the merchant 
shipbuilding industry was approximately the same or less than all of U.S. industry during
88 Industrial Relations Counselors Industrial Survey (1942), 1.
89 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 305.
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the remainder of the war years. Not to be minimized is the fact that, during the war years, 
merchant shipyards experienced a total 148 strikes that cost the nation 735,000 man-days 
of production.90 In comparison, the “no-strike pledge” that had to be signed as a condition 
of employment at navy yards helped to keep those yards strike free.91
Ninety percent of the more than 11,000 production workers at Electric Boat 
Company, Portsmouth’s prime competitor in submarine construction, went on strike on
0915 August 1944 for several days for higher wages. The union presented a list of 34 
grievances that it claimed had been originally presented to company officials the previous 
December. The company’s president, L.Y. Spear, insisted that “the strike was brought 
about by a small group of union officers in an attempt to hide the real issue -  the two-day 
suspension of the union president for being away from his job without permission.”93
Portsmouth was essentially free of the haggling and contentiousness between 
management and employees that existed at Electric Boat Company and other shipyards. 
Why was that the case? When interviewed, Eileen Foley repeatedly emphasized the 
exceptional patriotism and respect for authority that she and her fellow workers had 
during the war.94 William Tebo expressed similar thoughts about the shipyard 
managers.95 One might be quick to dismiss such idealism in today’s skeptical world but
90 Ibid.
91 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum. Shortly 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor major union leaders announced “no-strike” pledges. However, the pledge 
meant little as “some two million workers staged more than four thousand strikes in 1941, many o f them 
over organizational issues.” David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 638.
92 Portsmouth Herald., 15 Aug 1944, “Groton Strikers Deadlocked with Company,” 1.
93 Portsmouth Herald, 16 Aug 1944, “7,500 Strike at Sub Yard in Groton,” 1.
94 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
95 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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there is no doubt in Foley’s mind that respect for authority and patriotism were powerful 
forces at the yard during the war.
Also to be considered is that the increase in yard employees included few 
minorities and other workers relocating from distant parts of the country with different 
values and attitudes that might have caused tensions among locals with biases. Chapter 
VI of this dissertation will discuss the migration of great numbers of workers, including 
many African-Americans, who moved to the West Coast and Puget Sound area looking 
for shipyard employment. According to Lorraine McConaghy, who studied shipyard 
boomtown Kirkland, Washington, residents often complained of “the ignorance of 
Tarheels, Arkies, and Oakies” and “traded stories about the arrogance of Texans and the 
streetwise savy of Chicago city slickers.”96 Portsmouth residents and shipyard workers 
were not exposed to such a variety of strangers and, consequently, never developed 
similar feelings, attitudes, and prejudices towards the newcomers.
This is not to say that Portsmouth was not without ethnic diversity. Indeed, the 
city and the mill towns of New Hampshire experienced much immigration during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century that populated the state with many nationalities, 
including Italians, Irish, Greeks, Poles, and French-Canadian Catholics. However, by the 
late 1930s, the immigration wave had subsided and many of the immigrants had become
07American citizens, if not Americanized. Consider the following table of births showing
96 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during 
World War II,” 45.
97 According to David M. Kennedy, in 1924, “Congress choked the immigrant stream to a trickle, 
closing the era o f virtually unlimited entry to the United States. The ethnic neighborhoods that had 
mushroomed in the preceding generations would grow no more through further inflows from abroad.” 
Kennedy notes that “o f the 123 million Americans recorded in the census o f  1930, one in ten was foreign
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American or foreign parentage and marriages showing American or foreign nationality in
the city of Portsmouth between 1938 and 1945.
Table 9: Portsmouth Births and Marriages98 
(American vs Foreign) 1938-1945
Births Marriaees
Parents Parents Parents Both Both
American Foreign Mixed American Foreign Mixed
1938 261 4 36 549 14 87
1939 246 8 37 252 6 30
1940 298 7 38 267 6 47
1941 385 10 43 350 8 45
1942 620 6 47 369 3 53
1943 663 5 52 312 8 37
1944 Not Provided 304 6 36
1945 Not Provided 407 6 32
1946 Not Provided Not Provided
As can be seen, the preponderance of newborns had American parents, few had foreign 
parents, and about 9 % had mixed parents. Similarly, for marriages, a preponderance of 
both partners were American citizens, few were both foreign, and about 11% were mixed. 
While there were pockets of ethnic enclaves in the city and ethnic diversity was strong, it 
is also true that considerable mixing and intermarriage of immigrants had occurred prior 
to the start of the war. This relative stability was not challenged by the “outsiders,” 
predominantly other New Englanders, who moved to the area during the war.
At Electric Boat, in the early days of the expansion, new workers came from local 
communities, but as production increased the company recruited from as far away as
bom and, an additional 20 percent had at least one parent bom abroad.” David M. Kennedy, Freedom from 
Fear, 15-16.
98 New Hampshire Department o f Vital Statistics Reports for the Years 1938-1946. Concord, N.H. 
University o f  New Hampshire Milne Collection, Durham, N.H. The Vital Statistics Reports provide annual 
data on births, marriages, divorces, and deaths. No minority statistics are given for the years shown and the 
American versus foreign breakdowns for births and marriages ceased in 1944 for births and 1946 for 
marriages.
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Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Minnesota." Portsmouth, on the other hand, attracted 
other New Englanders. It will be shown that many of the new residents of the Portsmouth 
area merely relocated from other nearby towns and states. In fact, many relocated from 
the more distant parts of the same county, Rockingham County. When asked about new 
shipyard employees who had not grown up in the local area, William Tebo responded, 
“There were a lot from towns in Down East Maine.” Folks from Millinocket and 
Damariscotta share many of the same values and agendas as folks from Kittery and 
Portsmouth.
Loafing was also observed to be much too prevalent in the shipbuilding industry. 
Admiral Emory Land, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, was outspoken in his 
criticism of loafing in the shipbuilding industry during the initial months of the war.100 A 
March 1942 Maritime Commission investigation found eight yards rated satisfactory, 
seven rated fair, and eleven to be “unsatisfactory” or “downright disgraceful.”101 The 
Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) noted a high prevalence of inefficient 
standby time in some navy yards caused by the nature of short lead time and unplanned 
ship repair work. Much less tolerable were the unethical work practices that included 
sleeping during working hours, leaving work places before quitting time, and loafing.
The survey recommended firm supervisory control of work sites and timely discipline of 
offenders. According to the survey, shipyard workers that were short on work ethics 
could find ample opportunity to stand by, waiting for other support trades or supervision
99 “History o f  Electric Boat, 1899-1949,” Navy Department Library, author unknown, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, D.C., V-9.
100Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 301.
101 Ibid.
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to provide direction. Worse yet, slackers could escape detection in ship compartments 
and tanks and other out of the way work sites. As late in the war as January 1945, a 
Senate War Investigating committee reported an alarming condition of wasted labor at 
Norfolk Navy Yard with the conclusion that the yard’s supervisory system required 
improvements.102
Portsmouth’s World War II history is remarkably free of any need to discipline 
workers for unethical work practices. In fact, Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December 
1941) reported that, “The Board does not believe that loafing exists at this Yard to such a
1OTdegree as to constitute a serious problem.” However, the board did recommend a 
number of changes to reduce the temptation for workers to loaf, including reduced hours 
for the shipyard restaurant and mobile lunch carts, and improved staffing for both to 
avoid lines and time lost from the job. The same task force considered the established 
practice of monitoring shipboard job sites by checklist, to insure assigned workers are on 
the job, to be inefficient and not commensurate with the administrative burden it entailed. 
It was recommended that the practice be discontinued. All evidence points towards an 
uncommon level of mutual trust and confidence between managers and employees that 
started at the top with the commandant and extended down through the independent and 
specialized workers that roamed the waterfront routinely doing their jobs as needed to 
deliver submarines at record setting rates.
Eileen Dondero Foley, a painter’s helper during the war, who later served as the 
mayor of Portsmouth for a total of 16 years, was most emphatic, when interviewed, about 
the mutual respect that existed between management and employees during the war. She
102 Portsmouth Herald, 23 Jan 1945, “May Inspect More Yards.” 1.
103 Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (1941), 5.
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remembered the civilian managers as being ever-present in the industrial areas, 
monitoring the progress of work sites, but seldom criticizing or interfering with the 
workers. Attired in coat, tie, and felt hat, their dress was a symbol of their authority, 
which Foley remembered as being exercised in a firm, but fair, manner. During an 
interview with the Master of the Paint Shop, on her first day of work in 1942, she and 
another girl were told, “This is dirty work. You are here to paint the boats and not your 
faces.”104 Such was the no-nonsense approach of shipyard management to the increased 
hiring of women on the yard. Foley reported to work at the Paint Shop the next morning 
but she never saw the other girl again.
While Eileen Dondero Foley may have been directed by her shop master to 
deemphasize her personal appearance for the sake of the job and production, Alice 
Kessler-Harris claims the opposite was often the case during the war. She argues that 
women often “found themselves facing male pressure to be feminine” and personnel 
managers preferred “the girls to be neat ands trim and well put together,” claiming that it 
helped the women’s morale and brought prestige to the workplace. Another less 
welcomed consequence of the maintenance of a feminine appearance in the workplace 
was that “catcalls, whistles, and hisses faced women who walked onto production floors 
for the first time.”105 Neither Foley nor any of the other retired shipyard employees 
interviewed for this study alluded to the type of male behavior in the workplace described 
by Kessler-Harris. Rather, Foley’s example with the Master of the Paint Shop suggests 
the other extreme. One cannot draw conclusions from such a limited sampling; however,
104 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 2 Sep 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
105 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 268..
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it can be noted that the interviews for this study did find evidence to support the 
observations presented by Kessler-Harris.
Shipyard employees apparently were not as dedicated to safety regulations as they 
were to the quality of their work and the timely completion of their job responsibilities. 
The Booz-Allen Survey (1944) found that, “The Yard has a creditable safety record 
although its ratio of lost time to all accidents has been high.”106 The survey added that, 
“Safety hats were noticeable by their absence,” and “There was a noticeable neglect of
i r \n
using goggles on grinding operations.” William Tebo, who worked at the yard about 
the time of the survey, was issued a pair of safety glasses. However, he never wore a hard 
hat and does not recall any being made available. Tebo also recalled that ear plugs were 
not available until late 1944 when, he suspects, authorities began to make an association 
between growing hearing losses and the intolerable noise that resulted from banging and 
chipping on a submarine pressure hull. Tebo also had a friend lose a few toes in a shop
1 A O
accident for lack of safety shoes. The wartime environment at the shipyard, like most 
of society, was filled with hazards that were simply classified as the cost of doing 
business.
The Booz-Allen Survey (1944) also observed that, “There seemed to be a feeling 
in some shops that all action in accident prevention is the sole responsibility of the Safety 
Engineer and his staff.”109 Without too much imagination, one can conjure up an image
106 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
107 Ibid.
108 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
109 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
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of an employee, confident in his ability to get the job done, free of rules and restrictions, 
wanting to extend that same independence of choice to the observance of safety rules.
In summary, Portsmouth Navy Yard employees were intelligent, cooperative, 
independent, trusted, well-trained, and able to accomplish their jobs with minimal 
supervision. Cooperative and self-motivated employees enabled managers to employ 
worker empowerment and other team oriented concepts. There were no strikes or 
slowdowns at Portsmouth Navy Yard, employee disciplinary actions were infrequent 
when compared to other navy yards, and loafing, prevalent at some shipyards, was not an 
issue at Portsmouth. The harmonious management-employee environment at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard during the war was the exception in the shipbuilding industry rather than the 
rule. There is little doubt that the cooperative environment at Portsmouth Navy Yard was 
a significant factor in the yard’s success.
Women Employees
The mass industrial mobilization of women during the war to fill jobs vacated by
men joining the armed services was slow to develop. According to Alice Kessler-Harris,
As government programs began early in 1942 to “warm up” the unemployed to 
heavy industry, twenty men were offered places to every woman. Some workers 
received training in industrial skills in the last half of 1941. Only 1 percent of 
those were female. Employers believed women were not suited to most jobs and 
declared themselves unwilling to hire women for 81 percent of available 
production jo b s.. .  Attitudes began to change after Pearl Harbor...  For the first 
time employers sought out women for nontraditional jobs. By mid-1942, it was 
clear that this [the rate that women were entering the industrial workforce] was 
not enough...  The government lowered the age limit for employment of women 
from eighteen to sixteen years.. .  And in July 1943, the War Production Board 
declared itself in need of a million and a half more women.110
110 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f  Wage-Earning Women in the United States 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 275-276.
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The discussion that follows will show that the progress made by women employees in 
filling industrial jobs at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war, as Kessler-Harris 
described on a national level, was initially resisted by management and, consequently, 
was slow in developing. In addition, Portsmouth and the other east coast navy yards 
lagged their west coast counterparts in hiring women to fill shipyard employment needs.
Maritime historian Frederick C. Lane says that, “The female invasion began in the 
fall of 1942” and reached its maximum in 1944 and 1945 when “female workers formed 
10 to 20 percent in most yards.”111 According to Lane, female employment during the 
war was lowest in the Northeast and the Gulf and highest on the West Coast. For 
example, the percentage of females employed at the Richmond Shipyard outside San 
Francisco was 20 to 23 percent in 1944 and the Oregon Shipyard peaked at 33 percent in 
1945.112 These, of course, were both private shipyards.
West Coast government navy yards also had a higher percentage of female 
employees than other navy yards. The top two navy yards for female employment in 
March 1943 were Mare Island, California (19.6%) and Puget Sound, Washington 
(16.8%).113At that time, Portsmouth Navy Yard had a workforce composed of only 8.5 % 
female employees, the second lowest of the navy yards. New York Navy Yard was 
lowest at 8.0%. In September 1942, the Industrial Manager, Captain Davis, urged his 
department to “more aggressively pursue training programs for women -  as the West
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Navy Department, (Industrial Manpower Section) letter o f 1 May 1943 to Distribution 
including All Navy Yards, Subject: Employment o f  Women-Continental Navy Yards. NARA College Park, 
RG 38, Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 151, Folder NY1, 1 July 1942 to 30 Jun 1943.
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Coast shipyards have done so effectively.”114 At the high point for shipyard employment, 
20,445 employees in November 1943, 3,832 women were employed, almost 18.7 percent 
of the workforce. Near the end of the war, in July 1945, women comprised about 18 
percent of the total workforce of 15,078.115 Even though Portsmouth Navy Yard got off 
to a slow start, by the end of the war the yard employed women at about the same 
percentages as other navy yards.
In general, there was reluctance on the part of New England society to utilize
women employees to the fullest extent of their capabilities early in the war. Perhaps, in
the case of shipyards, it reflected a sincere desire on the part of the managers to keep
females safe and protected from the rigors and unsavory aspects of shipyard industrial
work. A directive issued by the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard in January 1942
illustrating concern about the safety of female employees reads:
The Commandant considers that most clerical positions in the yard can be 
filled by female employees, except stockman in the storehouse, clerks 
assigned to night shifts in the shops or in shops where a single clerk is 
employed, and messengers required to go in the shops or on the ships.116
In short, women were not to be hired for jobs where they might have to interact with men
in out-of-the-way job sites without other women present, especially at night. Without a
doubt, shipyard managers were concerned about the introduction of sexuality and its
potential repercussions to the workplace.
114 Manager memo o f 30 Sep 1942.NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 8, Folder A2-11/NY2, “Circular Letter Navy Yard.”
115 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 33.
116 Boston Navy Yard Commandant’s Circular No. 398 o f 13 Janl942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A2-11/NY2, “Circular 
Letter Navy Yard -  Boston.”
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Captain Davis encouraged the recruitment of women employees, but he too
expressed guarded optimism about their limitations and potential contributions. In
September 1942, Davis wrote:
In view of the increasing demands on the available manpower of the country 
for defense work and military duty, it is apparent that the services of women 
must be utilized in every type of work for which they can be trained and for 
which physically qualified. 17
Implicit in the memo is the understanding that women could not be expected to replace
certain male employees because of their inherent inferior physical qualifications and
training limitations. Specifically, Captain Davis emphasized that women were not to be
1 1 Q
employed onboard ships or as security guards.
Eileen Dondero Foley, who worked as a painter’s helper in 1942 and 1943, recalls 
that she was permitted to work topside on submarines, but, “Never, never, never, in the 
compartments or tanks.”119 Foley added, “They [the shipyard managers] were very strict 
about that.” The prohibiting of women workers onboard submarines did not last the entire 
war. William Tebo and Dan Maclssac both remembered women working alongside men
19ftin submarine compartments and tanks towards the end of the war.
Jeffery M. Dorwart found a similar initial reluctance to assign women to 
worksites onboard ships at Philadelphia Navy Yard that decreased as the war went on:
117 Manager memo of 15 Sep 1942 NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 8, Folder A2-11/NY2, “Circular Letter Navy Yard,” 
(emphasis added).
118 Manager memo o f 30 Sep 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2LC Pkg #7, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
119 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
120 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum. 
Oral interview with Dan Maclssac, 9 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum.
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The Philadelphia Navy Yard never appeared entirely comfortable with female 
employees during World War I I . . .  supervisors would not allow women to work 
on board the battleship New Jersey for nearly a year.. .Approximately 70 percent 
of the Navy Yard’s female employees held clerical, office, or inside shop work. .. 
The war drain on male employees [eventually] opened nearly every job except
191riggers to females.
Female employees at Portsmouth Navy Yard also found improved employment
opportunities as the war progressed.
Another Captain Davis memo of 30 September 1942 gives more insight into his
sympathies regarding women employees. Reacting to a Secretary of the Navy directive of
1 September 1942 that alerted the navy yards to hire women because all eligible males
would soon be called by the Selective Service, Davis wrote:
Seeing the trend of the movement [towards the hiring of women], it would 
behoove Portsmouth to take action to obtain the pick of women available as 
to avoid the serious dislocations which may occur if action is delayed and 
later forced [to hire women] upon the Yard in larger numbers and 
suddenly.122
At the risk of paraphrasing Captain Davis, he appears to be suggesting that it would be 
best to follow the Secretary of the Navy’s direction and expeditiously hire women for two 
reasons: by hiring women quickly the shipyard can get the pick of the limited female 
talent available, and if  the yard can increase the number of female employees, it may 
avoid being forced to hire women en masse at a later date and inundating the yard with 
great numbers of unqualified and untrained employees.
121 Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Philadelphia Navy Yard: From the Birth o f  the U.S. Navy to the 
NuclearAge. (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 178.
122 Manager memo o f 30 Sep 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
General Correspondence (Central Files), Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central 
Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2LC Pkg #7, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
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Captain Davis’ worst fears came true, in May 1943, when Assistant Secretary of
the Navy Ralph Bard directed Portsmouth and the other east coast navy yards to increase
their employment of women, especially skilled women. According to Bard:
During the past ten months, continental Navy yards have shown a definite 
increase in the employment of women, particularly in the semi-skilled Group
II. Greater efforts must be made immediately to increase this upward trend in 
Group II, and the employment of women in the skilled Group III by 
upgrading or direct employment must be materially increased in the very near 
future...  The Navy yards at Portsmouth, N.H., Boston, Mass., New York,
N. Y., Philadelphia, Pa., and Norfolk, Va., especially should increase their 
employment of women to at least the average for all yards. The acceptance of 
women in private industry indicates that the continental Navy yards are not 
utilizing women on a comparable scale, particularly in the skilled Group
III.123
Bard’s observation about the shortage of skilled female workers in navy yards was 
especially true for Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Most women at the yard were employed as clerks or administrative assistants in 
offices, mechanics’ helpers in the shops, shop cleaners, or operators of pieces of shop 
equipment on which they had been specially trained. Hazel Sinclair, an African- 
American woman, worked as a woodworker’s helper for over two years during the war. 
Sinclair reported that “They didn’t let women work on the machines”124 and, 
consequently, she stacked wood during the period of her employment. Rosary Cooper, 
another African-American woman, first found wartime employment at the shipyard as a 
file clerk and eventually qualified as a crane operator. Anna Jones, also African-
123 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f  25 May 1943 to Commandants All 
Continental Navy Yard. NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f  Naval Personnel General Correspondence, 
1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY Jan 11, 1943.
124 Valerie Cunningham and Mark J. Sammons, Black Portsmouth: Three Centuries o f  African- 
American Heritage (Durham: University o f  New Hampshire Press, 2004), 168.
125 Ibid., 170-171.
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American, began at the yard as a messenger and was in training to be a draftsman when
the war ended. Ambitious and opportunistic, these women took advantage of a window
of employment opportunity that opened for African-American women during the war.
Unlike most of the new employees at the shipyard during the war, who came from
nearby towns and states, Rosary Cooper “had come to the area from her native Florida as
a children’s nurse” before taking a job at the shipyard. Likewise, Anna Jones had
graduated from High School in Seneca Falls, in 1940, and served in the WAC in
Washington D.C. before moving to the area to find employment at the yard, where her
father had been hired earlier in the war as a refrigeration specialist. Based on these few
examples, it appears that African-Americans may have traveled further to find
employment at the yard during the war than most other employees.
Nationwide, many African-American women took advantage of a reduction in
discrimination to enter well-paying jobs. According to Alice Kessler-Harris:
For black women, the change was dramatic. For generations they had been denied 
access to good, skilled jobs that now opened to them ...  But black women took 
advantage of their previous work experience to move into more desirable jobs. 
About 20 percent of those who had been domestic servants found work in areas 
that had previously snubbed them. By war’s end the position of black women had 
improved substantially. They never got the best paying jobs . . .  But the numbers 
involved in low-paid and low-status domestic work dropped by 15 percent while 
the number of factory operatives more than doubled.. .Their movement into 
better jobs reflects not changed attitudes but their ability to take timely advantage 
of enlarged opportunities.12
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s Hazel Sinclair and Rosary Cooper were part of a national
movement that saw African-American women seize unprecedented opportunities to
improve their social status by moving into better paying jobs.
126 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 278-279.
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Women hired into industrial shops most often found employment as helpers for
1 T ”7 1 ”7 Swelders, sheet metal workers, or foundry molders. According to Fred White, the 
women employees at Portsmouth Navy Yard were more likely to be assigned to 
secondary operations, such as punching holes for fasteners or grinding metal for welds, 
leaving the primary operation for the male mechanic.129 In her capacity as a painter’s 
helper, Eileen Foley remembers being allowed to apply the primer or first coat of paint 
topside on a submarine, but the finishing coats were always left to the more experienced
1 TOmale painters.
Rosie the Riveter did not work at Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II. 
First and foremost, rivets were nearing extinction at the yard as submarines had moved 
towards all welded pressure hulls immediately prior to the war. Secondly, Portsmouth 
Rosie would not have actually driven the infrequently used rivets, but, rather, would have 
punched the holes for the rivets. The assignment of women to secondary jobs at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard was typical of all wartime industry where “women held just 4.4% 
of war jobs classified as skilled and a far smaller percentage of management
127 The shop distribution o f female workers at Portsmouth was very similar to that at a private yard 
in South Portland, Maine where half o f  the women employed were welders and the rest were assigned to 
trades that included shipfitting, pipefitting, burners, crane operators, etc. Lane, 257.
128 While not a scientific approach, a review o f the Public Works record o f upgraded women’s 
toilet facilities gives indications o f where the women were working in the shipyard in September 1942. The 
Industrial Manager had authorized toilet facility upgrades in the following buildings to accommodate the 
number o f female workers indicated; Building #96 for 25 female core and molding workers, Building #55 
for 50 female welders, Building #2 for another 50 female welders, Building #74 for 50 female sheet metal 
workers, and Building #75 for 50 female sheet metal workers. See Manager memo to Public Works Officer 
o f 2 Sep 1942, Subject; Toilet Facilities for Women in Shops and Shop Offices. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Box 36, Folder N4-14, “Latrines.”
129 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006 at his home in New Castle, H.H.
130 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
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positions.”131 Historian David M. Kennedy claims that the emblem of Rosie the Riveter 
as a “denim-clad, tool-wielding, can-do figure” actually typified very few wartime 
women employees. Kennedy suggests that Wendy the Welder, Sally the Secretary, or 
Molly the Mom might have been more appropriate labels for the typical wartime women 
employee.132
Other industries in the city of Portsmouth were also slow to hire women. A 
Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey (August 1943) reported that, in June 1942, of the 
three Portsmouth industrial plants engaged in defense work, only one, the Morley 
Company, employed any women. Morley Company employed 93 women, 3 of whom 
were married. At the time, the navy yard employed 430 women, 10 of whom were 
married.133 Thus, during the early stages of the war, a limited number of women were 
employed in an industrial environment and almost all of them were unmarried. The 
Portsmouth Defense Area Health and Welfare Survey concluded from a survey 
completed in June 1942 that “There has been no significant increase in the number of 
mothers employed since the inception of defense work.” Also, “Because the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard is the major industry [in the area], and the only large one, it seems there will 
be no appreciable increase in numbers of employed women unless, and until, the Navy
131 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 779.
132 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 776-779.
133 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, August 1943,” 35. Cumings 
Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, “S.C.D. Survey o f Health and 
Welfare in Portsmouth.” Hereafter “Survey o f  Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.” A 
later survey, between June 1942 and August 1943, found 470 female clerical workers at the yard and 400 
women employees at the Somersworth plant. “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense 
Area,” 67.
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Yard employs women in large numbers.”134 Women did find employment as taxi drivers 
early in the war in Portsmouth as the male drivers went to war and the demand for taxis 
increased with the overall shortage of automobiles, tires, and gasoline. In the summer of 
1942, Rosie was driving a taxi, not rivets, in Portsmouth.
Despite the slow initial progress in hiring women to replace men at the yard, the
Portsmouth Herald periodically featured front page articles and pictures that highlighted
any progress that was made by women. For example, on 18 May 1942, the paper
gleefully reported the advancement of women to positions of taxi cab and bus drivers:
No wonder people are beginning to wonder if it really is a man’s world. First 
Portsmouth had a woman cleaning company driver, then a taxi driver, and 
now the Hill Transportation company has hired from the government
l i e
employment agency two women for duty behind its wheels.
Thus, six months after Pearl Harbor, the hiring of local women as replacements for men 
had progressed to the dubious distinction of finding employment as taxi cab and bus 
drivers. And this was front page news.
While not a particularly glamorous or lucrative beginning, taxi cab driving paid 
better than house cleaning and other jobs available to women at the time. Over the next
year and a half, the Portsmouth Herald frequently carried pictures of women in training
•?
for, or assuming, traditional, and even better paying, men’s jobs at the shipyard. The 
Herald’ s coverage provides a chronological summary of the incremental progress women 
made towards more meaningful industrial employment. On 18 June 1942, one finds a 
picture of several Exeter girls “amid gears and belts of steel lathes,” who were among the
134 Ibid, 36.
135 Portsmouth Herald, 18 May 1942, “Feminine Detail Takes Over Bus Service to Navy Yard,” 1.
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first women to enroll in defense mechanical training classes with hopes of gaining
employment at the shipyard. The 22 March 1943 paper has a picture of the first female
navy yard machinist to apply for membership in the Ranger Lodge, International
Association of Machinists. The article notes that she is currently a “checker of machines
and other supplies,” but her number one ambition is to become a “full fledged machinist.”
The 12 May 1943 edition contains an article entitled “School Aids Production of Navy
Submarines” that heaps credit on the local Federal Vocational Training School and notes
that 125 of the 322 students enrolled in the school are women. On 11 November 1943,
four shipyard “welderettes” are pictured with their supervisor. According to the Herald,
the four women had patriotically completed 150 hours of electric welding training and:
They have swapped the duties of housekeeping and the tapping typewriter for 
the glow of a blow torch and the clang of steel. They’re laboring, sweating, 
amid steel beams and plates to build fighting submarines for America’s 
safety.136
Finally, in May 1944, a very important milestone was reached when the first women 
graduated from the yard’s supervisory training program. Four of the 195 graduates were 
women. Rear Admiral Thomas Withers’ graduation address praised not just the women, 
but also the class:
Your class is different from any other class in that it is coeducational. I am proud 
that this navy yard recognizes the fact that women are capable of becoming 
supervisors and I cannot understand why other navy yards do not take advantage 
of the capable women employees they must have.137
136 Portsmouth Herald, 11 Nov 1943, caption under the picture reads, “And More are Needed,” 1.
137 .Quoted in the Portsmouth Herald, 10 May 1944, “Yard Graduates Largest Group; Four 
Women,” 1.
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Withers’ remarks imply that the other navy yards had not yet trained any women for 
supervisory positions. Portsmouth Navy Yard, after a slow start, had made up a lot of 
ground on the other navy yards.
Women had progressed from housewives at the start of the war to bus and taxi 
cab drivers by May 1942, through machine operator training programs in the early part of 
1943, to fully qualified sweaty welders by November 1943, and finally to trained shop 
supervisors by May 1944. Elsewhere on the yard, military women were also breaking 
new ground. In May 1943, the first class of fifty “WAVES” arrived at the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard Hospital for four weeks of basic training. The first female doctor at the 
shipyard reported for duty on 22 February 1945.138
Mary C. Dondero, who had been a clerical helper in the Portsmouth Navy Yard
1 OQ
Supply Department early in the war, progressed further than any of the other women 
employed at the yard during the war when she was elected Mayor of Portsmouth in 
November 1944. Dondero was the first female mayor ever in the state of New Hampshire 
and one of the first in the nation.140 Her story will be covered in more detail later when 
discussing the transformation of the city of Portsmouth during the war. Before one gets 
too carried away with the progress made by New Hampshire women during the war, it is 
well to note that, a little over a month after Mary Dondero became mayor of Portsmouth, 
the New Hampshire House of Representatives rejected a bill to allow women jurists by a
138 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 89.
139 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, daughter o f Mary C. Dondero, 30 Aug 2006, at her 
home in Portsmouth, N.H.
140 Portsmouth Herald, 1 Jan 1945, 1.
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vote of 181 to 174. 141 Thus, in early 1945, women could hold responsible positions at the 
Portsmouth Navy Yard and govern the city of Portsmouth, but they could not sit on juries 
in the state of New Hampshire.
Late in 1945, Fred White was faced with the need to terminate about sixty women 
working in the sail loft of his shop making various torpedo straps, mattress covers, 
cushions, and other leather products for the submarines. All the women fell into the 
category of wartime employees without rights to continued employment after the war. 
After careful consideration, and with the women’s encouragement, White decided to 
forego the normal practice of terminating employees individually, according to hiring 
date, and release all sixty of the women on the same day. The decision was met with 
universal approval by the women who did not want to experience individual firings and 
possible disputes about who should go next. According to White, the women celebrated 
together as they walked out of the shop after the last day of their employment.142
Nationwide, women were quick to quit their jobs when war production ended. 
Alice Kessler-Harris wrote that “The rate at which women chose to leave jobs was at 
least double, and sometimes triple the rate at which they were discharged. And it was 
consistently higher than quit rates for men.”143 Many of the women who had found 
employment in the shipyard’s industrial shops during the war, like millions of women in 
comparable positions across the United States, were more than willing to abandon their 
wartime jobs, in favor of returning veterans, and to return to their homes and other 
occupations.
141 Ibid., 10 Feb 1045, “Women Juror Bill to Get New Action,” 1.
142 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
143 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 286.
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Selective Service
One of the yard’s most serious employment problems during the war was that the 
younger, more physically fit, and more trainable, employees were routinely drafted or 
volunteered for military service. The nation’s first peacetime draft bill was passed on 16 
September 1940. One month later, more than sixteen million men between the ages of 
twenty-one and thirty-five were registered on the draft rolls.144 To further complicate 
matters, the Navy’s well advertised “choose while you can” program enticed a large 
number of patriotic young men of the seacoast area to volunteer for the Navy and Marine 
Corps during the early years of the war.145 Thus, fifteen months prior to the start of the 
war, at about the same time that the shipyard ramp-up was gathering momentum, the best 
and the brightest of the yard’s employees began to be siphoned from the shipyard’s rolls.
The shipyard’s apprentice program was especially devastated by the loss of men 
to military service. The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) reported that, “Just before 
the war the Yard employed some 400 apprentices. The present number is about 80. Some 
240 former apprentices are in the armed forces on military furlough.”146 At the end of the 
war, in the summer of 1945, the shipyard reported “approximately 450 on military 
furlough, leaving less than 50 apprentices now employed.”147 The loss of skilled and
144 Amendments over the next two years extended the age limits from eighteen to sixty-five. 
However, the military wanted no men over forty-five and strongly preferred only those under the age o f  
twenty-six. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 459 and 632.
145 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 635. William Tebo, interviewed for this dissertation, 
was one o f  those who enlisted in the Navy rather than wait to be drafted.
146
Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
147 Administrative History, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, 
Kittery, Me., 36.
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experienced employees to military service was a never-ending problem throughout the 
war.
Percy Whitney was one of the skilled shipyard employees lost to the draft in 
1943. Percy entered the apprentice program in June 1940 and graduated three years later. 
He attributes his good fortune of being employed for three years at the shipyard, prior to 
being drafted, to the critical nature of the work he was doing in the foundry, his married
1 AQ
status, and a low lottery draft number. Even then, he joined the long list of former 
apprentices and valuable shipyard employees on military furlough when he was drafted 
into the Marine Corps in 1943.
Selective Service attrition in the shipyard welding shop was particularly acute at 
the start of the war. First established in November 1939, the shop grew quickly in 
numbers and importance as submarine construction increasingly moved to welded 
pressure hulls to replace riveted hulls.149 By April of 1942, the shop employed nearly 
one thousand people with a pressing need to hire many more welders.150 In early 1942, 
the shop was scheduled to lose twenty five to thirty qualified welders per month. Welders 
were being lost faster than replacements could be trained and certified.151
Selective Service was a particularly difficult challenge for the shipyard because 
management’s efforts to schedule the orderly release of employees with critical skills,
148 Oral interview with Percy Whitney, 23 Mar 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
149 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 2 Nov 1939 to Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy 
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5-14, “Welding Shop.”
150 Manager memo to Production Officer o f  22 Apr 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5-14, “Welding Shop.”
151 Ibid
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such as welders, had to be coordinated with numerous local boards in all three of the 
states from which the yard drew employees. In February 1943, the shipyard, under the 
leadership of Captain H.F.D. Davis, brought some order to this chaotic situation when it 
reached a precedent setting agreement with the Selective Service to release workers in 
accordance with a long range predetermined plan, with New Hampshire deferment rules 
applying to all yard employees subject to being drafted. According to the Portsmouth 
Herald of 5 February 1943, “This establishes the yard as the first employer in New 
Hampshire, and, it is believed to be the first navy yard in the United States to reach
• i ct
[such] an agreement with the Selective Service System.” Explaining the advantages of
the agreement, the Herald reported:
The naval authorities will no longer be required to deal with many local 
boards in several states in the cases of individual employees whose services 
they desire to retain for occupational reasons. The date of release in all such 
cases has been decided definitely as the result of studies and conferences 
which have been in progress for the past three months between General 
Bowen [Selective Service Director for the state of New Hampshire] and 
Captain Davis, the yard manager. A single deferment policy, that which 
prevails in the state of New Hampshire, will be applied to all employees at 
the yard who are vulnerable to the Selective Service and Training Act.153
Captain Davis, always meticulous in his planning, had reduced the shipyard’s Selective
Service problem to manageable proportions.
In July 1945 the Portsmouth Periscope reported that “As of 30 June, 5,033 
workmen had shifted from war work to the fighting front” and “85 men from this Yard 
have died in action.”154 During the peak war years, when the shipyard average
152 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Feb 1943, “They Agreed on Navy Yard Employee Induction Plan,” 1.
153 Ibid.
154 Portsmouth Periscope, 10 July 1945, 1, 6. Papers o f  Harold Caswell Sweeter, Portsmouth 
Navy Yard Supervisory Naval Architect, 1917-1958, Sweetser Family Papers, Milne Special Collections, 
University o f  New Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
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employment was about 18,000, the shipyard’s average loss to the selective service was 
well over 1,000 employees a year. However, knowing well in advance what critical skills 
would be lost, and when, the shipyard could schedule training for replacements and work 
them into production schedules in an orderly manner.
In summary, Portsmouth Navy Yard was blessed with an intelligent and 
motivated workforce during the war that gave patriotism and teamwork very high 
priority. Employee-management relations were characterized by a cooperative spirit that 
was based on mutual respect and trust. The result was harmony in the workplace and few 
disciplinary actions. Women played an increasingly important role in the yard as they 
gradually gained access to training programs that qualified them for more responsible 
positions. Their progress was impressive and their contributions were significant.
Because of the personnel disruptions caused by employees leaving the yard for military 
service, the yard arranged a precedent setting agreement with the Selective Service that 
allowed for orderly release of employees in accordance with a long range plan that 
permitted the yard to train replacements in a timely manner. The employees, in short, 
were the keystone upon which the shipyard built its remarkable success.
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CHAPTER V
METHODS & MEASURABLES
“Any present judgment of the organization, administration, and control 
procedures of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. must give great weight 
to the development of the Yard, subordinating all other considerations to 
the demands of the war effort, into a specialized construction activity for 
submarines only. All operating units have been streamlined for this sole 
purpose.”1
Booz-Allen Industrial Survey Report 
6 November 1944
By early 1942, several building blocks were in place upon which Portsmouth 
Navy Yard would build a remarkable production record over the next few years. An 
impressive team of naval and civilian managers had been assembled, massive facility 
upgrades were in progress, orders had been received for dozens of new submarines, 
employees were being hired at unprecedented rates and, organizationally, the yard had a 
free hand to manage its own growth and development. The final piece of the puzzle 
would be the implementation of well designed processes and practices that were tailored 
to take maximum advantage of the shipyard’s strengths, growing workforce, and 
expanding facilities. Those production methods included well-designed training 
programs, special teams, assembly line, risk management, innovation, open 
communications, control systems, farm-out programs, and lean manufacturing.
1 Secretary o f  the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f  6 Nov 1944, Subject: Survey o f  Industrial 
Department, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. -  Report No. 2 o f  Industrial Survey Division. NARA College 
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f  Ships General Correspondence (1940-45), Box 785, Folder NY1/A3, 3. Emphasis 
added.
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The effectiveness of those methods will then be evaluated under the section 
entitled Measurables. The word “measurables” cannot be found in most dictionaries, but 
it is common manufacturing terminology. For manufacturing processes, quantifiable 
results, things that can be measured, are usually the most meaningful indicators of 
success or failure. Measurables might include total numbers produced, production rates 
achieved, or manhours expended per widget. It was the eye-catching production 
measurables, in terms of submarine delivery rates, that motivated this study. In the 
interest of consistency, the yard’s production numbers will be revisited and examined in 
more detail in this section. Two other indicators of success, cost savings and quality, will 
also be reviewed. In today’s world of industry and shipbuilding, both of these are true 
measurables in every sense of the word, able to be quantified and analyzed in great detail 
for performance trends. Such was not the case at the yard during the war. Records for 
cost and quality were often abbreviated or eliminated in the interest of production 
efficiency. However, other evidence is available to gain some indication as to how the 
yard performed in both of these areas. Remarkable production numbers lose much of 
their luster if costs are out of sight or quality is poor. As it turns out, cost and quality 
were as much a part of the Portsmouth success story as was production.
Methods
This section argues that the yard’s outstanding performance was the result of well 
designed processes and practices that were tailored to take maximum advantage of the 
shipyard’s resources. In the case of the most critically needed shipbuilding resource, 
building ways, Portsmouth Navy Yard was grossly under capacity immediately prior to 
the war and remained challenged for building sites throughout the war. Necessity was
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very much the mother of invention as the yard made the most of what it had. The
innovative management techniques and processes that were developed to maximize the
shipyard resources available were, in some cases, years ahead of their time.
It was previously noted that shipyards were encouraged by higher authority to
accept facilities constructed to less than optimum technical specifications during the
ramp-up in order to expedite completion of urgently needed shipyard infrastructure.
While quality of workmanship was a high priority at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during
the war, it was time and production efficiency that drove the yard, not perfection of
product. It was the sacrifice of absolute quality for time that led to the production miracle
at Portsmouth Navy Yard and other American shipyards during the war.2 This was in
sharp contrast to the German approach to production which was more geared towards
optimum designs and technical excellence than efficient production. Historian David
Kennedy says that:
In the inescapable trade-off between quality and quantity, the Germans 
characteristically chose the former, the Americans the latter.. .  Though the 
Americans also ultimately proved capable of some epochal scientific and 
technical breakthroughs, they innovated most characteristically in plant layout, 
production organization, economies of scale, and process engineering. If Germany 
aimed for the perfection of many things, America aspired to the commodification 
of virtually every thing...  [The United States placed] a premium on organizing 
production around simple repetitive tasks that did not demand technical adeptness 
or extensive training.3
A common theme throughout this chapter will be the streamlining of work at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard to enable the repetitive accomplishment of the same jobs on numerous
2 Liberty Ships were prime examples o f  the sacrifice o f  quality for the mass production o f  product 
during the war. “At least one Liberty Ship foundered at the pier before sailing, and seamen lived in dread 
that the welded hulls would split open in heavy seas, as some tragically did.” There is little doubt that 
numbers were traded for performance as twenty-seven hundred Liberty Ships were built during the war. 
David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 652-653.
3 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 648-649.
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successive submarines. It will also be shown that the shipyard excelled in those attributes 
highlighted by David Kennedy that separated American industry from that of the enemy; 
plant layout, production organization, process engineering, and economies of scale. Not 
specifically cited by Kennedy, but also critical to Portsmouth’s successful submarine 
construction programs, were well designed and implemented training programs.
Training
The increase in shipyard employment required a vast upgrade to the skilled labor 
base in the area. Prior to the war, the area had a shortage of skilled workers and, 
consequently, Portsmouth had not been able to attract much industry.4 It was absolutely 
essential that the shipyard have a large skilled labor pool from which to draw if it was to 
achieve expected production. This upgrade was achieved through three primary means of 
training. First, the Shipyard Apprentice Training Program was run by the Shop Masters 
for advancement to the next class or to journeyman. Second, free supplementary and pre­
employment vocational training courses were given at off-yard locations with the 
cooperation of the Federal War Production Training Program through the State 
Department of Education. Finally, the Engineering Science Management War Training 
Program at the University of New Hampshire (UNH) conducted more advanced technical 
and engineering courses.
The Apprentice Program was a well-established shipyard tradition by the late 
1930’s. Immediately prior to World War II, the program was functioning near full 
capacity and successfully providing the skilled mechanics that the shops needed at the 
time. For example, the program had 346 students enrolled in August 1941, 342 students
4 The huge increase in skilled labor in the seacoast area as the result o f  the shipyard and defense 
training programs during the war is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII, “Community Consequences.”
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on 1 December 1941, 336 students on 5 January 1942, and 391 students on 2 March 
1942.5 There was no need to create a new in-yard apprentice training program to meet the 
increased skilled tradesmen needs. One only had to continue the current program and 
expand it as necessary to meet the rapidly growing need for skilled employees.
The existing apprentice program consisted of approximately eighteen classes of 
about twenty students each that met for two hours a day, three days a week, taking 
advantage of shift turnovers and mid-day breaks for classes during the work day. A high 
school diploma was required for entry to the program. A minimum credit of 1,816 school 
hours or selective shop training was required before a candidate could take the 
promotional exam that was routinely given twice a year prior to the war. However, by 
October 1941, the exam was being given more often because of the increased numbers in 
the apprentice program.6 Percy Whitney, who had hired into the apprentice program after 
two and one half years at Bates College, remembered the apprentice program as being 
quite demanding academically. In particular, he recalled having to pass classroom 
metallurgy, trigonometry, and other challenging technical courses while working as an 
apprentice in the shipyard foundry.7
The War Department Training Program was run by the states, with machines and 
equipment provided by the federal government. It provided supplemental trade and 
technical instruction required to be employed at the shipyard, or to become better 
qualified in one’s trade once employed. There were fourteen similar training programs
5 Shop Superintendent memos o f 26 Aug, 27 Nov, 30 Dec 1941 & 25 Feb 1942. NARA Waltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC, 
PKG #6, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
6 Ibid.
7 Oral interview with Percy Whitney, 23 Mar 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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run throughout the state of New Hampshire. The Portsmouth program, however, was 
“praised by the navy vocational officers as one of the finest in the country.”
By early 1941, a coordinated federal, state, and local effort had established 
machine operator classes at Portsmouth High School. In March 1941, the high school 
program was expanded to include a three-shift defense school for welders.9 The machine 
shop classes underway at the time added an extra session from 10 pm to 7am. The 
training program was subsequently expanded to include gas and electric welding classes 
at a local industrial firm, the Morley Company, to meet an urgent need for welders at the 
navy yard. As noted earlier, the yard’s Industrial Manager, Captain Davis, had identified 
a shortage of welders to be the most critical obstacle to increased production in early 
1942. Classes at Morley Company grew to include training 24 hours a day for welders, 
sheet metal workers, pipe fitters, ship fitters, machinists, electricians, machine operators, 
blueprint machine operators, and copyist draftsmen. In 1943, the program trained nearly 
1,000 workers for positions at the navy yard.10 During the three years of operations, the 
school employed as many as eighty instructors who trained over 7,000 people.
William Tebo was a fifteen year old high school junior when he took 400 hours of 
machine operator defense training at Portsmouth High School to gain employment at the 
shipyard. Once hired, he was further trained as an electrician in order to perform limited, 
but important, shipboard wiring jobs. According to Tebo, there were hundreds of fifteen 
and sixteen year old high school students employed by the shipyard during the war. They
8 Portsmouth Herald, 12 Mar 1944, “Free Training Courses Offer Top Opportunities,” 1.
9 Ibid, 20 Mar 1941, “Start School for Welders Next Week,” 1.
10 Ibid.
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would go to school during the day and then work the 3:00 pm -  11:00 pm shift at the 
shipyard. Like Tebo, most of them just passed through the shipyard for less than a year 
on their way to military service once they turned 17 years of age.11 Tebo was at the yard 
for about six months, beginning in early 1944. By maintaining good grades, he and other 
teenagers could be excused from the last two periods of the day at the high school which 
gave them enough time to get to the yard in time for the shift start.12
Employment at the shipyard in 1942 was more than just a job to young people 
like William Tebo and Eileen Dondero. During interviews, both conveyed the fact that a 
sense of duty and patriotism had as much, or more, to do with their motivation for 
seeking employment at the yard as wages. Employment at the shipyard was seen as a way 
that they could contribute to the war effort until they could join friends and family 
members in the armed services. Tebo became a submariner13 and Dondero joined the 
Women’s Army Corps.
Patriotism and personal sacrifice were strong forces in the seacoast area during
the war. Barbara McLean Ward’s Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The
Grocer and the Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II  is filled
with stories of similar sacrifices made by Portsmouth residents:
Housewives, USO hostesses, Y.M.C.A. “girls,” and “office girls,” after their 
regular workday was completed, turned up in large numbers to work at 
Morley [Company] when a government contract was due . . .  Portsmouth 
residents turned out in large numbers to staff the wartime committees . .
11 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
12 Ibid.
13 Tebo knew o f at least two other friends who worked at the yard and became submariners during 
the war. While prior employment at the yard did not help them get into the submarine force, the knowledge 
o f submarines gained at the yard was o f  great benefit at Submarine School in New London, Ct. Oral 
interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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Thousands of others did their part by participating in scrap drives, rubber 
drives, and numerous other salvage efforts.1
William Tebo volunteered for high school sponsored scrap drives, rag drives, and
clothing drives for which he received no compensation.15 He and others on the
Portsmouth home-front were quick to do whatever was required for the war effort.
Employment at the shipyard, volunteering for scrap drives, and participation in the many
training programs being offered were all seen as ways to help win the war.
The University of New Hanpshire Engineering Science Management War 
Training Program provided the more technical and professional training required by 
shipyard technicians, engineers, and managers. This curriculum included courses in 
Mechanics, Strengths of Materials, Metallurgy, Welding Theory, and so forth. Over five 
thousand employees took advantage of the free training offered by the state and the 
university.16 The shipyard benefited greatly from the nearby availability of a state 
university, just ten miles distant.
Some industries had avoided the seacoast area prior to the war because of a lack 
of skilled workers. The programs discussed above produced thousands of skilled workers 
during the war and turned the shortage of skilled labor into an abundance of the same in a 
few years. In addition, the conversion of the federal defense training program to a state
14 G. Colati and Ryan H. Madden, “Victory Begins at Home: Portsmouth and Puddle Dock during 
World War II,” in Barbara McLean Ward, ed., Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The Grocer 
and the Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II (Portsmouth: Strawbery Banke 
Museum, 1994), 59, 68.
15 Tebo also volunteered for a high school program that had students make model German 
airplanes for use by coastal lookouts as identification aids. In return for their work, the students received 
points towards honorary military titles that advanced in seniority and importance according to the number 
o f models they built. Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard 
Museum.
16 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 47.
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vocational training school, immediately after the war, went a long way towards insuring 
that the area had a long-term supply of skilled labor.
Special Teams
A well trained and self-motivated workforce with a homogeneous and repetitious 
workload, coupled with management concerns about the gradual loss of employees to the 
military services, was an environment rife for the use of special teams. A worker 
specially trained to accomplish the same job on submarine after submarine was highly 
productive, as well as an expert, in that task. In addition, if he were drafted into the 
military, his replacement could be quickly trained for the limited task with minimal 
disruption to the building process.17 For all of these reasons, Portsmouth Navy Yard 
made maximum use of special teams.
The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) noted the shipyard’s widespread use of 
special teams and reported that, “Although the quality of the working force is at a high 
standard, there are many employees who have developed only specialized skills.”18 
Pointing towards the need for a more uniformly trained workforce during reduced post­
war operations, the survey report recommended that the specialists who were to be 
retained as shipyard employees after the war should receive more formal and extensive 
training. It was no accident that Portsmouth Navy Yard had a large number of employees
17 It became routine shipyard practice to periodically schedule meetings for eligible employees to 
accommodate their registration for Selective Service. For example, on 7 February 1942, the Manager 
reminded all Shop Masters and Supervisors that, on 14 -16 February 1942, those men must register for 
Selective Service who reached age 20 prior to 1/1/42 and will not be older than 45 on 2/16/42. Manager 
memo o f 7 Feb 1942 to All Shop Masters and Supervisors, Subject: Registration for Selective Service. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, 
Folder A3-2/LC, PKG #6, “Orders to Shop Foremen.” The shipyard began to experience losses to the 
Selective Service as early as February 1942. The early loses included 12 welders in February, 11 in March, 
and 8 in April 1942. Manager memo o f  22 Apr 1942 to the Production Officer. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC, PKG #6, 
“Orders to Shop Foremen.”
18 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
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with specialized skills. Shipyard management recognized early-on that specialized 
training and specialized teams should be an integral part of the shipyard’s industrial 
operation.
The team that Commandant Wainwright had assembled in November 1941 to
study work practices and make recommendations for improvements highlighted the need
for specialization. Recognizing the difficulty that the shipyard faced in obtaining the
numbers of skilled and trained mechanics that would be needed to quickly ramp up
production, the team reported:
While it is not possible to train skilled mechanics in short enough time to 
make them available in the near future, it is possible to train unskilled men 
who have suitable adaptability in a few of the operations of the various trades 
in short time. By assignment of these men to operations which they have 
been trained to perform and by placing them under the supervision of skilled 
mechanics, it is possible to get work done which could not be accomplished 
if only skilled men were used.19
Similarly, the team recommended that the existing practice of some shops, to assign a
group of men to custom build a single ship through completion, be discontinued in favor
of using the same men to perform the same operations on different submarines.
According to the team report:
It is obvious that a man or a group of men is better able to perform a task 
after having done it on another similar ship than is a different man or group 
of men. Since the interval between keel layings, launchings, and completion 
of successive ships is approximately six weeks, it is recommended that each 
man or group of men be assigned to such jobs or parts of jobs on a ship as 
will require approximately six weeks to complete and that, after they have 
completed this work on one ship, they be moved to the next ship and assigned 
the same work. This recommendation applies not only to mechanics, but also 
to shop supervisors and to ship superintendents.20
19 Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (December 1941), 3.
20 Ib id , 9.
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From 8 December 1941, the shipyard was dedicated to specialized training and a high 
degree of repetitive tasking.
The Production Officer, Captain S.E. Dudley, reinforced and formalized the
recommendations of Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (1941) when he advised the Shop
Supervisors that the new work methods needed to achieve expected production increases
should include a high degree of specialization:
We have 18 hulls to lay dow n.. .  Our previous methods produced good ships, 
but each vessel was a custom built job. Such methods will not meet the 
problem that we are now facing.. . .  You can’t run Subs down an assembly 
line, but for “outside work” you can do the next best thing, that is, move men 
along from ship to ship to do the same work on each.21
Similarly, in mid-January 1942, the Industrial Manager reminded the shops to use “repeat
work teams for assembly, installation, erection, and test jobs in shops.”22 It was believed
that completion dates on some ships might suffer from the effort to maximize
specialization, but in the aggregate, the result would be an optimum performance
overall.23 Production results proved this belief to be true beyond a shadow of a doubt.
Job specialization was by no means unique to Portsmouth Navy Yard. The 
practice was widespread in the shipyards that mass produced Liberty ships for the same 
reasons that it appealed to Portsmouth. According to historian Frederick C. Lane, “When 
the work was planned so that the same crew had the same task every day, there was no
21 Production Officers memo o f  23 December 1941 to Masters, all Shops. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG 
#7, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
22 Manager memo o f 16 Jan 1942 to Shop Masters, NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG #6, “Orders to Shop 
Foremen.”
23 Production Officer memo o f  23 Dec 1942 to Masters, all Shops. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG #7, 
“Orders to Shop Foremen.”
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need of teaching the new workmen the 40 or 70 operations which had formed part of the 
craft learned by an apprentice at Newport News. Instead, a man who had only one skill 
could be kept busy doing that one thing.”24 The one task, to be performed on a Liberty 
ship by a worker with limited skills, was much simpler than the specialized submarine 
tasks assigned workers at Portsmouth, but the same concept applied.
William Tebo, the high school teenager employed at the navy yard in 1944, 
recalled how he traveled from submarine to submarine on the building ways performing 
the few electrical jobs for which he was the “expert installer” with minimal supervision. 
According to Tebo, he was a member of a small team of electricians assigned to a 
specific submarine compartment. One of his jobs was to wire the electrical distribution 
panel for the newly installed, and highly secretive, shipboard radar. With the radar 
consoles and equipment concealed under wrappings and coverings, Tebo dutifully wired 
the radar electrical panels on submarine after submarine.25 Thus, with limited electrical 
training, and minimal supervision, Tebo was able to provide a most useful and productive 
service to the yard during his six months of employment, prior to leaving for military 
service. Tebo was one of hundreds of specialists on small teams scattered throughout all 
the trades. It is clear that specialized training, and the formation of specialized work 
teams, were part of the shipyard’s mobilization agenda from the start of the war.
An Assembly Line of Sorts
Contrary to the opinion of the Production Officer in December 1941, Fred White 
remembers that the shipyard did manage to achieve an assembly line of sorts. Submarine 
sections, or modules, constructed in various buildings, were moved to the building sites
24 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 238.
25 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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to be welded together and, after launching, the submarines were moved from berth to 
berth for the completion of berth-specific tasks leading to machinery trials and 
completion. Granted, there was no assembly line as such, but the process did bear some 
resemblance to the automotive industry’s conveyor belt that received subassemblies at 
various stations and moved on until a completed car was produced at the end of the line. 
At any rate, the submarine building process at the yard during the war was far removed 
from the custom building practices of the 1920s and early 1930s.
Portsmouth Navy Yard started modular construction of submarines in 1934 on the 
NIRA submarines, Porpoise and Pike. Prior to that, flat steel plates were rolled to the 
desired cylindrical shapes in the structural shop and moved to the building site where 
they were riveted together. Each submarine constructed was custom built at the building 
site. A Local Shore Station Development Board letter dated 30 July 1934 noted that, “A
n / r
new method has been developed for the construction of submarines.” The letter 
explained that:
The submarines Porpoise and Pike are being constructed in sections. A 
section of the boat weighing approximately twenty tons is constructed at 
Building 96 and after it has been riveted and welded the section is moved by 
crane and railroad cars and placed on the building ways in Building 115. This 
method of constructing a large section and moving it as one piece to the ways 
has proven economical and more rapid than the method which was formerly 
used.27
The shipyard wanted approval for the continued use of Building 96 as a submarine 
section erection site instead of converting it to a storehouse as previously planned. This
26 Local Shore Station Development Board letter to Senior Member o f the Departmental Shore 
Station Development Board o f 30 Jul 1934. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, “Local Development Boards Package 1.”
27 Ibid.
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request, and others that followed, sought to continuously improve the sectional 
construction concept.
The fact that sectional construction began on the NIRA submarines in 1934 
illustrates the point made earlier that Portsmouth Navy Yard benefited greatly from a 
very limited, but nevertheless steady, stream of submarine construction orders during the 
1920s and early 1930s. By directing new submarine orders to Portsmouth when Electric 
Boat and other yards were getting no submarine orders, the Navy allowed Portsmouth to 
maintain a relatively stable and trained workforce that could develop new submarine 
construction techniques. The shipyard would further develop and refine sectional 
construction during the latter half of the 1930s by creating other independent erection 
sites in various buildings as convenient to the building sites as possible. For example, the 
shipyard’s 1937 plan for facilities development contained numerous features to 
accommodate sectional construction, including a large addition and alteration to the ship
98fitters shop, additional building ways, and larger capacity cranes. Thus, Portsmouth 
planned for facilities conducive to sectional construction, developed those facilities to the 
extent that limited funding was available, and acquired experience in this production 
technique. When orders skyrocketed and mass production became the order of the day, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard was poised to capitalize on the revitalized naval rebuilding 
program when other shipyards were thankful to go back to work.
28 Commandant First Naval District letter o f  10 Dec 1936 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, 
Folder A l-Y l, “Local Development Boards.”
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Portsmouth Industrial Survey #2 (June 1942) concluded that more work should be 
done on the structural hull assemblies before they were placed in position on the ways.29 
The board recommended the installation of more equipment foundations, bulkhead 
valves, stuffing tubes, small structural bulkheads, and other miscellaneous components. 
Increasing the completeness of the hull sections prior to delivery to the building ways 
accelerated the overall assembly schedule by reducing the time needed on the critically 
few building ways. Also, it reduced the number of workers needed in the confined spaces 
of submarine tanks and compartments after launch. Shipyard management recognized 
early on that the maximization of sectional content was critical to increased production.
The formula that Portsmouth Industrial Survey #2 (June 1942) outlined to
increase submarine production was the same formula that other shipyards would use to
deliver thousands of Liberty ships in record times a few years later. According to
maritime historian Frederick C. Lane:
The phenomenal speed attained in [Liberty] shipbuilding during World War 
II consisted above all in reducing the length of time between keel layings and 
launchings. If the work of putting together the steel plates and shapes which 
formed the hull was all performed on the ways or building berths, then each 
building berth was occupied by one ship for a relatively long time. If, in 
contrast, the pieces were joined into large sections elsewhere than on the 
shipway, the time on the shipway could be reduced.30
Working with much simpler systems and much roomier spaces, the builders of Liberty
ships were able to accomplish more prefabrication and preassembly than was Portsmouth
Navy Yard for the submarines it built. Nevertheless, throughout the war, Portsmouth
sought to increase the number of components, primarily foundations, hull fittings,
29 Portsmouth Industrial Survey #2 (June 1942), 14.
30 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 207.
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bulkheads, and other structural components that were installed in submarine sections 
prior to delivery to the building ways.
This is not to imply that Portsmouth Navy Yard was the only submarine yard 
employing the sectional construction of submarines. The other submarine building yards 
used some form of the sectional assembly process. In fact, Electric Boat’s version of the 
process included an “upside down” feature that rotated the pressure hull sections so that 
welders could “work upright instead of standing on their heads inside a rigid hull.”31 
Portsmouth’s advantage was that, having been first with the process in 1934, the yard had 
more experience in perfecting the process and adding content to the cylinders. 
Portsmouth, with fewer building sites than other yards, had great motivation to perfect 
the sectional construction process to accelerate the turnover of submarine hulls on the 
limited number of building sites. Without this concept, Portsmouth would have been an 
average shipyard. With it, the yard was something special.
According to Fred White, the thirteen steel cylinders that were welded together to 
form a pressure hull were manufactured at various sites in the shipyard, and staged at the 
building ways, ready to be lowered by crane into the dock or basin as soon as a launching 
occurred and the dock was free. Figure 13 shows two submarine pressure hull sections on 
the blocks in Dry Dock #1. On at least one occasion, White recalled, a launching 
occurred in the morning, the dock was pumped down during the day, and the thirteen 
pressure hull cylinders were lowered into place on the blocks on the dock floor by the end 
of the same day.32 Fred White and his crew of riggers were well aware of the shipyard’s
31 Portsmouth Herald, 16 May 1942, “New Method Puts Subs Into Mass Production,” 1.
32 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 April 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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critical need to maximize the use of the building sites in order to achieve maximum 
production.
Figure 13: Submarine Pressure Hull Sections in Dry Dock #1. 
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New 
Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
If the sectional construction process was Part #1 of the pseudo-assembly line at 
the yard, Part #2 was the stepping of the submarines through various berths for the 
completion of berth-specific jobs, many of which were accomplished by special teams. 
Referring to Figure 14, White recalled that newly launched submarines were first berthed 
at Berth 11 A, to have the sail and topside superstructure finished, after undocking from 
Dry Dock #1. White’s men then moved the submarine to Berth 1 IB for the installation of 
periscopes and masts, then on to Berth 11C where the bow torpedo tubes were completed, 
including the firing of water slugs with the bow pointed out into the Piscataqua River.
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Figure 14: World War II Berthing Arrangements. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Base Central Files, Box 18, Folder S-6, “Launching-General.”
The submarines were then moved around the comer to Berth 13 where the stem tubes 
could be completed and fired, and then on up the berth for the completion of work and 
preparations for dock trials. Other work, of course, took place at each successive berth in 
the process. The end result was an assembly line of sorts, where the submarine stepped 
from berth to berth and Portsmouth’s work specialization teams reported to the same 
berth over and over again to accomplish repetitive tasks.
1 Ibid.
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Risk Management
The shipyard management team was aggressive and willing to assume reasonable 
risks to increase production. Portsmouth Navy Yard faced two major obstacles to 
increased production at the start of the war. The first, insufficient building ways, was 
satisfactorily resolved locally through aggressive and innovative management. The 
second, late deliveries of components supplied by contractors, was more difficult and 
frustrating for management to deal with because the solution required the support of 
external contractors and agencies. The yard could control its own fate on the first but 
much less so on the second. As the war progressed, it was found that many contractor- 
supplied components were not only late but unreliable. This section looks at how the 
shipyard, through risk management techniques, was able to resolve its dilemma with 
building ways and contractor’s components.
By December 1942, the shipyard had created a number of opportunities for 
increased production. One possibility was the use of the new Dry Dock #1 for 
construction of two or three submarines at a time, instead of the repair of submarines as 
originally intended by the Chief of Naval Operations. At the start of the war, the Chief of 
Naval Operations placed the highest priority on the repair and maintenance of the 
existing fleet over new construction. Consequently, the Chief of Naval Operations 
considered it an urgent matter to insure shipyard facilities and dry docks were available 
for that purpose. The discussion that follows shows how Portsmouth Navy Yard 
successfully challenged the original intent for the dock in the interest of maximizing 
production at the yard. The tension that existed between the interests of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, in the maintenance of the existing fleet, and the interests of the
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Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in the construction of new ships, met in Dry Dock #1 at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
By way of background, the Greenslade Report on the Adequacy and Future 
Development of Naval Shore Establishments, dated 6 January 1941, concluded that 
Portsmouth Navy Yard should “handle 6% of the repair load of the entire U.S. Fleet.”34 
The Greenslade Board recommended that “a Twin Destroyer Dock [able to accommodate 
two destroyers at the same time] be built to enable the shipyard to carry its portion of the 
work level.” The Bureau of Ships authorized the shipyard to construct such a dock in 
March 1941.36 The Portsmouth Herald of 20 March 1941 reported that the dock “will be 
big enough to handle destroyers as well as subs.” At no point in the article did it say that 
the dry dock, at this early stage, would be dedicated to the construction of two or three 
submarines simultaneously, which was its ultimate fate.
In January 1941, it was part of the U.S. Navy’s mobilization plan to assign 
Portsmouth Navy Yard a significant fleet repair workload that was not necessarily limited 
to submarine repair work. That intent was the Navy Department’s basis for authorizing 
the new dock. Portsmouth management, however, wanted to shed as much repair work as 
possible in order to streamline its operation for submarine new construction work. 
Shipyard management could kill two birds with one stone if it could get the Bureau of 
Ships and the Chief of Naval Operations to authorize the building of submarines in the 
new dry dock. The yard would gain two, possibly three, additional building ways for
34 Chief Bureau o f Ships letter o f  30 Dec 1942 to Chief ofNaval Operations. NARA College Park, 
RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol.3).
35 Ibid
36 Bureau o f Ships letter o f  14 Mar 1941. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General 
Correspondence 1940-45, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol.3).
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increased submarine construction and, at the same time, discourage the assignment of 
excessive repair work to the yard.
Commandant Withers presented two options to Washington to obtain the 
additional building ways needed for increased production. Two side launching ways 
could be built at Berth 6 in four or five months for about $90,000, or the new dry dock 
could be used for new construction. The shipyard argued that the use of the new dry 
dock was far more efficient, more economical, and less risky than the side launching 
ways. The dock was the more efficient option, because it was more centrally located to 
the shops, and the more economical option, because the cost of preparation and launching 
would require less timber and other materials than side launching ways. Finally, 
launchings would be less risky because launching from the dry dock was merely an 
undocking evolution while “the side launching scheme required the second vessel to be
•1 0
skidded up into launching position.”
The management of Portsmouth Navy Yard had ulterior motives for the dry dock 
from the time construction started. Internal studies in December 1941 by Lieutenant 
Junior Grade Arnold and Hull Superintendent Captain Spiller proposed the use of the 
upper end of the new dry dock as a building basin for the construction of two submarines 
simultaneously with the completion of the caisson and dry dock machinery. It was 
thought that the dry dock would be far enough along to start construction of two 
submarines in May 1942. The study concluded that, “By this method two vessels could
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ltjg H.A. Arnold memo o f 12 Dec 1941 to the Hull Superintendent. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box2, Folder A l-3, “Building 
Program, PKG #4.”
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be sufficiently far advanced to permit floating them near the same time that the dock is 
ready to go into operation [December 1942].” In other words, in December 1941, some 
shipyard managers were considering the option of starting construction of two 
submarines in a hole in the ground with no means of getting them waterborne unless the 
remainder of the dry dock was completed as scheduled. This proposal was never 
advanced to higher authorities for approval, but it does illustrate the aggressive thinking, 
and the willingness to accept risk, that came to characterize the management of 
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. From the start of the war, there appeared to be 
little doubt in the minds of shipyard managers that they would eventually use the new dry 
dock for construction of submarines. They merely needed to pick the right time to tell 
their superiors of their plans. In the meantime, construction moved forward on the dock, 
still officially intended for repairs and overhauls, through the summer and fall of 1942.
With the dock nearing completion, the yard moved to realize its objective. On 27 
November 1942, Commandant Rear Admiral Withers wrote a personal letter to Rear 
Admiral W.B. Farber, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, to gain support for 
the yard’s plan to build submarines in the dock. Withers wrote, “The new twin dock is 
fitted for shipbuilding, and it is located just outside our Shipfitters’ Shop, which is ideal 
for shipbuilding.”40 Withers noted further that approval would result in a $100,000 
savings over the other option of building two side-launch ways alongside one of the piers. 
Withers then asked his friend to assist in gaining quick approval for his official request 
that would soon follow.
40 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Radm Thomas Withers personal letter to Radm W.B. 
Farber o f  27 Nov 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence 
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, PKG #4.”
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In December 1942, the yard pushed its proposal to a successful conclusion. Key 
to gaining the necessary approval was the shipyard’s argument that the other dry dock 
(Dry Dock #2) would be sufficient capacity for emergency repairs and that it would be a 
waste of a valuable resource to not use the new dry dock for submarine construction.41 
Utilizing the new dry dock with two building ways increased the number of building 
ways to nine, giving a potential minimum annual building rate of twenty-seven 
submarines. Higher building rates were possible if the time on the building ways could be 
shortened to less than four months or more submarines could be squeezed into the new 
dry dock.42 Both were eventually realized and the shipyard went on to achieve a building 
rate of over thirty submarines a year.
How valid was the shipyard’s argument that Dry Dock #2 could handle all the 
anticipated submarine repair work? In retrospect, it was probably a stretch of an 
argument and somewhat of a risk to make such a case. An analysis of the 1943 weekly 
dry dock usage reports shows that the dock was rarely without a submarine and 
frequently there were two submarines in the dock.43 As it turned out, when building 
dozens of submarines a year, a fair number of those required docking for repairs or 
inspections. That workload alone kept Dry Dock #1 busy. The new dry dock, despite the
41 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Radm. Thomas Withers letter o f  7 Dec 1942 to Vice Chief 
o f Naval Operations. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence 
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, PKG #4.”
42Back-up memo for above letter, o f 1 Dec 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box2, Folder A l-3 , Building Program, PKG #4.
43 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral Thomas Withers letter o f  30 Mar 1943 to 
Chief o f  Naval Operations. NARA College Park, RG 80, Records o f  the Navy Department 1798-1947. 
Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence o f the CNO / Secretary o f  the Navy 1940-1947, Box 
897, File L9-3/NY-NY1.
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approval to use it for new construction, was first used for repairs to the US S Marlin in 
March 1943. After that, the dock was dedicated to new construction for the remainder
Figure 15: Two Submarines Nearing Launch in Dry Dock #1. 
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New 
Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
of the war. The heavy use of Dry Dock #2 suggests that it may have been a marginal 
decision as to whether or not that dock could comfortably handle the repair workload. It 
appears that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Bureau of Ships were content to let 
Portsmouth Navy Yard run its own show as long as new submarines were being delivered 
at record rates.
The risk management of Dry Dock #1 did not stop with the authorization to use it 
for new construction of submarines. The first two submarine keels, for USS Bang (SS 
385) and USS Pilotfish (SS 386), were laid in the dock on 30 April and 15 May 1943 
respectively and those submarines were launched simultaneously on 20 August 1943.
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Determined to maximize the use of the dock, a few weeks later, on 9 September 1943, the 
yard laid three keels in the dock for USS Razorback (SS394), USS Redfish (SS 395), and 
USS Ronquil (SS 396). The launching of these submarines together on 27 January 1944 
was described in the vignette that opened this dissertation.
The experiences with Dry Dock #1 illustrate well the aggressiveness of the 
shipyard management team and a willingness to assume risks to achieve production 
increases. At the same time, the decision to limit submarine construction in Dry Dock #1 
to two at a time, after building three at a time only once, shows that the shipyard was also 
quick to balance reason and risk. Recalling that the triple simultaneous launching 
occurred in January 1944, had the shipyard continued to successfully build three at a time 
in Dry Dock #1, the title of this dissertation might have been 36 in ’44 instead of 32 in 
’44.
j f k - k
The emphasis of Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (December 1941) was on
facility and personnel upgrades. By the time of the team’s second report in June 1942, the
personnel issue was of secondary importance, facility improvements were well underway,
and the emphasis had shifted to material procurement and scheduling. The board’s June
1942 report opened with an enthusiastic endorsement of the yard’s exceptional
performance during the first six months of the war:
The increase in the rate of building submarines has far exceeded not only the 
schedule but even the most optimistic hopes of everyone connected with i t . . .
This [greatly reduced] length of time on the building ways seems phenomenal 
when compared to the best performances reached by other yards.4
44 Portsmouth Industrial Survey II (June 1942), 1.
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The report then turned to the problem of material procurement:
The greatly accelerated rate of construction of submarines has brought to 
light certain additional factors which adversely affect the building program in 
various degrees.. .  Procurement under present conditions [a lack of orders far 
into the future] is one of the most critical factors in submarine construction.. .
A system has been formed and the method of scheduling has been changed 
radically...  the system offers promise of more orderly construction and 
shorter building periods.45
It was the team’s opinion that “the acquiring of a long-range construction program is of
prime and critical importance” because it would allow bulk ordering and “lessen the
difficulties of procurement which in itself would eliminate or minimize many other
problems of management.”46 In other words, if the shipyard could order material for five
or six submarines at a time, the first submarine on the schedule might suffer late
deliveries but the others would probably have a large percentage of ordered material
sooner than needed.
Unfortunately, the shipyard’s plans to bulk order material further aggravated a 
military procurement system that, according to historian David M. Kennedy, by the 
summer of 1942, had “abandoned any vestige of military discipline” as “Military 
purchase orders became hunting licenses, unleashing a jostling frenzy of competition for 
materials and labor in the jungle of the marketplace.”47 In time, more disciplined priority 
systems would better integrate and coordinate interservice and civilian needs. However, 
at the start of the war each service and industrial community was looking out for itself 
and Portsmouth Navy Yard was certainly no exception.
45 Ibid., 5.
46Ibid:
47 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 626-627.
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In late 1942, the shipyard reported that the only scheduling delays being
experienced at the yard were associated with late component and material deliveries. In a
12 December 1942 letter to the Bureau of Ships, Portsmouth reported with confidence
that it could build submarines in 150 days, but necessarily continued scheduling
construction for 210 days because of problems with material deliveries, especially steel
and main engines. Industrial Manager Captain Davis wrote:
The steel situation calls for special comments. At the start, the [SS]285 Class 
submarines were handicapped due to late receipts of high tensile steel and 
heavy plates for bulkheads. This same situation exists now for the [SSJ308 
Class, and serious delays are being encountered. 48
Late steel deliveries were a widespread problem in the shipbuilding industry. In Ships for
Victory, maritime historian Frederick C. Lane concluded that, by late 1942, “Facilities
were adequate so that deliveries [of completed merchant ships] would have been higher
in the last quarter of 1942 and throughout 1943 if more steel had been allocated to the
yards.”49 The bulk ordering of steel for many submarines of the same class permitted
Portsmouth Navy Yard to build 32 submarines in 1944, very close to the maximum
capability of its facilities. Unfortunately, bulk ordering, such as employed by Portsmouth
Navy Yard, further exaggerated steel shortages at other shipyards. Lane noted, “It should
be made clear that the limit to merchant ship production was set not by the nation’s steel
capacity alone, but by it in conjunction with the allocation of steel to Army, Navy, and
other users.”50 Implied by Lane is that the excessive ordering of steel throughout the
48 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 12 Dec 1942 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, 
“New Construction 1941-1943.”
49 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 343-344.
50Ib id , 301.
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armed services, which enjoyed much higher priorities than the U.S. Maritime 
Commission, contributed to the detriment of merchant shipbuilding. Portsmouth Navy 
Yard stands guilty as charged.
Late deliveries were not limited to steel. In April 1942, the yard reminded the 
Bureau of Ships that the delivery schedule for the submarine building program in 
progress depended on delivery of main propelling machinery for which the Bureau was 
responsible. Worse yet, the shipyard had received no information from the Bureau as to 
when the equipment would be available.51 In August 1943, the shipyard reported 
schedule delays due to late receipt of main power electrical control cubicles and motors 
for auxiliary equipments. The next month the yard reported that delivery dates for
Cl
auxiliary and main engines and generators were 4 to 8 weeks late for orderly progress. 
Delivery dates for radars, sound gear, and batteries were reported to be 2-3 weeks late. As 
noted earlier, the delivery dates for the first submarine of an order were often in jeopardy 
but the remainder of the submarines on that order usually had the needed equipment on 
hand well before the scheduled installation dates.
The problem with late contractor components was highlighted at a conference at 
the Bureau of Ships on 13 and 14 August 1943 that had been called in response to Under 
Secretary of the Navy James ForrestaTs request to see what could be done to speed up
51 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 6 Apr 1942 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA College 
Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY/P-16-1 
January 1944.
52 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 11 Aug 1943 to Bureau o f  Ships, NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New  
Construction.”
53 Portsmouth Navy Yard Progress Report for Month o f September 1943 NARA at College Park, 
RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY1.
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submarine construction. Portsmouth Navy Yard was represented at the conference by the 
Production Officer, Captain Dudley. Dudley’s conference report shows that 
representatives from Portsmouth, Electric Boat, Manitowic, Cramp, and Boston were 
“unanimous in their comments that the present difficulty was largely due to late delivery 
of component parts and that the situation was getting no better.”54 Each yard identified 
other needs that might lead to improved production, but all else paled in comparison to 
late material deliveries. It was suggested by the Bureau of Ships that perhaps a central 
procurement agent, like Electric Boat, might better coordinate deliveries to each shipyard. 
The Electric Boat representative responded that E.B. did not want the job, but “they 
would do it if it was decided upon.”55 The yards agreed that it would be better to continue 
with the present system than try to initiate a new ordering system that might further 
compound their problems.
At the conference, the shipyards were asked to predict annual submarine 
production capacities assuming the completion of necessary plant improvements and the 
assumption of satisfactory material deliveries. The following responses were given by the 
representative of each yard:56
1944 1945
Portsmouth 30 35




54 Capain Dudley’s conference report o f 17 Aug 1943 on BuShips Conference o f  13 & 14 Aug 
1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, 
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Indicative of the comprehensive understanding that Portsmouth had of its capabilities and 
processes, the yard came close to achieving its predicted maximum production the next 
year when 32 submarines were actually delivered in 1944, two more than predicted. All 
the other yards fell short of their predictions. A major reason for Portsmouth’s success 
was its ability to manage and work around late and unreliable contractor components.
In addition to late deliveries, Portsmouth Navy Yard and the other yards had to 
deal with the receipt of poor quality and unreliable components. The shipyard determined 
early on that certain pieces of critical equipment were too unreliable to install shipboard 
as received from the contractor. To do so was to jeopardize completion schedules, if the 
equipment failed later and had to be removed from the tight confines of the submarine for 
overhaul. Worse yet, premature failure after leaving the yard could jeopardize lives. Not 
having the time and resources to satisfactorily engage and resolve all contractor issues in 
a timely manner, the shipyard routinely reworked critical components, at its own 
expense, prior to installation. The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) highlighted this 
practice:
Certain items of submarine equipment such as electric driven pumps and air 
compressors are invariably broken down after delivery from the 
manufacturer, and given a complete overhaul. This is justified by the Yard as 
economical in the long run since, earlier in the building program, defects 
developed after installation so that units had to be removed for overhaul.57
By assuming extra work up front in the schedule, the shipyard hoped to avoid late and
disruptive work that might jeopardize completion. Risk management was well integrated
into the routine shipyard planning, procurement, and production processes during the
war.
57 Booz-Allen Industrial Study (1944), 8.
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The production scheduling system developed at Portsmouth Navy Yard early in 
the war became a valuable tool for managing and working around material procurement 
problems. Faced with a rapidly expanding workload, it soon became obvious that the 
work scheduling practices, which had produced one or two custom-built submarines a 
year in the past, were outdated. In addition, the expected increased production required 
much closer coordination between designers, material procurers, schedulers, and those 
executing the work.58
Prior to any description of Portsmouth’s scheduling system, it is important to 
appreciate the advantage that Portsmouth and Electric Boat enjoyed as the principal 
designers of the submarines they were building. During the war, each new order for a 
group, or class,59 of submarines brought the requirement to incorporate the latest 
technical improvements, frequently determined by feedback from battle tested 
submarines. As a principal design agent, Portsmouth could incorporate the necessary 
changes, freeze the design, and promptly feed the changes to the yard’s scheduling 
system for advance bulk ordering of material and job order preparation for the next group
58 Industrial Manager Report o f  Manager’s Conference o f  22 Jun 1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General 
Management 1932-1940.”
59 Accounting for the classes o f  submarines built during World War II can be a confusing subject. 
Gary Weir, Forged in War, 16, note 30 explains that “Although the three principal classes o f fleet 
submarines during World War II were Gato, Balao, and Tench, technical variations within each class often 
prompted submariners and BUSHIPS to refer to particular groups o f submarines by more specific class 
names, like Gunnel or Drum,” According to Cdr. John D. Alden, “Victorious Submarines o f World War 
II,” United States Submarines, 116, Gato was the basic World War II fleet submarine design. B alao’s 
primary technical variation was an increased test depth and Tench’s  primary technical variation was 
increased torpedo stowage. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s Administrative History o f  World War II, 1 notes that 
between June 1940 and June 1943 the yard received contracts for no less than 8 different classes totaling 
106 submarines. Thus, Portsmouth Navy Yard considered each new order for a group o f submarines to be 
a new class o f  submarine.
239
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of submarines to be built. This was all part of the streamlining of the design and 
production processes for new construction.
The improved scheduling system, the Portsmouth Material Control System, 
revolved around the yard’s continual efforts to maximize hull section content in the shops 
prior to delivery to the building sites. This more formal system of subassembly, work 
scheduling, and material control was implemented in July 1942 with the express purpose 
of “providing a better means of building more submarines in less time.”60 The basic 
building block of the system was a control unit, termed a “group,” that was essentially the 
largest subassembly that could be efficiently put together, usually off-site, prior to 
shipboard installation. Based on the shipyard’s experience, the completion of groups was 
scheduled no more precisely than the specific week that the assembly was needed after 
the laying of the keel. For example, a group that was required two weeks before the 
laying of the keel would be labeled 2B [for Before] and a tank required four weeks after 
keel laying would be identified as 4A [for After]. This was a major advance over 
previous scheduling attempts at the yard. The scheduling system, designed and 
implemented in 1942, reflected eight years of experience with submarine sectional 
construction that had started in 1934 with the NIRA submarines.
Under the new Portsmouth Material Control System, the start date for 
construction or assembly of each group then dictated need dates for all the other support 
activities that were required in advance of that event, including material deliveries, the 
issuance of drawings and plans, and shop manpower assignments. A key step in the 
process was the verification that all material and support documentation were on hand
60 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 23.
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prior to the start of the job. The group schedule could be easily transferred from hull to 
hull for all submarines of the same class, permitting the bulk ordering of material for 
similar ships of the same class far in advance of actual need dates. Thus the Portsmouth 
Material Control System became the prime tool that enabled the yard to circumvent the 
inefficiencies of the procurement system.
Portsmouth’s Material Control system was a first step towards critical path 
scheduling. Portsmouth’s locally designed and implemented scheduling system was 
critical to the shipyard’s ability to accelerate construction from mid-1942 through the end 
of the war. The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) acknowledged the value of the 
Portsmouth Material Control System and recommended further enhancements to the 
system for improved integration of material ordering with planned work schedules.61 
Innovation
Much of what shipyard management did to increase production during the war, 
and much of what has been presented in this chapter thus far, can be grouped under the 
generic heading of innovative management. However, a few additional examples will 
make the argument for innovative management even more convincing. For a starter, 
innovation was obviously present in August 1941 when the shipyard convinced the 
Bureau of Ordnance to permit the use of twenty obsolete muzzle loading guns of the 
Civil War period, then in storage at the yard, as bollards on the new extension of 
Berth 6 62
61 Booz-Allen Industrial Study (1944), 11.
62 The Chief o f  the Bureau o f Ordnance letter o f  2 Aug 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files, Box 
36, Folder N20-5, “Bollards Mooring.”
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Two other examples, much less pragmatic, were far more important to the 
shipyard’s mission. The first involved the need to find transportation to and from the 
shipyard for thousands of new employees. The second involved delaying the arrival of 
submarine crews at the shipyard to minimize mutual interference between crews and 
shipyard workers during the final stages of construction. The latter was not as simple a 
matter as it may first appear as it required that the Chief of Naval Operations be 
convinced that the war effort would benefit by having the crews spend less time at the 
shipyard becoming familiar with their new submarines. As with the shipyard’s plan to use 
Dry Dock #1 for new construction, Commandant Withers did not hesitate to challenge the 
decisions and policies of his superiors when needed to improve his shipyard’s 
productivity. Similarly, Portsmouth Navy Yard’s recommendations were usually well 
received in Washington because of the yard’s recognized position of excellence in 
submarine technology and construction.
The rapid increase in employment required some means to get thousands of new 
employees to work at the shipyard at a time when automobiles were in short supply and 
gasoline was rationed. In March 1942, the yard contracted with Hill Transportation 
Company of Portland, Maine to provide bus service within a 60 mile radius of the yard. 
The service continued until November 1944 when the yard began to run its own fleet of 
buses. Hill’s fleet of over 100 buses brought employees to work from as far away as 
Lowell, MA., Portland, ME., and Manchester, N.H. The shipyard estimated in a 1946
63 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 38.
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report that, during the peak employment period of the war, 10,000 employees arrived for 
work daily in 2,500 vehicles (averaging 4 occupants per vehicle), 8,000 by bus, and 2,500 
walked to work. Vehicles and buses were filled to capacity to conserve gas and tires for 
the war effort.64
Mass bus transport for shipyard workers contributed to a significant reduction in 
local traffic during the war years, despite a doubling of the local population and a 
quadrupling of shipyard employees. Undoubtedly, the rationing of automobiles, tires and 
gasoline also contributed significantly to traffic reduction. At any rate, traffic surveys of 
vehicles crossing the interstate bridge connecting Portsmouth and Kittery showed the 
following:65






It is interesting to note about the time that the Portsmouth Navy Yard employment
peaked at 20,465, in late 1943, the traffic crossing the bridge was less than half what it
was at the start of the war. Employees were walking to work from nearby housing
projects, sharing a ride with several other employees, or taking the bus. The innovative
and far-reaching bus system was critical to the local communities’ conservation efforts,
as well as the shipyard’s success.
***
64 Ibid.
65 “Survey o f  Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area” Cumings Library and 
Archives, Strawbery Bank Museum, Portsmouth, N.H.
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Innovation was also evident when Commandant Withers approached the Chief of 
Naval Operations in January 1943 with a request to delay submarine commissioning 
dates and, thus, the arrival of submarine crews at the shipyard, so as to minimize the 
mutual interference between crews and shipyard workers as the submarine approached 
completion.66 Prior to the spring of 1943, this period of mutual interference varied from 
submarine to submarine but was typically between six and eight weeks. For example, the 
USS Balao (SS 285) was commissioned at Portsmouth Navy Yard two months before 
completion on 4 April 1943.
The Chief of Naval Operations approved Wither’s request and the next submarine 
completed at Portsmouth, the USS Billfish (SS SS286), was commissioned just 15 days 
prior to completion. Thereafter, during the war, submarines at Portsmouth Navy Yard 
were routinely commissioned between two and three weeks prior to completion. 
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s record of success and recognized expertise in submarine 
construction had paved the way for the fleet support that was needed to promote further 
success. Confident in the quality of Portsmouth-built submarines, and the leadership of 
Commandant Withers, the Chief of Naval Operations agreed to reduce the time that his 
submarine crews had to inspect and familiarize themselves with their submarines prior to 
departure from the shipyard. This action proved to be less controversial than one might 
think because, as the war progressed, the submarine commissioning crews included 
increased numbers of battle experienced submarine sailors who required less time to 
familiarize themselves with a new submarine.
66 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  16 Jan 1943 to Vice Chief o f  Naval Operations. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50, Box 4, Folder SS/S8 
Trials.
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Communications and Control
Earlier it was established that Commandant Withers had great “people skills” as a
leader. He was a personable leader with a bent towards congeniality and open
communications with his subordinates and employees. Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Ralph A. Bard held similar views about the importance of open communication. In June
1943, Bard urged navy yard commandants to promote open lines of communication
between management and employees. Bard believed that:
Any team whether in sport, industry, or war, to be effective must have a 
common understanding of the game. To secure the highest degree of 
efficiency, each member of the team must at least understand the signals, the 
objective, the rules, and the part he is to play.67
Bard saw the process of open communication to be a win-win situation for both
management and employees, “The process of taking employees into the confidence of
management creates far greater respect for management and usually saves much time and
energy for both groups.”68 Commandant Withers and his managers could not have agreed
more.
There was no need to establish open lines of communication at Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, as the Secretary of the Navy was suggesting, because it already existed in spades. 
From Rear Admiral Withers’ open leadership style, to the civilian managers that Eileen 
Dondero observed roaming the industrial areas interacting with the employees, open 
communication was a way of life in the yard. As the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey 
(1944) had observed, despite a minimum amount of paperwork and written instructions
67 Assistant Secretary o f  the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f 5 Jun 1943 to Commandants and 
Commanding Officers Concerned. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General 
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management 1932-1940.”
68 Ibid
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and few meetings, the work got done. William Tebo never saw a job order during the six 
months that he worked at the yard in 1944.69 He was well trained for the jobs he was 
assigned and performed them well as did, apparently, most shipyard employees. Open 
and efficient communications were byproducts of the yards’ “walk around” style of 
management. Furthermore, management tried to take advantage of the latest technology 
to facilitate communications and information transfer.
***
The state of communication and information transfer systems that existed in 1940, 
when mass production arrived at Portsmouth Navy Yard, was inadequate for the task. If, 
as this study suggests, the shipyard employed management techniques well ahead of their 
time, the yard did so with rudimentary communication tools, making the shipyard’s 
success even more remarkable. Management’s efforts to upgrade the yard’s technical 
capabilities for efficient information transfer and communication can be taken as an 
indicator of the importance that was given these subjects. Unfortunately, shipyard 
management struggled throughout the war to gain the approvals needed from higher 
authority to upgrade internal communication and control systems to the extent that they 
believed necessary to effectively coordinate the greatly increased activity in the yard.
At the start of the war, Portsmouth Navy Yard lacked internal systems of 
communication and control that existed in other shipyards. These shortcomings included 
a grossly inadequate phone system, ineffective means to transmit messages and work 
instructions throughout the yard, no “clock system” for the accounting of employee 
hours, and no “check system” for employee payment. In fact, the shipyard did not begin
69 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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paying by check until 13 May 1942.70 In essence, Portsmouth was still a manual yard 
whereas other yards had taken the first steps towards the automation of various 
administrative tasks. Portsmouth, favored with workload prior to the war, had not been 
favored with any degree of automation. The custom building of a submarine or two a year 
was primarily based on experience and acquired skills, not state of the art communication 
and automation.
The yard’s telephone system was outdated and greatly under the required capacity 
at the start of the war. In 1936, it was reported that the shipyard manual phone system 
had a capacity of 200 lines, 150 of which were then in service, with some 13 pay stations. 
As the shipyard began to ramp up production in response to ever increasing orders in 
1940 and 1941, shipyard management quickly realized that the shipyard’s phone system 
was not equipped to handle the increasing workload. Telephone upgrades were installed 
on a piecemeal basis, but complaints of poor service persisted throughout the war.
The late 1930s saw the development of several technological developments in the 
telephone that greatly increased the capacity and efficiency of phone systems. Coaxial 
cable was introduced in 1937, as well as multiplexing techniques that allowed numerous 
calls to be carried over one cable simultaneously. Switching technology also advanced in 
the late 1930s, becoming more rugged and reliable. More mundane improvements 
included the combined handset and spiral cord, both introduced in 1938. Transistor 
circuitry and electronic switching, developed for military applications during the war, 
found widespread civilian application immediately after the war. At any rate,
70 Portsmouth Herald, 14 Mar 1942, “Portsmouth Navy Yard Makes First Payment by Check”, 1.
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telecommunications technology had made great strides by 1940 but the shipyard had
71benefited little from those advances.
Rear Admiral Withers issued a shipyard notice on 10 December 1942 that urged 
employees to make as few calls as possible, because “The large expansion in personnel 
and work of the Yard has increased the volume of telephone business to the point where 
the present capacity of the Yard Telephone Exchange is overtaxed during certain hours of 
the day.”72 The Industrial Manager also believed, as late as January 1943, that “The 
Yard’s steadily expanding building program, combined with the increasingly difficult 
problems of material procurement, has developed to a point where the existing telephonic 
communication between the material Planning Superintendent’s desk and the Supply
7TDepartment. . .  is totally inadequate.” Davis wanted the shipyard to purchase one of the 
many inter-office communication systems that were appearing on the market about that 
time.74
The state of communications technology in the early 1940s is a study unto itself. 
Systems that the shipyard considered buying at the time were quite rudimentary. Those 
systems included SELECT-O-PHONE (an automatic telephone service that eliminated 
the need for an operator and provided for “hands free” speaker communication), an 
exclusive Exec-U-Phone, a system for recording conversations on vinyl 78 RPM records,
71 Susan E. McMaster, The Telecommunications Industry (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 2002),
68-71.
72 Portsmouth Navy Yard Notice o f 10 December 1942, NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management 
1932-1940.”
73 Manager memo o f 14 Jan 1943 to Public Works Officer. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
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a TelAutograph Telescriber (an inter-department communication system to eliminate 
phone calls between shipyard departments and provide for the efficient movement of 
material and supporting paper between departments), an RCA Paging and Public Address 
System, and an audible and visual call system for the shops. In the spring of 1943, the 
shipyard was attempting to get approval to install an announcing system that would 
enable the commandant to readily communicate in a broadcast manner to many important 
buildings and worksites, and also enable industrial managers to better communicate 
within their buildings.75 The request was denied by the Bureau of Ships.
The manual methods of transfer of technical specifications and work instructions 
between the Supply and Industrial Departments that worked when the yard built one or 
two submarines a year could not work efficiently when it built one or two dozen 
submarines a year. In 1941, Portsmouth requested approval from the Bureau of Ships for 
the purchase of three teletype machines to improve the internal “handling of dispatches
Ifand other paper.” Again, the request was denied. According to the Bureau of Ships, 
teletype machines were not cost effective when compared to telephone rates and other 
means to transmit production instructions throughout the yard.77 Clearly, the Bureau of 
Ships was out of touch with the needs of the navy yards.
75 Industrial Manager Capt. H.F.D. Davis memo o f 1 Apr 1943 and Portsmouth Navy Yard letter 
o f 18 May 1943 to the Chief o f  Yards and Docks. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management 1932-1940.”
76 Navy Yard Portsmouth Dispatch 261600 o f 26 Jun 1941 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA College 
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 791, NY1/L11-3 vol.2 to C- 
NY1/N6, Folder NY1/N36.
77 Chief Bureau o f Ships letter to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard o f 25 Aug 1941. NARA 
College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 791, NY1/L11-3 vol.2 to 
C-NY1/N6, Folder NY1/N36.
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Portsmouth Navy Yard’s outdated systems were not limited to communication 
and information transmittal systems. The Industrial Officer, Captain Davis was surprised 
to find, upon reporting to the shipyard in 1941, that “Unlike probably all Navy Yards, 
Supervisors of Shipbuilding [at private shipyards], Commercial Companies, and
70
Government Offices, Portsmouth does not have a clock system.” Instead, employee 
time and attendance records were kept manually. Worse yet, the shipyard did not have a 
check payment system in place, as most other shipyards had, and employees lined up 
every Friday for a cash payday that was the height of inefficiency and disorder.79
Hull Superintendent Tusler deplored the chaotic conditions that existed in the 
yard on Fridays when large numbers of employees lined up to be paid in cash for their 
weekly hours. He recommended that the shipyard “adopt a check method of paying Yard 
employees in order to eliminate the delays now encountered on Friday.” Tusler also 
recommended that the yard “Adopt a time-clock system of checking employees in and 
out, and require employees to check in and out four times a day as is customary in other 
Yards.” The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts authorized the shipyard to install an
O A
employee clock system in June 1941, but it would be nearly a year later, 13 May 1942, 
before the shipyard would have the time-clock system completely installed and be able to
78 H.F.D. Davis letter o f  24 May 1941 to Capt. Claude A. Jones, Bureau o f Ships. NARA College 
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 791, NY1/L11-3 vol.2 to C- 
NY1/N6, Folder NY1/N36.
79 Hull Superintendent (F.A. Tusler) memo to Production Officer o f  3 Feb 1941. NARA Waltham, 
RG 19, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 26, Folder A 19, 
“Conferences, Congresses, and Conventions.”
80 Bureau Supplies and Accounts 1 letter o f 19 Jun 1941. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f  
Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, NY1/L11 3 vol.2 to C NY1/N6, Folder NY1/P18-2.
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81begin to pay by check and alleviate the inefficiencies caused by cash paydays. Cash 
paydays may have made sense when the yard employment was a few thousand, but by 
May 1942 employment was about 15,000 and chaos reigned on Friday afternoons. It was 
estimated in May 1942 that the check payment system would save 7,000 man-hours per 
week.82
The yard started the war with insufficient and inefficient systems that were 
inferior to many of the other yards. Worse yet, even though the yard recognized the need 
for significant upgrades to those systems that were commensurate with the production 
improvements expected of the yard, support for those upgrades was not forthcoming. As 
the yard management did with other obstacles, be it building ways, unreliable contractor 
components, or antiquated communications and control systems, it found a way to get the 
job done with what it had available.
Farm-Out Programs
The shipyard could not have achieved its production records without an extensive 
farm-out program. This program involved a network of local shops able to accomplish 
the machining, welding, and electrical work that exceeded the capacity of the shipyard’s 
shops. Prior to September 1941, the machining of aluminum containers for electrical 
fixtures was the only work farmed-out by the shipyard. With increased orders for 
submarines, the capacity of the Inside Machine Shop was quickly exceeded and, in late 
1941, the Industrial Development Company of Portland, Maine was contracted to 
manufacture air compressor and pump parts. In March 1942, additional Machine Shop
81 Portsmouth Naval Base Order No. 15-42 o f  5 May 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 8, Folder “Navy Yard Orders 1942.”
82 Portsmouth Herald, 14 May 1942, “Portsmouth Navy Yard Makes First Payment by Check,” 8.
251
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
work was farmed-out to Kidder Press Company of Dover, N.H. Kidder Press eventually 
accumulated $4.7 million of Portsmouth Navy Yard contracts and performed so well 
against those contracts that, based on the shipyard’s recommendations, received several 
government awards for excellence. Local welding companies were also used to relieve 
the overloaded shipyard welding shop.
Figure A-4 in the appendix, Portsmouth Navy Yard Man Hour Curve per
no
Submarine (1940-1945) shows how the shipyard greatly increased farm-out work 
(shaded on Figure A-4), beginning in late 1942 and continuing until mid-1945. Most 
noteworthy is the fact that when the yard achieved its maximum efficiency of 665,000 
manhours per submarine in mid-1944, approximately 100,000 of those man-hours were 
attributed to farm-out work. Farm-out work was extensive through mid-1945, when 
shipyard orders declined and greatly reduced the need to export work. Shipyard records 
for 1943-44 indicate that, “The total value of contracts farmed out amounted to 
approximately $13,190,409. This represents a value greater than the entire Yard output 
during the fiscal years of 1939 and 1940.” In other words, the annual farm-out program 
during the two peak war years, 1943 and 1944, approximated the annual shipyard 
production for the two years immediately prior to the war.
The magnitude of the farm-out programs highlights even more the importance of 
the Portsmouth Material Scheduling System. The shipyard needed to coordinate a farm- 
out program that approximated the workload of another entire shipyard, as well as late 
and unreliable contractor supplied material and components, with accelerating production
83 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 31.
84 Ibid.
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schedules. Fortunately, most of the farm-out program involved reliable local vendors that 
were essentially an extension of the shipyard.
Lean Manufacturing
Lean manufacturing, the elimination of frills and waste from manufacturing 
processes, was not a household phrase in the early 1940s. One might think that lean 
manufacturing would be a natural by-product of war time production. This is true to a 
large extent and, in fact, the submarines delivered by Portsmouth Navy Yard during the 
war had few frills and crew comfort features compared to today’s standards. However, it 
is also true that, during the war, shipyards had to be reminded of the need to direct 
resources to essential work only. The following example illustrates the seriousness with 
which the senior German submarine officer, Admiral Karl Donitz, viewed the subject of 
lean manufacturing and how the Bureau of Ships used an intercepted Donitz communique 
to make the same point to navy yards.
In January 1942, the Bureau of Ships directed navy yard commandants to restrict 
the use of shipyard resources for crew amenities in order to support more critical 
shipboard work and timely deliveries of ships under construction. The Bureau noted that 
the enemy had taken extreme measures in that regard, as evidenced by a 16 April 1941 
communication from Admiral Donitz to his subordinates that the Office of Naval 
Intelligence had intercepted with the capture of a U-570 Class submarine in August 1941. 
Donitz wrote:
I have noticed that too much time has of late been spent on finishing work 
and repairs.. .  I absolutely forbid the issue of orders which merely contribute 
to the comfort of the boat’s complement. . .  The kind of finishing work that
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is being carried out at present can no longer be tolerated, because it retards 
active service and puts too great a strain on the dockyards.85
The Bureau of Ships suggested that, “The conditions which led to the issuance of
this order in Germany in the spring of 1941 apply with even greater force in the
United Nations in the spring of 1942.”86
The Bureau of Ships had little need to caution Portsmouth Navy Yard about
excessive finishing work and accommodating requests from the crews for comfort items.
Portsmouth was delivering submarines rapidly in cookie cutter fashion, where all came
from the same mold, with little opportunity for variation. In addition, the crews, after
Commandant Withers’ move to shorten their time in the yard to a few weeks prior to
completion had little time to solicit extra work from the shipyard.
In summary, the methods employed by Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war 
contained many of the same elements taught in management schools and seminars forty 
years later, especially employee empowerment and special teams. In addition, well- 
designed training programs, assembly lines, risk management, innovation, open 
communications, farm-out programs, and lean manufacturing were all in evidence at the 
yard during the war. Moreover, the methods were implemented by a competent 
management staff and an intelligent, self-motivated workforce. The combination proved 
to be a powerful force that produced submarines at unprecedented rates.
oc
Chief Bureau o f Ships E.S. Confidential letter o f 4 Mar 1942 to Commandant Navy Yards. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50 -  Declassified by 
NARS per NCD Project #745085 and by the Navy Department, Box 3, Folder E.F. 30, “ German, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, May 1929-August 1945.”
86 Ibid
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Measurables
No matter how competent the management, how dedicated the workforce and 
how well conceived the industrial tactics and strategy, it is results that count. This section 
analyzes the results of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance during the war in terms of 
production, quality, and cost.
Production
As noted at the beginning of this study, the Portsmouth Navy Yard completed 
seventy-nine submarines between 1 July 1940 and 1 July 1945 after averaging the
• 87completion of less than two submarines a year in the 1930s. Electric Boat completed 
seventy-eight submarines during the same period. Portsmouth built 81% of the 98 
submarines built in navy yards and Electric Boat built 70% of the submarines built in 
private yards. At the risk of being slightly repetitious, the discussion that follows restates 
a few of the production records presented earlier in this study, along with additional
QO
noteworthy achievements.
87 Portsmouth Herald, “Yard Tops in Sub Production,” 1.
88 With much o f the discussion that follows focused on the large numbers o f  submarines built by 
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war and the remarkably short building periods between the laying o f  the 
keels and completion for many o f those submarines, it is appropriate to highlight a December 1941 change 
to the completion trials agenda that shortened subsequent building periods by several weeks to a month. On 
18 December 1941, the Chief o f  Naval Operations eliminated builder’s underway trials and substituted 
main propulsion and auxiliary machinery trials alongside the pier, subject to the acceptance o f  the Board o f  
Inspection and Survey (Insurv Board). Underway trials were eliminated to accelerate completions and 
avoid any possibility o f  off shore enemy attacks. The process for acceptance trials o f submarines was 
simplified even more in October 1942, when the President o f the Board o f Inspection and Survey requested 
shipyards to establish their own sub-boards to perform acceptance trials and inspections in those cases 
where workload prevented the participation o f an Insurv Board team. As the result o f this abbreviated 
wartime acceptance procedure, any comparisons between World War II submarine building durations and 
prior building durations must take this change into account. Comparisons o f building durations between 
competing submarine building yards during the war are legitimate as they all complied with the same 
completion requirements.
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The yard’s remarkable string of “firsts” began with the first double launching of 
United States submarines when the Scamp and Scorpion slid down their building ways on 
20 June 1942.89 Another first for the yard was the double launching of Picuda and 
Pampanito from the new building basin on 12 July 1943, marking the first time that 
submarines had been fabricated below water level at Portsmouth Navy Yard. This 
practice, of course, would become the key to Portsmouth’s success once Dry Dock #1 
was put into use for the construction of new submarines. The construction of multiple 
submarines below the waterline in the building basin and Dry Dock #1 would enable the 
shipyard to dramatically increase production, despite the severe limitation in traditional 
building ways. The yard improved upon its dual launchings with the first triple submarine 
launching on 28 October 1943 when the Sterlet and Pomfret were floated in the new 
building basin and the Piranha was launched in the traditional manner from the building 
ways.90 On 27 January 1944, the shipyard went one better and set another world’s record 
by launching four submarines on the same day. Razorback, Redfish, and Ronquil were 
floated in Drydock #1 and Scabbardfish slid down a building way.91 A fifth submarine, 
the Segundo, was launched from a building way ten days later making it five launchings 
in eleven days.92
89 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Jun 1942, “Marks Yard’s 6th, 7th Sub o f 1942,”1.
90 Portsmouth Herald, 25 Oct. 1943, “Three-Sub Launching Wednesday,” 1.
91 Portsmouth Herald, 27 Jan. 1944, “4 New Subs Launched for World’s Record,” 1. To keep the 
record straight and acknowledge that other shipyards were also achieving remarkable production during the 
war, it should be noted that the front page o f the Portsmouth Herald, of 2 Mar 1943 has a picture o f  four 
new destroyers being launched in fourteen minutes at the Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company at 
Kearny, N.J. earlier that year.
92 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Feb. 1944, “5th Sub Here in Ten Days,” 1.
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The time from the laying of the keel until completion of a submarine was cut 
more than in half between November 1941, when USS Drum (SS 228) was delivered in 
469 days, and December 1942, when USS Steelhead (SS 280) was delivered in 222 days. 
Portsmouth would eventually reduce submarine building time to 173 days and set another 
record by launching USS Cisco (SS290) just 56 days after laying the keel.93 The 
production numbers leave little doubt that Portsmouth was a superior shipyard.
Figure 16: Rear Admiral Withers and Managers Displaying “E” Award. 
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, 
Durham, N.H.
Those numbers led to six Army-Navy Production “E” Awards between 10 August 1942 
and 18 July 1945. Portsmouth Navy Yard had the distinction of being the first naval
93 Administrative History: Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 69.
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establishment to receive the award.94 The initial award was presented by Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard at a ceremony with two governors, two Senators, a 
Congressman and 10,000 shipyard employees in attendance. The five renewals of the 
semi-annual award that followed meant that the yard was continuously recognized 
throughout the war for superior production performance.95 The yard won the award 
every time it was eligible for the award.
Table 10 compares the World War II performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard 
against its primary competitors, Electric Boat, Groton, Ct. and Mare Island Navy Yard, 
Vallejo, C a:96
Table 10 -  Submarine Shipyard Schedule Performance (World War II)
Subs Built No. Bldg Ways Shortest Shortest Time
Shipyard 1940-45 1941 1945 Bids Pd on Bids Wavs
Portsmouth 79 5 9 173 days 56 days
Electric Boat97 78 11 21 317 days est. 8 mos.
Mare Island98 17 2 8 273 days 192 days
Compared to its competitors, Portsmouth submarines spent remarkably less time on
the building ways and were completed many months sooner. With only nine
building ways at Portsmouth, compared to twenty-one ways at Electric Boat,
94 Portsmouth Herald, 8 August 1942, ‘Navy Yard Hailed for ‘Practical Patriotism;’ Gets E Award 
Monday,” 1.
95 Administrative History, Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 73.
96 David Randall Hinkle, Editor-in-Chief, United States Submarines (Annandale: Navy Submarine 
League, 2002), 114-115.
97 John D. Horn, Submarines and the Electric Boat Company, Page V-3, Electric Boat had 11 
building ways in 1940. Page V-5, Ten building ways were added with the Victory Yard in 1941. Navy 
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
98 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Ships, 1946, Navy Department 
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 635-637.
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Portsmouth-built submarines were launched at a rate that was over four times faster
than those at Electric Boat. As has been repeatedly emphasized throughout this
study, it was this unusually high launch rate that was critical to the success of
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
A comparison to the average time on the building ways for Liberty ships,
which were simply designed for rapid construction by the hundreds, sheds even
more light on Portsmouth’s remarkable achievement. After averaging about 150
days on the ways in January 1942, Liberty ships were routinely launched in 40 days
by late 1942, and that performance remained typical for the remainder of the war."
As noted earlier, the submarine USS Cisco was launched at Portsmouth in late
1942 after just 56 days on the ways. By late 1942, private shipyards had progressed
well down the learning curve for Liberty ships and the yards were mass producing
the vital shipping needed to replace that being sunk at record rates by German U-
boats. Portsmouth was making comparable progress towards the mass production
of submarines that would eventually return the favor.
The shipyard’s record of consistent, outstanding production performance was well
recognized during the war. In April 1944, the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged
the fleet’s appreciation of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance:
The Chief of Naval Operations desires to extend his congratulations to the 
Commandant, to the officers and men under him, and to the civilian 
employees who have contributed a part to the submarine building program.
Their wholehearted cooperation and thorough workmanship, characteristic of
99 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 174.
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all Portsmouth boats, is a factor that has contributed in no small part to our 
Navy’s success in the submarine war to date.100
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s remarkable production and the quality of Portsmouth-
built submarines as well, were recognized and appreciated at the highest levels of
the U.S. Navy.
Costs
It was not that Portsmouth Navy Yard management did not care about costs.
Rather, early on, they had decided that the importance of costs paled in comparison to
time when building submarines for national defense. The report issued by Captain
Andrew.I. McKee’s industrial review team on 8 December 1941 concluded with a
statement emphasizing the importance of time versus costs:
Time which is lost now can not later be made up no matter how great the 
effort. In comparison with time, cost is now of so little importance that it 
must be completely disregarded if thereby a loss of time can be avoided.101
Thus, from the day the war started, it was the shipyard’s strategy to essentially disregard
costs for the sake of production and accelerated submarine completions. The analysis that
follows will show that this management strategy that placed extreme emphasis on
production efficiency also produced excellent cost performance as a byproduct.
Any cost analysis of operations at Portsmouth Navy Yard during war suffers
because o f abbreviated and incomplete accounting records. However, there is sufficient
information available to evaluate the cost performance of Portsmouth relative to other
navy yards in selected areas. In addition, local records are available that show dramatic
100 Chief o f  Naval Operations letter o f  26 Apr 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
NARA College Park, RG 38, Chief o f  Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 1182, Folder NY1,
1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
101 Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (December 1941), 15.
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reductions in the number of labor manhours (labor costs) required to build a submarine as 
the war progressed.
Table 11 shows the average manday costs of productive labor and the indirect
overhead expense as a percentage of productive labor for all navy yards for FY 1942.102
Table 11 - Navy Yard Costs Performance (1 July 1942 to 30 June 1943)
Ave. man-day Cost of Indirect Ovhd
Productive Labor f$) Expense % P.L.
Portsmouth 8.32 39.8
Boston 8.41 37.7





Mare Island 8.64 42.2
Puget Sound 8.77 54.9
Pearl Harbor 9.10 65.2
Average All Yards 8.38 47.2
For comparison purposes, it can be seen that the average cost per labor manday at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard was slightly above the average at all navy yards, while the 
overhead expense was considerably less than the average at all navy yards. The labor 
costs are more geographically influenced than indicators of individual yard efficiency; 
the West Coast yards being the highest, the southern yards the lowest, and the East Coast 
yards in the middle. However, overhead expenses, the indirect costs and support required 
for productive labor to accomplish its work, is an indicator of shipyard efficiency and 
Portsmouth is among the leaders in this category, far below the average of all navy yards.
102 Chart entitled, “Comparative Statement — Expense Trends at Navy Yards -  Percentages of 
Productive Labor.” NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 
1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY Jan 1, 1943.
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Streamlining shipyard operations for submarine new construction, especially independent 
small teams that required little support, would have contributed to low overhead rates.
On a macro scale, the above analysis indicates that Portsmouth Navy Yard was 
very competitive with other navy yards as far as labor and overhead costs were 
concerned. However, that cost competitiveness would only result in cost reduction and 
cost savings if the yard was able to improve its performance on each successive 
submarine.
It was not a simple matter to determine the cost of a submarine built at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. Part of the streamlining of processes for new 
construction was the issuance of job orders by classes of submarines and not for 
individual submarines, because the same jobs were accomplished on all submarines of 
the same class. Consequently, costs were not collected on individual submarines but 
rather on the entire order of a group of submarines. Thus, return costs were not available 
until the last submarine of the order was completed and, even then, much prorating of 
costs was involved. This practice prevented the use of return costs as a management tool. 
However, a popular maxim of the shipyard industry is that “time is money,” meaning that 
ships require expenditures as long as they remain at the shipyard. At a minimum, ships 
require services and utilities, and, being the complicated piece of machinery that they are, 
something always requires maintenance or repair. Thus, while Portsmouth was not 
monitoring and managing costs on an individual ship basis, the shipyard was certainly 
keeping costs under control by delivering a submarine to the fleet every few weeks 
during the height of the war.
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In March 1945, responding to the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) that noted
a lack of production and cost control records, Commandant Rear Admiral Withers
emphasized that the shipyard’s first priority during the war had been production, but cost
reduction had also been a by-product of that priority:
During the war and until recently the Yard’s principal business has been the 
construction of submarines. The Yard completed 12 submarines in 1942, 19 
in 1943, and 32 in 1944. Production records covering man hours required to 
build those vessels and most of their important components during the three 
years are available and clearly indicate that costs were reduced progressively 
as the volume of production increased.103
Figure A-4, Portsmouth Navy Yard Man Hour Curve per Submarine (1940-1945),
illustrates well the cost reduction to which Commandant Withers was referring. Note on
Figure A-4 that the manhours required to build a submarine decreased from close to
2,000,000 on 7 December 1941 to 665,000 during the second quarter of 1944. It can be
concluded that the labor cost per submarine delivered in 1944 was about one third the
labor cost per submarine delivered in late 1941.
Portsmouth’s ability to deliver submarines at the end of the war, at 33 percent of 
the manhour cost required at the start of the war, compares favorably with the manhour 
cost reductions experienced on Liberty ships. At the start of 1942, the first Liberty ships 
delivered required about 1,250,000 manhours to construct. By mid-1945, the manhours 
had dropped to about 400,000 per ship, 32 percent of the initial cost.104 One can conclude 
that Portsmouth Navy Yard achieved cost reductions on submarines during the war that 
were almost identical to those achieved on Liberty ships, a product that was much less
j(V2
Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 23 Mar 1945 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L-5, “Inspection 
Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
104 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 231, Figure 19.
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complicated than submarines and specifically designed for ease of construction.105 When 
examined in light of the well documented efficiencies of Liberty ship construction, 
Portsmouth’s war record is all the more impressive.
But how did Portsmouth cost performance compare to its prime competitor, 
Electric Boat? Naval historian Gary Weir says that, “Of the five building yards 
producing the Navy’s submarines during the war, EB did the job more cheaply than the 
others.”106 Citing an Electric Boat cost of $2,765,000 for SS222, Weir shows that, 
“When compared by the Price Adjustment Board in the spring of 1942, EB’s unit cost on 
the SS222 fell below those recorded at Portsmouth and Mare Island by about $1 million
1fi7[36% less].” Weir also cites a 1938 Navy Department study comparing the cost of 
building ships at private versus public yards that concludes that private yards could build 
ships more cheaply for reasons that included lower pay rates and less generous leave 
policies. The study noted, however, that comparisons “could only be made in the most
» A O  t
general terms.” Only general comparisons could be made because the cost accounting 
practices were different between public and private yards. Weir closes his analysis of 
construction costs by noting that in the spring of 1942, Electric Boat took an average of 
fourteen months to complete a submarine whereas Portsmouth took only nine and one 
half months, 32 % less time. The completion of a submarine in 32% less time at 36% 
more cost argues against the “time is money” argument presented earlier. The analysis
105 Twenty-seven hundred Liberty Ships were built during the war. Another three thousand ships 
o f all types were built, including 1,556 naval vessels. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 653.
106 Gary Weir, Forged in War, 34.
107 Ibid
108 Ibid., note 70.
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that follows will clarify this apparent discrepancy and show that, had the Price 
Adjustment Board done a similar review of submarine construction costs in 1944, during 
the peak production years of the war, Portsmouth’s costs would have compared much 
more favorably to Electric Boat’s costs.
World War II actual cost data for submarine construction is scarce at best. 
However, in early 1941, Captain Davis’s staff provided him the following cost estimates 
for submarines under construction at Portsmouth; USS Marlin (SS205) - $3.6 Million, 
USS Grayling (SS209) - $4.3 million, and USS Drum (SS228) and USS Runner (SS275)
- $4.5 million each.109 The last three submarines are of the same class as the Electric Boat 
submarines that resulted in the average unit cost of $2,765 million reported earlier. Thus, 
an apples-to-apples comparison is possible. At first blush, it appears that the average cost 
differential between Portsmouth and Electric Boat was even greater than the $1 million 
reported by the Price Adjustment Board.
Analyzing Figure A-4, showing the average labor manhours required per 
submarine at Portsmouth, will further clarify the yard’s cost performance. The high cost 
estimates provided the Industrial Manager in early 1941 were most likely based on the 
yard’s recent performance in 1940, when the yard required about 1.75 million manhours 
to complete a submarine. By the spring of 1942, when the Price Adjustment Board 
provided its comparison figures, Portsmouth had reduced their labor per submarine to 
about 1.4 million manhours. This 20% reduction in labor manhours would have reduced 
actual costs on SS228 and SS275 proportionately to about $3.6 million, roughly equal to 
the $1 million differential cited by the Price Adjustment Board in the spring of 1942. The
109 Memorandum for Manager o f  5 Feb 1941, Subject: Estimate o f  Statistical Cost o f  Submarines 
Under Construction. NARA Waltham, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central 
Files), Box 26, Folder A 19, “Conferences, Congresses, and Conventions.”
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question is, “Is that a fair comparison of Portsmouth and Electric Boat costs for the 
reminder of the war years?” When asking that question, one should keep in mind that 
almost all of the submarines built by Portsmouth (79) and Electric Boat (78) during the 
war were built after the Price Adjustment Board’s report in the spring of 1942.
Another look at Figure A-4 leads one to conclude that the comparison is fair and 
accurate only if Electric Boat made the same dramatic labor savings as did Portsmouth 
throughout the remainder of 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944. In other words, 
Electric Boat would have had to reduce labor costs by over 50%, as did Portsmouth, 
between the spring of 1942 and the summer of 1944, for the comparison to be valid in 
1944.
Granted, Electric Boat probably experienced labor savings during those years. 
However, this is where the “time is money” argument reenters the picture. As it turns out, 
in the spring of 1942, Portsmouth was still turning out submarines in 12 or 13 months and 
not the 9 lA months reported earlier.110 By the summer of 1944, Portsmouth was routinely 
completing submarines in six months or less. Thus, between the spring of 1942 and the 
summer of 1944, Portsmouth reduced its average building period approximately 50% 
while reducing costs by about the same 50%. Electric Boat did not experience a similar 
dramatic reduction in building durations. As noted in Table 10, Electric Boat’s shortest 
building period was a little over ten months. If one gives Electric Boat a seemingly
110 Administrative History, Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me. An addendum provides a chart showing dates for keel laying, launching, 
and completion for all Portsmouth-built submarines between 1940 and 1945. In the spring o f 1942, 
completions had been reduced to 12 or 13 months. On June 6, 1942 Portsmouth Industrial Survey I, 1 
reported, “The time required to build submarines between keel laying and completion has been reduced 
from 15 months for the fastest built ships at this yard before December 1, 1941 to a few days less than 12 
months for the latest completed ship. To date the shortest building time at other yards has been 12 1/3 
months at Groton and 14 months at Mare Island.”
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generous credit of 25% improvement in building time, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that a cost comparison between the two yards in 1944, when both were operating at 
maximum efficiency, would have found Portsmouth comparing much more favorably 
than it did in the spring of 1942.
There is another factor to be considered when comparing costs between 
Portsmouth and Electric Boat. It will be argued later in this section that Portsmouth-built 
submarines were typically more complete and better equipped with the latest design 
improvements than were submarines delivered by Electric Boat. That is to say that 
Portsmouth, a government shipyard, was more accommodating to contract modifications 
that added work, than was Electric Boat, a private shipyard. Late work is often costly and 
disruptive to other planned work. Portsmouth’s costs would have been driven up 
accordingly.
In the shipyard’s response to the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey Report (1944), 
Commandant Withers explained that the recent curtailment of orders for new submarines, 
and the assignment of other miscellaneous work to the yard, required the shipyard to pay 
closer attention to the forecasting of workload and manpower requirements. Also,
Withers explained that the yard was returning to former cost control and cost monitoring 
practices that included the keeping of material usage and tonnage records of production 
in the Blacksmith Shop and Foundry, the rate of use of each type of welding rod, and the 
issuance of individual ship job orders.111 Thus, in May 1945, the yard began to undo
111 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter P20-1 (8927-l)o f23  Mar 1945 to Bureau o f Ships. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L-5, 
“Inspection Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
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much of the streamlining for new construction that had carried it so successfully through 
the war.
In highlighting the return to cost control measures with the winding down of the 
war, the shipyard was confirming the assignment of secondary importance to such 
measures during the war. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s emphasis was on maximum 
production during the war, not keeping records. Returning to Figure A-4, it can be noted 
that, with the reinstitution of record keeping and cost monitoring practices, the manhours 
expended per submarine increased dramatically in 1945. Many factors contributed to this 
labor cost increase, including a drop in orders for new construction, an increasing repair 
and miscellaneous workload, and the efficiency disruptions that typically accompany a 
dramatic reduction in workforce in an industrial environment. Even more difficult to 
measure, but definitely a factor, was the psychological return to normalcy and more 
relaxed work rates after working under supercharged wartime conditions for four years. If 
nothing else, the inefficiencies realized in late 1945 validated the golden era of 
production that Portsmouth Navy Yard had experienced during the war, when the decks 
had been cleared for new construction and processes had been streamlined towards that 
end.
Quality
Lacking modem quality control records, the quality of Portsmouth submarines 
built during World War II is best judged by the reports of the Board of Inspection and 
Survey and the testimonials of the men who sailed them to war. For example, the material 
condition of the USS Trout, one of the first submarines that the yard delivered to the fleet 
after Pearl Harbor, was praised by the Board of Inspection and Survey: “The Trout was in
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an unusually advanced stage of completion and excellent operation condition. 
Workmanship is excellent. This vessel is an achievement that reflects credit upon the
119 • •Portsmouth yard.” Portsmouth-built submarines were routinely praised by inspection 
teams.
The fleet’s high regard for Portsmouth-built boats was acknowledged by the Vice 
Chief of Naval Operations, in March 1945, when he sent the shipyard the following 
excerpt from the war report of a recently returned U.S. submarine, “The officers and crew 
of this submarine heartily endorse the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, as a
119builder of rugged submarines.” The choice of the adjective “rugged” to describe 
Portsmouth-built submarines was most likely made by a submarine Commanding Officer 
whose ship and crew had survived a depth charge attack, thanks to the skilled 
workmanship of Portsmouth employees.
Between 10 January 1944 and 7 July 1945, the Commanding Officers of ten 
different submarines commended the shipyard for the fine construction and workmanship 
on their Portsmouth-built boats.114 Those compliments included one from Lieutenant 
Commander George Street, Medal of Honor recipient as Commanding Officer of 
Portsmouth-built USS Tirante. Lieutenant Commander Street thanked Portsmouth Naval 
Yard “for building us such a crackerjack submarine.” He reported that the “Japs tested
112 The Portsmouth Herald, 19 Feb 1941, “Commends Navy Yard on Sub Trout," 1.
113 Chief o f  Naval Operations letter o f  27 May 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
NARA College Park, RG 38, Chief o f  Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 79, Folder; 
Portsmouth, 1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
114 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 69.
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the hull” and the “crew found it eminently satisfactory.”115 It was an accumulation of 
such accolades that caused the Chief of Naval Operations to cite the “thorough 
workmanship, characteristic of all Portsmouth boats”116 in an April 1944 letter to the 
shipyard.
The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) confirmed what the fleet already knew 
when it concluded that the result of Portsmouth’s efforts “has been an outstanding 
performance, not only in numbers of vessels produced, but in the satisfactory quality and 
performance of these vessels, as evidenced by favorable comment of commanding 
officers.”117 Indeed, the best measurement of the quality of a shipyard’s workmanship is 
the favorable endorsement of the Commanding Officers and sailors who sailed its ships 
into harm’s way.
A submarine sailor’s perception of quality has much to do with the time and effort
required of him to make repairs. Submarines built in private yards apparently sailed from
the yard with incomplete work that was left for sailors to finish. On the other hand, a
Portsmouth-built boat left the yard a much more complete product. According to
submarine historian Commander John D. Alden:
As a government yard, Portsmouth was quick to correct problems 
encountered during service, whereas the boats delivered from the private
115 Portsmouth Naval Base Notice o f  8 May 1945. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Base General Correspondence, Box 9, Folder A7-1 “Notices Navy Yard and Naval Base Jan 1 1945 -  to 
1950.”
116 Chief o f  Naval Operations, letter o f 26 Apr 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
NARA College Park, RG 38, Chief o f  Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 1182, Folder NY1, 
1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
117 Secretary o f  the Navy letter o f 6 Nov 1944, to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA, 
College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, Folder NY1/A3.
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yards had to have more last-minute changes made at Pearl Harbor or other 
advanced bases before going on patrol.11
From this standpoint alone, one can understand the fleet’s appreciation for a Portsmouth-
built boat.
In closing this discussion on quality, it is appropriate to highlight the fact that 
Portsmouth maintained consistently high quality despite frequent first-time installations 
of important new design features on its submarines. With a career background steeped in 
submarine tactics and technical needs, Commandant Withers had a compelling interest in 
expediting the latest design upgrades to the fleet. The designers, draftsmen, and planners 
who worked for the Planning Officer, Captain A. I. McKee, were responsible for working 
out the details and sending the upgrades to the production schedulers. As noted earlier, 
the yard was blessed with a cadre of experienced and talented designers who were able to 
expedite those upgrades. Captain McKee, who held the important Planning Officer 
position from March 1938 until January 1945, brought considerable experience and 
consistency to the process that hastened design changes to the fleet.
Portsmouth Navy Yard, as the primary submarine design yard during the war,
often delivered its submarines with state-of-the-art technical upgrades far in advance of
other submarine shipyards. Shipyard records note, with considerable pride, the important
technical features that the yard was able to progressively and routinely incorporate into
the basic World War II fleet-type submarine design that existed at the start of the war:
Included in these changes were: the increase of hull strength, or maximum 
depth for submergence; addition of several types of radar; a change to direct 
drive with slow speed motors instead of noise-producing reduction gears; 
addition of considerable sonar equipment; equipment capable of withstanding 
the shock of depth-charge; sound isolation methods to minimize noise
118 Cdr. John D. Alden, USN (Ret), “Victorious Submarines in World War II,” in David Randle 
Hinkle, Ed., United States Submarines (Annandale, Va.: Naval Submarine League, 2002), 115.
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transmitted through the hull by auxiliary machinery and electrical equipment, 
and many others. 19
First-time installations of design changes require special attention and extra effort to 
insure satisfactory performance and compatibility with other shipboard systems. They are 
typically costly and not trouble-free. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to routinely install 
design upgrades, while achieving remarkable production rates and consistently high 
quality, reflects even more credit on the shipyard management and employees. More 
importantly, submarine Commanding Officers could confidently go to sea in a 
Portsmouth-built submarine knowing that it was well built and technically superior to 
other submarines.
Considerable evidence supports the conclusion that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s 
remarkable production performance during the war was achieved with no sacrifice to cost 
and quality. The well advertised production numbers speak for themselves and a closer 
look at cost and quality has shown equally impressive results.
119 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 2.
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CHAPTER VI
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
“By the mid-twentieth century. . .  sources responsible for air and water pollution as 
well as solid waste had long since dumped their waste on the most readily available 
land, into nearby streams, or into the air. Most of these argued that this strategy of 
dispersion should continue.”1
Samuel P. Hayes
Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental
Politics in the United States 1955-1985
Shipbuilding and submarine construction has had an environmental impact on the 
natural resources of the seacoast area of New Hampshire and southern Maine for over 
three hundred years. Shipbuilding started locally at New Castle in 1690, subsequently 
moved to Badger’s Island, and the Portsmouth Navy Yard was established in 1800. 
During the era of wooden sailing ships, local forests were cleared for shipbuilding timber 
including, at the time, the world’s best supply of tall, large diameter pines that were ideal 
for masts for ships of the Royal Navy. The 19th century also saw the shipyard land area 
greatly expanded through extensive marshland reclamation and the filling of shoal waters 
between islands. This shipyard tradition of land accrual continued well into the 20th 
century and peaked during World War II. Diesel powered submarines were first built at 
the yard in 1915 and nuclear submarines were constructed at the site between 1965 and 
1972. The primary business of the yard, since 1972, has been the repair and overhaul of
1 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 72.
273
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nuclear submarines.2 As shipbuilding materials and technology advanced and the 
construction of submarines became the primary business of the yard, the by-products of 
the industrial processes took an increased toll on the environment. As it turned out, that 
environmental toll had long term consequences that were little appreciated at the time. A 
significant milestone in the environmental history of the yard was reached in 1994 when 
the yard was declared a Superfund site as the result of the local dumping of industrial 
waste, subsequently found to be hazardous, for many years. The roots of many of the 
waste disposal practices that led to the Superfund status can be traced to World War II
-3
activity at the yard.
Many of the environmental events discussed in this chapter were of little concern 
during the war. This is not so much a reflection on the shortcomings of Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, as it is a measure of the need to restructure priorities, whatever the cost, to support 
the war effort, and an ignorance and innocence towards environmental matters typical of 
the times. In particular, there was little appreciation for the long-term consequences of 
unsatisfactory waste disposal practices. The shipyard dumped raw sewage and industrial 
effluents directly into the Piscataqua River during the war, as did most of the 
communities surrounding the yard. Not only was there little concern for this practice, but 
the visible pollution occasionally reported by inspectors went, to a large degree, 
unnoticed by shipyard workers. If noticed, it was quickly accepted as a cost of doing 
business. That business, of course, was to win a war. The dedication and effort needed to
2 The last submarine to be built at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the USS Sand Lance (SSN 660), 
was completed in 1972. The shipyard continues to overhaul nuclear submarines, and will do so for the 
foreseeable future, after surviving an attempt by the Department o f Defense to close the yard in 2005.
3 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is 
an EPA national program to identify and assess past hazardous waste disposal sites posing a potential threat 
to human health or the environment. Sites gaining this dubious honor are referred to as Superfund sites in 
recognition o f  the costs that are normally incurred to restore the sites.
274
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
win the war overwhelmed any thoughts of moderating industrial activity to accommodate 
concerns for natural resources.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studies in the 1980s found extensive 
evidence of inadequate postwar waste disposal practices for hazardous materials, at the 
shipyard, that included chromium, lead and cadmium-plating sludge, asbestos insulation, 
volatile organic compounds, waste and paint solvents, mercury-contaminated materials, 
and sandblasting grit containing various metal wastes. According to those studies, many 
of these materials were dumped on the shipyard’s tidal flats as part of land reclamation 
projects. This dumping, and other similar practices, caused the shipyard to be placed on 
the National Priorities List (NPL) for Superfund projects in 1994. Recovery actions to 
date have required the expenditure of millions of dollars in clean-up projects.4
The EPA studies of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard seldom extend back into the 
World War II era for lack of records and evidence. As noted earlier in this study, record 
keeping during the war was greatly abbreviated. This study, however, does show that the 
filling of shipyard tidal flats and shoreline shoal waters occurred during the war. The 
nature of the yard’s work and the associated work practices did not change appreciably 
with the conclusion of the war. Consequently, waste used as fill material during the war 
probably contained many of the same waste products that EPA studies attribute to 
postwar practices.
EPA studies also concluded that the shipyard’s postwar operations included the 
discharge of raw sewage and industrial waste into the Piscataqua River. That industrial
4 http://vosemite.eDa.gov/rl/npl pad.nsf. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Waste Site. 
Cleanup & Reuse in New England.
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waste included acidic and alkaline wastes, waste battery acid and lead sludge, as well as 
waste water and spent baths from electroplating. EPA studies identified three postwar 
liquid discharge sites immediately off shore from the shipyard’s fitting out piers with 
high levels of heavy metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), cyanide, phenol, oils and 
grease.5 This study shows that the shipyard’s sewage system was greatly overloaded 
during the war and, there is reason to believe, that the wartime sewage overload included 
many of the same hazardous materials that the EPA attributes to postwar operations.
Many of the EPA’s findings deal with the use of industrial waste products as fill
material to increase the shipyard’s acreage. The use of this waste for fill material
conformed to practices and procedures that were acceptable at the time but were later
found to be inadequate. The following table shows estimates of hazardous waste
reportedly disposed of at the Jamaica Island Landfill during the postwar period from
1945 to the mid-1970s:6
Substance Estimated Quantity
Chrome Plating Sludge 5,000-10,000 pounds
Lead Plating Sludge 5,000-10,000 pounds
Cadmium Plating Sludge 5,000-10,000 pounds
Asbestos Insulation several thousand pounds
Waste Paints and Solvents 500,000 gallons
Sand Blasting Grit 5,000 tons/year
If these wastes were being dumped in the Jamaica Island Landfill immediately after the
war, it is reasonable to assume that even greater annual rates were dumped during the war
years when the industrial activity was several times higher than it was at any time in the
5 Frederick T. Short et at., The Ecology o f  the Great Bay Estuary, New Hampshire and Maine: 
an Estuarine Profile and Bibliography (Durham: University o f  New Hampshire, 1992), 85, Table 6.12.
6 Ibid., 82, Table 6.11.
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postwar period. This dissertation provides evidence of inadequate processes associated 
with the above waste products.
Land recovery has been so critical to the shipyard’s development that the practice 
has occurred almost continuously since the shipyard’s establishment in 1800. As a result, 
the shipyard’s landscape and topography have been transformed significantly over the 
last 200 years. Much of that transformation occurred during World War II. Prior to 
analyzing wartime land reclamation projects, it is appropriate to review the historical 
importance of such projects to the growth and development the yard. This longtime 
practice has obviously been a mixed blessing.
Shipyard Land Reclamation (1800 to WWII)
A current map places Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on Seavey’s Island in the 
Piscataqua River in the state of Maine. As can be seen from Figure A-5 in the appendix, 
the current Seavey’s Island is the result of the combining of major four islands; Dennett’s 
Island, the original Seavey’s Island, Pumpkin Island, and Jamaica Island.7 Figure A-5 
highlights the extensive filling of shoal waters that has been required to enable the 
shipyard to reach its current size.
7 The shipyard islands experienced numerous name changes prior to 1800. According to Walter E.
H. Fentress, Centennial History o f  the United States Navy Yard at Portsmouth N.H., (Portsmouth: O.M. 
Knight, Publisher, 1876), 8, two o f the islands are noted in the Records o f York County (1631) as 
Puddington Islands, “so called because a John Puddington used the islands for drying fish.” In 1645, the 
Puddington Islands were granted to Thomas Fumell by the colonial representative o f Charles I. Early 
Kittery Town Records show many land grants to the Femald family (John Sr., Nathaniel, Samuel, James, 
William, and John), starting in 1660, and no Fumell entries. Early maps show the original shipyard island 
as Femald Island suggesting a derivative o f  the Fumell name some time after the purchase o f the island by 
Thomas Furnell. In 1794, James Sheafe purchased the island destined to be the site o f  the shipyard from an 
heir o f  Thomas Fernald and, in turn, sold it to William Dennett just three months later. Dennett purchased 
the island in anticipation o f its need by the U.S. Navy. According to the York Registry o f  Deeds, Book 65, 
Page 87, (transcribed printed copy held at the Kittery, Me. Town Office), Dennett sold the fifty-eight acre 
island to the government in 1800 for $5,500. This study will consistently refer to Dennett’s Island when 
referring to the original shipyard island.
277
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Marshland reclamation increased the initial shipyard on Dennett’s Island from 58 
acres to 64.37 acres by 1843 and the shipyard more than doubled in size again with the 
U.S. Navy’s purchase of Seavey’s Island’s 105 acres for $105,000 in 1866. The accrual 
of Pumpkin Island and Jamaica Island, which occurred during World War II, constitutes a 
large part of the shipyard transformation described in detail later in this study. World War 
II and subsequent reclamation projects have increased the shipyard acreage to a total of 
287 acres.8 It is noteworthy that the 50 acres of Superfund sites identified in the 1990s 
were only slightly less than the shipyard’s original 58 acres on Dennett’s Island.
With the creation of the Department of the Navy in 1798, Congress authorized the 
building of six 74-gun frigates. The frigates were to be built, one each, at navy yards to 
be established at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Washington 
D.C. Surveys for the proposed Portsmouth yard found nearby Dennett’s Island to be a 
more favorable site for long-term naval construction than Badger’s Island, which had 
been the construction site for substantial colonial shipbuilding. Dennett’s Island was 
much larger, fifty-eight acres as compared to Badger Island’s twenty acres, and better 
suited for timber storage. In addition to a deep harbor and convenient access from the 
ocean, Joshua Humphries, the Chief Naval Constructor of the United States, noted that 
“There is sufficient quantity of stone [on Dennett’s Island] for any building that may be 
thought necessary to be erected for the use of the navy-yard.”9 Humphries’ report goes on
8 Clarke’s Island was added to the shipyard in the 1960s when it was acquired to accommodate a 
much needed sound pier.
9 Joshua Humphries’ Report, January 29, 1800. Excerpts quoted in George Henry Preble, Rear 
Admiral, History o f  the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H .(Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1892), 24.
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to note several disadvantages including “rapidity of the current” and a “hard, stony 
bottom” that would complicate future wharf and pier construction. On a final note, he 
added that the island is “never troubled with ice” because of the rapid currents. The rapid 
river currents that prevented the accumulation of ice in 1800 were also thought to provide 
adequate flushing of the yard’s sewage discharge to the river during World War II.
The Navy completed the purchase of Dennett’s Island from William and Sarah 
Dennett on 12 June 1800. As can be seen from Figure A-6 in the appendix, the 1800 plan 
for the proposed Portsmouth Navy Yard, the Navy purchased a sparsely populated island 
with topographical limitations for future development. Much of the island was unusable, 
steep, rocky highland, or lowland swamp. In the near term, limited shipyard operations 
could begin on the south shore where the few houses on the island had been built. This 
part of the island was also blessed with deep water and accessible waterfront. However, 
full advantage could not be taken of those attributes until the highlands and rocky cliffs 
were leveled and the lowlands filled to allow construction and development. The useable 
southern portion of the island, near the deep water, was squeezed into the very limited 
waterfront area available between the highlands and the shoreline.10 The highlands would 
have to go if  the shipyard was to grow.
Beginning in 1833, annual appropriations for leveling the yard, filling in low 
grounds, and extending the wharves and waterfront area became routine. Most of this 
activity was limited to the portion of the island directly across the river from what is now
10 Again, during World War II the shipyard was faced with the need to develop and extend the 
southern portion o f the shipyard into the river to take maximum advantage o f  the deep water and accessible 
waterfront. The most obvious example is the reclamation and development o f Pumpkin Island Shoals, 
opposite Strawbery Banke, at the start o f the war to accommodate the construction o f the five acre fitting- 
out pier.
279
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Portsmouth’s Strawbery Bank. In May 1843, the commandant was able to report to the
Secretary of the Navy that the original 58 acres of Dennett’s Island had grown to 64.37
acres, a 16% increase.11 A few months later, in July 1843, a local contractor, Mr.
Murgridge, one of many bidding on another major excavation project in the yard, wrote:
Proposal for removing Stone and earth at the Navy Yard and depositing the 
Same within the Quay walls now being constructed . . .  I will remove the 
Ledge [by blasting] & earth in front of the Store House near the landing 
place, and what may be required to finish the remainder of the contract, the 
materials to be taken from the Ledge where I am now at w ork.. .  .sixty three
19cents per Cubic Yard.
Murgridge apparently won the contract because, a year later, the shipyard reported to the 
Bureau of Yards and Docks that Murgridge had fulfilled his contract and removed 10,000 
cubic yards of ledge and earth.13 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the leveling of 
the shipyard was nearing completion and marshland recovery had become a well 
established practice.
In reclaiming marshlands, the navy yard was merely following the lead of many 
local colonial communities. As towns like Boston and Portsmouth grew and exhausted 
the immediately available real estate, the marshes became hindrances to urban prosperity. 
Early Boston consisted of 1,185 acres of dry land with 485 acres of salt marsh and 1,570 
acres of mudflats and shallow water surrounding the growing commercial and residential
11 George Henry Preble, Rear Admiral, H istory o f  the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1892), 72.
12 Murgridge memo to Captain G.W. Storer o f  11 July 1843. NARA, Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence, Box 7, Folder “ Misc. Letters. Received.”
13 Captain G.W. Storer letter to Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks o f 5 July 1844. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence, Box 3, Folder “Letters to Bureau 
Yards & Docks.”
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development. By 1640, Boston’s population had reached 1,200 and lowlands greatly 
restricted future growth. Reclamation of lowlands became a commercial necessity if 
Boston was to grow and become the hub of New England. By 1647, the same year 
Kittery was established, Boston had converted much of its natural salt marsh to useful 
town property.14 Portsmouth experienced a similar expansion through the reclamation of 
lowlands around Puddle Dock and other waterfront salt marsh areas.15 In time, urban 
development at Boston and Portsmouth demanded more than just the reclamation of 
lowlands. Large landmasses were added to city boundaries by filling in channels that had 
previously separated nearby islands. Well before the shipyard’s founding in 1800, the 
New England tradition of lowland recovery and island accrual, by filling in shoal waters, 
was well established. It was only natural that the shipyard would follow a similar pattern 
to acquire the real estate needed to insure its continued development.16
As discussed earlier, Dry Docks #1 and #2 were critical to the shipyard’s success 
during the war. Both were constructed on sites with topographical advantages conducive 
to dry dock construction and operation. A review of the historical development of those 
sites will serve to illustrate important shipyard transformations leading up to World War 
II. Dry Dock #1, the site of the launching of three submarines in January 1944, evolved 
from a natural cove on the original Dennett’s Island. Examining Figure A-6 (1800 map), 
with an eye towards the future transformation and development of the shipyard, the cove 
labeled “deep water cove most suitable for a dry dock” in the southwest corner of the
14 Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A History o f  America's Wetlands 
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 31-32.
15 See W. Jeffrey Bolster, ed., Cross-Grained & Wily Waters- A Guide to the Piscataqua 
Maritime Region (Peter E. Randall Publisher: Portsmouth, N.H., 2002), 68-73 for an account o f the Puddle 
Dock transformation.
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shipyard would evolve, by 1874, into a dock basin with a marine railway to pull ships out 
of the water for hull repairs. Figure 17 below (1874 map) shows the rectangular shaped 
dock basin and marine railway at the eight o’clock position on the island as part of the 
post-Civil war expansion of the shipyard. The dock basin would contain the first shipyard 
floating wooden dry dock, in the late 1800s, and become the site of Dry Dock #1 in 1942. 
It was the use of Dry Dock #1 for submarine construction that enabled the yard to achieve 
remarkable production despite a shortage of traditional building ways.
Y A R D■I
Figure 17: Portsmouth Navy Yard Map of 1874. Courtesy 
Of Milne Special Collections. Universtiy of New Hampshire 
Library, Durham, N.H.
Figure 17 also shows the early development on Seavey Island, in the lower right 
corner, after its purchase by the Navy in 1866. Dry Dock #2, the submarine repair and 
overhaul dock during the war, was built between 1899 and 1906 in Jenkins Gut, the 
channel separating Dennett’s Island and Seavey’s Island. A stone dry dock was
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constructed and the earth and rocks from the excavation for the dry dock,were used to fill 
the remainder of the channel between the islands to accommodate building sites for 
further shipyard development. Figure A-l (1939 map) shows Dry Dock #2 in the heart of 
the shipyard. Dry Dock #2, and the buildings surrounding the dock, were the center of 
shipyard activity until construction during World War II moved the shipyard center of 
operations decidedly south and west towards the new dry dock and fitting out pier shown 
on Figure A-2 (1945 map).
Thus, the dry docks that were so critical to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance 
during World War II were historically the products of natural topographical features 
transformed through dredging, extensive reclamation of wetlands, and the filling of shoal 
waters throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. World War II developments at the 
yard continued the topographical transformation that had been evolving over the past two 
hundred years.
One final, near instantaneous, topographical transformation will complete this 
pre-World War II review of important shipyard topographical changes. With the advent 
of the deeper draft steel ships at the turn of the 20th century, deeper and safer access to the 
shipyard was needed. On July 22, 1905, 18,000 people crammed into wharves, islands, 
and every available vantage point to watch the largest manmade explosion to that point, 
when thirty-six tons of dynamite dislodged and crumpled 70,000 tons of rock at 
Henderson's Point. The blast removed the most southern tip of Seavey’s Island and
1 7widened the Piscataqua River by 400 feet at its narrowest point. When dredged to 35 
feet, the navigable waters leading to the shipyard were greatly increased and improved.
17 What is left o f Henderson Point is shown Figure A-2 (1945 map), the southern most tip o f  the 
shipyard in the center o f the map. Also see W. Jeffrey Bolster, e d Cross-Grained & Wily Waters- A Guide
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With improved access to the yard, the first half of the twentieth century saw 
continued, gradual development of the shipyard. Between 1910 and 1940, the shipyard 
experienced no major topographical changes. The emphasis, during this period, was on 
the construction of the shops and facilities needed to accommodate the construction and 
repair of steel hulled steam vessels, and then submarines, to the extent that federal 
funding was available. The release of federal funds, for the ramp up for World War II, 
renewed and accelerated the development and topographical transformation of the yard.
Shipyard Land Reclamation during World War II 
As noted earlier, the shipyard’s land reclamation projects during the war included 
the use of industrial waste as fill material. Shop records were greatly abbreviated during 
the war. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what wartime industrial waste was 
dumped in which locations. With the postwar reemphasis on record keeping and material 
accountability, it became easier to track waste materials. The postwar evidence was more 
than sufficient to make the EPA’s case for Superfund status so there was no need to 
attempt to reconstruct wartime industrial dumping. This study does resurrect evidence of 
wartime dumping.
A memorandum from Commandant Rear Admiral C.W. Cole to shipyard 
managers, dated 12 April 1939, indicates that inappropriate industrial waste was being 
used for land fills on the eve of World War II. After a tour of the shipyard, Commandant 
Cole wrote:
It is noticed that considerable burnable material (including food) is being 
dumped in the Old Timber Basin adjacent to Bldg. 129. All burnable material 
must be burned and the incinerator is maintained for that purpose. It is also 
noted that tin cans and drums of various capacities are being disposed of
Guide to the Piscataqua Maritime Region (Peter E. Randall Publisher: Portsmouth, N.H., 2002), 193-197 
for a series o f  photographs showing Henderson Point before, during, and after the explosion..
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without any effort being made to crush these containers. This practice not 
only causes the area to be unsightly but will result in a very unstable fill. All 
containers must be crushed before disposal in any fill.18
It is highly probable that the cans and drums were petroleum containers with
environmental consequences that were unappreciated at the time. Commandant Cole was
not objecting to the routine use of cans and drums for fill material, or expressing any
concerns about the original contents of the containers. Rather, his prime concern was that
the drums be crushed to promote the long-term stability of the fill. The reclaimed timber
basin was to be transformed into building sites for an expanding shipyard, following the
shipyard’s well established practice of lowland reclamation. With this example of the
shipyard’s industrial dumping practices immediately prior to the war, one can only
imagine the extent of dumping activity that must have accompanied the great increase in
production during the war. The few records available show evidence of no special
handling of waste that must have included lead based paints, petroleum products,
asbestos, lead celled batteries, and mercury filled instruments.
The purchase of Jamaica Island early in the war, for ammunition storage, 
eventually required extensive landfill to permit efficient access to the island. Shortly after 
purchase a causeway was built to provide that access. Additional fill in the area of the 
causeway started late in the war and continued after the war with the bulk of the Jamaica 
Island landfill occurring in the post war era. Jamaica Island is not even shown on Figure 
A-1 (1939 map) and it is shown, fully developed, with a substantial land connection to 
the shipyard proper, on the upper right hand comer, of Figure A-2 (1945 map). Figures 
A-7 (1941 map enlarged) and A-8 (1945 map enlarged) show in more detail the
18 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral C.W. Cole letter o f  12 April 1939, Subject: 
Grounds, and refuse material -  care of. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, 
Folder N l-1 , “Grounds 1925-39.”
285
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
development of this portion of the shipyard. It is obvious that much fill material was 
needed to connect the islands and it appears logical that the practice used to reclaim the 
nearby timber basin in 1939, the dumping of drums and other industrial waste, would 
have provided much of that fill.19 A 1950 report, discussing the disposal of shipyard 
waste, confirms the continuation of the practice observed by Commandant Cole in 1939. 
According to that 1950 report, large items and cans were sent to a burning dump and 
what did not burn was “carried to fill area near Jamaica Island.”20 It is not surprising that 
the Jamaica landfill was one of the most troublesome of the Superfund sites and that 
millions of dollars would be required to clean up the area fifty years later.
The war also saw extensive reclamation of shoal waters on the northern shorelines 
of Seavey Island. Figure A-8, an enclosure to the shipyard’s five year development plan, 
submitted in June 1946, shows these areas annotated “FILL” with arrows pointing to the 
filled areas. The annotation done in June 1946, on a shipyard map dated 30 June 1945, 
appears to indicate that there was considerable dumping activity in these areas during the 
final year of the war. These areas were also revisited and reworked as Superfund Sites in 
the 1990s.
The largest reclamation project during the war was the dredging and filling of 
Pumpkin Island shoal that reclaimed over four aces of land for the construction and 
development of the new fitting out pier. This area is highlighted on Figure A-2 (1945 
map) that shows the new fitting out pier in the lower left hand comer jutting out into the
19 The timber basin is shown on Figure A -l (1939 map) just south o f the northern shoreline at the 
12 o’clock position on the map.
20 Portsmouth Navy Yard Medical Officer’s Semi-Annual Report for 1950 o f  4 Jan 1950 to the 
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder “A9-1 
Sanitary Reports.”
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river. This project extended the shipyard real estate well out into the Piscataqua River 
towards Strawbery Banke and provided 1100 feet of additional pier space and berths for 
submarines. The filling of Pumpkin Island Shoal was reminiscent of the process that 
began in the early 19 century, when highlands in the same general area were leveled and 
marshlands filled to develop those portions of the shipyard nearest the deepest channels 
of the river. The Pumpkin Shoal reclamation did not become a Superfund Site. Much of 
the fill for this reclamation was brought in from off the yard.21 Nearby dredging 
operations that deepened the river access to the new fitting out piers also provided clean 
uncontaminated fill.
Dr. C.F. Jackson’s Biological Survey o f Great Bay New Hampshire (1944) gives 
some indication of the probable environmental consequences of the shipyard’s land 
reclamation projects during the war. According to Jackson, “The mid-channel of the 
lower Piscataqua and that of Little Bay have probably changed but little in the last several 
hundred years. They are rock strewn and little erosion of sedimentation could have 
occurred.”22 The river tidal flats, however, provided a protected “nursery for young fish 
and a refuge for an abundance of fish food.” Historically, an abundance of eel grass 
provided a protective carpet that prevented erosion of the tidal flats and efficiently 
strained the heavy silt that otherwise would have covered clam beds and fish spawning 
grounds. About 1931, “a disease attacked the eel grass along the Atlantic coast causing its 
virtual disappearance.” Consequently, silting of mud flats had become a problem of
21 According to James Dolph, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard historian, much o f  the fill material 
for the new fitting out pier was trucked in from off-yard because the Jamaica Island fill was consuming all 
the shipyard generated waste then believed suitable for fill material. Telephone interview with James Dolph 
o f 16 March 2007.
22 All quotes in this paragraph are from Jackson, A Biological Survey o f  Great Bay New 
Hampshire, 24.
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increasing proportions in the 1930s. During the war, Dr. Jackson and others were still 
experimenting with various “disease-resistant strain[s] of eel grass” with hopes of 
rejuvenating the mud flats. Thus, the Pumpkin Island, Jamaica Island, and other shipyard 
land reclamation projects during the war that filled in tidal flats must have further 
reduced a shrinking fish and marine life food supply. And the shipyard’s uncontrolled 
sewage and industrial waste discharges into the river would have compounded the 
problem.
The reclamation of wetlands for shipyard expansion during the war was by no 
means limited to Portsmouth Navy Yard. During the first few years of the war, Mare 
Island Navy Yard more than doubled in size, expanding from 635 to 1500 acres, and 
much of that expansion involved the reclamation of wetlands. Describing the 
environmental consequences of accelerated shipbuilding in the Bay Area, Wayne Bonnet 
says:
At the time, unavoidable physical degradation of the land and shoreline was 
an acceptable cost. To accommodate new shipyards, hills and rocks were 
dynamited, channels dredged, wetlands diked and filled.24
Shipyard construction, or expansion, required an accommodation between the sea
accesses and the land and facilities where the work was to be done. It was inevitable that
real estate would have to be rearranged and shore lines adjusted. Portsmouth Navy yard
was no exception.
23 U.S. Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f  Yards and Docks, Vol. 1. Navy 
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 196.
24 http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/wwHbavarea/shipbuilding.htm. “World War II Shipbuilding in 
the San Francisco Bay Area,” 3.
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Industrial Sewage
Portsmouth Navy Yard discharged sewage and other shop effluents directly into 
the Piscataqua River prior to, and during, World War II. The shipyard was not unlike the 
rest of the country in this regard. According to Samuel P. Hays, urban sewage treatment 
“did not receive much attention until the New Deal public-works programs in the 1930s, 
and was not taken up by most cities until massive federal funding became available 
beginning in the 1960s.”25 Hays notes that it was not until after World War II that 
industrial discharges began to arouse as much interest as did municipal sewage.26 Until 
about 1950, a strategy of pollution dispersion prevailed whereby the dumping of wastes
97into nearby streams was accepted practice. What little environmental conscience the 
shipyard possessed during the war can be summed up in the belief that the disposal of 
sewage and industrial waste to the swift flowing Piscataqua River was an acceptable and 
effective practice.
Limited pre-World War II efforts by state agencies to get the Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, and other federal shore establishments, to comply with suggested state policies for 
sewage treatment had no substantial legal basis for enforcement. Consequently, the 
attempts were treated, for the most part, with benign neglect by the Navy and Portsmouth 
Navy Yard. Once the war started, attention was focused on more urgent matters.28
25 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United 
States1955-1985, 77.
26 Ibid.
21 Ib id ,12.
28 Portsmouth Navy Yard did not get a sewage waste treatment facility until 1975. However, 
Admiralty Village, the housing project built in 1941 for naval personnel and shipyard employees did 
include a waste treatment facility.
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The origins of the legal argument that prevented states from enforcing waste 
discharge policies on federal navy yards can be traced back to Chief Justice John 
Marshall and the McCullough v. Maryland (1819) Supreme Court decision. This decision 
established the supremacy clause of the Constitution and thus made federal facilities 
immune from state and local regulation. This federal immunity gradually eroded after 
World War II with the passage of legislation that included the Fresh Water Quality 
Assurance Act (1948), the Clean Water Restoration Act (1966), subsequent Clean Water 
Acts and amendments, and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(1970). Slowly but surely, federal shore facilities were held to increasingly demanding 
environmental regulations administered through the EPA. However, prior to that time, the 
Navy and its shore facilities treated attempts at regulation with a definite lack of 
enthusiasm, as evidenced by events at Portsmouth Navy Yard in the mid-1930’s and early 
1940’s.
The dumping of raw sewage by local communities, including the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard, into the Piscataqua River, was a long-time practice that began to come under 
increased scrutiny in the mid-193 Os as the result of growing national concerns about such 
practices. Prompted by Congress, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks in 
September 1935 advised the shipyard that, “A resolution adopted by the House of 
Representatives on 7 August 1935 requested the President to inform the House of the 
number and distribution of Federal institutions and establishments of every kind and 
character, which are depositing untreated sewage into the navigable or non-navigable
29 Commander Charles W. Tucker, JAGC, USN, “Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and 
Local Environmental Regulations,” in The Naval Law Review, Spring 1986, 87-112.
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•5 A
waters of the United States.” The supremacy clause of the Constitution was evident in 
the dismissive nature of the resolution that merely requested that the executive side of the 
government inform the House of Representatives of the extent of dumping of untreated 
sewage by federal shore facilities.
The Bureau of Yards and Docks, not having concerned itself with such matters in 
the past, surveyed its shore facilities in September 1935, to determine what each was 
doing with raw sewage, so that it could report back to the House of Representatives. In 
response, Portsmouth Navy Yard reported that a shipyard population of about 2800 
people (380 residents and 2400 employees) produced an estimated 18,000 cubic feet of 
raw, untreated sewage daily that was dumped directly into the Piscataqua River through
A 1
several sewers. The shipyard made no apologies for the dumping, or noted any plans for 
future treatment of the sewage.
Jumping ahead to the World War II years of this study, it is an interesting exercise 
to scale the estimated 18,000 cubic feet of raw sewage per day for 2800 people in 1935 to 
the high activity periods of the World War II years, when the shipyard employment 
reached greater than 20,000 people. At that time, the daily population of the yard 
probably approached 25,000 including residents, prisoners, submarine crews, hospital 
staff and patients, and contractors. That estimate equates, proportionately, to roughly 
160,000 cubic feet of shipyard waste dumped daily into the Piscataqua River during the 
peak years of World War II. That volume represents about four acres (1 acre = 43,560
30 Chief o f  Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f  16 Sep 1935 to Commandant, Navy Yard, 
Portsmouth, N.H., Subject: Disposal o f Untreated Sewage into Waters o f the United States. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, PNSY Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
31 Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. letter o f 20 Sep 1935 to Chief o f Bureau o f Yards 
and Docks, Subject: Disposal o f Untreated Sewage into Waters o f  the United States. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, PNSY Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
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square feet) of raw sewage at a depth of one foot. If anything, this estimate is probably on 
the low side, when one considers the greatly increased pace of industrial operations 
during the war and the increased shop industrial waste that must have been generated.
Illustrating an innocence, and lack of awareness, of the dangers of environmental 
pollution typical of the times, the shipyard’s 1937 annual sanitary report described the 
shipyard’s sewage system as “excellent” with “no open drains,” and flowing “directly 
into the Piscataqua River, either into the main channel or back channel” and “carried to 
the ocean by the river current or tide.” Great confidence was placed in the ability of the 
river to flush itself clean and carry the waste out of sight to a safe place.
In 1940, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks received another prompting 
about the discharge of raw sewage. This time it was from the Surgeon General of the 
United States. The Bureau advised the naval shore establishments, in December 1940, 
that it had met with state health officials and the Surgeon General of the Public Health 
Service in Washington on 16 and 17 September 1940, relative to the discharge of 
domestic and industrial sewage at industrial plants essential to the national defense. The 
meeting resulted in a resolution that it be “brought to the attention of the heads of defense 
agencies” that naval shore establishments “should conform to the standards of the 
Department of Health of the State in which such facilities may be located.” The Bureau 
further advised, “If there is any question as to the adequacy of the methods proposed or 
now in use, it is suggested that conferences be arranged with local or state health 
departments to determine any additional steps in the protection of water supply and
32 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1937 -  1939 to the Commandant. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary 
Reports.”
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disposal of wastes which may be required, and that, where necessary, suitable 
recommendations be forwarded to the Bureau.” Here again, the recommendation that 
federal facilities comply with state policies for sewage discharge was respectful of the 
federal government’s superior legal position. The request was couched in terms of 
suggestions of what should be done as opposed to mandated compliance.
The Bureau of Yards and Docks felt no obligation to commit resources towards 
compliance but, rather, directed the navy yards to study the problem some more. The 
yards were tasked to establish liaison with the appropriate states, regarding sewage 
discharge, and report the findings back to the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Indicative of 
the lack of priority given environmental issues at the time, a year went by before the 
Bureau of Yards and Docks next addressed the dumping of raw sewage. One week prior 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau advised the shipyards that it had “moderate 
funds” budgeted for “rectifying those faulty conditions [of sewage discharge] of a minor 
nature” and sought details for larger projects needed to comply with state policies. The 
Bureau stated its plans to attempt to obtain the needed funding through future legislation 
and then pursue those projects “if funds become available.” The Bureau’s intentions 
were good, if not aggressive, but the timing was bad, as the nation’s need for submarines 
quickly overwhelmed concerns about industrial sewage discharge.34
33 Chief o f  Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 5 Dec 1940 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Subject: Water Supply and Discharge o f  Domestic Sewage at Training Areas and Industrial Plants 
essential to the National Defense. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, 
Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
34 Chief o f  Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 28 Nov 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy 
Yard, Subject: Water Supply and Discharge o f  Domestic Sewage -  Navy Yard Portsmouth, N.H. Waltham, 
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
293
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Despite the start of the war, Portsmouth Navy Yard pursued the matter with its
two border states and learned, first, from the Department of Health and Welfare of the
state of Maine on December 24, 1941 that:
The policy of this Department concerning the discharge of sewage into the 
Piscataqua River near the Navy Yard at Kittery and Eliot is the same as we 
have had for a number of years relating to the discharge of sewage along the 
seashore in that vicinity. We have recommended*5 to the various towns that 
no raw sewage be emptied into such waters and as a result of this, primary 
settling tanks have been installed at Oqunquit, York, York Beach, and other 
communities along the shore. We believe that at least this degree of treatment 
should be supplied for any sewage disposal projects emptying into the 
Piscataqua River or nearby tributaries.36
Here again, the state of Maine could merely recommend that the federal shipyard should
comply with its long-standing policy.
New Hampshire’s response, of December 16, 1941, was even more revealing of
the times. Responding to the shipyard’s request for the state’s policy and laws regarding
discharge of sewage into the Piscataqua River, the state said:
As applicable to a case of this kind, the latter [laws] are nil, except in so far  
as ground for a charge o f nuisance could be found, and this would scarcely 
be possible here. That is, there is no legal action this department could take 
respecting the existent sewage disposals at Dover, Portsmouth, and the Navy 
Yard.37
In other words, the state was powerless to regulate shipyard sewage discharges except 
under conditions of a nuisance complaint. Unstated, but implied, is that a national defense
35 The italics in this quote, and on the remainder o f this page, are the author’s, to emphasize the 
weak position o f  the states relative to that o f the federal government.
36 Department o f  Health and Welfare, Bureau o f Health, State House, Augusta letter of 24 Dec 
1941 to Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
37 The State o f New Hampshire, State Board o f Health letter o f 16 Dec 1941 to Commandant, U.S. 
Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 
36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage” (emphasis added).
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facility, such as the shipyard, would never be subject to nuisance laws. New Hampshire’s 
response, dated a week after Pearl Harbor, recognized that the shipyard had more 
important matters on its agenda than sewage discharge.
Dutifully wrapping things up, despite the outbreak of World War II, Portsmouth 
Navy Yard advised the Bureau of Yards and Docks on December 28,1941 that “The 
present number of sewer outlets at the Yard is the same as has been in existence for a 
number of years and the raw sewage is emptied into the Piscataqua River.”38 Indicative 
of the sewage change that was in the air [pardon the pun], the shipyard’s report added 
that, “At the Navy Yard Housing Development at Kittery, Maine, raw sewage is [at 
present] emptied into Spruce Creek. . .  A Federal Grant has been issued for a sewage 
treatment plant and garbage incinerator for the Housing Development.”39 The shipyard 
neglected to provide any cost estimates for sewage treatment facilities it might need and 
turned its attention to the multi-million dollar facility upgrades that were then underway 
in the yard to increase submarine production.
A year later, in December 1942, the Bureau of Yards and Docks provided further 
direction on sewage discharges. At that time, it merely restated its intentions to “comply 
with legitimate requests from local health officials in regard to the treatment of the 
sewage from naval shore establishments.” However, those intentions had to be weighed 
relative to “the current shortage in steel, copper, and mechanical equipment.” 
Furthermore, the Bureau added, “It is requested that the apparent necessity for sewage
38 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  30 Dec 1941 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks, 
Subject: Water Supply and Disposal o f  Domestic Sewage -  Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
39 Ibid
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treatment at any station be investigated thoroughly before arrangements are made to 
install sewage treatment structures since there are conditions where, by a reasonable 
extension of the outfall sewer, the immediate need for sewer treatment may be removed 
and the treatment plant may be omitted for the present.”40 The treatment plant was 
omitted not only for the present, but for the next thirty years, as Portsmouth Navy Yard 
did not get a sewage and industrial waste treatment plant until 1975.
The tone of the correspondence between the navy and state health officials, 
regarding the potential compliance with state policies for sewage discharge, illustrates 
well the positions of the state versus the federal government regarding environmental 
protection in 1940-41. First, the states were in no position to dictate sewage discharge 
requirements to federal facilities involved in national defense. They could merely bring 
the matter to the attention of the Navy and note that naval facilities should comply with 
local and state requirements. Second, the Bureau of Yards and Docks had no intention of 
mandating, across the board, that all its facilities immediately comply with local 
requirements. Instead, the facilities were repeatedly told to investigate local requirements, 
and communicate those requirements back to the Bureau where any costs involved would 
be weighed relative to other and probably more urgent priorities.
As estimated earlier, the increased activity at the shipyard in the early 1940s must 
have greatly overloaded the sewage system. This speculation is confirmed by the 
shipyard medical officer’s annual report for 1942:
40 Chief o f  the Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f  18 Dec 1942 to Officer-in-Charge o f  
Construction Bureau Yards & Docks Contracts, U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., Subject: Sewerage and 
Sewage Treatment Facilities at Naval Stations. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
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With all the new toilet fixtures and with an increase in personnel several 
times the former figures, the amount of sewage now emptying into the river 
is great. There have been several complaints about the odor. Some of it has a 
tendency to lodge about piers and has to be cleaned away.41
Raw stinking sewage sloughing around underneath the piers was apparently a cost of
doing business, when that business was mounting the industrial effort needed to build the
large number of submarines needed to win the war. The medical officer’s report went on
to say that “Consultation with Public Works resulted in conclusion that it would be a
major task to extend the sewer down the river [as recommended by the Bureau of Yards
and Docks].”42 And finally it was suggested that, “Since there is apparently no health
hazard such an undertaking is not recommended for the duration of the war.”43 Many
projects and lives were put on hold during the war.
The above examples highlight the relative unimportance assigned open and 
unsanitary sewage disposal by health officials during the war. Not to be overlooked is the 
tolerance of shipyard employees who routinely accepted the unhealthy situation as a cost 
of doing business. It is also obvious that the Navy lacked any serious commitment to the 
expenditure of funds for sewage treatment upgrades when faced with more urgent 
wartime priorities. Finally, states were unable to push federal facilities to comply with 
state policies and regulations because of their inferior legal position. All of this would 
change dramatically with time but, in the early 1940s, the Navy and Portsmouth Navy 
Yard were focused on other matters.
41 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1942 to the Commandant. NARA 
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The communities surrounding the navy yard were no more responsible with 
sewage discharge than was the yard. According to the 1943 Portsmouth Health and 
Welfare Survey:
All of the sewage from the community is discharged raw into the Piscataqua 
River with the exception of sewage from the Wentworth Acres section...
The sewage system has grown gradually as the city increased in population. 
However, as in many instances, little attention has been given to the 
engineering phases. For this reason, some of the mains are undersized and, 
under proper tidal conditions, back flooding in the low areas occurs. Also, 
some of the sewer outlets are not submerged, or have not been extended 
sufficiently, at times giving rise to localized odor nuisances.44
Conditions along the waterfront in Portsmouth were not unlike the odiferous and fouled
waters around the piers at the navy yard. The Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey
(1944) noted that the raw sewage being dumped did “add materially to the pollution of
Great Bay, thereby having a direct effect on the shellfish and recreational potentialities of
the areas.”45 Local leaders took some satisfaction from the fact that “there are several
other towns and cities bordering on streams discharging into the Bay and they also
contribute to the pollution.”46 At least there was some recognition of the long term effects
of the continued dumping of raw sewage into the river. However, as with the navy yard,
the focus of the local communities was elsewhere and, besides, everyone was dumping
sewage into the river.
In 1944, however, the focus of University of New Hampshire’s Dr. C.F. Jackson 
was on the increasing pollution of Great Bay. His report in conjunction with the Marine 
Fisheries Commission, A Biological Survey o f  Great Bay New Hampshire, introduced a
44 “Survey o f  Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” Cumings Library, Strawbery 
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new era of concern for the increasing pollution of local streams. Jackson’s survey of 
microbial contamination showed a coliform bactria count of 2,400 per 100 milliliters of 
water for the lower Piscataqua River. The U.S. Public Health Service Standard for 
shellfish waters at the time was 70 coliform bacteria per 100 milliliters of water. There 
can be little doubt that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s untreated sewage discharges endangered 
Piscataqua River shellfish. Before one is overly critical of the shipyard, it is appropriate 
to note that the coliform bacteria levels reported in the Cocheco and Exeter Rivers were 
10,634 and 9,020 respectively.47 The shipyard was but one of many activities, including 
riverside textile mills, that were guilty of polluting the local rivers..
William Tebo remembers the local rivers turning colors, in the early 1940s, when 
the textile mills changed dye colors. Worse yet, he remembers swimming in the
4 8Technicolored rivers. Tebo’s recollections are validated in Jackson’s report. By 
lowering a simple instrument known as a Secchi disc, “a disc ten inches in diameter, the 
alternative quarters of which are painted black and white,”49 into local streams until the 
disc disappeared from sight, Jackson gained an appreciation of stream pollution. 
According to Jackson, “Much of the material coming from the print mills is colored, and 
the use of the disc gave a fair idea of the amount of this type of pollution [chemical] that 
was present.”50 Of course, any other suspended matter [physical pollution] in the water 
would also affect the clarity of the water. At any rate, test results showed that the disc 
disappeared at a depth of about three feet in rivers with a high density of mills such as the
47 C.F. Jackson, A Biological Survey o f  Great Bay New Hampshire, 35-37 and Table IV.
48 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
49 C.F. Jackson, A Biological Survey o f  Great Bay New Hampshire, 32-33.
50 Ibid.
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Salmon Falls, Cocheco, and Bellamy Rivers. On the other hand, the disc disappeared at a 
depth of six feet one inch in the Piscataqua River.51 Thus, at first glance, the navy yard 
did not appear to contribute to the pollution of local waters as much as the textile mills.
Jackson was working towards an eventual evaluation of the effect of pollution on 
all local marine life including clams, oysters, lobsters, and fish. However, the 1944 report 
addressed only the status of clam flats by specific river locations. For the Lower 
Piscataqua River, it was concluded that “The clam flats of the Lower Piscataqua are in 
better shape than most of the other rivers. A reasonably swift current keeps silt removed
S')
and brings food organisms to the growing clams.” Thus, from the standpoint of 
chemical, physical, and bacterial pollution, as well as the quality of the clam flats, the 
lower Piscataqua River was judged to be less polluted than other local rivers. That is not 
to say that pollution in the Piscataqua River was not increasing. Indeed, the noted 
decrease in marine life and their foodstuffs suggested otherwise and that was the 
motivation for Jackson’s survey.
As noted by Samuel P. Hays, up until the mid-twentieth century “Sources 
responsible for air and water pollution as well as solid waste had long since dumped their 
waste on the most readily available land, into nearby streams, or into the air.”53 Jackson’s 
study had shown that the shipyard and local communities should be counted among those 
polluters who dumped their waste in the most readily available streams, the Piscataqua 
and other local rivers.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 40.
53 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 72.
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The report of the shipyard medical officer for 1947 noted another consequence of 
the discharge of extensive waste products to the Piscataqua River; heavy silting in the 
waters around the shipyard. According to the report, “The silting at Dry Dock #2 was 
reported to be so bad that it interfered with docking operations.”54 Had the war continued 
past 1945, it is highly possible that operations in Dry Dock #2 would have had to be 
suspended for the period of time necessary to dredge the river of shipyard waste.
Subsequent reports in 1950 noted as many as thirty-two shipyard sewage 
discharges into the river.55 Later, EPA studies of the 1980s identified six shoreline areas 
for cleanup that had contained sewage and industrial waste outfalls to the river, prior to 
the building of the waste treatment plant in 1975.56 The discharge of industrial waste 
directly to the river was obviously a large problem during the war years, which went 
relatively unnoticed by local authorities.
The sewage situation at the shipyard and surrounding communities was not unlike 
other shipyard boomtowns and, in some respects, it was much better. Lorraine 
McConaghy’s study of another wartime shipyard boomtown, Kirkland, Washington, is a
54 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports to the Commandant, 1946 report. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary 
Reports.”
55 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Semi-Annual Report for 1950 o f 14 July 1950 to the 
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
56 Revised OU3 Risk Assessment, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine, Northern Division, 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Contract Task Order 0166 o f May 2000, 2-6,7.
301
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
horror story in comparison.57 Kirkland, located on the eastern shore of Lake Washington, 
doubled in population to about 15,000 during the war when employment at its shipyard 
grew from a few hundred to 8,000. Not blessed with the natural hydraulic current and 
tidal flushing of the Piscataqua River, the uncontrolled sewage dumped into Lake 
Washington caused a public health catastrophe. In the spring of 1943, shipyard workers 
became ill when drinking from fountains in the yard and beaches were closed because 
they were unsafe for swimming. In the summer of 1944, Kirkland’s water supply was 
declared unfit for human consumption due to sewage leaking into the drinking water 
supply and raising E coli bacteria to five times the permissible level. A portable 
chlorinator alleviated the problem, but drinking water had to be boiled for a period of 
time. Portsmouth’s sewage problems, while not as severe as those of Kirkland, 
Washington, were nevertheless a growing concern for Dr. C. Floyd Jackson and others 
who were becoming more and more aware of the increased pollution of local waters.
Pickling Tanks
Pickling of steel plates to remove oxide scale, prior to form-rolling for pressure 
hull sections, was another under-appreciated environmental hazard prior to, and during, 
the war. Pickling required large tanks, of approximately 2000 cubic feet in volume, 
typically filled with a 10% sulfuric acid at about 200 degrees Fahrenheit, into which the 
steel plates were submerged for long periods of time, to loosen and dislodge the scale, 
forming sludge in the bottom of the tank. At the Portsmouth Navy Yard, the tanks were 
installed in underground pits conveniently close enough to the river to periodically flush 
the tanks to the river. To further complicate the problem, up into the 1940s, many of the
57 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during 
World War II,” 42-51.
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tanks were of a wooden construction, which required constant attention to the seams, and 
tightening of fasteners, to avoid leakage.
In 1936, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy forwarded an article about the 
design, construction, and maintenance of wooden pickling tanks to all the navy yards for
; o
their information and compliance. The article explained that wood selection was 
critical to well-designed tanks, with yellow pine being the preferred wood. The pitch 
(resin) of well-seasoned yellow pine increased the resistance of the lumber to corrosives 
and the wood also experienced less shrinkage than other woods over time. The article 
elaborates: “Water, either hot or cold, will swell any tank; but hot sulfuric acid, even at 
low concentrations . . .  has a dehydrating effect on the lumber, and it will shrink the wood 
with which it comes in contact.” Repeated expansion and contraction of wooden tanks 
often resulted in excessive leakage of the acidic pickling bath. Another design 
consideration was the potential for accelerated electrolytic action that the sulfuric acid 
would accommodate between dissimilar metals of fasteners or tie rods, leading to even 
more leakage. The article concludes with a discussion of the importance of observing the 
tank closely, when in operation, and consistently and sequentially tightening fasteners to 
prevent leakage. Pickling tanks were accidents waiting to happen.
In 1938, the Bureau of Construction and Repair assigned Portsmouth Navy Yard 
the task of running a side-by-side evaluation of a wooden and a new steel tank as 
replacements for two badly deteriorated wooden tanks. Portsmouth Navy Yard 
subsequently reported that, “On 10 October a steel rubber lined pickling tank 
manufactured by B.F. Goodrich Company,. . .  and a long leaf yellow pine wooden
58 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy (Shore Establishment Division) letter o f  9 Jan 1936 with 
enclosure “Wooden Pickling Tanks,” from Steel o f  December 2, 1935. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5-15, “Pickling Plant.”
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pickling tank were installed in the galvanizing plant.”59 The letter also cites the
advantages of the steel tank that was lined with rubber and further sheathed with acid
proof brick. Regarding the wooden tank, the commandant noted the difficulty of
acquiring suitable lumber for the new tank, as well as the unsatisfactory performance of
the new and previous wooden pickling tanks:
The securing of lumber for this tank was very difficult, and extended over a 
period of three years, including three rejections of lumber, before suitable 
material could be found.. . .  Every effort was made to make this wooden tank 
the very best that could be constructed.. .  .Up to this time it has been 
impossible to make this tank absolutely tight.. .  The leakage of the acid from 
the wooden tank is particularly undesirable, as the leakage from the two 
original wooden tanks so destroyed the concrete foundations of the pickling 
plant, that a new floor and foundations had to be installed after the old tanks 
were removed, and prior to installation of the two subject tanks.60
Such gross leakage, and resultant damage, from a carefully constructed state-of-the-art
wooden pickling tank in 1938, leaves one with questions about other long-term material
and human health consequences of the shipyard’s pickling operations. Pickling
operations at the yard began in the early twentieth century when steel hulled ship
construction began at the shipyard. Surely the sulfuric acid solution leakage that ate
concrete floors must have caused other unreported damage.
The story of Portsmouth Navy Yard pickling tanks becomes even more intriguing, 
one year after the side-by-side evaluation of the steel and wooden tanks, when the 
shipyard made plans for the installation of a large steel pickling tank (Length -3 1  'A feet, 
Depth -  12 feet, Width - 6 feet at top and 8 feet at bottom) and a vertical lime tank of
59 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f  27 Oct 1938 to Bureau o f Construction and 
Repair, Subject: Pickling Tanks -  Report on. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
(Central Files), Box 36, Folder 15-5, “Pickling Plant.”
60 Ibid.
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similar dimensions in a new storage area. The tanks were to be sunk to a depth of 6 lA 
feet to 7 feet below the existing ground level within a concrete lined pit. The Production 
Officer explained the need that the tank be designed to accommodate flushing to the 
river:
It is further desired that a drain pipe and valve be installed leading from the 
pit through the adjacent sea wall. It is realized that the bottom of the pit will 
be below high tide level. The valve will prevent flooding of the pit at high 
tide and will permit drainage and washing down of the pit at low tide.61
Thus, the shipyard planned to avoid the type of concrete deterioration experienced earlier
with the wooden tanks by periodically flushing the concrete pit for the new steel tanks
into the river, a practice totally consistent with the wide-spread flushing of other shop
industrial waste through the sewer drains. The pickling tanks, approved and installed as
designed adjacent to the plate yard, were in operation in 1942. The extent of tank
flushing that occurred during the war is unknown.
Galvanizing Plant
Galvanizing is a process that increases the corrosive resistance of steel 
components, by applying a protective coating of zinc, acquired through an immersion or 
electrolytic process. The process requires a thorough cleaning of the steel components in 
acid tanks, not unlike the pickling operation. Portsmouth Navy Yard constructed a 
galvanizing plant in Building 184 in 1943. The plant’s pit, containing the acid cleaning 
tanks, was filled in and covered with a concrete floor in the 1960s, when the building was
61 Production Officer memo o f  22 Dec 1939 to the Public Works Officer, Subject: Pit for Vertical 
Pickling Tank. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 15-5, 
“Pickling Plant.”
62 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral Withers letter o f  10 Nov 1942 to Bureau of 
Ships, Subject: Building for Metal Cleaning Equipment at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College 
Park, Record Group 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
305
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
converted to use as a welding school. An acidic crystalline growth on the walls of the 
building caused it to be designated a Superfund site in 1994. As recently as October 
2006, a letter printed in the Portsmouth Herald reported, “The curious crystals growing 
along the bottom of the walls in the Welding School building have been cleaned once 
again and the affected areas covered with protective plastic sheets. The basic problem 
remains unresolved but the building is now much safer for welder training.”64 The 
periodic reappearance of acidic crystals in Building 184 continues the legacy of the 
shipyard’s World War II galvanizing operations.
In 1939, Portsmouth Navy Yard management was not interested in a proposed in­
yard galvanizing plant, as long as the yard could continue to efficiently and economically 
contract for outside galvanizing as it had done for many years.65 This position changed, in 
late 1942, when wartime needs caused a dramatic increase to the shipyard’s need for 
galvanizing services. Faced with the need to clean 500,000 pounds of metal in calendar 
year 1943, the shipyard anticipated contractor shortages and sought a new galvanizing 
facility and building. The new facility was to include “a tank for Oakite solution, cold 
spray tank, sulfuric acid tank, hot dip tank, and a sandblasting machine with drying racks
63 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Installation Restoration Program Site 30 EE/CA Fact Sheet 
contained in Feasibility Study Report for Operable Unit 3 Volume I o f II Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Kittery, Maine, November 2000, prepared by Northern Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 
Contract Number N62472-90-D-1298, Contract Task Order 0166.
64 Portsmouth Herald, 13 Oct 2006, A12, “PNS cleanup is Paying Off,” James O. Horrigan, RAB 
member, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League.
65 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 11 Jun 1941 to Lcdr. Philip Lemler, Bureau of 
Ships. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 2,_Folder A l-1 , 
“Developments.”
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and storage space.”66 When the facility was initially rejected by the Bureau of Ships, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard quickly requested reconsideration because of the excessive costs 
and inefficiencies of contracting for galvanizing services. The Bureau of Ships 
subsequently approved the facility.
The new galvanizing plant was built and performed even better that anticipated.
In early 1944, the shipyard reported the galvanizing of large quantities of material at
remarkable savings and predicted a quick return of investment:
The galvanizing plant. . .  has now been put into very successful operation. It 
is therefore taking care of all the present needs of the Yard, approximately 
426,909 pounds of material galvanized per month. The current cost is 
estimated at approximately $.015 per pound, compared with the recent 
contract cost of $.035 per pound. It is estimated, therefore, that the first cost 
of the plant, $175,000, will be saved in twenty months. The plant is operating 
one eight hour shift. In addition to the sandblasting and pickling required for 
the above galvanizing, approximately 300,000 pounds of pickling and 50,000 
pounds of sandblasting have been done preparatory to painting or treatment 
other than galvanizing. It is further estimated that 500,000 pounds can be 
galvanized per month, operating single shift, at a cost of $.015 per pound.68
The capacity of the plant had exceeded all expectations and things got even better the
next year. In April 1945, Lieutenant Junior Grade William P. Gregory reported to the
Bureau of Ships that:
It is worth noting in the year 1944, this shop produced 3,680,881 pounds of 
finished material at a cost of $.02 per pound . . .  For the first quarter of 1945,
66 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard T. Withers letter o f  2 Oct 1942 to Bureau o f Ships, 
Subject: Building for Metal Cleaning Equipment at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College Park, 
RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
67 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard H.F.D. Davis letter by direction o f 25 Nov 1942 to 
Bureau o f  Ships, Subject: Construction o f Galvanizing Plant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 1930-1950, 
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction June 1940 to Dec 
1943.”
68 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard T. Withers, letter o f 18 Feb 1944 to Bureau o f Ships, 
Subject: Galvanizing Plant. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940- 
45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
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the shop produced 1,029,596 pounds of finished material at a cost of $.0205 
per pound.69
The initially predicted annual cleaning rate of one half million pounds of metal in 1943
had increased to over four million pounds of metal per year by the first quarter of 1945.
There is every reason to believe that the eight fold increase in galvanizing operations was
typical of the increased demand of many operations and processes throughout the yard.
Similarly, one might expect an eight fold increase in waste products, with essentially no
increase in the means or efficiency of disposal.
The financial success story of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s World War II galvanizing
plant is tempered somewhat by the EPA’s findings, reported in November 2000:
The pit was closed for the last time in the 1960s. At that time the pit was 
filled in and covered over with a concrete floor. And since then the building 
has been used as a welding school.. . .  At various times since the pit was 
filled, a crystalline substance has been noted to form on the inside wall of 
the building near the former pit. The crystalline growth was found to be 
acidic based of a low p H . ..  .Investigation at the site indicated that there is a 
potential risk to people working in the building who come in direct contact 
(skin contact) with the acidic crystals. The investigation showed that the fill 
material (including water in the pit) is the likely source of the crystalline 
growth. In addition, there is a concern that if there were a release from the 
pit, the high metals concentrations in the pit water could potentially 
adversely impact ground water under the site.70
The pit was subsequently uncovered, the pit fill material excavated, the site cleaned, and
the concrete floor restored. If the site was judged to be a potential health risk to people
69 Ltjg USNR William P. Gregory (PNY) letter to Cdr. William Spowers (BuShips) o f  21 Apr 
1945. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder 
NY1/N5.
70 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Installation Restoration Program Site 30 EE/CA Fact Sheet, 
contained in Feasibility Study Report for Operable Unit 3 Volume I o f II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Kittery, Maine, November 2000. Prepared by Northern Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 
Contract Number N62472-90-D-1298, Contract Task Order 0166.
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forty years after it was last used, what must the potential risks have been in 1944, when 
3,680,881 pounds of material were processed through the tanks of the galvanizing plant.
A photograph in Nelson H. Lawry’s Portsmouth Harbor’s Military and Naval 
Heritage which shows metal piping being cleaned in the shipyard’s sulfuric acid and 
trisodium phosphate baths gives some indication of the risks involved. With heavy fumes 
rising from the baths, the picture caption reads, “Although one of these men is wearing 
rubber gloves, they are little protected from fumes as they lower a section of piping into 
the TSP tank in the 1940s.”71 Indeed, the two workers are shown standing in the fumes 
with no breathing or body protection except for the rubber gloves mentioned. Industrial 
risks were little appreciated in the yard’s shops during the war. However, the acid that 
continues to seep through, and crystallize on, the walls of Building 184 serves as a 
constant reminder of those unappreciated risks.
Painting Operations
Correspondence, detailing the need for a galvanizing plant in late 1942, describes 
the existing shipyard sandblasting operation to prepare components for galvanizing. 
According to that correspondence, the sandblasting that took place in Building 63, a 
former unheated and unventilated wagon shed, was unsatisfactory because it created a 
“large amount of dust dangerous to personnel and machines with which it comes in
77 • • • •contact.” Airborne dust and dirt in the sandblasting shop was another condition 
tolerated as a cost of doing business.
71 Nelson H. Lawry, Glen M. Williford, and Leo K. Polaski., Portsmouth H arbor’s Military and 
Naval Heritage (Portsmouth, N.H.: Arcadia Publishing, 2004), 100.
72 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard T. Withers letter of 10 Nov 1942 to Bureau o f Ships, 
Subject: Building for Metal Cleaning Equipment at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College Park, 
RG19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
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The scraping and cleaning of marine growth and loose paint from submarine 
hulls, in the dry dock, produced equally hazardous airborne dust and debris. This 
operation was especially hazardous in that the resulting airborne contamination contained 
chemicals designed to kill marine growth that also caused health problems for workers. 
Copper based anti-foulant coatings had been in use for over two hundred years to kill 
marine growth. Other, more effective metal bases, like lead, were being investigated 
during World War II. While the hazards of such paints are well known today, one can not 
help but wonder how many health-damaging incidents occurred during the frantic efforts 
to overhaul and repair war damaged ships and submarines.
Hand scraping, and brushing rather than sand blasting, was routinely employed to 
remove antifoulant paint systems from submarine hulls at Portsmouth Navy Yard. That 
scraping and brushing produced considerable airborne contamination. Worse yet, it was 
often impossible to know the composition of paint systems that had been applied to 
foreign submarines that visited the shipyard during the war. One particularly noteworthy 
incident of dry dock airborne contamination occurred at Portsmouth Navy Yard in 
September 1941. The incident involved the visiting French-built submarine Surcouf, the 
largest submarine in the world at the time. During the brushing of the Surcouf’s 
underwater hull, in preparation for renewing the preservation and anti-foulant coatings, 
workers experienced unusual skin and eye irritation that they believed to be caused by the 
unusual amount of dust generated by their cleaning of the hull. The medical officer’s 
report shows that the problem was so severe that seventeen of the men working in the dry 
dock reported to the dispensary complaining of burning eyes, nose, and face. The
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medical officer suspected some unknown pollutant in the paint to be the cause. Further
investigation showed that:
The ship had been in dry dock over a week and the bottom was thoroughly 
dry. There had been no rain for several days and there was practically no 
wind yesterday so that the workmen were in a cloud of dust raised by the 
brushes. A Frenchman reported that the bottom was last painted in England 
with English paint. There was no difficulty when the bottom of the English 
ships were scraped [Portsmouth had overhauled a couple English submarines 
earlier that year] but it so happened that they were scraped during rainy 
weather which prevented dust. Four men developed skin irritation on August 
2nd while working in a ballast tank on an English ship and six men had the 
same experience on August 19th while working in the battery compartment of 
a French ship. It has not been possible to determine the composition of the 
English paint, but it is certain that there is some ingredient in their paint that 
is not present in ours as we have not had previous similar experiences.
The men with the burning symptoms were treated and released, but no attempt was made
to determine the composition of the paint. This is an example of the hazards of working
on foreign submarines, as well as another example of the casual acceptance of work
related injuries.
Further examples of this casual acceptance of risk, associated with painting 
operations, can be found in a 1942 study, done by the U.S. Public Health Service, to 
evaluate the toxicity of a new fireproof paint containing antimony oxide. The new paint 
was developed by the U. S. Navy to replace more flammable paint systems that were then 
being used to paint ship interior compartments and living spaces. The study concluded 
that “the new antimony paint is no more hazardous than the control [existing] paint,”74
73 Medical Officer Portsmouth Navy Yard H. F. Lawrence memo o f 10 Sep 1941 to Commandant, 
Subject: Special report o f  injuries o f Yard employees investigated by Ltjg J.L. Hatch. NARA Waltham, RG 
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Industrial General Correspondence, Box 43, Folder EP13/L9-3 (161) 
“British Empire Surcouf 1941-42.”
74 U.S. Public Health Service memo from Principal Industrial Toxicologist L.T. Fairhill and 
Surgeon Paul A. Neal to the Commander N.A. Ingram o f 1 October 1942. NARA College Park, RG 80 
General Records o f  the Department o f the Navy 1798-1947, Formerly Security Classified General 
Correspondence o f  the CNO / Secretary o f the Navy, 1940-1947, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol 3).
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implying that some level of risk was inevitable and acceptable. The study explained that 
guinea pig mortality rates were high when exposed to the burning fumes of both paints. 
The animals experienced mortality rates of 75% to 100% when exposed for one hour to 
fumes emanating from the paints heated to 650 degrees Fahrenheit. As the deaths were 
due to lung irritation and damage rather than toxic poisoning, the study concluded that 
“the usual precautions (such as respiratory apparatus, etc.) necessary for the application 
of paints in general, must be taken in the use of antimony paints.” While it is somewhat 
reassuring to know that the potential for toxic poisoning was considered in the 
development of shipboard interior paint systems in 1942, it is also clear that flammable 
interior paints had found widespread use on ships of the U.S. Navy.
Industrial Scrap and Rubbish Disposal 
Industrial scrap and routine rubbish, that found its way to the river and shipyard 
dump sites, produced another set of problems. A memorandum, written in 1926 by 
Shipyard Manager Captain H.W. Osterhaus, indicates that the shipyard routinely dumped 
industrial scrap in the harbor. In the memorandum, Captain Osterhaus chastised shop 
managers for the cluttered and untidy appearance of their spaces and encouraged them to 
collect excess junk and dispose of it in the river. Referring to some boilers that were 
rusting in the industrial area, he wrote, “The boilers, if of no value, and if they cannot be 
sold as junk, could be put on the lighter and dumped overboard as is done at regular 
intervals when a load has been accumulated.”75 In 1926, it had apparently been a long
75 Manager Captain. H.W. Osterhaus memo o f 12 Apr 1926, Subject: General Appearance in the 
vicinity o f  shops. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder N l-1 , “Grounds 
1925-39.”
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time practice to periodically clean up the shipyard by dumping barge loads of useless 
junk in the harbor.
It is not clear how long the practice of dumping industrial scrap in the harbor 
continued. However, a report in the Portsmouth Herald of 1 September 1942 raised 
questions about the yard’s handling of industrial scrap. Reporting on a local salvage 
drive, the paper reported that the navy yard had contributed 2,555 tons of scrap during the 
eight weeks of the drive. The shipyard’s contribution to the scrap drive was more than the 
average displacement of a typical Portsmouth-built submarine during the war. With the 
yard’s help, the final total of 3,526 tons had almost tripled the original goal for the drive. 
Rear Admiral Withers was quoted as saying that the report of the scrap drive “will 
materially assist in putting a stop to the vicious rumors that have sprung up about the
7  f tscrap salvage program at the yard.” Unfortunately, there were no amplifying remarks 
about the vicious rumors, leaving one to speculate about what might have happened to 
2,555 tons of shipyard scrap had it not been contributed to the scrap drive.
Exhibiting the same naivete towards the dumping of trash and rubbish, annual 
reports by the shipyard medical officer, from the mid-1920s through the 1930s, 
considered the shipyard’s handling of rubbish to be entirely satisfactory, if not excellent. 
The 1932 report noted satisfactory conditions as the result of on-station incineration,77
76 Portsmouth Herald, 1 Sep 1942, “Navy Yard Ups City Total,” 1 & 5.
77 According to James Dolph, Portmouth Naval Shipyard historian, the yard began incinerating 
trash in the 1890s. Over the years, it became the practice to bum as much industrial waste as possible and 
use for landfill that waste which would not burn. The residue and ash remaining after burning was then 
bulldozed as fill material for nearby lowlands. Telephone interview with James Dolph o f 26 March 2007.
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78contract removal services, and well-managed dumps. Throughout the 1930s and the 
early war years, the reports were, for the most part, free of criticism of the yard’s waste 
and scrap handling practices.
In 1930, however, the shipyard was critical of its neighbors in Kittery, who were 
guilty of routinely dumping trash in the waters between the mainland and the shipyard. 
Unlike the shipyard’s dumping of waste products and junk in the middle of the river 
where it was out of sight and out of mind, the town’s trash cluttered the shoreline and 
entrance to the shipyard. In 1930, Commandant Rear Admiral W.W. Phelps complained 
to the Kittery Board of Selectmen that the properties bordering the approach to the bridge
7Qto the shipyard were “unsanitary and unsightly.” The Board’s response was to build a 
high board fence across the inner end of the old navy yard bridge to “prevent some of the 
dumping of rubbish that makes the Southwest shore of the Yard approach unsightly.”80 In 
1930, concerns about the pollution of shorelines and harbors had more to do with 
appearance and tidiness than concern for disease.
Benign annual sanitary reports continued until 1944 when, with the war winding 
down, and without previous warning, it was noted that, “The presence of rats and
78 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1932 o f 18 January 1931 to the 
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
79 Portsmouth Navy Yard Commandant Rear Admiral W.W. Phelps letter o f 7 May 1930 to the 
Kittery Selectmen. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence Box 20, 
Folder EM “Kittery 1925-47.”
80 Kittery Selectmen letter o f  13 May 1930 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, 1930-1950, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence Box 20, Folder EM 
“Kittery 1925-47.”
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O 1
cockroaches presents a problem in maintaining good sanitation in the yard.” The 
overloaded wartime shipyard conditions that contributed to sewage sloshing around the 
piers were also apparently contributing to an infestation of rats and roaches.
The shipyard’s postwar efforts to bring the infestation problem under control were 
of limited success. Rat infestation became such an unbearable problem by 1950 that the 
district medical officer was called in to conduct a rat infestation survey and recommend 
methods to be taken to bring the problem under control. In the process, the shipyard 
handling of waste was described in considerable detail. “Refuse, very often mixed with 
food and scrap material is picked up from all sources, such as submarine barracks, 
cafeteria, shops, and quarters,” and sent, first, to the incinerator in Building 46, where it 
is sorted by hand for burning. The area around the incinerator was found to be “unclean 
and large chunks of meat scraps were scattered over the ground, attracting sea gulls, and
89being a source of food supply to rats and flies.” As terrible as it sounds, this description 
probably fits the conditions found at most town dumps across the United States in 1950. 
Granted, a rat infestation of an island community such as the shipyard was a more serious 
problem.
There is no reason to believe that the shipyard’s waste disposal and dump 
practices were any better or any worse than those of other industries. And there is 
certainly no reason to believe that the yard’s practices during, or prior to, the war were 
any better than they were in 1950. Indeed, the shipyard had been struggling with the rat
81 Portsmouth Navy Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1944 o f 15 Jan 1945 to the 
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 191, Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
82 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Semi-Annual Report for 1950 o f 17 Jan 1950 to the 
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 191, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
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infestation problem since first identified in 1944 and had probably improved conditions 
to those reported in 1950. The conditions reported in 1950 had more than likely existed 
for a long time and simply were never judged to be unusual or important enough to merit 
discussion in previous reports. One is left to speculate about what sanitary conditions 
must have been like in 1944 with an employment of over 20,000 if an employment under 
5,000 in 1950 produced an infestation of rats.
Water
The Medical Officer’s Annual Sanitary Reports contain evidence of periodic 
concerns about the quality of the shipyard’s water supply. At various times between 1929 
and 1936, the shipyard’s water, provided from local reservoirs through the Kittery 
municipal water system, was reported to be muddy, taste of fish, and have a bad odor.83 
At other times, the positive reports of water quality were couched in such terms as “taste 
improved” or “free of disagreeable odor and taste” that hint of past problems.84
A March 1944 Sanitary Survey of the yard by an Epidemiology Unit from 
Newport, R.I. found that “solids were very high for treated water” and that “the 26 ppm
o f
of organic material could be a basis for future trouble.” According to the report:
In so far as can be ascertained, there has never been on the station serious 
outbreaks of diseases which have been directly attributable to the water 
supply. It may be noted however, that it might have occurred as an epidemic
83 Medical Officer’s Annual Sanitary Reports for 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 ,and 1936. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
84 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Reports for 1935 and 1938. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
85 Officer in Charge, Epidemiology Unit #11, Newport, R.I. letter o f  14 Mar 1944 to Medical 
Officer, First Naval District, Boston, Mass, Subject: Sanitary Survey of U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., 
6. NARA College Park, RG 52, Records o f  the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery General Correspondence 
1842-1951, Box 134, Folder NY/A3-1 to NY2/N33.
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of gastro-intestinal upsets not severe enough to incapacitate, among the 
civilian personnel of the shops w/o coming to the attention of the medical 
department of the yard.86
The next year, a similar survey reported that chemical and bacteriological examinations
an
over the previous year had found “no signs of pollution.”
While pollution was not a problem in May 1944, later in the year the Medical
Officer reported that foreign organisms had been observed in the shipyard’s water:
In May and June of this year, “wigglers” were found in the water from 
several of the taps in the Yard.. .  A report was received that these 
microscopic living organisms were larvae of the midge family and were non- 
pathogenic. The Yard Medical Officer consulted with the Superintendent of 
the Kittery Water System, who stated that the condition had occurred before 
and was due to the change in the water at the reservoir and these living 
organisms come from the bottom layer and are carried through the pipes to 
the Yard. Because there is no filtration system, he advised flushing all mains 
in the Yard.88
Like so many other aspects of shipyard life during the war, many marginal sanitary 
conditions were merely inconveniences to be tolerated. The Medical section of this 
chapter provides a disease history of the yard that is characterized by periodic outbreaks 
of fevers, sore throats, and stomach aches of vague description. It is possible that, as 
alluded to in the 1944 Sanitary Report, the shipyard’s water problems caused health 
issues that were misdiagnosed.
t6 Ibid., 14.
87 First Naval District Medical Officer letter o f  9 May 1945 to Commandant First Naval District, 
Subject: Report o f  Inspection o f Medical Department, U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College 
Park, RG 52, Records o f  the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery General Correspondence 1842-1951, Box 
134, Folder NY/A3-1 to NY2/N33.
88 Medical Officer’s Annual Sanitary Report for 1944. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
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Other Environmental Issues
The diesel powered submarines of the World War II era required the shipyard to 
process and store large quantities of diesel fuel oil. Fuel oil had to be offloaded from 
submarines arriving at the yard for overhaul and newly constructed submarines had to be 
fueled before leaving the yard. Lesser volumes of lubricating oils and gasoline were also 
required to service the various pieces of shipboard and shipyard machinery. Leakage was 
more an economic than environmental concern.
The Public Works Officer’s annual inspection report for 1947 indicates that 
during the past year the twenty-four year old #2 fuel storage tank (150,000 barrels 
capacity) had to be drained to be repaired because it leaked badly. The outside shell had 
settled 6-8 inches more than the bottom and had pulled the bottom plates at their 
connection to the shell plates. Repairs were also needed on #1 fuel storage tank (150,000 
barrels capacity) because a similar condition existed. The smaller #5 gasoline stowage 
tank (90,000 gallons capacity) was reported to be in even worse condition and not worth 
the cost to repair.89 Subsequent EPA risk assessment surveys in the 1980s did not identify 
the site of these tanks for clean-up or further monitoring. The tanks were removed in 
1998.90
The area that had contained two other oil tanks (Waste Oil Tanks Nos. 6 and 7), 
used between 1943 and 1989 for the storage of shop waste oils prior to offsite disposal, 
was designated as a Superfund site when elevated levels of lead and other contaminants
89 Public Works Officer memo o f 19 May 1947 to Commandant Portsmouth Naval Base, Subject: 
Report o f Annual Inspection, Public Works and Public Utilities. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder L-5, “Inspection Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
90 Cultural Resources Survey, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, United States Department o f Defense, 
Legacy Resource Management Program, April 2003. Prepared by the Louis Berger Group, Inc. for the 
Engineering Field Activity Northeast Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 39.
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were found during the EPA surveys. The stored waste oils included motor oils, hydraulic 
oils, transmission oils, and other oils suspected of containing various metals. The tanks 
were removed in 1989, along with 332 tons of contaminated soil that were excavated and 
disposed in an approved offsite facility.
***
Efforts to control mosquitoes on the yard have introduced other environmental 
issues, some more serious than others. One of the less serious, almost humorous, 
incidents involved an attempt to control mosquitoes through the stocking of ponds 
with mosquito-eating fish. In the 1920s, the shipyard’s ponds were stocked with 
goldfish that were purported to devour large populations of mosquitoes. In 1926, 
further stocking of the ponds with gambusia (generic name of small freshwater fish 
useful in mosquito control) was under consideration until the Department of Fisheries 
recommended against it. According to the Department of Fisheries, “As the ponds at 
the Navy yard have been stocked with goldfish it would be inadvisable to further 
stock them with gambusia as the former would devour the latter and that furthermore, 
goldfish tend to keep down mosquitoes.”91
That same year, 1926, Commandant H.W. Osterhaus led an effort to fill lowlands
09“where water will stand after a rain and where mosquitoes breed rapidly.” The shipyard 
continued to battle the mosquito problem, as evidenced by the medical officer’s annual 
report of 1930 that cites the problem as a particular nuisance, since the shipyard had
91 Department o f Commerce, Dr E. A. Logan letter o f  19 Apr 1926 Subject: Stocking ponds in 
Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder N l-1, 
“Groundsl925-39.”
92 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral H.W. Osterhaus memo o f  12 Jun 1926. 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder N l-1 , “Groundsl925-39.”
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discontinued the practice of spreading oil on the ponds to discourage breeding.93 What
example could better illustrate ignorance towards environmental matters than purposeful
oil contamination of ponds to discourage the breeding of mosquitoes?
Numerous mosquitoes and flies were again highlighted in the 1935 report, but the
high numbers were considered to be of minor concern because disease rates were low. As
late as 1944, a malaria control survey of the shipyard reported that the mosquito
population on the yard appeared well under control, due to the continued efforts of a large
number of resident goldfish in the yard’s ponds:
Mosquito producing areas were not encountered during the course of the 
survey. The two ponds appeared ideal for mosquito breeding but 
undoubtedly the mosquitoes are destroyed by the large numbers of goldfish 
existing there.94
The stocking of shipyard ponds with goldfish, which started sometime prior to 1926, 
continued to be an effective mosquito control practice at the end of World War II.
Towards the end of the war, the use of DDT as an insecticide was increasing in 
popularity. A Portsmouth Herald editorial of 23 October 1945, in discussing the 
drawbacks of the use o f DDT, noted that “it kills honey bees and other good insects,”95 
with no mention of any harmful effects to human beings. The editorial predicted a “bright 
future as a gardener’s weapon” because it killed many insects, was effective longer than 
other insecticides, and was less dangerous to handle than other compounds. One wonders
go
Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1930. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 
General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,“Sanitary Reports.”
94 Lt (MC) J.L. Garey, Epidemiology Unit #42 letter o f  24 Sep 1944 to Commandant, First Naval 
District, Subject: Malaria Control Survey at the U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College Park,
RG 52, Records o f  the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery General Correspondence 1842-1951, Box 134, 
Folder NY/A3-1 to NY2/N33.
95 Portsmouth Herald, 23 Oct 1945, “DDT in the Garden,” 4.
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how something that killed honeybees and was not safe, but merely less dangerous than 
other compounds, could have a bright future in a gardener’s tool kit. In 1945, society was 
beginning to appreciate the need to clean up our rivers and streams, but it would be 
another fifteen or twenty years before it would begin to awaken to the dangers of 
insecticides like DDT.
One last example will serve to further illustrate a prewar lack of concern for the
environmental consequences of the mishandling of hazardous materials. The example
concerns a misplaced emphasis on the need for the careful handling of mercury
thermometers. The breakage of mercury thermometers, like diesel oil leakage, was more
an economic than environmental concern. An innocuous internal shipyard memo of 15
November 1929 advises of an apparent cost savings as the result of reducing the number
of thermometers broken by guards at the main gate bridge who routinely threw tethered
thermometers from the bridge to take the daily seawater temperature.
This is to bring your attention to the excessive breakage of water 
thermometers in use at the main gate, where the guard takes the temperature 
of the sea water. In years past it has been the practice to fill a bucket with 
seawater and take the temperature of the water in the bucket. This saves 
throwing the thermometer overboard from the bridge, thus eliminating danger 
of breakage.96
As with a number of other hazardous materials discussed in this section, the writer’s 
primary concern was cost savings, as the result of reduced thermometer breakage, and
96 Memorandum [Believed to be from the Main Gate Security Office] to Captain o f  the Yard o f 15 
November 1929. NARA College Park, Waltham, RG 181, PNSY Central Files, Box 26, Folder H15, 
“Seawater.”
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certainly not the reduction of mercury contamination in the back channel of the 
shipyard.97
All things considered, Portsmouth Navy Yard was not an environmentally 
friendly place during the peak production years of World War II. Increased production 
brought industrial hazards that included acid fumes from pickling operations and airborne 
dust of unknown chemical composition during the removal of hull paint from foreign 
submarines. Large land reclamation projects dominated both extremes of Seavey Island, 
with the incessant noise and confusion that accompany such projects. Raw sewage and 
industrial waste were dumped into the river or landfills with little or no controls. Sanitary 
conditions cited as unsatisfactory after the war, in 1950, must have been even worse 
during peak production years of the war, when shipyard employment was four times 
greater.
The war effort demanded sacrifices of the yard’s patriotic and dedicated 
workforce, not the least of which was the overlooking of marginal sanitary conditions and 
occasional wigglers in the water. In retrospect, the shipyard could not have been a very 
healthy or pleasant place to work during the war. Yet, all the people interviewed in the 
course of this study were proud of their service at the yard during the war and none 
voiced any complaints whatsoever about their work environment or any of the conditions 
described in this study, their focus and priorities being elsewhere.
97 Mercury is a toxicant that is easily absorbed through the skin, respiratory, and gastrointestinal 
tissues. Mercury contaminated foodstuffs are especially harmful to humans, causing reproductive failure, 
intestinal damage, stomach disruption, DNA alteration, and kidney damage. Mercury contamination can 
enter the human food chain through large fish that absorb and accumulate mercury in contaminated water. 
EPA Fact Sheet, EPA-823-F-01-011, June 2001, “Mercury Update on Fish Advisories.”
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CHAPTER VII
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
“City’s Venereal Disease Record Shows Improvement. .  . due to the alertness of the 
local police and increased vigilance on their part, Portsmouth has not been named 
as the source of venereal disease as often as it was previous to the formation of the 
[Portsmouth Social Protection] committee last spring.”1
Portsmouth Herald
20 October 1944
The increased population and industrial activity at the yard during the war caused 
numerous health and medical problems. Comprehensive shipyard records permit 
confident analysis for some of those issues. For example, monthly shipyard reports on the 
frequency and severity of accidents, and the shipyard medical officer’s monthly reports 
on communicable diseases, permit analysis for accident and disease rates and trends. A 
review of the medical officer’s reports quickly leads one to the conclusion that venereal 
disease was a rampant problem among enlisted military men at the shipyard during the 
war. The efforts to control venereal disease took on a life of its own as the shipyard 
leadership sought local cooperation to eliminate the source of the disease by ridding 
Portsmouth of prostitution. At the same time, Portsmouth’s civic leaders had considerable 
difficulty admitting the existence of such a vice in their fair town.
1 Portsmouth Herald, 20 Oct 1944, “City’s Venereal Disease Record Shows Improvement, Report
Says,” 1.
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Submarine industrial work has historically involved considerable handling of 
hazardous materials. During World War II, the shipyard routinely processed large 
quantities of asbestos insulation, lead based paints, lead battery storage cells, mercury 
gauges and thermometers, various petroleum products, and other hazardous materials. 
During the war, procedures for the handling and disposal of the industrial waste from 
these materials were often weak or nonexistent. In most cases, only fragmented and 
anecdotal evidence exists for the health issues that can be traced to these materials. 
Although fragmented, this evidence does show how lightly regarded were the long-term 
effects of some industrial materials that were later determined to be extremely hazardous.
One of the byproducts of the greatly increased industrial activity at the shipyard 
was increased accident rates. For example, accident rates increased during the early and 
late years of the war, when the yard workload and workforce were in transition. The yard 
experienced its highest lost time accident frequency and severity rates in late 1942 when 
the hiring rate was the steepest and thousands of newly hired employees were being 
introduced to the industrial hazards of a rapidly expanding shipyard. To the shipyard’s 
credit, the accident rates decreased significantly in the following years as the employees 
were successfully assimilated into the workforce.
The densely populated shipyard also experienced limited, but noticeably 
increased, communicable disease rates. The focus of the study of communicable diseases 
that follows is primarily on shipyard military personnel, as the archives contain 
comprehensive and quantifiable records for only the military population on the shipyard 
during the war. Within that cohort, the communicable disease rate rose and fell during the 
war as dictated, most often, by the latest outbreak of fevers, sore throats, and measles.
324
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The notable exception was the rate of venereal disease which rose throughout the war and 
peaked dramatically in 1943 and 1944. High rates of venereal disease prompted shipyard 
leaders to pressure local civic officials to rid the area of prostitutes and increase 
monitoring of the establishments they frequented. Venereal disease dominated the health 
concerns of shipyard officials during the war and it also, appropriately, dominates the 
following study of communicable diseases.
The increased use of asbestos insulation on ships and submarines during the war 
contributed to an increase of asbestosis among shipyard workers. While Portsmouth Navy 
Yard was not singled out as one of the shipyards with a high incidence of asbestosis, the 
yard was included in a 1945 asbestosis study of three navy yards and two private yards. 
The study included atmosphere surveys of shop and shipboard conditions at each yard 
that allow analysis of conditions at Portsmouth and comparisons to other yards.
Two other important medical issues, cited in shipyard medical reports during the 
war, were Vincent’s Infection (trench mouth) and Brassfounder’s Ague. Trench mouth 
was detected among visiting foreign submarine crews that had served under extremely 
unsanitary shipboard conditions. Precautions against the disease included immediate 
fumigation of foreign submarines upon arrival at the shipyard. Brassfounders ague was 
an industrial respiratory disease of the era that was all too common to poorly ventilated 
foundries and metal working shops. This section concludes with a discussion of these two 
health issues.
Lost Time Accidents
There is little doubt that a rapidly increasing, and inexperienced, workforce 
contributes to increased accident rates. However, that is by no means the only factor that
325
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
increases the frequency of accidents. During the early years of the war, widespread new 
construction and renovation of buildings and piers, increased numbers of work sites, and 
the need to reinvent and abbreviate processes to meet accelerated schedules all 
contributed to unusual and chaotic conditions in the yard that could cause accidents to 
increase.
The following table summarizes the frequency and severity of lost-time accidents
at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war.
Table 12 -  Lost Time Accidents (1942,1943 & 1944)2
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
Frequency
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1942 16.99 13.06 8.16 10.96 8.44
1943 7.82 8.39 7.49 4.54 NA 3.12 4.20 5.88 4.6 5.59 5.49 5.02
1944 6.59 5.47 3.52 9.29 NA 9.04 
Severity
9.15 8.78 8.29 3.56 10.00 1.80
1942 .35 .27 .19 2.19 2.05
1943 .20 .15 .26 .12 NA .12 .10 .08 .25 .74 .08 7.06
1944 .004 .130 .180 2.11 NA .14 .06 2.10 .08 2.06 .09 2.09
According to the shipyard medical officer’s annual report for 1942, the number of lost 
time accidents peaked at 51 in August of that year. The accident frequency (number of 
lost-time accidents x 1,000,000/ number of employees) and accident severity (days lost / 
thousand man-hours worked) remained high through the end of the year, as shown in 
Tablel2. The severity rate peaked in November and December 1942 and then dropped
2 Table 12 is constructed from data included in the Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s 
Annual Reports for the years 1942 to 1944 to the Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station 
General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Annual Reports.” When reviewing these numbers for 
accident frequency and severity, it is well to keep in mind that the frequency o f accidents will, in general, 
be the more consistent number, with smoother transitions from month to month. On the other hand, the 
severity index is more likely to jump around, from month to month, as it could be heavily influenced by a 
few very serious accidents that result in many production days lost. The occasional death on the job will 
spike the severity index and hardly affect the frequency index. For example, the four severity peaks greater 
than 2.00 in 1944 are attributed to the four deaths due to accidents in 1944. Portsmouth Naval Yard 
Medical Officer’s Annual Report for the year 1944, 5.
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dramatically in January1943. As the new workforce gained experience and became more 
familiar with the hazards of the shipyard work environment, the frequency and severity of 
lost-time accidents continued to decline in 1943.
For the period 1 January 1942 to 1 July 1945, the shipyard reported an average 
accident frequency rate of 8.05 per million man-hours and a severity rate of 0.468 days
•i
lost per thousand man-hours worked. The above table shows high accident rates during 
the latter half of 1942 and 1944, both periods of rapidly changing shipyard employment. 
Employment was increasing rapidly in late 1942 and decreasing at a similar rate in late 
1944. However, as shown in Table 13, the yard’s relatively high accident frequency rates 
during these peak periods (July-December 1942 and July-December 1944) were well 
below the annual averages reported for Bureau of Ships activities and naval activities in 
general.4
Table 13 - Accident Frequency Rates
Activity 1942 1943 1944 1945
Portsmouth Peaks 5.13 (Jul-Dec) 6.93 (Jul-Dec)
BuShips Average 15.08 12.55 9.90
All Navy Average 15.35 14.01 10.58
Despite the impressive low accident frequency rates shown in Table 13, the best that can 
be said about Portsmouth Navy Yard’s safety record was that the yard was recognized as
3 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 42.
4 Navy Department (J.L.Bird, Acting Chief Office o f  Industrial Relations) letter o f  16 Aug 1946 
to Chief o f  Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery. NARA College Park, RG 52, Records o f  the Bureau o f  
Medicine and Surgery, Headquarters Records Correspondence 1842-1951, General Correspondence 1942- 
1946, Box 140, Folder P2-4/LL 1945-1946.
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the third best of the nine Navy Yards in 1943 and 1944.5 The yard’s performance 
continued to improve, as evidenced by a Bureau of Ships Safety Engineering Survey in 
August 1945 that noted, “The yard accident frequency and severity rates are well below 
the rate for all Navy Yards.”6 However, unlike the Production “E” Awards that the 
shipyard earned at every opportunity, the yard was less frequently recognized for 
excellent safety performance.
Venereal Disease
Early in the shipyard’s history and up until the 1920s, the annual report of the 
yard medical officer gave statistical data for the entire shipyard population, including 
both civilian and military employees. Disease and injury numbers and rates were based 
on both populations. However, by World War II, that report comprehensively covered 
only the shipyard military personnel, with occasional discussion of civilian employees on 
a case basis, or to report unusual circumstances. Consequently, the discussion of disease 
rates that follows, unless otherwise indicated, is necessarily restricted to the shipyard 
military population.
Table 14, constructed from the annual reports of the shipyard medical officer, 
provides annual communicable disease rates for the shipyard military population (enlisted
5 Administrative History: Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 42.
6 Bureau o f Ships letter o f  27 Sep 1945 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard, Subject: Safety 
Engineering Survey o f  the U.S. Navy Yard Portsmouth New Hampshire on 14 August 1945. NARA 
College Park, RG 80, General Records o f the Department o f the Navy 1798-1947, Formerly Security 
Classified General Correspondence o f  the CNO/ Secretary o f  the Navy ,1940-1947, Box 18, Folder P2-4 
(vol 3).
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and officers) during the war.7 As no cases of venereal disease were reported among the 
officers during the war years, the venereal disease rates shown are for the enlisted 
population. The total absence of any cases of venereal disease from the officer ranks is
o
curious and suspect, but one must work with the data available.
Table 14 -  Communicable Disease Rates at Portsmouth Navy Yard (1939-44)
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Average monthly SY population 3757 5874 9309 16934 21389 20932
Ave. monthly enlisted military population9 219 327 850 1340 948 900
No. cases communicable diseases (all military) 17 33 64 193 214 219
Venereal Disease Cases (enlisted) 5 11 16 27 65 94
Communicable Rate per 1000 w/VD (all) 4.76 5.61 6.88 11.40 10.00 10.41
Communicable Rate per 1000 w/o VD (all) 3.19 3.75 5.16 9.80 7.20 5.97
VD Rate per 1000 enlisted 22.83 33.6 18.82 17.91 68.56 104.44
Referring to the boxed lines in Table 14, the communicable disease rate per thousand, 
with VD included, increased from 4.76 in 1939 to 11.40 in 1942 and then held fairly 
steady at that high rate through 1944. With VD excluded, the communicable disease rate 
was 3.19 in 1939, peaked at 9.8 in 1943, and dropped to 5.97 in 1944. The specific 
diseases that contributed to these trends will be analyzed later in this section. The real 
issue is highlighted by the last row of Table 14, the high incidence of syphilis and
7 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for the years 1939 to 1944 to the 
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
8 In way o f explanation o f Table 12, the first five rows o f the table are as presented in the annual 
reports, with venereal disease included along with all the other communicable diseases. Consequently, the 
fifth row labeled “Communicable Rate per 1000 w/VD (all)” is heavily skewed by the increasingly high 
percentage o f VD, compared to the other communicable diseases. The last two rows are constructions by 
the author to separate venereal disease rates from the other communicable diseases rates to give a more 
accurate representation o f each. The total shipyard population figures that include employees, relief 
workers, and military personnel are provided to show how relatively small the enlisted population was 
compared to the total shipyard population.
9 The enlisted military population includes all the enlisted men serviced by the Portsmouth Navy 
Yard hospital. This population consists o f the enlisted men assigned to the navy yard and the crews of 
submarines that were in the yard at the time.
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gonorrhea among enlisted men during the war. The next several pages of this study 
address that issue.
The VD rates for enlisted personnel were high throughout the war years, with
huge increases in 1943 (68.56) and 1944 (104.44). Portsmouth Navy Yard’s VD rate of
104.44 per thousand late in 1944 was higher than the rates experienced navy-wide at the
close of the war. A post-war Bureau of Medicine and Survey letter noted that, “Within
the past few months there has been a gradual lowering of the venereal disease rates [for
the overall navy] to 95.8 per thousand per annum. However, this rate is still much greater
than at the close of the war.”10 The Navy’s venereal disease rate was apparently higher
than that of the Army. According to historian Alan M. Brandt:
Although in 1940 the venereal disease rate in the Army had risen to 42.5 per 
1000, by 1943 it had fallen to 25 . . .  In fact, Army data for rates of infection 
within the military were essentially equivalent to civilian rates. For the entire 
duration of the war the average incidence of venereal disease was 37 per 1000.11
Thus, the incidence of venereal disease at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during the early
years of the war was lower than the national average while the rates at the end of the war
were considerably above the national average. The shipyard’s annual medical reports
attribute the high rate of venereal disease to the prevalence of prostitution in the
Portsmouth area. The report for 1944 notes that shipyard officials were working with
10 Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery Circular Letter No.47-88 o f 30 Jun 1947 to Commandants, All 
Naval District and River Commands, Subject: Venereal Disease Control Officers and Interviewers. NARA 
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), 1925-50, Box 8, 
Folder A2-11/EN10 “Bureau o f  Medicine and Surgery.”
11 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f  Venereal Disease in the United States 
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 170.
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civilian authorities to reduce the number of prostitutes in the local area. This effort met 
with limited success.
Portsmouth officials did not agree that their city was overrun with prostitutes. In 
fact, they went to great lengths to dispute early rumors to that effect. In November 1942, 
the chairman of the Portsmouth Board of Health, Dr. George A. Tredick, in a reply to an 
attorney’s claim that Portsmouth was “overrun by vice and venereal disease,”12 declared 
that “Portsmouth has no noticeable increase in prostitution or venereal disease.”13 Dr. 
Tredick added, “Portsmouth does not live up to reputation visiting speakers have recently 
tried to give it of being a den of iniquity due to the influx of defense workers and men in 
the armed services.”14 The high VD rates shown on the last line of Table 14 argued to the 
contrary.
By June 1943, the city was more accepting of the high venereal disease rates. The 
Portsmouth Herald headline of 9 June 1943 reported, “Portsmouth police act to smash 
vice rackets.” The associated article noted that Army, Navy, and State Board of Health 
officials had reported that vice conditions, and the venereal disease rate, had recently 
increased substantially in Portsmouth. Navy doctors had reported that “There are more 
cases of venereal disease in the city now [during the first five months of 1943] than 
records show for all of last year.” The smashing of vice rackets reportedly involved 
routine inspections of beer parlors where the prostitutes congregated to meet enlisted
12 According to the Portsmouth Herald, 10 Nov. 1942, 1, Atty. Stanley Bums o f Dover had told 
the Catholic Daughters o f  America, at a 4 Oct. 1942 meeting, that prostitution is being practiced 
indiscriminately in Portsmouth and that “Portsmouth police are trying to get rid o f  the menace of 
professional prostitutes but the job is too great for them in view o f the tremendous increase in Portsmouth 
population.”




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
men. Apparently, vice smashing also meant raiding homes and bedrooms because the 
next month the Herald reported that, “Two sailors and two Portsmouth girls were found 
guilty in municipal court this morning of a morals charge in the second vice case heard in 
the local court in less than a month.”15 Slowly, but surely, the community was beginning 
to acknowledge to the problem. The Portsmouth Herald came close to admitting a 
Portsmouth prostitution problem, in June 1943, when it described some of the female 
visitors to beer parlors as “women who are involved with vice rackets here and who may 
be carriers of venereal disease.”16
When Army and Navy doctors continued to raise concerns about the local 
prostitution problem, city officials and the local newspaper redefined the problem in 
more benign terms. The venereal disease problem was attributed, not to prostitutes, but to 
large numbers of young females, many local adolescents, who frequented the bars to 
meet servicemen. This explanation suggested that Portsmouth’s problem was more 
associated with patriotism than prostitution. Portsmouth’s “Girl Problem” will be 
explored in considerable detail later in this study, under a discussion of the community 
consequences of the population explosion. Suffice it to say, at this point, that the requests 
of shipyard medical officers for community assistance to solve the rampant venereal 
disease problem among shipyard enlisted men were met initially with a definite lack of 
enthusiasm and cooperation.
15 Ibid., 7 Jul 1943, “Two Couples Found Guilty in Vice Case,” 1.
16 Portsmouth Herald, 9 Jun 1943, “Beer Parlors to Undergo Inspections,” 1.
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According to shipyard medical reports, the dramatic increase in the number of 
VD cases, reported in 1943 (65) and 1944 (94), may be artificially inflated. Those reports 
attribute the high numbers, in 1943 and 1944, to the increased availability and 
effectiveness of penicillin as a treatment at the shipyard hospital. After experimenting 
with the drug in 1943, the shipyard hospital received its first million units of penicillin on 
4 January 1944.17 Prior to the advent of penicillin, treatment of VD at the shipyard 
hospital required a period of hospitalization for which the men did not receive pay. 
Consequently, it was suspected that the enlisted men sought treatment elsewhere to avoid 
a loss of pay. This reasoning, of course, would also argue that the rates earlier in the war 
were artificially lower than reported if the sailors were seeking off-yard treatment.
The shipyard hospital was one of the first medical facilities to receive penicillin 
shipments. In early 1943, penicillin was being given experimentally to syphilitic rabbits. 
By September 1943, the U.S. Public Health Service announced successful results with 
humans and mass production of the antibiotic was underway shortly thereafter. Within a 
year, more than 10,000 patients had received penicillin for treatment of early syphilis and 
rates of cure were an unprecedented 90 to 97 percent. Portsmouth Navy Yard sailors were 
among the first to benefit from that remarkable success rate.18
The medical officer believed that, once penicillin was available, and patients 
could be treated without the need for overnight stays and lost pay, “those cases which 
were formerly treated by the outside practitioner are now reporting to the naval medical
17 Administrative History: Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 86.
18 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f  Venereal Disease in the United States 
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) 170-171.
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officer for treatment.”19 The avoidance of lost pay was obviously a good reason to seek
free treatment at the shipyard hospital, but the medical officer suspected another
contributing factor. He also believed that the apparent effectiveness of penicillin created
“a false sense of security” that caused “a lack of restraint and carelessness regarding
prompt prophylaxis,” that contributed to even more VD and the need for more penicillin.
Ironically, the cure was increasing the rate of the disease.
Some argued that the no-pay provision was an effective deterrent to the spreading
of the disease, but other military officers increasingly argued that the no-pay provision
led to concealment of the disease, clandestine treatment, and possible serious
consequences. One report noted that “Pilots were found to be continuing to fly while
< « 00taking [clandestine] treatment, a considerable risk.” Congress put an end to the debate
in September 1944 by repealing the law that required loss of pay for time hospitalized for
01treatment for venereal disease.
Venereal disease had a clandestine history in the city of Portsmouth. Despite an 
1883 law that required the Board of Health to report disease statistics, it was not until 
1918 that syphilis and gonorrhea were listed in the city’s reports. According to a local 
medical history:
Perhaps the increased activity at the Navy Yard during the First World War had 
seriously increased the incidence of those previously unmentionable diseases or
19 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Report for 1942 o f 19 Jan 1943, to the 
Commandant, 4. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
Sanitary Reports.”
20 Alan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet, ” 169.
21 Ibid
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perhaps the Board of Health had merely suppressed them from earlier published 
reports to spare the public’s sensibilities.22
During World War II, increased activity at the shipyard would once again increase the
incidence of the unmentionable disease and challenge the public’s sensibilities.
There are a number of indicators that venereal disease was more prevalent in the
local community during the war than admitted at the time by local leaders. For example,
the Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey, dated August 1943, summarized diseases
reported in Portsmouth from September 1941 to September 1942 as communicable (174),
23occupational (5), and venereal (34). If one assumes that the 34 cases of venereal 
disease occurred among males in the 15 to 25 years of age group and that the group 
included about 2000 people in 1942,24 a venereal disease rate of 17 per thousand results.25 
This rate closely approximated the VD rate in the navy yard (17.9) for the same period 
(1942). This is, at best, a rough approximation, but it is an indicator that venereal disease 
was probably a significant local health issue in late 1942, when it was also the most 
serious health concern at the shipyard.
Another section of the Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey (1943) permits 
further analysis of Portsmouth’s VD problem:
22 J. Worth Estes and David M. Goodman. The Changing Humors o f  Portsmouth: The Medical 
Biography o f  an American Town, 1623-1983. Boston: The Francis A. Countway Library o f Medicine, 
1984.
23 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.” Cumings Library, Strawbery 
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, Table 9 “Diseases in Portsmouth from September 
1941-September 1942.”
24 Ib id , Table 11, “Portsmouth Defense Area Population -  Age.”
25 The reported 34 cases o f  venereal disease are not defined by gender. The navy yard cohort was 
all young males. Also, as noted earlier, some enlisted men may have sought treatment at a civilian facility 
to avoid the confinement and loss o f  pay that resulted when treated at the navy yard.
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For a two-year period, 1941 and 1942 (Oct. 15,1942), the syphilis rate for the 
white population, on the basis of actual blood tests and not on a total population, 
was 1.8 percent [18 per thousand]. None was reported for the negro population.26
Again, the rate of 18 per thousand is almost identical to the navy yard rate of 17.9 for
1942.
Penicillin was available much earlier at the navy yard than in the local civilian 
community. Whereas the navy yard received its first shipments of the drug in January 
1944, penicillin was first used in Portsmouth in the fall of 1944. On 24 March 1945, the 
Portsmouth Herald reported that, “A total of 126 patients in 43 different disease 
classifications have been treated with penicillin at Portsmouth hospital during the past 10 
months, from the time when the drug first was distributed in small quantities on a quota 
basis, until March 15, when it became available for general civilian use.” The article 
further explained that penicillin had been a most effective medicine in treating such 
diseases as pneumonia, cellulitis, and meningitis, but not others. It is interesting to note 
that, across the river in the navy yard, penicillin was the miracle drug of choice for the 
treatment of venereal disease, but no mention was made of penicillin being used as a 
treatment for venereal disease at the Portsmouth Hospital.
Finally, the frequency of venereal disease clinics at the Portsmouth General 
Hospital is further evidence of community concern. In August 1943, a venereal disease 
clinic was the only weekly disease clinic held at the hospital. As a comparison, the only
26 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 52. Cumings Library, 
Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, Table 9 “Diseases in Portsmouth from 
September 1941-September 1942.”
27 Portsmouth Herald, 24 Mar 1945, “126 Patients Make Use o f Penicillin in 10 Months at 
Portsmouth Hospital,” 1.
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• • 28other disease clinics were tuberculosis and cancer clinics that were held twice a month.
The hospital would not have held weekly venereal disease clinics without the customer 
base to support such a frequency.
Other Communicable Diseases 
Venereal Disease was not the only communicable disease with a strong track 
record during the war. Table 15 shows that a large number of cases of irritating nose and 
throat symptoms were diagnosed and treated as catarrhal fever and tonsillitis during the 
war.
Table 15 -  Most Common Communicable Diseases at PNY (1939-1944)
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 19'
Catarrhal Fever 14 15 40 99 94 64
Tonsillitis 1 4 6 22 36 36
German measles 0 0 0 25 15 0
An outbreak of German measles in 1942 and 1943 also contributed to increased rates of
■JQ
communicable diseases. It was noted earlier that Portsmouth General Hospital recorded 
174 cases of communicable diseases between September 1941 and September 1942. 
According to that report, “Most of these cases were measles and German measles.”30 
Early in the war, when New Hampshire coastal observers were on guard for German 
ships, German submarines, and a possible German invasion, it was only German measles 
that managed to sweep through the area.
28 Ibid., 48.
29. Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Report for 1942 to the Commandant o f 19 
Jan 1943,4. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, 
“Sanitary Reports.”
30 Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, Table 9. Cummings Library, 
Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, Table 9 “Diseases in Portsmouth from 
September 1941-September 1942.”
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Finally, in December 1943, the local area, and most of the nation, experienced a 
flu epidemic. The Portsmouth Herald reported on 16 December 1943 that, “Portsmouth is
• * • T 1adding many of its residents to the nationwide sick list of 1,000,000 influenza victims.”
It is more than likely that many of the fevers and sore throats reported at the shipyard 
dispensary in 1943 and 1944 could have equally been diagnosed as flu symptoms. The 
thousands of employees that commuted daily to and from the shipyard undoubtedly 
helped spread measles, flu, and other communicable diseases.
Asbestosis
In February 1945, the Bureau of Ships, responding to a Bath Iron Works report
that several shipyard workers had asbestosis symptoms, requested that the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery investigate allegations that asbestos operations in navy yards
might be an occupational hazard. In response to that request, the Chief of the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery, Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire, minimized the hazards of
asbestos operations at navy yards. Mclntire wrote:
Reports of chest x-rays, which have been made of employees engaged in 
handling, processing, and applying asbestos to pipe in Boston and Bremerton 
Navy Yards do not indicate any diseases of the lungs from exposure to 
asbestos. Repeated observations by personnel of the Yard Safety and 
Industrial Health Departments indicate that the exposure of civilian 
employees in U.S. Navy Yards to asbestos do not form an occupational 
problem as alleged.33
31 Portsmouth Herald, 16 December 1943, “Portsmouth Hit by Flu; Many Sick,” 1.
32 Bureau o f Ships letter o f  24 Feb 1945 to the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery, Subject: 
Industrial Health and Safety Survey Concerning Asbestos. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships 
General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol. 3).
33 Chief o f  the Bureau o f  Medicine and Surgery Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire letter o f 8 Mar 
1945. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 18, Folder 
P2-4 (vol. 3).
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The minimizing of the occupational hazards of exposure to asbestos by the U.S. Navy 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in 1945 appears to have been premature.
Further review of shipyard asbestos operations was conducted over the summer 
of 1945 under the leadership of Dr. Philip Drinker, Chief Health Consultant, U.S. 
Maritime Commission. The results of that study showed a similar disturbing lack of 
knowledge about the health hazards of working with asbestos. Drinker’s study concluded 
that “This work [asbestos pipe covering], as found in our Navy Yards, is most unlikely to 
cause ill health.”34 The study claimed that previous asbestos studies had shown that 
“Asbestosis results from breathing asbestos fibers of relatively long lengths such as 15 to 
75 microns [and] it is not caused by chopped up asbestos fibers of one or two microns.” 
With shop air samples showing low percentages of long asbestos fibers and only 3 of 
1074 employee lung x-rays showing asbestosis markings, the study pronounced that, 
“Asbestos covering is a relatively safe operation.”
In retrospect, the study obviously looked at too short an exposure period and was 
too reliant on lung x-ray markings to draw valid conclusions about the dangers of 
asbestos exposure. Asbestos had only been used on ships and submarines about 15 years 
when the Drinker Report was published in 1945. According to the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, “The effects of long-term exposure to asbestos typically don’t 
show up until 20 to 30 years after initial exposure.”36 Obviously, the Drinker Report
34 Phillip Drinker, Chief Health Consultant, U.S. Maritime Commission letter o f 21 Sep 1945 to 
Bureau o f Ships forwarding enclosure (1), A Health Survey o f  Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing 
Naval Vessel. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 18, 
Folder P2-4 (vol. 3).
35 Ibid.
36 http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/asbestos/index.html. U.S. Department o f  Labor, OSHA website.
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detected the most severe cases of asbestosis. Had the study been done fifteen years later, 
of the same workers, more asbestosis would probably have been found.
According to the Drinker Study, the use of asbestos for pipe and machinery 
insulation in the shipbuilding industry grew consistently throughout the 1930s, and 
peaked immediately prior to World War II with the accelerated shipbuilding programs. 
Asbestos blocks and blankets to insulate steam turbines and other machinery had been in 
use prior to 1930, but it was the development of asbestos felts and cements that could be 
applied to valves, fittings, and piping that greatly expanded its use during the 1930s. The 
material’s low thermal conductivity, strength, and light weight made it an attractive 
shipbuilding material. High temperature asbestos pipe coverings, weighing 18 pounds per 
cubic foot, replaced previous magnesia insulators that weighed 26 pounds per cubic foot. 
Furthermore, the lower thermal conductivity of asbestos meant that less of it had to be 
used than previous insulators.
Weight savings, always a critical concern in shipbuilding design for reasons of 
stability and cargo carrying capacity, was even more of a concern in the 1930s because of
• 3 7
the tonnage limitations of the various naval treaties. With United States naval 
construction restricted to treaty tonnage limitations, the greater than thirty percent weight 
savings that resulted from the use of asbestos insulation on piping systems throughout the 
ship, was a significant advantage to the U.S. Navy. In addition, fire resistant asbestos 
insulations proved to be a good replacement for the flammable, and sometimes vermin 
infested, animal hair insulations that had been previously used on cold water pipes to
37 Ibid.
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reduce sweating. The end result was a rapid growth in the use of asbestos in the 
shipbuilding industries during the latter half of the 1930s. The naval shipbuilding boom 
during the mobilization for World War II greatly expanded the demand for the material, 
and the potential for increased asbestosis among shipyard workers.38
The Drinker Study conclusions were based on a survey of the asbestos operations 
at Boston and Brooklyn Navy Yards and two private yards, Bethlehem Fore River and 
New York Shipbuilding. The survey included atmospheric sampling of shop ventilation 
for dust count and chemical content, and a review of the medical records of over one 
thousand workers at those yards. The survey also included a review of shop dust 
exposure data provided by Portsmouth Navy Yard. No on-site visits were made to 
Portsmouth and no Portsmouth employee medical records were reviewed. The study 
does, however, permit comparisons of Portsmouth asbestos shop and shipboard 
operations with the other yards surveyed.
The Drinker Study showed that the Portsmouth Navy Yard asbestos operation 
was small in comparison to the other yards surveyed. Portsmouth had only 5 asbestos 
shop workers and 35 shipboard workers, whereas Brooklyn Navy Yard had 50 shop and 
700 shipboard employees and Boston Navy Yard had 34 shop and 467 shipboard 
employees. Portsmouth used only 2000 cubic feet of amosite [the generic name for the 
asbestos fiber] each month and Brooklyn and Boston used over 50,000 cubic feet of the 
material. Similarly, Portsmouth used 120 pounds of asbestos cement monthly and the 
other Brooklyn and Boston used 38,800 and 34,400 pounds respectively. Simple division 
shows that the 40 Portsmouth asbestos workers were exposed to an average of 50 pounds
38 Ibid.
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of asbestos fiber per month, whereas the Brooklyn and Boston asbestos workers were 
exposed to 66.7 and 99.8 pounds per month respectively. This one indicator suggests that 
Portsmouth workers were less exposed to asbestos than those in other yards surveyed.
Overall dust surveys show that the Portsmouth asbestos shop and ship 
atmospheres were significantly cleaner than the other two yards. However, long fiber 
asbestos surveys found Brooklyn to be the most contaminated yard, Boston the least 
contaminated, and Portsmouth somewhere in between the two. Table 16 shows total dust 
and asbestos (long fiber) dust counts for the three navy yards included in the Drinker 
Study:
Table 16 - Drinker Study Asbestos Shop Dust Counts
Boston Brooklyn Portsmouth
--------------- Dust Content in Parts per Million----------------------
Total Asbestos Total Asbestos Total Asbestos 
Shop Atmosphere 30 .26 26.9 1.0 6.9 1.0
Ship Atmosphere 142 .02 128 2.8 11.9 0.3
The total dust count on board ships, in the other two yards, is over ten times greater than 
that at Portsmouth. Shop dust counts were about four times greater at the other two yards. 
The extremely clean shipboard environment on submarines was probably more the 
product of the procedures applied to the overall submarine work environment than any 
special precautions for asbestos workers. Workers in the confined work spaces and tanks 
of submarines could not tolerate very dusty or otherwise contaminated atmospheric 
conditions.
Despite the superior overall cleanliness conditions, the prevalence of long fiber 
asbestos dust in the shops was greatest at the Portsmouth and Brooklyn Navy Yards and 
lowest at Boston. Thus, the study suggests, the asbestos shop workers at Portsmouth
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Navy Yard were equally at risk for asbestosis as workers at the other yards. Knowing 
that, it is discouraging to note that the study reported that, of the forty Portsmouth 
asbestos workers, only the band saw operator wore a respirator. The study also noted a 
lack of shop ventilation fans. One small exhaust fan was used at the cementing station 
and all other ventilation was natural.39
The Drinker Study deemed the asbestos operations at all three yards to be 
acceptable and safe. With such reassurances from the highest levels of the U.S. Navy, 
concern at Portsmouth Navy Yard and most other shipyards, for the dangers of asbestos, 
was low and precautions were few. This would change dramatically in years to come.
Other Industrial Diseases
The early visits of foreign submarines to Portsmouth Navy Yard, in the summer 
of 1941, contributed a few cases of Vincent’s infection (trench mouth). Trench mouth is 
a severe form of gingivitis most often found among populations with poor nutrition and 
living conditions. According to the shipyard medical officer, “During the past year 
[1941], several co-belligerent submarines have put in for repair.. .  To date, the only 
problems were several cases of Vincent’s Infection which were promptly isolated and 
treated.”40 Vincent’s Infection was also found among the crew members of the German 
U-boats that were brought to the yard in the summer of 1945.
Wartime sanitary conditions on the foreign submarines were far below the 
standards of U.S. submarines. According to Fred White, those submarines had an 
unusually high content of interior wood, compared to U.S. submarines, and the wood
39 Ibid.
40 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1941. Held At NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,“Sanitary Reports.”
343
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
often proved to be a breeding haven for roaches and occasional vermin.41 White 
remembered the German submarines that were impounded at the shipyard at the 
conclusion of the war as being especially unsanitary. The medical officer’s report 
confirmed his observation, “During the period from 15 May 1945 to 5 June 1945, four 
surrendered German U-boats were inspected and, in each case, fumigation with 
carbonoxide gas was recommended [and accomplished].”42 The maintenance of 
satisfactory sanitary conditions onboard a submarine is always a challenge. Under 
wartime conditions, it obviously assumed an even lower priority. In this regard, the 
submarines had something in common with the shipyard and local communities 
bordering the Piscataqua River, which also sacrificed cleanliness for production.
***
In 1937, six cases of “brassfounder’s ague” occurred in the foundry in Building
No. 75. According to the shipyard’s annual sanitary report:
These cases were typical text book pictures (chills, considerable elevation of 
temperature, and sweating with prostration). They were of moderate severity, 
lasting from 12 to 24 hours. The probable cause was that brass casting had 
increased six times the volume of the previous year with the necessary 
increase in personnel and with insufficient ventilation to care for the furnaces 
in cold weather.43
The report goes on to say that the ague problem was eliminated with the installation of 
several exhaust blowers. Brassfounder’s ague appears to have been another accepted 
hazard of the trade, as the report also mentioned that the problem had occurred from
41 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 April 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
42 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1945. Held At NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth 
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,“Sanitary Reports.”
43 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1937. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 
General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
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“time to time” in previous years. Yet, it took another outbreak of the disease to cause the 
installation of a few fans.
By 1941, the foundry had been moved to Building No. 96, which also had 
ventilation problems that were noted in the Medical Officer’s annual report. He reported 
that, “under certain climatic conditions, when manganese or zinc is being melted, 
excessive fumes and smoke results and therefore menaces health.”44 These foundry 
conditions, reported in 1941, were highly conducive to brassfounder’s ague, yet there is 
no specific mention of the disease. It is highly possible that the high fevers that passed in 
less than a day could have been misdiagnosed as symptoms of a more common disease.
Health and medical consequences accompanied the shipyard population 
explosion, and increased pace of industrial operations, during the war. To the shipyard’s 
credit, the increased accident rates that often characterize periods of extreme industrial 
employment and workload transitions were quickly stabilized and brought under control. 
Less successful were the efforts of shipyard medical officials to control the alarming rise 
in venereal disease among shipyard enlisted men. Much of this lack of success is 
attributed to reluctance on the part of Portsmouth civic leaders to take decisive action to 
rid the city of prostitutes. Although not readily acknowledged at the time, the community 
venereal disease rate was also high. Other communicable disease rates during the war 
varied with the latest outbreak of fevers, sore throats, or measles, and were often shared 
across shipyard and local community boundaries. Asbestos was not a significant health 
issue at the yard during the war. However, shop and shipboard conditions were rife for
44 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 
General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
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future asbestosis problems and precautions against such problems were few. Other 
medical byproducts of the increased activity at the yard during the war included trench 
mouth, attributed to the unsanitary conditions found on visiting foreign submarines, and 
brasssfounder’s ague due to increased foundry and metal ship operations.
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CHAPTER VIII
COMMUNITY CONSEQUENCES
“Thus what was basically a prosperous New England port [Portsmouth], 
steeped in history and thriving as a summer resort, has been transformed 
swiftly into a war-production area with the only newcomers being yard 
workers, soldiers, and sailors. There is no one in the city whose life has not 
been altered by the transformation.”1
Milton Bracker 
New York Times 
5 October 1942
Discussing the effects of wartime mobilization, Portsmouth Herald reporter 
Franklin E. Jordan wrote, “It is no exaggeration to state that Portsmouth now has the 
greatest problem in its 318 year history and that its future for the next 318 years will be 
affected by the way the problem is handled.”2 One might assume that Jordan was writing 
near the end of World War II, after the city had experienced a tremendous population 
boom, with concerns about how the city would adjust to the postwar era. This was not the 
case. Jordan wrote of the greatest problem in the city’s history in the summer of 1941, 
four months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Portsmouth’s World War I experience was fresh in the minds of Jordan and many 
of Portsmouth’s civic leaders on the eve of World War II. During and after World War I,
1 Milton Bracker, “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust to an Influx o f Men and Money,” The New York 
Times, 5 Oct 1942, 1,10.
2 Franklin E. Jordan, “Portsmouth and National Defense,” 5. A series o f  13 articles that appeared 
in the Portsmouth Herald in the summer o f 1941 that were compiled and published by J.D. Hartford o f  the 
Portsmouth Herald  on 1 August 1941. Cummings Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., 
MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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the city had struggled with a number of issues as the result of expanded operations at the 
yard, including a postwar economic recession. The city’s infrastructure and services had 
been challenged when the population had increased from 11,269 to 13,569 during the 
war. At the same time, the local economy had benefited from the increased population 
and industrial activity. The end of the Great War brought employment reductions at the 
yard and an economic recession to the area. In the summer of 1941, when Jordan wrote 
his article, the shipyard employment had grown from 5,722 to 8,500 in a year and was 
still climbing rapidly. Who knew what problems the community would face if the 
shipyard grew to 15,000 or 20,000 employees, which it eventually did?
Jordan’s primary concern was the aftermath of the anticipated home building, 
infrastructure development, and the increase in municipal services that would accompany 
the forthcoming population boom. How could the city financially support and maintain 
the new Portsmouth after the war, when the inevitable shipyard cutbacks occurred and 
federal funds were curtailed? Jordan conducted a comprehensive analysis of how the 
approaching mobilization, and the peace to follow, would affect the city’s utilities, 
schools, hospitals, police and fire protection, government, recreational facilities, and 
other resources. Jordan concluded that, “Relief will be the greatest problem in a postwar 
depression.”4 Thus, even before World War II began, recent memories of the Great 
Depression, and the belief that another postwar recession was inevitable, caused 
Portsmouth leaders to fret about the peace that would follow the war that was yet to start.
3 Ibid., Table 1.
4 Ibid, 84.
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The greatly expanded operations at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War
II did bring the population and economic booms that Jordan had predicted. Also, as
predicted, the area was transformed and its future was largely determined by the wartime
mobilization. The early stages of that transformation were the subject of an article in the
New York Times, dated 5 October 1942, entitled “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust to an Influx
of Men and Money.” The article described the rapid growth in the Portsmouth Navy
Yard’s employment and payroll and the difference that both had made to Portsmouth’s
economy and quality of life:
Thus what was basically a prosperous New England port, steeped in history and 
thriving as a summer resort, has been transformed swiftly into a war-production 
area with the only newcomers being yard workers, soldiers, and sailors. There is 
no one in the city whose life has not been altered by the transformation.5
The transformation of Portsmouth included many challenging problems and unusual
opportunities.
Population explosions, overloaded community services, deteriorated living 
conditions, and environmental impact due to accelerated shipbuilding programs were by 
no means unique to the Portsmouth Navy Yard and its environs during the war. Indeed, 
many communities throughout the United States had similar, and often more challenging, 
experiences than Portsmouth. According to historian Frederick C. Lane, “From the point 
of view of living conditions offered the workers, shipyards may be divided into two 
groups: those in or near metropolitan centers equipped to handle a large population, and 
those placed in what had been mere towns or very small cities.”6 As implied, living
5 Milton Bracker, “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust to an Influx o f Men and Money,” The New York 
Times, 5 Oct 1942.
6 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r  Victory, 437.
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conditions were often marginal, at best, in the small towns that had exploded in
population with the construction or expansion of a nearby shipyard. Lane cites Panama
City, Florida, Pascagoula, Mississippi, and, to some extent, Mobile, Alabama as prime
examples of those situations. Portsmouth, New Hampshire also fits the definition of a
small wartime boomtown.
Pascagoula grew from 4,000 residents before the war to 30,000 in 1944. Likewise,
Panama City grew from 20,000 to 60,000 in 1943. Mobile increased population from
114,000 in 1940 to 201,369 in 1943. Describing the deteriorated living conditions that
accompanied the prefabricated housing quickly constructed in Pascagoula, Lane says,
“They formed a community without adequate sewerage, stores, or pavements. . .  Garbage
stood in the streets and the town was overrun with rats.” Similarly, in Mobile:
Some couples located places with cooking facilities, but if they had children 
they usually ended up in a tent, a trailer, or a shack... .Sewers were 
desperately needed.. .  The war was almost over before Mobile caught up 
with itself and, in the meantime the discontent of the workers with their 
living conditions had been expressed in “quits,” in absenteeism, and even in 
strikes.7
The living conditions in Richmond, California were not any better:
Fire protection was woefully inadequate. There were not sufficient hospital 
beds nor doctors to care for the sick. The water supply was inadequate.. .
Schools were overcrowded.. .  Juvenile delinquency rose to alarming 
proportions.8
Suffice it to say that the population boom (25,029 to 35,293),9 experienced by 
Portsmouth, and its contiguous towns, defined for this study as Eliot, Greenland, Kittery,
7 Ibid., 431-441.
8 Ibid., 444.
9 Franklin E. Jordan, “Portsmouth and National Defense,” Table 1. The population figures are for 
1940 and 1943.
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New Castle, Newington, Portsmouth, and Rye, during the war pales in comparison to the 
population booms experienced by other shipyard communities. Similarly, the wartime 
challenges and deteriorated living conditions experienced by Portsmouth residents, while 
extreme to local standards and previous experiences, were less severe than those found in 
other shipyard boomtowns.
Wayne Bonnett’s Build Ships! San Francisco Wartime Shipbuilding Photographs
tells a story not unlike much of this study. According to Bonnett, shipyards in the San
Francisco Bay area also produced ships at a remarkable rate during World War II. Mare
Island Navy Yard alone produced 17 submarines, 4 submarine tenders, 31 destroyer
escorts, 33 small craft and more than 300 landing craft.10 Here too, civic and shipyard
leaders in the San Francisco Bay area faced more serious sociological problems than their
counterparts in the Portsmouth area. According to Bonnett:
In addition to delivering ships on schedule, shipyard management had to 
participate in dealing with labor unions and subcontractors, crime in shipyard 
boomtown and racial and gender conflicts. Problems naturally arose, 
breakdowns and accidents occurred, mistakes were made.11
Portsmouth Navy Yard managers had relatively few problems in their dealings with labor
unions and subcontractors. In addition, racial and gender conflicts were much less
noticeable and crime in boomtown Portsmouth, N.H. was pretty much limited to the vice
of prostitution and the frequent arrests of disorderly servicemen. While the criminal
activity in the Portsmouth area was apparently less serious than that found in West Coast
10 http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/wwllbavarea/mar.htm. “Mare Island Naval Shipyard: World 
War II in the San Francisco Bay Area.” This site is an essay excerpted from Wayne Bonnet, Build Ships! 
San Francisco Wartime Shipbuilding Photographs (Windgate Press: Sausalito, C A  2000).
11 http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/wwllbavarea/shipbuilding.htm. “World War II Shipbuilding in 
the San Francisco Bay Area,” 3.
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boomtowns, the impact of that activity on a previously tranquil New England town was 
significant.
Frederick C. Lane notes that the population of Richmond, California mushroomed 
from 23,000 in 1940 to 100,000 in 1943, including an African American population that 
rose from 400 to about 14,000. Lane says that, “Workers came from all over the Midwest 
and Southwest -  the Okies, Arkies, and Texans were most evident.”12 The wartime 
workers that migrated into the Portsmouth area traveled much shorter distances and 
represented much less ethnic diversity. In fact, many relocated from other New England 
towns to the area, or merely commuted long distances from hometowns in New 
Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts that were within the reach of the shipyard, once 
the far reaching bus service was implemented. In addition, the influx of Portsmouth 
workers added relatively few minorities to an area that already had a small percentage of 
minorities. Consequently, the potential for racial conflict was minimal.
Puget Sound also produced ships at a remarkable rate during the war and shared 
many of the same wartime experiences as Portsmouth and the Bay Area. Puget Sound 
Navy Yard built 19 major ships including 8 destroyers, 8 destroyer escorts, 5 escort 
aircraft carriers, and other vessels. Puget Sound’s primary role, however, was the repair 
of battle damaged ships in the Pacific theater. According to a local history of the Puget 
Sound area:
Labor shortages replaced unemployment lines and a great migration 
developed as Americans moved from poorer areas, particularly in the South, 
to areas with major war industries. Census takers in 1940 counted slightly
12 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r  Victory, 437.
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more than 1.7 million Washington residents. The war effort quickly added a 
quarter-million more - including thousands of African Americans. 3
The migration of workers into the Puget Sound area was also much larger and more
diverse than that experienced in and around Portsmouth Navy Yard.
The government contracts awarded industries in the Puget Sound Area were 
considerably greater those assigned to the Portsmouth area. The National War Production 
Board, in August 1942, revealed that, up to July 1, 1942,’’More than $1 billion in 
contracts had been awarded Seattle’s aircraft industry and $709 million had been awarded 
shipyards in Seattle.”14 In comparison, New Hampshire historian Phillip Guyol says that 
$400 million federal dollars found their way to the Portsmouth area during the entire 
war.15 Albeit, that $400 million was concentrated on a much smaller area than the federal 
funding that was spread across the entire Puget Sound area. At any rate, war brought an 
economic boom and prosperity to Portsmouth and southern Maine just as it did to the 
Puget Sound area, and many other shipyard communities, throughout the United States.
As can be seen from the above discussion, wartime Portsmouth was a microcosm 
of a nationwide phenomenon of boomtowns that struggled to adjust to large influxes of 
workers. Portsmouth’s wartime experiences, as disruptive and challenging as they were 
by local standards, paled in comparison to the experiences of other shipyard communities 
across the nation. This fact makes Portsmouth no less deserving of study. In the final 
analysis, Portsmouth, the city and the shipyard, stood tall in the face of a myriad of 
boomtown issues and produced submarines beyond anyone’s expectations. That wartime
13 http://www.historvlink.rg/essavs/output.cfm7file id=1664. “World War II Home Front on Puget 
Sound - - A Snapshot History.”
14 Ibid.
15 Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 162.
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production, patriotism, and perseverance are sources of deep community pride that 
deserve further exploration and recognition.
The population, and economic, booms that the Portsmouth area experienced 
during World War II were all the more significant because of the twenty years of stability 
that preceded the war. Prior to analyzing the wartime factors that transformed the 
seacoast areas of New Hampshire and southern Maine, it is appropriate to investigate the 
calm before the storm.
The Calm
Figure 18 shows the population boom that Portsmouth and the surrounding 
communities experienced during World War II.16 The surrounding New Hampshire
Figure 18 - Population of Portsmouth 
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HI Portsmouth B  Seacoast
16 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.” Graph is constructed from 
figures in Table entitled “Population-Total Trend” in the Appendix and population discussion on page 18. 
Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, 
Folder 1, “State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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communities include Rye, Greenland, New Castle, Newington, and Portsmouth. The 
Maine communities include Kittery and Eliot. The graph also shows the calm before the 
boom. After a significant increase in population during World War I, also due to 
expansion of the navy yard workforce, the local population had remained fairly stable 
between 1920 and 1940.17
Returning to the New York Times quote, dated 5 October 1942, that described
prewar Portsmouth as a “prosperous New England port, steeped in history and thriving as
a summer resort,” one might add that nothing much had changed in the previous twenty
years. Wallace Nutting’s New Hampshire Beautiful (1923) describes the Portsmouth of
the 1920s that tourists found so appealing:
It is not strange that this district has become the main gateway for travelers in 
New England who seek the calm, the inspiration, and the beauty of its 
summers.. .  Portsmouth itself has appealed to us as the most pleasing of all 
small shore cities.. .  To those who love at once the old and picturesque 
together with some signs that Americans are not dead, Portsmouth appeals 
strongly.. .  It may be as well that Portsmouth is no larger. Nevertheless, we 
have often wondered why, with its strategic location, it has not developed 
into a more populous center.18
In the 1920’s the Portsmouth area enjoyed a reputation as a quiet, under populated
summer resort destination.
As reported in the American Guide Series New Hampshire: A Guide to the
Granite State (1938), things had not changed much by 1938:
Apart from the Navy Yard, Portsmouth is not an industrial city . . .  Popular as 
a resort, the city doubles its population each summer.. .  This influx of 
summer visitors adds to the prosperity of the city, which even in winter is the
17 The shipyard employment grew from 1,450 in 1916 to 5,500 in 1918 and then fell to 2,850 in 
1921. Cradle o f  American Shipbuilding: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: 
Government Printing Office, 1979), 76.
18 Wallace Nutting, New Hampshire Beautiful (Framingham: Old America Publishers, 1923), 76.
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shopping center for a large area.. .  The po rt. . .  is occupied now only by an 
occasional naval vessel, small yachts, or a barge bringing in gypsum and 
taking out scrap iron. Portsmouth still hopes that it will again become a busy 
harbor.19
On the eve of World War II, Portsmouth continued to attract large numbers of summer 
visitors. Otherwise it was a relatively quiet city and harbor that lacked industry except for 
the navy yard.
If anything, between 1930 and 1940, the local area had become more rural, with a 
bent towards increased farming. Table 17 shows that, between 1930 and 1940, the local 
area saw almost no increase in urbanization, a large increase in the farming community,
•  • •  90and a significant increase in the rural non-farming communities.
Table 17 -  Local Urban vs Rural Population Distribution (1930 & 1940)
1930 1940 % Increase
Urban (Portsmouth) 14,495 14,521 1.8%
Rural Farms 1,201 1,701 41.6%
Rural Non-farms 9,513 11,755 19.1%
Immediately prior to World War II, the city of Portsmouth was not attracting large 
numbers of new residents, and those that were attracted to the area were settling in rural 
communities. This rural trend was generally true throughout the state of New Hampshire,
• • 91where the rural population had climbed to 42.4% in 1940 compared to 41.3% in 1930.
19 New Hampshire: A Guide to the Granite State. American Guide Series. Written by Workers of  
the Federal Writer’s Project o f  the Works Progress Administration for the State o f  New Hampshire. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.
20 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area” Table is constructed from 
information included in Table entitled “Population -  Location, 1930 -  1940” in the Appendix. Thayer 
Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, 
“State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
21 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Oct 1941, “Rural N.H. Like Topsy-Still Growing,” 1.
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Also, prior to the war, industrialization had not been a high priority with local 
civic leaders. The front page of the 2 September 1939 Portsmouth Herald announced the 
formation of the Portsmouth Industrial Association to stimulate community interest in 
bringing new industries to Portsmouth. According to the article, “The lack of diversified 
industries in our city has been felt by everyone with business interests for some time.” 
One week later, the paper’s editorial, discussing the lack of public support for the 
Portsmouth Industrial Association, cited a “lack of cooperation and coordination and a 
much too prevalent feeling of smug, complacent self satisfaction as far as community 
problems are concerned.” In the fall of 1939, there was no groundswell of public support 
for increased industrialization.
Another Portsmouth Herald editorial, in June 1939, entitled “The Portsmouth of 
Tomorrow,” presented a vision for the city that included moderate industrialization. That 
vision saw “highways with dividing strips and no left turns”, “restriction of business 
development to designated sites,” increased “happiness-giving recreation,” many “small, 
inexpensive, yet solid and attractively-designed homes, each with its plot of land”, and 
“many small private industries, utilizing the products of nearby farms in new ways.” 
Nowhere was there any mention of a behemoth industry, like the shipyard, that would 
dominate the area and spark a population boom that would lead to frantic housing 
construction, massive infrastructure development, and a deferral of “happiness-giving 
recreation.” In 1939, given its choice, it appears that Portsmouth’s leaders would have
'7')chosen a different path for its future than what emerged from World War II.
22 Portsmouth Herald, 24 June 1941, “The Portsmouth o f Tomorrow,” 4.
357
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The navy yard was a welcomed part of the economic and social fabric of the
Portsmouth area in the late 1930s. One tourist guide book for New Hampshire noted:
The United States Navy Yard, possessor of a stirring history, is the backbone 
of modem Portsmouth,. . .  The Navy Yard contributes much to the town, 
both financially and socially. The naval families are a distinct section of the 
population, and their presence adds much to the gaiety of the city. Balls and 
entertainments in the best naval tradition attract many of the townspeople and 
give the city a sophisticated air not common in New Hampshire. The sailors 
have their moments as in any seaboard town, and occasionally too-happy 
hedonists are escorted to their quarters by naval police23
Immediately prior to mobilization for the war, during the calm before the storm, the navy
yard was the backbone of the community, contributing gaiety, military balls, naval
tradition, uncommon sophistication, and an occasional too-happy hedonist to the social
scene. Things were about to change. Among other things, Portsmouth would soon be
inundated with happy hedonists.
The Portsmouth Herald’s editorial on 30 December 1939 took inventory of events 
in the seacoast area over the past year and spoke with optimism about the prognosis for 
1940. The newspaper was enthused about the growing shipyard employment and 
continued its push for new industry that had been met with lukewarm support a few 
months earlier:
We have had a most excellent 1939 as a whole. The stores report excellent 
business during the Christmas season. The prospects for work at the navy 
yard are as bright if not brighter than a year ago. There are more men 
working there now than at any time since the close of the World W ar.. .  The 
possibilities for new industries seem bright, and more industries mean more 
people living in this city which means more business for the merchants.. .
Who knows what the new year may bring? We cannot tell, but we can be 
ready for whatever may benefit the community as a whole.24
New Hampshire: A Guide to the Granite State. American Guide Series. Written by Workers of 
the Federal Writer’s Project o f the Works Progress Administration for the State o f New Hampshire. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938). Emphasis added.
24 Portsmouth Herald, 30 Oct 1941,4.
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Things were unraveling in Europe in December 1939, but on the local scene business was 
improving, employment was up, and there was hope for attracting limited new industry 
and people to the city. Things were calm and the future looked bright and good for the 
new year. Assuming the city’s primary newspaper accurately reflected the mood and 
attitude of the residents, neither had a clue about what the next year would bring.
Population Boom
Returning to the Figure 19 at the beginning of this section, it is obvious that 1940 
brought a population boom to the area. Table 18 provides details for the population 
increases for the critical period 1940 to 1944.
Table 18 - Local Population Boom (1940-1944)
1940 1944 Increase
Population Portsmouth and Contiguous Towns25 25,039 35,294 41 %
(Immediate Shopping Area)
Portsmouth 14,821 20,029 35%
Kittery 5,374 9,475 76%
Rockingham County26 58,142 60,276 3.6%
Other local towns -  York, Durham, Exeter, etc.27 18,127 20,410 12%
(Outer Shopping Area)
New Hampshire28 491,524 459,250 - 6.6 %
25“Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” Table entitled “Population- 
Total Trends” in the Appendix. The contiguous towns are Eliot, Greenland, Kittery, New Castle, 
Newington, and Rye.
26 Portsmouth Herald, 15 Feb 1944, “Survey Shows Trends,” 1. The 3.6% gain is based on a 
comparison o f the 1940 census with ration book distribution in 1944.
27 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, “Table entitled “Population- 
Total Trends” in the Appendix. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, 
Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
28 The estimating o f shifting populations during the war was inaccurate, at best. In this table, the 
1940 figures are census based and presumably accurate. The 1944 town figures are based on ration book
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As might be expected, with the rationing of automobiles and gasoline, the communities 
within walking distance of the shipyard, especially Portsmouth and Kittery, experienced 
tremendous growth. On the other hand, Rockingham County, the county where 
Portsmouth is located, only experienced a 3.6 % gain in population. With Portsmouth 
and its contiguous towns experiencing a 41% growth, while the entire county remained 
relatively stable, it appears that there was a great migration out of the southern and 
western parts of the county to the Portsmouth area. This is in sharp contrast to the San 
Francisco Bay and Puget Sound examples presented at the introduction to this chapter 
that experienced a massive influx of workers from distant parts of the United States.
In The U.S. Economy in World War II, economist Harold G. Vatter describes the 
dynamic migration westward of workers in search of job opportunities in the aircraft, 
shipbuilding, and other war related industries and the static or declining populations in 
eastern regions:
The great migration wave regionally was to the Pacific Coast.. .  the three 
Pacific Coast states increasing their population by over 34% ... Of the net 
national migration of about 3.5 million people between April 1940 and 
November 1943, nearly 1.5 million went to California...  Almost all other 
regions experienced arrested population growth or losses. The New England, 
Middle Atlantic, and East North Central regions containing the old
OQmanufacturing belt barely held their own during the war.
distribution. The 1944 state figure is Guyol’s estimate, exclusive o f those in the armed services. Based on 
registrations for War Rations Books for May 1942 (470,000) and October 1943 (445,000), Guyol concludes 
that the decrease (25,000) reflects the loss o f population to the armed forces. Guyol, 104 and note 3. All o f 
this is to say that, if  one uses the October 1943 ration book figure o f 445,000, the decrease in the state’s 
population could have been as high as 9.5%. I chose to keep the 6.6% because that is the figure commonly 
seen in the literature.
29 Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985), 114-115.
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The state of New Hampshire did not hold its own during the war. The state experienced a 
migration of population to out-of-state wartime manufacturing centers that led to the 
noted 6.6 % reduction in population during the first few years of the war, not including 
the losses to the military services. Over 20,000 new residents had relocated to the 
seacoast of New Hampshire during the war while the state had lost 30,000 residents 
overall. Clearly, the Portsmouth area was a beehive of growth and activity, as compared 
to the rest of the state. There is little doubt that the center of the state’s population, 
manufacturing, and economy moved sharply in the direction of Portsmouth.
The 41% increase in population of the Portsmouth Defense Area between 1940 
and 1944 was characterized by a significant shift in age distribution towards the youth, as 
shown in Table 19.30
Table 19 -  Local Age Distribution (1940-1943)
Age 1940 Census 1943 Census % Shift
<5 1750 3000 71.4%
5-14 3800 5950 56.6 %
15-24 4100 5450 32.9 %
25-34 3950 4825 22.2 %
35-44 3650 4500 23.2 %
45-54 3125 4125 32.0 %
55-64 2250 2850 25.7 %
>65 2325 2450 5.4 %
Apparently the number of young adults, many with children, rushing to the seacoast area 
to find employment at the shipyard, more than compensated for those going into the 
armed forces. The result was a disproportionate increase in youth and adolescents. A
30 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” Table is constructed from 
graph entitled “Portsmouth Defense Area Population-Age” in the Appendix. Note: the numbers in this table 
were read from the hand-drawn graph cited. Accuracy can be assumed to be within 25 people. Thayer 
Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, 
“State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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consequence of the increased number of adolescents, Portsmouth’s “girl problem,” will 
be discussed in considerable detail later.
As might be expected, a high percentage of the new seacoast residents worked at 
the shipyard. Table 20 shows the number and percentage of shipyard employees that 
resided in Portsmouth and Kittery and nearby communities.
Table 20 - Shipyard Employment Distribution by Town (1944)




Other local towns -  York, Durham, Exeter, etc.
New Hampshire
In 1944, one out of every five local residents worked at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. 
Nearly 3% of the state’s entire population, and 7% of the state’s labor force of 185,000,35 
worked at the yard. Moreover, in 1944, when the state had 12,981 people working at the 
shipyard, only 73,000 people were working in all the other manufacturing jobs 
throughout the state that included the textile, leather, paper, machinery, lumber, and other
31 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.,” Table 17. Thayer Cumings 
Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State 
Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
321bid.
33 Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 104, note 3.
34 “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 1. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery 
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
35Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights 131.
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Population Employed Percentage 
by Shipyard
35,294 7,382 20.9 %
20,029 4,355 21.7%
9,475 2,188 33.8 %
20,410 2,220 10.8 %
459,26033 12,98134 2.8 %
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industries.36 Manufacturing had quickly overtaken farming as the chief industry of the 
seacoast area.
Speaking to the local Rotary Club in January 1941, Mr. Lawrence M. Meyer, 
industrial agent of the New Hampshire Planning and Development Commission, noted 
that “the tremendous influx of [skilled] workers at the Portsmouth Navy Yard can be one 
of Portsmouth’s greatest assets in the future.” Meyer noted that the area had in the past 
“lost not one but several industrial opportunities because we did not have sufficient 
skilled labor.”37 Meyer’s speech was a testimony to a shortage of industrialization in the 
seacoast area before the war and an accurate prediction of the abundance of skilled labor 
that would exist in the postwar era. That postwar skilled labor pool would ultimately 
exceed Meyer’s wildest imagination.
Portsmouth and its environs were transformed quickly, during the early years of 
the war, from an area with a rural and farm population that was growing faster than its 
urban population, to an overpopulated industrial area with a decidedly younger 
population. That transformation brought tremendous opportunities and serious 
challenges.
Economic Opportunities
The Portsmouth area and New Hampshire did not suffer as much economically, 
during the Great Depression, as most areas of the country. According to New Hampshire 
historian Philip N. Guyol, at the very bottom of the depression, in 1933 and 1934, New 
Hampshire stood twelfth in the United States in per capita income, and, during the lean
36 Ibid., 126, Chart II.
37 Portsmouth Herald, 30 January 1941, “Navy Yard Workers Asset for City’s Future,” 1.
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years, 1930 -1939 inclusive, the state’s income per capita was comfortably above the
T O
national average. In 1939, the state stood seventeenth in per capita income. And, as 
noted earlier, Portsmouth had an excellent year in 1939, with strong retail sales at the end 
of the year and employment on the rise. In April 1940, the Portsmouth Herald reported 
that the city had $8,727 million in retail sales in 1939, as compared to $8.57 million in 
1938. Moreover, in 1939, with only 3.18% of the state’s buying power, the city reported
I Q
5.7% of the state’s retail sales. The newspaper attributed the favorably disproportionate
sales to recreational and value-minded visitors to the seacoast area. By any measure, the
local area was not in dire economic straits at the start of 1940.
While the Portsmouth area experienced favorable economic conditions in mid-
1940, the Great Depression still lingered on in other areas across the country. Economist
Harold C. Vatter wrote:
Nevertheless, 1940 was the eleventh year of the Great Depression...  1940 
GNP was still only 9 percent above 1929. This was a historically miserable 
performance, particularly if one were to allow for stimulus to the 1940 GNP 
from business anticipation of a forthcoming preparedness boom .. .  With a 
civilian unemployment rate of 14.5%, the economy was still far from 
promising to absorb fully the army of unemployed.40
Historian David M. Kennedy argues that the army of nine million unemployed workers in
1940, combined with greatly underutilized industrial facilities, was an advantage when
the nation finally decided to mobilize. Unlike World War I, when the nation struggled to
recruit soldiers from a fully employed work force and convert near capacity civilian
38 Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 187.
39 Portsmouth Herald, 27 April 1940, editorial, 4.
40 Harold C. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II, 1.
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production to military purposes, the start of World War II found manpower readily 
available and idle factories easily adapted to military purposes.41
Unlike much of the nation, in the summer of 1940, Portsmouth’s economy was 
good and about to get much better. The city was well positioned to reap huge economic 
benefits from the increased activity at the shipyard. The local communities benefited 
greatly from the $23 million of capital investment at the navy yard between the summer 
of 1940 and the summer of 1941. That investment, the rapidly increasing shipyard 
payroll, and other federal spending for defense related projects, provided an exceptional 
economic stimulus for the area. As shown on Table 21, between 15 July 1940 and 15 July 
1941, the federal government authorized expenditures of $37.5 million for the following 
projects:42
Table 21 -  Local Federal Project Expenditures 
(5 July 1940-15 July 1941)
Portsmouth Navy Yard $23.00M
Portsmouth Harbor Defense $ 1.5 0M
Bridges -  State and Interstate $3.30M
Housing -  Federal and Private $5.00M
City of Portsmouth Facilities $2.50M
Non-municipal Utilities $1.40M
Total $37.50M
The Portsmouth Navy Yard received most of the federal monies, but other federal 
projects brought additional funds to the city.
New Hampshire’s primary industries, prior to the war, were textiles, leather, and 
wood and the industrial center of the state was inland near the mill-towns. The activity at
41 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 617.
42 “Portsmouth and National Defense,” a series o f  articles reprinted from the Portsmouth Herald, 1 
Aug 1941. Thayer Cumings Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96 Box 2, Folder 
1, “State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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the shipyard during World War II moved the state’s industrial center decidedly towards 
the seacoast. During his analysis of New Hampshire industry during World War II, 
historian Phillip N. Guyol noted that “Perhaps the outstanding industrial phenomenon 
was the surge of Portsmouth Navy Yard to the position of the largest single employer in 
the state, at its peak employing about as many people [from all states] as the entire textile 
industry [in New Hampshire].”43 Guyol had strong grounds for his bold statement. 
Portsmouth Navy Yard invested a total of $36,000,000 in plant additions and facilities 
between 1940 and 1945, much of which was directed into the local economy.44 In 
addition, during the same period, shipyard payrolls and expenditures to local merchants 
for products and services, excluding plant additions and facilities, generated almost 
another $400,000,000 in charges. Those charges, which were a direct stimulant to the 
local economy, increased annually throughout the war as shown in the Table 22 below:45 
Table 22 - PNY Annual Expenditures Excluding Facilities (1940-1945)
There can be no doubt that the shipyard was a tremendous economic engine for the 
seacoast area.
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Fueled by federal spending, the local Chamber of Commerce claimed $15,314 
million in retail sales in 1943. The strength of the local economy, midway through the 
war, is revealed by Table 23, which compares Portsmouth retail sales in 1943 to the retail 
sales of the state and the nation.46
Table 23 -  Portsmouth Retail Sales Compared to State and Nation (1943)
Portsmouth % of Population Portsmouth % of Retail Sales
New Hampshire 4.42 6.6947
United States .016 .024
In way of clarification, with only 4.42% of the state’s population, Portsmouth accounted 
for 6.69% of the state’s retail sales and likewise, with only .016 % of the nation’s 
population, Portsmouth claimed .024% of retail sales for the nation. The high percentage 
of retail sales, while an indicator of local prosperity, was also heavily influenced by the 
tourist invasion that occurred every summer.
Further evidence of prosperity is provided by Table 24, which shows the average 
Portsmouth resident’s annual purchasing power relative to that of residents of the state 
and nation in 1943 48
46 “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 3. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery 
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
47 It was noted earlier in this section that the Portsmouth Herald o f  27 Apr 1940 reported that 
Portsmouth had 5.7% of the state’s retail sales in 1939. While the 1943 retail sales o f 6.69% is obviously 
higher, direct comparisons suffer because the Herald did not define the towns included in the 1939 figure. 
Portsmouth Herald, 27 Apr 1940, editorial, 4.
48 Ibid
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Table 24 -  Local Purchasing Power (1943)
Annual Purchasing Power Portsmouth Multiple
Portsmouth $1,136 1.00
New Hampshire $833 1.36
United States $1,103 1.03
Portsmouth’s annual purchasing power was only slightly higher than the national
average, but it was 36% higher than the state average. The disparity between the annual
buying incomes of residents of Portsmouth and the rest of the state of New Hampshire
speaks to the lack of prosperity in the rest of the state.
According to Guyol, New Hampshire benefited the least economically of all the
states during the war.
Total income payments to individuals in New Hampshire rose from 
$268,000,000 in 1939 to $460,000,000 in 1945, or from $548 to $971 per 
capita. New Hampshire moved down from seventeenth place in 1939 to
thirty-fifth place in 1945 during the whole period of wartime prosperity
from 1940-1945 the gap between the two [state and national per capita 
incomes] attaining its maximum in 1944.49
While prosperity had increased significantly in the seacoast area during the war, as shown
earlier, the area and the state were not particularly depressed prior to the war. The local
area probably remained more stable during the war than many other wartime boom towns
that were rocketed out of the Great Depression with enormous government contracts. The
picture was quite different in the rest of the New Hampshire, where incomes increased
much less than the rest of the country. The Portsmouth area was an economic anomaly in
the state of New Hampshire. The city had quickly become an affluent community, albeit,
49 Philip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 187 and note 2.
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an overpopulated affluent community with challenging problems and concerns for its 
future.
Challenges
While mobilization presented Portsmouth with challenging new problems, it is
also true that the town entered the war with a number of unresolved community issues.
An August 1943 study, “A Survey of Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense
Area,” organized and coordinated by the New Hampshire Planning and Development
Commission, noted that, “There are many problems of long standing in Portsmouth,
which started prior to the war. Such for example are housing, government, and pollution.
They should be distinguished from emergency problems growing out of the rapid influx
of workers and their families into this area.”50 Existing problems with housing and
pollution were further aggravated by the rapid increase in population. The same study
noted some of the additional problems that the Portsmouth area had inherited:
Increased health hazards of a rapidly expanding community are 
overcrowding, growth in incidence of communicable diseases, rise of 
venereal disease, prevalence of unsanitary conditions attendant upon 
increased restaurant loads, overcrowding of hospital facilities and recreation 
centers, and taxing of medical, nursing, and school personnel. Many of these 
conditions will be found in Portsmouth, Greenland, New Castle, and 
Newington.51
The problems and challenges were many.
50 “Survey of Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 99. Thayer Cumings Library 
and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f  
Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
51 Ibid., 46.
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Housing and Infrastructure
Not the least of those challenges was where the thousands of new residents would
live. The first inkling of the housing problem was presented at a meeting, between yard
and city officials, in January 1940, where Commandant Rear Admiral Cyrus W. Cole
advised that, “An increase will practically double the civilian force at the Portsmouth
Navy Yard and its officers and men proportionately during the coming year,” and that
“the lack of reasonable rentals, apartments, and rooms within a 25 mile radius is a serious
problem.” By the summer of 1940, the Portsmouth Herald reported the results of a
shipyard survey that showed the housing shortage was preventing many shipyard
employees from bringing their families to the area. Furthermore, “A far larger number [of
employees] reported that, while their families were here, the housing secured was
extremely inadequate with many conveniences, which are today considered necessary by
most people, unavailable.”52 A local history later confirmed the shortage of and
inadequacy of housing in the Portsmouth area:
The Portsmouth City Planning Board reported that a survey of housing made 
in 1941 showed that more than half of the 4021 “dwelling units” in 
Portsmouth were more than 80 years old, while less than one quarter of the 
units in Manchester were even 40 years old. The situation in Portsmouth was 
so bad that the report only considered 28 housing units as “unfit for use” even 
though 70 units had no running water, 160 had no gas or electric lights, 162 
had no toilets, and 879 had no bathtubs or showers.. .  A federal housing 
survey conducted in 1940 determined that there was a need for 2200 new 
housing units within a 25 mile radius of the shipyard.53
52 Portsmouth Herald, 16 July 1940, “Proposal Believed Likely to Materialize; Navy Yard Co­
operating on Project,” 1.
53 Gregory C. Colati and Ryan H. Madden, “Victory Begins at Home: Portsmouth and Puddle 
Dock during World War II,” in Barbara McLean Ward ed., Produce & Conserve, Share & P lay Square: 
The G rocer and the Consumer on the Home-front during World War II (Portsmouth: Strawbeiy Banke 
Museum), 1994, 65.
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In August 1940, the Herald reported that Portsmouth needed more than 2,000 new homes 
to accommodate the increased population in the area.54 If 2,000 new housing units were 
needed in 1940, when the shipyard was at 8,000 employees, more than 4,000 new units 
would be needed by 1943, when shipyard employment exceeded 20,000. Available 
housing was a problem that would become progressively more severe as the shipyard 
grew in employment at a rate much greater than the availability of local housing. 
Ultimately, housing construction during the war fell far short of the number of new units 
needed.
When it became obvious, in 1939 and 1940, that the navy yard was going to 
increase several fold, the Federal Government sponsored three housing projects, 
Admiralty Village (600 units) in Kittery and Pannaway Manor (200 units) and 
Wentworth Acres (800 units) in Portsmouth. These projects, as urgently needed as they 
were, met with a certain amount of disapproval from local civic leaders. Pannaway 
Manor was believed to have a “monotony created by the unchanged proportions of the 
houses.” The location, number, and construction of the units at Wentworth Acres 
reportedly had been “determined against sound advice from local municipalities and 
against their wishes.” In addition, “the buildings were erected with as much speed and 
economy as possible and were not designed for long life.” Finally, Admiralty Village 
reportedly had “neighbor trouble” because of the lack of privacy due to the thin walls 
separating units, no back yards, and insufficient recreational space. From the initial 
conception and construction of the government housing projects, local authorities were
54 Portsmouth Herald, 23 Aug 1940, “Present Projects Still Would Leave Housing Shortage,” 1.
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concerned about inheriting long-term problems when the projects were turned over to the 
city after the war.55
The city of Portsmouth had to expand much of its infrastructure and utilities to
accommodate the increased numbers of residents. On 10 April 1941, the Portsmouth
Herald, recapping the city’s progress during the “first year of the emergency,” noted that
it had been about a year since the President had designated Portsmouth as a defense area
for Federal Housing projects. During that year, most of the $2 ‘A million in federal aid the
city had requested had been approved. Housing projects had been completed, bridges had
been modernized, telephone, gas, electrical, and sewage service had been expanded, the
water supply had been greatly increased and additions had been made to schools and
hospital services. While the shipyard had been ramping up facilities and services, the city
had been doing likewise. Confirming extensive local development, the local Chamber of
Commerce noted in 1944 that:
There has also been much private building. There have been tremendous 
extensions of water and sewer mains, of telephone facilities and of the facilities of 
other utilities. New schools have been built, [as well as] new streets and sidewalks 
and roads.56
The war had obviously challenged Portsmouth’s municipal services. The city had met 
that challenge and brought greatly improved services to the residents of Portsmouth.
55 All quotes in this paragraph are from “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense 
Area,” 46. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, 
Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
56 “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 3. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery 
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
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Vice Control
The war also brought other challenges less successfully met by city officials,
primarily the control of prostitution and venereal disease. Much of the war found the U.S.
Navy on the offensive pushing Portsmouth officials to rid the city of disease carrying
prostitutes, with the city officials being much less responsive than the Navy desired. The
Navy had the upper hand in these encounters as the result of the May Act, passed in
January 1941, making “vice activities near military installations a federal offense.”57
According to Allan M. Brandt:
The May Act provided the legal power necessary for the Department of Justice to 
assume the policing of areas deemed too be hazardous to the troops by the 
secretary of the army or the secretary of the navy. In other words, if prostitution 
persisted in a given community, federal authorities could take action. .. Although 
only invoked twice during the course of the war -  in Tennessee and North 
Carolina- the May Act nevertheless served as a prod to local officials to “clean 
up” their communities or be deposed by federal officials.58
Thus the leverage that the Navy enjoyed through the May Act compelled Portsmouth city
officials to be responsive to periodic accusations that the city should be “cleaned up” to
reduce the shipyard’s spiraling venereal disease rate. This tug-of-war between the
military and the city was characteristic of a scene that was played out in many military
communities during World War II.
The aggressive effort to root out and quarantine prostitutes was a carry over from
the military’s experience with combating venereal disease during World War I. Venereal
disease had a tremendous impact upon American forces during World War I. According
to historian Allan M. Brandt:
57 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f  Venereal Disease in the United States 
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 162.
58 Ibid, 166.
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Almost seven million days of active duty were lost to venereal diseases, the most 
common illness in the service next to influenza, which struck in epidemic 
proportions. A total of 383,706 soldiers were diagnosed with either syphilis, 
gonorrhea, or chancroid between April 1917 and December 1919... Some 12.7 
percent of the over two million men in the Army stationed in the United States 
were admitted to sick report with a diagnosed venereal disease. Indeed, soldiers 
serving in the United States accounted for 76.6 percent of the venereal disease 
infections in the entire Army during the war.59
Lacking any effective antibiotic to combat the disease, the American military sought to
gain control of the debilitating disease through “a combination of education, repression of
prostitution, medical treatment of the infected, and rigorous case finding and contact
tracing.”60 With World War II looming on the horizon, the United States military, not
wanting to repeat its disastrous wartime experience with venereal disease, reinstituted the
anti-venereal disease measures that had evolved during World War I. Consequently,
Portsmouth’s experience with prostitution and venereal disease during World War II
heavily reflects the local military’s ambitious prosecution of two carry over tactics from
the previous war, the repression of prostitution and rigorous contact tracing,
Prostitution was not a new problem for Portsmouth. The industry had thrived
along the notorious Water Street brothel district between 1897 and 1912 when a
combination of increased activity at the shipyard and frequent visits by fishing boat crews
flooded downtown Portsmouth with young sailors. Some claim that the city was
compelled by local organizations, apparently inspired by progressive movement, to close
down the district.61 However, local historian Ray Brighton attributes the closing of the
Water Street brothels to “the Navy’s threat to ship all its liberty parties to Boston.”
59 Ibid, 115.
60 Ibid, 162.
61 Kimberly E. Crisp, “Water Street Remembered.” History Honors Thesis, University o f New  
Hampshire, 1996, 78
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According to Brighton, ”It was only after the Navy marched a liberty party through 
Congress and old Vaughn Street town to the railroad station on Deer Street [to catch a 
train to Boston]”62 that local leaders got religion and cleaned up Water Street.
Efforts to eradicate the city’s shady past include the renaming of Water Street to 
Marcy Street about 1925 and the purchase of most of the properties by the Prescott sisters 
that led to the eventual establishment of the riverfront park that bears their name today. 
By the time World War II rolled around, the city’s red-light history was a distant 
memory. Wartime operations at the shipyard would rekindle those memories and bring a 
renewal of the Navy’s pressure on city officials to rid the city of prostitutes.
Medical officers at the navy yard attributed increased VD rates to widespread 
prostitution in Portsmouth. Portsmouth’s civic leaders, on the other hand, were reluctant 
to acknowledge the presence of prostitutes, but quick to redefine the problem as local 
adolescent girls eager to entertain servicemen. The Portsmouth Health and Welfare 
Survey of 1943 devoted considerable space to Portsmouth’s “Girl Problem.” The problem 
was believed to be centered on unsupervised “opportunities for unaccompanied women 
and girls to meet servicemen on leave.”64 Meeting opportunities were reportedly found 
“on the street as casual meetings or pickups, at beer parlors or taverns or juke joints.”65
62 Ray Brighton, The Prescott Story (New Castle, N.H.: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1982), 59.
63 Kimberly E. Crisp, “Water Street Remembered.” History Honors Thesis, University o f New  
Hampshire, 1996,2-3.
64 “Survey o f  Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 50. Thayer Cumings Library 
and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f  
Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
65 Ibid.
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While the girl problem sounds a lot like a prostitution problem, the report was quick to 
add:
With respect to prostitution, there are no known “houses” existing in 
Portsmouth. It was rumored that of late, in several scattered areas throughout 
the city, women have allowed seduction. This matter is under investigation.
The chief problem with respect to sexual promiscuity seems to be with the 
younger girls of teen ages, i.e. those who may be termed amateurs, whose 
general attitude seems to be that they are working for the cause and are 
providing entertainment for the servicemen. This is rather a serious problem, 
and it needs to be checked -  for if allowed to continue undoubtedly will lead 
many of these girls to become professional prostitutes.66
The truth probably fell somewhere between the U. S. Navy’s hard stand on prostitution
and the locally defined “girl problem.” Portsmouth demographics had taken a definite
turn towards the younger set, during the early stages of the war, and increased numbers of
adolescent girls were probably available and interested in the sudden abundance of young
servicemen. The New York Times article of 5 October 1942 addressed the problem of
adolescent girls roaming the streets of Portsmouth:
For the problem of Portsmouth’s adolescent girls had become grave. Every 
night the dimmed-out streets are filled with men from all branches of the 
armed forces, as well as yard workers. Within a year Mrs. Dorothy Bovard, 
who represents the Travelers Aid Society here, noted twenty-five cases of 
girls “chasing service men to camps” and having to be brought home.67
This account suggests a far less serious problem that the rampant prostitution reported by
the military later in the war. Therein probably lays the answer to the dichotomy of views
between the military and city officials. The evidence suggests that Portsmouth had a “girl
problem” early in the war that grew into a more serious prostitution problem later in the
war. The evidence also suggests that the extent of hard line professionals practicing in
66 Ibid., 51.
67 Milton Bracker, “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust Life to an Influx o f  Men and Money.” The New 
York Times, 5 October 1942, 10.
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Portsmouth was a far less serious problem than existed outside the gates of other 
shipyards.
Then again the answer may not be that simple. The debate over Portsmouth’s girl
problem versus a prostitution problem was by no means unique. Similar debates took
place in hundreds of communities across the United States during the war. As the result
of aggressive military prosecution, Allan M. Brandt wrote,
More than seven hundred cities and towns closed their red-light districts during 
the course of the war. Not since World War I had prostitution been so vigorously 
prosecuted in the United States. Despite the incarceration of thousands of 
prostitutes, it soon became clear that that this could not in itself solve the venereal 
disease problem.. .  Increasingly army physicians reported that prostitutes 
constituted only a minority of the soldiers’ sexual contacts.. .  .The military soon 
turned its attention to the “promiscuous” girl. Women of loose morals, eager to 
support the war effort, were determined to be the primary locus of the infection...  
The harlot with the painted face had stepped aside for the girl-next-door.68
In light of the evidence from the national scene, Portsmouth city officials may have been
more accurate in the assessment of the problem than officials at the navy yard who were
rattling their sabers to force the expulsion of harlots with painted faces from the local
drinking establishments.
While the extent of prostitution in Portsmouth may have been debatable, there is
no doubt that the navy yard boom had promoted increased socialization and night-life in
Portsmouth that contributed to increased VD rates at both the navy yard and the
Portsmouth Hospital. There is also no doubt that the combination of young sailors and
marines, beer, and local teenage girls was an explosive mixture that caused headaches for
the local police. Reportedly, the curfew that required all children who were under sixteen
68 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet, 167-168..
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years of age to be off the streets after 9:00pm was not enforced.69 In December 1942, 
local restaurant owners complained of servicemen’s brawls that destroyed tables, chairs, 
crockery, and fixtures almost nightly.70 The shipyard increased Shore Patrol officers in 
response to the request of city officials and also declared trouble spots “out of bounds” 
for enlisted men.71 One local restaurant owner, Andrew Jarvis, was quoted as saying that 
he would rather have all navy men and marines barred from his premises than suffer
77losses as he had been doing m the recent past. Portsmouth had been transformed from a 
quiet seacoast tourist town to a “sailor town” and some had difficulty making the 
adjustment.
In the interest of balanced and fair reporting, Eileen Dondero Foley, a young 
woman residing in Portsmouth during the early years of the war, saw another side of 
Portsmouth social life. Eileen remembered that dances were routinely held almost every 
night of the week at one of several locations where young women could meet and mingle 
with servicemen. The dance sites included the US O Club on Congress Street, the
70
shipyard, and Camp Langdon. According to Foley, the dances were extremely popular
69 “A Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, August 1943,” 52. Thayer 
Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, 
“State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
70 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Dec 1942, “Hewitt to Seek Aid o f Yard Officials on Disorders Here,” 1.
71 Portsmouth Herald, 11 Dec 1942, “Navy Bars Enlisted Men from Some Spots,” 1.
72 Ibid.
73 According to the Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey (1943), the Portsmouth Recreational 
Committee scheduled the dances at the USO on Thursday evenings, the American Legion on Wednesdays 
and Fridays, a favorite local restaurant on Saturday nights, and at Camp Langdon once a week. See page 49 
o f the survey. No mention is made o f the dances at the shipyard, but Eileen Foley distinctly remembered 
going to dances on the yard. Camp Langdon was located in New Castle between the town and the 
Wentworth Hotel. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., 
MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f  Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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and well attended. She and her friends often attended more than one dance a week, as the 
dances were scheduled so as not to interfere with each other. In addition, the military 
provided convenient bus service from the downtown USO to the dances on the military 
bases. The dances were chaperoned and curfews were observed.74
The social scene that Eileen Foley remembers was much more innocent and 
wholesome than the sailor bar reports that frequently made the front page of the local 
newspaper. When asked about the bar scene and Portsmouth’s prostitute problem, Foley 
confirmed that side of the Portsmouth social scene, “Oh yes. They were there. They lined 
the bridge waiting for the boys to leave the shipyard.”75 The shady side of Portsmouth’s 
social life, populated by young women of questionable reputation, was balanced to some 
extent by an active group of young women like Eileen Dondero Foley, who worked hard 
during the day, and socialized with servicemen under more structured and supervised 
social settings in the evenings.
However, it was the rowdy bar scene and not the popular USO dances that made 
the pages of the local newspaper. According to a Portsmouth Herald editorial of 19 
March 1943, the Portsmouth Police department had been totally ineffective in controlling 
acts of vandalism perpetrated upon the city’s business establishments. The Herald 
reported that, “Almost nightly, merchants suffer loses due to broken glass, destroyed 
signs, and from acts of indecency.” The grossly understaffed Portsmouth Police 
department had only eighteen patrolmen, when national standards required thirty-five for 
a city the size of Portsmouth. With civic pressure mounting to gain control of the
74 Oral interview with Eileen Foley, 30 August 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
75 Ibid
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situation, and unable to hire more policemen because of the manpower shortage, the 
Police Department requested more military police, from the shipyard, to patrol
7 f\Portsmouth’s streets between 6:00 pm and 2:00 am. One of the more troubling 
consequences of the increased industrial activity at the yard was increased drunkenness 
and vandalism on the streets of Portsmouth.
One might question how the relatively small population of enlisted men at the 
Portsmouth Navy Yard could cause such havoc. For a starter, the number of enlisted men 
at the yard peaked at about 1,300 in late 1942 and early 1943, including several hundred 
Marines. As the war went on, many of the submarine sailors at the yard\ were veterans of 
war patrols who had returned to the yard to put the next submarine in commission. 
Likewise, the Marines who guarded the yard were often assigned to the shipyard after 
having experienced combat. Thus, many were battle tested young men looking to take 
full advantage of their respite at Portsmouth before going back to war. Battle tested 
submarine sailors and Marines, mixing at the same local bars with Army enlisted men 
stationed in the area, occasionally made for an explosive mixture.77
Seeking to call a “spade a spade,”78 the 14 May 1943 Portsmouth Herald editorial 
drew attention to Portsmouth’s teenage problem, but likened it to the problems 
experienced at other important defense areas and armed services centers. In particular, the 
editorial took some satisfaction in knowing that Portsmouth’s problem was not as bad as 
the teen age problem at Portland, Maine where, “The police blotter coldly reports the fact
76 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Apr 1943, “Army, Navy Asked to Aid Police Here,” 1.
77 According to William Tebo, only beer was legal and, supposedly, available at the local bars.
78 Portsmouth Herald, 14 May 1943, “Spade’s a Spade,” 4.
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that 14, 15, and 16 year old girls are openly soliciting and that they are just average cases 
among the more than 100 teenage girls arrested in six months.”79 Reading local 
newspaper reports between December 1942 and June 1943, it is obvious that the city of 
Portsmouth was suffering growing pains in its new role as a navy town, and that city 
officials were overly complacent and comfortable with the belief that things were not as 
bad as some believed.
After the summer of 1943, the press had very little to say the rest of the year about 
Portsmouth’s girl problem, vandalism perpetrated by military enlisted men, prostitution, 
or venereal disease. It is somewhat revealing of the community’s state of denial that the 
Portsmouth Herald’s end-of-the-year list of twenty resolutions for 1944 contained several 
about postwar planning, but did not mention anything about eliminating vice and 
restoring order to the city. One would like to think that, during the previous six months, 
these issues had been brought under control or eliminated, but that was clearly not the 
case. The VD rate at the shipyard continued to climb to new heights and the navy 
continued to put pressure on city officials to clean up the town.
Shipyard officials presented the New Hampshire Board of Health with 
quantifiable evidence that identified the sites in Portsmouth that were sources of venereal 
disease. Armed with that information, federal health officials formed the Portsmouth 
Social Protection committee that, in turn, exerted pressure on city officials to take action 
against known sites of prostitution. For example, the navy advised the State Board of 
Health in May 1944 that 24 of the 97 cases of VD reported in Portsmouth in 1943 had
79 Ibid.
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0/1
been acquired through contacts at the Dolphin Hotel. Eight additional cases during the 
first quarter of 1944 had also been traced to the same hotel. The next highest figure for
O  1
any particular site in Portsmouth for 1943 was five cases. With almost five times the 
VD rate of any other Portsmouth establishment, the Dolphin Hotel apparently did a good 
business -  whatever that business was.
The report of the Portsmouth Social Protection Committee to the mayor,
published on the front page of the 14 July 1944 Portsmouth Herald, sounded a call for
action to resolve the city’s widespread venereal disease problem. Yet, like other
newspaper accounts, the word “prostitute” did not appear in the report. Instead, the article
reported that “vice conditions” needed to be corrected to prevent the spread of “social
diseases,” “transient girls” were to be kept away from “exposure places,” and taxi drivers
were to cease acting as “producers.” In the only instance where the words “venereal
disease” appeared, the report noted that, “Ninety-seven of 200 cases of venereal disease
in New Hampshire are attributed to Portsmouth.” Even more damning, the report
observed that “Portsmouth is known as an open city; city officials not interested.” The
committee’s report to Mayor Dale concluded:
That you as mayor, [should] through proper channels bring pressure to bear upon 
the law enforcement force which would make it possible to correct the deplorable 
conditions in the community which has been brought to our attention by the navy 
department, Federal Security Agency, and other social agencies.82
80 For those familiar with downtown Portsmouth, the Dolphin Hotel was located at the site 
presently occupied by the Metro Restaurant just o ff Market Square.
81 Portsmouth Herald, 1 Jun 1944, “Navy; Police Fight Vice; Find Dolphin Hotel Chief Venereal 
Infection Source,” 1.
82 Portsmouth Herald, 14 Jun 1944, “Mayor Promises Action Here on Vice Conditions,” 1 
(emphasis added).
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A previously annoying, but tolerable, situation described as Portsmouth’s “girl problem” 
had become a deplorable and intolerable blight on the city that needed immediate 
correction. Portsmouth’s beleaguered and grossly understaffed police force took issue 
with the committee’s accusations that they had been lax in the performance of their 
duties. However, the department subsequently redoubled its efforts to rid the city of the
O'!
conditions reported.
Six months after the increased campaign against vice and venereal disease,
Cecelia T. McGovern, associate social protection representative of the Community War 
services, reported that conditions in Portsmouth had improved considerably. According to 
McGovern, the venereal disease control officer of the First Naval District had indicated 
that “due to the alertness of the local police and increased vigilance on their part, 
Portsmouth has not been named as the source of venereal disease as often as it was 
previous to the formation of the committee last spring.” In a backhanded compliment, 
Portsmouth had been praised with faint damnation for its relative progress in controlling 
venereal disease. While the city was apparently less often identified as a source of 
venereal disease, the VD rate amongst shipyard sailors and marines continued to climb
nr
from 68.56 per thousand in 1944 to 104.44 per thousand in 1945. Enlisted men were 
still managing to become infected with VD somewhere in or around the city of 
Portsmouth.
83 Portsmouth Herald, 22 Jun 1944, “Police Board Denies Laxity in Vice Fight,” 1.
84 Portsmouth Herald, 20 Oct 1944, “City’s Venereal Disease Record Shows Improvement, 
Report Says,” 1.
85 See Table 14 in the Medical section o f this chapter.
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Having identified the victims of venereal disease as enlisted men, it is important
to highlight the double standard of the times noted by Alan M. Brandt:
The word “promiscuous” was firmly anchored to “girl” -  a promiscuous man was, 
by definition, an oxymoron. Women in this view, were the keepers of sexual 
mores . . .  “They” infected the soldiers. In this view, venereal disease could only 
be transmitted in one direction.86
Brandt suggests that navy yard officials may have misidentified the victims and that,
perhaps, infected enlisted men were spreading the disease to previously uninfected local
girls. While the sources of the disease may have been varied, many, and debatable, the
increased rate of disease towards the end of the war was a fact.
Venereal disease was still an issue in the city, in March 1946, when operators of
nineteen Portsmouth restaurants, taverns, and hotels were summoned to city hall for a
meeting with Mayor Dondero and a dozen representatives from the military and state
0-1
who were once again concerned about the venereal disease rate in Portsmouth. The 
Dolphin Hotel and Restaurant, on probation since the Navy’s efforts in the summer of 
1944 to clean up the city, was placed off limits for military personnel at this time. It 
appears that the only times that the subject of venereal disease received attention from 
local leaders was when the military officials demanded action to control the spread of the 
disease. Except for those occasions, the press and city officials chose to avoid the subject. 
Out of sight out of mind seems to have been the city’s modus operandi for dealing with 
the issue.
While the campaign against VD was showing slow and debatable progress, the 
city also continued to be plagued with drunk and disorderly sailors on liberty in
86 Alan M. Brandt, The Magic Bullet, 168.
87 Portsmouth Herald, 19 Mar 1946, “Army, Navy Press Fight Against Disease Here,” 1.
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downtown Portsmouth. On 18 January 1945, it took all nine police officers on the night 
shift to break up a brawl on Congress Street, between navy yard sailors, at 1:30 in the 
morning. The fight had started in a local diner and spilled over into the street. Seven 
sailors involved in the brawl were arrested for drunk and disorderly conduct and, 
incredibly, two other sailors were arrested for drunkenness when they stormed the police
on
station in an attempt to liberate their comrades. It was not an easy job to be a 
Portsmouth policeman on the night shift during the war.
Postwar Worries
One of the biggest problems that mobilization brought to Portsmouth was the fear 
of what the inevitable postwar recession might bring. Fresh in the minds of many were 
the conditions that developed quickly after World War I. James Tucker, the head of the 
local Chamber of Commerce remembered “Committees of Portsmouth citizens rushing to 
Washington for relief after the armistice had been declared and practically all work
OQ
discontinued at the local navy yard.” He also recalled “how servicemen sold pencils 
and peddled apples on the streets,” and, if humanly possible, he wanted to avoid similar 
conditions after the current war.
The Portsmouth Herald had raised the initial alarm with Franklin E. Jordan’s 
series of articles in the summer of 1941 but, once the war swung into full gear, other 
issues pushed postwar concerns to the background for a few years. By mid-1943, the 
progress of the war was such that people became confident of ultimate victory and local 
concerns began to compete with global issues for attention once again.
88 Portsmouth Herald, 18 Jan 1945, “Arrest, Fine Yard Sailors After Brawl,” 1.
89 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Jul 1943, “Portsmouth Hopes to Keep Yard Booming After Victory,” 1.
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In July 1943, the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce launched a campaign to 
keep the yard booming after the war through a gradual tapering of submarine 
construction, the return of all farmed-out work to the shipyard, and the use, by private 
industry, of whatever yard facilities the government did not plan to use.90 A commitment 
to these objectives was obtained from local government and business leaders, 
Congressmen, and shipyard officials at a conference in late July.
The Portsmouth Herald’s editorial platform, which had changed from a strong 
neutrality position to a win-the-war position in March of 1941, changed again in late 
November 1943 to reflect confidence in victory. This time the first plank of the platform 
required “Complete Victory Over the Axis with No Appeasement” and the second plank 
pointed towards “A Just and Lasting Peace Enforced by a Truly United Nations.” The 
third plank, “A Postwar Prosperity Plan for Greater Portsmouth,” highlighted the 
Chamber of Commerce’s campaign for postwar prosperity and helped to focus 
community attention on issues needed to guarantee that prosperity. Thus, six months 
before D-day, and well before the conclusion of the war, local leaders were targeting their 
own deliverance plan for Portsmouth and the Seacoast area. In late 1943, when naval 
officials were trying to gain the city’s attention to solve a prostitution problem, the city’s 
top priority was its future.
The Portsmouth Herald’s managing editor, Franklin E. Jordan, who had raised 
the initial concerns about postwar Portsmouth in the summer of 1941, updated those 
concerns in a fifteen part series of articles in March 1944. This time Jordan was even 
more emphatic in his belief that the city’s future was inexorably tied to the shipyard’s 
fate. Jordan wrote, “Our navy yard is Portsmouth - whether we like it or not,” and
90 Ibid.
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repeatedly stressed that, “Portsmouth’s future fate will be determined by its dependence 
on the navy yard.” The message was clear: Portsmouth’s new found prosperity would be 
short lived if the economic engine across the river slowed or shut down.91
Noting the importance of the shipyard monies that were being pumped into the 
local economies, Jordan wrote, “Our navy yard provides incomes for almost four out of
09every five families and, indirectly, about one of every three service workers.” Jordan 
emphasized that, unlike many communities that had converted peacetime industries to 
war industries, Portsmouth had no prewar industrial base to resurrect after the war. 
According to Jordan, “The city has practically no converted factories of machinery. This 
[income on which the city depends] comes from work done on government land, in 
government buildings, with government machinery, all designed to produce articles of 
war.” So then, Jordan asked, what happens when the navy yard returns to peacetime 
production and employment levels? Where do the excess employees go and how does the 
community compensate for the lost incomes?
Jordan decided the area’s most valuable asset in 1944 was a large skilled 
workforce. This was in stark contrast to the prewar situation, when industry had shunned 
the area because of a lack of skilled workers. The federal training programs had created 
thousands of welders, pipe fitters, mechanics, and other craftsmen. The challenge was, 
first, to maintain as much work as possible at the yard after the war and, second, to create 
other opportunities for the soon-to-be excess of skilled workers. It was to these ends that 
the local Chamber of Commerce, city officials, and Congressman dedicated their efforts 
in late 1944.
91 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Mar 1944, “Portsmouth and Peace,” 1.
92 Ibid
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The concerns of Franklin Jordan and the Chamber of Commerce began to be 
realized in July 1944, when Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard advised 
Commandant Withers that recent successes in the Pacific had reduced the need for large 
numbers of submarines and, consequently, a considerable number of submarines would 
be canceled from the current building program. Without providing numbers, Bard said 
that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s workload would be reduced accordingly. Portsmouth and 
the other submarine building shipyards had become victims of their own success. Having 
produced the tremendous numbers of submarines that had contributed significantly to 
winning the war in the Pacific, the Japanese Navy and shipping had been forced into a 
smaller area, in turn reducing the need for United States submarines. Instead of more 
submarines, the Navy urgently needed aircraft carriers, cruisers, amphibious assault 
ships, cargo carriers, tankers, and other weapons of war to carry the fight to the Japanese 
homeland.
Faced with the first official notice of shipyard cutback, the Portsmouth Chamber 
of Commerce published a study that reiterated its position of a year earlier, calling for the 
continuance of the maximum possible workload at the shipyard after the war.94 The 
awkward and lengthy title of the study summarized the community’s fears, “Can the One 
Step Which Might Separate a ‘Boom-Town’ from a ‘Bust-Town’ be Avoided or Must 
Portsmouth do an Economic Back-somersault.” The one step, of course, was continued 
high navy yard employment. Boom-town or Bust-town? That was the question that was
93 Portsmouth Herald, 31 Jul 1944, “Navy Slashes Sub Construction Next Year at Portsmouth 
Yard; Pacific Success Cause Cutback; No Discharges Seen,” 1.
94 Portsmouth Herald, 4 Aug 1944, “James Tucker Outlines Five Point Reconversion Plan for City 
before Rotarians,” 1.
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on Jordan’s mind, in the summer of 1941, when he wrote of Portsmouth’s greatest 
problem, and that continued to be chief concern of the Chamber of Commerce in 1944.
Another Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce study, of a similar nature, entitled 
“The U.S. Navy Yard: Portsmouth’s One Big Industry” documented local population and 
economic changes that had occurred during the war and also argued the need for 
continued strong navy yard employment after the war. Citing a total of 12,981 New 
Hampshire residents employed at the shipyard, and assuming an average family size of 
four people, the Chamber of Commerce concluded that about 52,000 New Hampshire 
residents were dependent on a shipyard paycheck.95 The Chamber’s assumption of a 
family size of four may be high, considering the probability of multiple family members 
working at the yard, but there is no avoiding the conclusion that the local economy was 
heavily dependent on the shipyard.
During the latter half of 1944, New Hampshire’s Congressmen were relentless in 
their efforts to secure work for Portsmouth Navy Yard. Succumbing somewhat to that 
pressure, Rear Admiral E. L. Cochrane, Chief o f the Bureau of Ships, clarified the navy’s 
intention to give Portsmouth and Electric Boat preferential treatment, during the 
forthcoming curtailment, because they were the “two leading yards on matters of 
submarine design.”96 According to Cochrane, the bulk of the cutbacks would be taken 
from the other four yards building submarines and Portsmouth and Electric Boat would 
“carry along on a reduced scale into 1947.” Senator Russell Tobey reassured the
95 Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce letter o f  3 July 1944 to Rear Admiral Thomas Withers with 
enclosure “The U.S. Navy Yard: Portsmouth’s One Big Industry.” Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, 
Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
96 Quoted in Portsmouth Herald, 21 August 1944, “Chamber Told o f  Plans for Navy Work,” 1.
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Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce on 29 Aug 1944 that he had extracted a pledge from 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard that the preferential treatment, planned for 
the yard, would include a fair share of the postwar overhaul and repair workload. On 27 
October 1944, Rear Admiral E. L. Cochrane, reassured 400 shipyard employees, during 
an address at the yard, that “A workload of no small proportions is being retained at 
Portsmouth,” and that the yard would be maintained “as a going submarine design 
building yard -  to be ready to take us into the next period of development.”97 Despite the 
assurances, city officials remained apprehensive about the future.
The apprehension that many held for Portsmouth’s future in 1944 was prevalent 
in many towns throughout the country. The war had brought industry and prosperity to 
many areas that now feared for the vacuum that would be left when those wartime 
industries were shut down. Marc Scott Miller, in his work, The Irony o f  Victory: World 
War H and Lowell, Massachusetts, notes that “World War II artificially stimulated 
Lowell’s economy, orienting it towards military rather than civilian and human needs.
Q O
Continued growth depended, in large part, upon continuing war production.” Such was 
the case in hundreds of towns in 1944. As it turned out, Portsmouth fared much better 
than Lowell, which, after the brief recovery provided by the war, continued its prewar 
economic decline.
Reminiscent of James Tucker’s memories of how various committees from 
Portsmouth traveled to Washington immediately after World War I to solicit work for the
97 Quoted in Portsmouth Herald, 27 Oct 1944, “Adm. Cochrane says Portsmouth Subs Play Major 
Role in Pacific,” 1.
98 Marc Scott Miller. The Irony o f  Victory: World War II and Lowell, Massachusetts (Chicago: 
University o f  Illinois Press, 1988), 206.
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yard, three representatives from Ranger Lodge 836, International Association of 
Machinists, traveled to Washington in early December 1944 looking for work for the 
yard. True to the Navy’s elevated priorities for the weapons and equipment needed for 
the final push to Japan, the committee returned with a guarantee for work for the 
construction of, not more submarines, but pontoons for advanced bases." The 
streamlining of shipyard operations for submarine construction, that had produced thirty- 
two submarines in 1944, would be of little use in the construction of pontoons. The times 
were changing.
In August 1945, the yard returned to a five-day, forty hours work week for the
first time in five years. At the same time, yard officials discontinued the third (night) shift
and announced plans to return to one shift operations as soon as possible.100 Signs of
drastic employment reductions were everywhere. Late 1945 and early 1946 were filled
with frequent rumors and fears about employment reductions at the yard, followed
quickly by reassurances from the Navy and Congressmen that Portsmouth Navy Yard
would be treated fairly with regard to reductions in employment. None were denying
reductions, but all were claiming that the reductions would be as gradual as possible. The
Chamber of Commerce report, at the close of 1945, claimed satisfaction to date with the
community’s efforts to control the reduction in workforce at the yard:
Because of the continuing efforts which the Chamber of Commerce 
inaugurated in July 1943 to soften this economic blow [employment 
reductions at the navy yard] and because of like efforts by organized labor at 
the yard, the local community has not yet suffered severely in a business way.
Work has been tapered off, arrangements are being made eventually to return
99 Portsmouth Herald, 12 December 1944, “Union Gets Wash. Agreement o f  Future Work at 
Navy Yard.” 1.
100 Portsmouth Periscope, 27 August 1945, 1.
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farmout work manufacturing processes to the yard . . .  new types of work 
have been found to help take up the slack and more repair work has been sent 
to Portsmouth.101
This expressed satisfaction would wane in the coming months when reductions in
employment were much greater than expected.
The ultimate goal of the Chamber of Commerce was to rally public,
Congressional, and, hopefully, federal support for maximum postwar employment at the
yard. The Chamber believed that the federal government, having brought the boom, was
responsible for the prevention of the much feared bust:
A further factor is that the Federal Government, having expanded the 
population and productive powers of Portsmouth, Kittery, and the environs, 
bears a direct and unavoidable responsibility to see that when contraction 
occurs, the least possible dislocation of life and services is experienced.
Housing projects without tenants, expensive sewer and water services built to 
meet the war emergency but no longer needed in peacetime, and a large
1 (Y)group of unemployed, should not be left as burdens upon the community.
The analysis of how the relationship, between the federal government and the 
community, played out in the postwar years is a study unto itself that is well beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Suffice it to say that Portsmouth Navy Yard and the city of 
Portsmouth have enjoyed a very successful partnership since 1945.
Politics
In discussing wartime political changes in California, Roger W. Lotcin makes the 
observation that women made little progress in gaining political office during the war. He 
finds this a little surprising because “With so many males absent and absentee-voting
101 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Jan 1946, “Chamber Official Reports ’45 Activities to Members,” 1.
102 “Survey o f  Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 123. Cumings Library and 
Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f  
Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth..”
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turnouts light, women were certainly the potential majority of the electorate.”103 He 
suggests that the reason may be because “there was no labor shortage in politics as there 
was in the labor force.”104 Jacqueline R. Braitman answers that, while women made very 
little electoral progress during the war [in California], they advanced in other, less visible, 
political spheres instead.105
Unlike California women, Portsmouth women did make significant electoral 
progress during the war. This progress was highlighted by the precedent setting election 
of Mary Dondero as mayor of Portsmouth in November 1944. Dondero was the first 
female mayor of Portsmouth and the first woman elected to the position of mayor in the 
state of New Hampshire. After having been elected by seven votes in 1944, she was 
reelected to a second term in November 1945 by the largest plurality in the history of the 
city, and then defeated by one vote in 1946.
It was a time of great political turmoil as the Republicans’ long-standing grip on
the city’s politics was challenged by the progressive ideology of the Democrats and Mary
Dondero. The Portsmouth Herald, a strong Dondero supporter at the time,
enthusiastically reported her reelection ini 945:
Mayor wins all Five Wards to Rout GOP...  Mayor Mary C. Dondero, first 
woman chief executive in the history of the City of Portsmouth, yesterday 
won an overwhelming victory in her quest for a second term. . .  In doing so
103 Roger W. Lotcin, “The Historians’ War or The Home Front’s War?: Some Thoughts for 
Western Historians,” The Western H istorical Q uarterly Journal vol. 26, No.2 (Summer 1995), 191.
104 Roger W. Lotchin. “California Cities and the Hurricane o f Change: World War II in the San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego Metropolitan Areas,” Pacific H istorical Review  63 (August 1994), 
414-416.
105 Jacqueline R. Braitman, “Partisans in Overalls: New Perspectives on Women and Politics in 
Wartime California.” The Way We R eally Were: The Golden State in the Second G reat War. Roger W. 
Lotchin, ed. (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 2000), 215-235.
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she won a 2,494-vote victory over the same Republican opponent whom she 
barely nosed out by seven votes a year ago.106
Similarly, the Portsmouth Herald’s editorial on 7 November 1945 hailed Dondero’s
reelection as a changing of the guard:
An aroused Portsmouth citizenry showed its confidence in Mayor Dondero’s 
integrity and administration and repudiated the tactics of the Republican 
machine by reelecting her by an overwhelming majority and, with the same 
vote, riding the Republicans out of town on the well known rail.107
The Herald’s obvious delight with Dondero’s reelection was not just a partisan reaction
to a Democratic victory. The paper had repeatedly expressed discontent with FDR’s New
Deal politics108 and had endorsed Republican Governor Dewey over FDR in the last
presidential election. The newspaper’s endorsement of the new mayor had more to do
with her honest and open style of government than the fact that she was a Democrat. Of
course, the Herald did not know, at the time, that the Republicans would ride the same
rail back into town the next year,
How much did events at the shipyard have to do with the transformation of
Portsmouth city government in 1944? One can argue that the large influx of workers and
military personnel stressed city services as never before and made the incumbent
Republican administrations more vulnerable than they had ever been in the past. The
Herald repeatedly criticized the Republican incumbents for slow, secretive, and
bureaucratic practices when dealing with the challenges presented the city during the war
years. Dilapidated housing, a perceived inadequate police force, and a community water
106 Portsmouth Herald, 7 N ovi 945, “Mayor Carries all Five Wards to Rout GOP,” 1.
107 Portsmouth Herald, 7 Nov 1945, “A Vote o f Confidence and Repudiation,” 4.
108 Portsmouth Herald, 4 Nov 1945, “Had Enough -  More Than Enough?,” 4.
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shortage were just a few of those challenges. As problems mounted, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the citizenry would become less tolerant of business-as-usual government 
and look for a change in leadership.
What about Roger W. Lotchin’s argument that many males were absent, absentee- 
voting turnouts were light, and women were potentially the majority of the electorate? 
Could Dondero’s election have been facilitated by a preponderance of woman voters? 
Table 25 suggests that the argument may have merit.
Table 25 - Portsmouth Residents by Sex109
1930 1940 1944 (assumes 34.3 %
increase and 10% 
of men in service)
Women 7250 7610 10,197
Men 7211 7245 8,737
The table shows that the number of Portsmouth female residents increased, between 1930 
and 1940, until there were 365 more female residents in 1940. Lacking hard data, the 
constructed figures for 1944 reflect an average 34% increase in population through 1943 
and a reduction in the male population by 10% to account for military service. Keeping in 
mind that the figures represent all residents, and not just voters, it still appears that 
women would have been a decided majority in the 1944 elections.110 Admittedly, Table
109 The 1930 and 1940 figures are from “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense 
Area,” Table in appendix entitled “Population Sex, 1930 — 1940.” As indicated, the 1944 figures assume 
the 34.3% increase that the survey attributes to the entire area between 1940 and 1943 and a 10% reduction 
for males to account for military service. “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 3. Thayer Cumings 
Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State 
Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth..”
110 At the risk o f extrapolating an estimate from an approximation, one could apply age 
distribution percentages from Table 19 and conclude that there were about 6600 women and 5700 men o f  
voting age in 1944.
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25 does not speak to the number of women registered to vote or the number that actually 
voted for Dondero. However, the table does suggest a demographic that may have 
worked to Mary Dondero’s advantage in the November 1944 election.
There is another wrinkle to this analysis of female voters. Mary Dondero was 
enormously popular with mothers because of the attention she showered on sons and 
daughters leaving for military service. According to Eileen Foley, her mother, as a 
Councilwoman and later as mayor, presented every person leaving for the service with a 
carton of cigarettes, a box of chocolate, and writing paper. The presentations took place 
in the center of town outside Jarvis’s Restaurant, after which Mrs. Dondero, waving a 
large American flag, would lead the assembled group, accompanied by the small high 
school band, to the train station.111 This practice endeared her to many mothers and, 
unquestionably, garnered her many female votes.
In November 1944, Dondero was one of several Democrats elected in 
unprecedented numbers to Portsmouth city offices. Elected by only seven votes in 
November 1944, the refreshingly open style of government practiced by Mary Dondero 
was obviously well received, as evidenced by her landslide victory in November 1945. 
Dondero introduced a new era in Portsmouth government, but she very well may not 
have gotten the seven votes she needed for her initial victory in 1944 had the city not
j p
been challenged with wartime issues.
111 Interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
112 When interviewed on 30 August 2006 at her home in Portsmouth, N.H., Eileen Foley, Mary C. 
Dondero’s daughter, attributed her mother’s political victoiy in November 1944 solely to her popularity 
with the people o f  Portsmouth. She particularly emphasized the gifts and small parade given each new 
recruit. Foley recalls that her mother did the same for her in 1944 when she left Portsmouth for the WAC. 
At any rate, Eileen Foley believed that it was her mother’s patriotism, visibility, and popularity that got her 
elected and not Portsmouth’s turmoil as I argue. While I share Foley’s assessment o f  her mother’s 
enormous popularity at the time, the fact that a number o f other Democrats were also elected for the first
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Another shipyard boomtown, Kirkland, Washington, experienced a Democratic 
landslide in the 1944 election that the local newspaper, the East Side Journal, attributed 
to newcomers voting for the first time in the state. The paper linked political affiliation 
with length of residence and social class, implying that the thousands of industrial
workers that had been added to the rolls of the local precincts had skewed the vote
• • 1 1decidedly in the Democrat’s favor. This demographic dynamic may have also
contributed to the Democrats’ success in the Portsmouth elections in 1944 and 1945.
After winning by the largest plurality ever in 1945, Dondero lost the November 
1946 election initially by eight votes and, after several appeals and a recount, lost by one 
vote to her Republican opponent.114 Partisan politics ran rampant through the city during 
this period. The Republican stronghold had been shaken, but not ridden out of town on a 
rail, as the local newspaper had reported a year earlier. Still, Portsmouth politics were 
never the same after Mary Dondero’s election in November 1944. Democrats and women 
have held important political leadership positions ever since.
As contentious as the political scene was in Portsmouth towards the end of the 
war, to the credit of both Republicans and Democrats, there were no reported scandals or 
political graft. There was not the case in other boomtowns where the war brought huge 
federal contracts, and temptations, to public officials administering those contracts. In
time in November 1944 seems to point to factors, in addition to popularity, that brought Mayor Dondero 
and the Democrats to power. When interviewed, William Tebo noted that he had missed getting Mary 
Dondero’s going away package because his parents drove him to Concord to catch the train rather than 
leaving from the Portsmouth train station. Mary Dondero, dedicated to departing servicemen as she was, 
later delivered the package to Tebo’s parents to give to him. Oral interview with William Tebo at the 
Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum, 3 November 2006.
113 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during 
World War II.” 43-44.
114 Portsmouth Herald, 12 Dec 1946, “Dondero May Continue [State] Senatorial Seat Fight,” 1.
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Kirkland, Washington, the city treasurer, mayor, attorney, and a councilman were 
indicted on grand larceny charges involving government contracts and resigned.115 The 
Portsmouth political scene was mild in comparison. It was filled with hotly contested 
political elections and infighting, but no criminal activity.
Riding the economic engine of the Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war, 
Portsmouth and its environs were transformed, in a few years, from an area with a rapidly 
growing rural and farm population, for the ten years preceding the war, to a prosperous 
industrial community of 20,000 with many new, and decidedly younger, residents. The 
newfound prosperity brought growth in purchasing power and retail sales far above that 
of the rest of the state, which lost ground to the nation. Sociological problems 
accompanied the great influx of workers, military, and federal monies. Portsmouth, a 
quiet vacation destination before the war, became a military town with increased vice, a 
housing shortage, and inadequate services. Over a thousand new housing units were 
constructed along with new schools, new streets and roads, and tremendous extensions of 
water and sewer mains, telephone facilities, and other utilities. Having achieved so many 
gains during the war, the seacoast community was left heavily dependent on continued 
high shipyard employment to protect those gains after the war. This exceptional 
dependency has been painfully revisited on numerous occasions since 1945 each time the 
yard was threatened with workforce reductions or closure. Lastly, the political change to 
female Democratic leadership at the end of the war, a watershed in Portsmouth politics, 
has had an equally lasting impact on the city.
115 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during 
World War II,” 45.
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CHAPTER IX
TRANSFORMATIONS
“Our navy yard is Portsmouth - whether we Like it or not. . . .  Portsmouth’s future 
fate will be determined by its dependence on the navy yard.” 1
Frank E. Jordan 
Portsmouth Herald 
21 March 1944
An overarching theme for this dissertation has been the transformation of 
Portsmouth Navy Yard and the surrounding communities as the result of the activities at 
the yard during the war. Also, the futures of both were, to a large extent, determined by 
that same activity. This chapter summarizes those transformations and important postwar 
events.
Shipyard
During the war, the shipyard continued to transform itself by expanding its 
boundaries through the reclamation of wetlands and shoal waters. This practice continued 
a tradition that extended back to the yard’s establishment in 1800. That tradition would 
continue unabated for another twenty-five years or so before the potential environmental 
consequences of such practices would be realized. The significant physical changes that 
took place at the shipyard during the war are readily apparent by comparing the pre and
1 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Mar 1944, “Portsmouth and Peace,” 1.
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postwar maps of the yard in the appendix, Figures A-l and A-2 respectively. Referral to 
these maps will be helpful in understanding the summary that follows.
The most obvious change was that the ever expanding shipyard had extended 
itself about a quarter of a mile into the river towards Strawbery Banke by the acquisition 
of yet another island, Pumpkin Island, and the surrounding shoal waters. The trapezoidal 
shaped extension is the new fitting-out pier that added about a half mile of submarine 
berths. During the war, those berths were filled to capacity with submarines stepping off 
the building ways at record setting rates. Shortly after the war ended, the berths were kept 
filled to capacity with captured German submarines, and excess United States 
submarines, waiting to be overhauled, mothballed, or purchased by foreign countries. The 
piers would never again be as active as they were during and immediately after the war. 
However, during the peak years o f the Cold War, with the need to overhaul the nation’s 
large nuclear powered submarine fleet, the piers again bristled with activity. Today, the 
inactive piers stand as moot testimony to the excess capacity at Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard due to the extensive build-up during Word War II.
The prewar map of the shipyard does not even show Jamaica Island, purchased 
during the war for an ammunition storage site. The postwar map shows a fully developed 
Jamaica Island, complete with ammunition storage bunkers and a connecting road that 
runs over a rather sizeable landfill. That landfill would be included in the infamous 
Jamaica Island Superfund site. Extending from the base of that landfill out into the back 
channel is a large peninsula that was not there in 1939, the result of more landfill.2 In 
1945, the quarters for the Commanding Officer of the Hospital were constructed on this
2 According to James Dolph, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard historian, all o f  the land fill in the 
vicinity o f  this peninsula, known locally as Strawberry Point, is considered to be part o f the EPA 
designated Jamaica Island Superfund site. Telephone interview with James Dolph of 26 March 2007.
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peninsula. Hospital wards and nurses quarters were built on the landfill immediately to 
the west of the road leading to the quarters. This peninsula, and the surrounding area, 
would also become one of the more active of the Superfund sites, requiring millions of 
dollars in clean-up costs. It is a tragically ironic sign of the times that a doctor’s living 
quarters would be constructed on a hazardous waste landfill.
Probably as important as the physical transformations that occurred at the 
shipyard during the war was a transformation that did not happen. There was, apparently, 
no more concern for the dangers of industrial pollution at the end of the war than there 
was at the beginning. After giving brief consideration, before the war, to compliance with 
state policies for control of sewage discharge into the Piscataqua River, the issue waned 
in importance once the war began. The shipyard was dumping much more raw sewage 
and industrial effluents into the river in 1945 than it did in 1939. The shipyard was not 
alone, as the local communities, with their greatly increased populations, were doing the 
same.
The physical appearance of the yard changed radically, with the addition of many 
new buildings and extensions to old buildings, the most significant of which was the 
upgrading of Building 50 early in the war, the large black structure that dominates the 
shipyard skyline when viewed from across the river at Prescott Park. This structure 
housed the building ways that increased from two to five during the war. Also, the 
building was effectively doubled in size, with an extension to allow for the nearby
3 Cultural Resources Survey, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, United States Department o f  Defense, 
Legacy Resource Management Program, April 2003. Prepared by the Louis Berger Group, Inc. for the 
Engineering Field Activity Northeast Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Table M -l. Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me.
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construction, assembly, and easy transport of submarine sections to the building ways. 
During the 25 years of submarine construction after 1945, only 23 submarines, 13 diesel 
and 10 nuclear powered, were built on the building ways. The last was the USS Sand 
Lance (SS660), completed in 1972. After 1945, the yard completed, on average, less 
than one submarine a year and never more than three submarines in any one year, a far 
cry from 32 in ’44. In the interest of fair reporting, submarines became increasingly 
complex technological marvels after the war, in comparison to the thirty-two fleet boats 
that the yard delivered in 1944.4 Today Building 50 also stands as a testament to excess 
capacity at the yard. Material and parts are stored in this building that once launched 
submarines at record rates during the war.
The wartime construction of the fitting out pier, Dry Dock #1, and the 
Shipbuilding Basin, had the effect of shifting shipyard operations decidedly westward. 
Prior to the war, the center of the industrial work in the yard was located near the only 
dry dock at the time (Dry Dock #2) and the nearby building ways, critical shops, and the 
old fitting-out piers. During the war, and most certainly after the war, when the building 
ways saw less and less activity, the industrial heart of the yard moved westward to the 
new fitting out piers.
The creation of Squalus Memorial Park, in the heart of the shipyard, is another 
important physical transformation that occurred as the result of the war. The Squalus, 
sunk off the Isle of Shoals in May 1939, recovered in October 1939, rebuilt in 1940, and
4 The primary technical advancement was nuclear power versus diesel power. Other technical 
improvements included thicker high strength allotted pressure hull steels, shipboard atmosphere control 
equipment (carbon dioxide scrubbers, oxygen generators, carbon monoxide scrubbers, and increased use o f  
electronics for communications, navigation, and fire control equipment. Missile tubes, with the associated 
equipment needed to house, monitor, and fire ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, added another 
dimension to the technical complexity o f  later submarines.
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recommissioned as the Sailfish, went on to enjoy twelve very successful war patrols in 
the Pacific. The submarine was credited with the sinking of two Japanese carriers, a light 
cruiser, two submarines, three destroyers, and more than twenty merchant ships.5 The 
submarine returned to the yard in late 1945 for decommissioning and scrapping. Prior to 
such a regrettable ending for such a fine ship, New Hampshire Governor Charles Dale6 
and New Hampshire Senator Russell Tobey wrote Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
and obtained the navy’s approval to permanently place the submarine’s conning tower 
and bridge in the center of the yard, as a suitable memorial to the men who lost their lives 
when the submarine sank, as well as the men who fought her so gallantly during the war.7 
Today, this memorial serves as the site of the yard’s most important gatherings and 
official ceremonies, during which the conning tower and bridge of the Squalus serve as a 
speaker’s platform. On such occasions, one cannot help but be reminded of the 
remarkable World War II accomplishments of Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Less apparent than the physical transformations were the contributions that 
Portsmouth Navy Yard made to changes in the U.S. Navy’s submarine technical and 
industrial strategy. If nothing else, the performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard, during the 
war, validated the policy change that the U.S. Navy had initiated after World War I to 
gain technical control of submarine construction. Unlike during World War I, when the 
Navy had little or no technical input to the design of the submarines built by private
5 Portsmouth Herald, 30 Oct 1945, “Tribute Paid to Gallant USS Sailfish,” 1.
6 Governor Dale attended the triple simultaneous launching on 27 Jan 1944 as the Mayor of  
Portsmouth.
7 Portsmouth Herald, 31 December 1945, “Dale, Tobey Act to Get Sailfish Conning Tower for 
Memorial,” 1.
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industry, the U.S. Navy directed and controlled all technical upgrades during World War 
II. Not only did the U.S. Navy control submarine design and technology, it was able to 
feed back wartime experience to the Design Division at Portsmouth Navy Yard and have 
the desired technical alterations installed on the next order of submarines. Private 
industry, on the other hand, often resisted technical changes to contracts in the midst of 
large production orders. Rear Admiral Withers and Portsmouth Navy Yard welcomed 
those changes.
Dr. Gary Weir argues that the dramatic increase, in both the submarine force and 
industrial base between 1940 and 1943, “marked the birth of the naval-industrial complex
o
for submarines.” According to Weir, “In the crucible of the interwar period, naval 
authorities, plagued by fiscal and technical trials, defined the vessel and the strategy they 
wished to employ as well as the character of the naval-industrial relationship.”9 The Navy 
then used its dominant position, early in World War II, to form and secure the desired 
control over submarine technical and production matters. Portsmouth was an integral part 
of the grand naval strategy that so successfully transformed the future relationship 
between private industry and the submarine force. That relationship contributed 
significantly to the successful build-up of the United States nuclear submarine fleet that 
became such a powerful deterrent to Soviet aggression during the Cold War.
Just as the Navy successfully culminated a policy transformation during the war 
that had been in progress for thirty years, Portsmouth Navy Yard completed a long-term 
strategic transformation, from a multi-purpose shipyard to a shipyard specializing in 
submarine construction. The favored treatment that the shipyard received from the U.S.
8 Gary Weir, Forged in War, 35.
9 Ibid
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Navy between 1920 and 1940 led to the development of a strong design team and many 
orders for new submarines prior to, and during, World War II. The shipyard capitalized 
on that favored treatment and, by the time mobilization began to accelerate in the late 
1930s, the yard had acquired a reputation for excellence in submarine construction. 
Capitalizing on that reputation and wartime needs, the yard was able to convince the 
powers that be in Washington to direct as much new construction work as possible to the 
yard to the exclusion of almost all other work. With the newly created Bureau of Ships 
overwhelmed with other responsibilities, Portsmouth, being one of the best performing 
and highly respected navy yards, was, for the most part, left to manage its own affairs. 
With the deck stacked in its favor, the yard thrived beyond all expectations. By 1944, 
Portsmouth Navy Yard had completed its transformation from a developing submarine 
shipyard, with a mix of miscellaneous work, to the preeminent designer and builder of 
submarines for the U.S. Navy.
The end of the war quickly brought an end to the ultra-efficient shipyard with 
processes streamlined for new construction. The yard was quickly transformed back to 
prewar conditions, with employment levels closer to 6,000 than the peak of 20,469 in 
1943. A potpourri of postwar work included orders for submarine repairs and overhauls, 
the manufacture of miscellaneous pontoons and yard craft, and the work needed to 
prepare submarines for the mothball fleet, disposal, or sale to foreign nations. More and 
more, the building of new submarines was pushed to a secondary role. After building 32 
in ‘44, the yard built 12 submarines in 1945,3 in 1946, none in 1947, 1 in 1948, none in 
1949, and none in 1950.
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By 1950, employment had fallen to a little over 4,000 workers, about the same 
employment that the yard had in 1939. The shipyard had come full cycle and the ultra 
efficient shipyard, streamlined for the construction of submarines, receded into the past. 
The shipyard kept remnants of the mass production techniques it had employed but, for 
the most part, wartime innovations found less and less application as the workload 
dropped. The construction of multiple submarines was discontinued in Dry Dock #1 and 
the Building Basin, the stepping of submarines from berth to berth for specific work 
items lost its production advantages, and paperwork and record keeping returned in 
spades. By the 1970s, the yard had acquired a specialty in the repair and overhaul of 
nuclear submarines that continues until this day. However, that specialty, unlike the 
repetitious construction of World War II diesel submarines, in no way lends itself to 
streamlining procedures for mass production.
Community
The great increase in employment and activity at the shipyard, during the war, 
transformed southern Maine and the seacoast region of New Hampshire from rural and 
farming communities to a much more densely populated and urbanized area. A 
tremendous transformation occurred in housing as over a 1,500 new housing units were 
constructed at the three Federal Government sponsored housing projects. These projects, 
as urgently needed as they were, met with a certain amount of initial, and continuing, 
disapproval from local civic leaders because of their hasty and utilitarian construction. 
Significant infrastructure development included new schools, new streets and roads, and 
tremendous extensions of water and sewer mains, telephone facilities, and other utilities. 
Urbanized and industrialized, Portsmouth was a radically changed city in 1945, as
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compared to the “prosperous New England port, steeped in history and thriving as a 
summer resort,” that the New York Times reporter had described in October 1942.
The state of New Hampshire was also transformed as the result of activity at the 
yard during the war. While the local seacoast region of New Hampshire experienced a 
20.9% increase in population during the war, the state of New Hampshire experienced a 
significant decrease in the overall state population of 6.6 %. The center of New 
Hampshire’s population, commerce, and manufacturing shifted dramatically towards 
Portsmouth. Towards the end of the war, the effective annual purchasing income of 
Portsmouth residents was slightly greater than the average in the United States, and 
considerably higher than the average of the state of New Hampshire, as the state’s center 
of prosperity also gravitated towards Portsmouth.
The Portsmouth area was also transformed from an area that was shunned for 
manufacturing development prior to the war, because of a lack of skilled workers, to an 
area attractive to manufacturers because of an abundance of skilled workers. The 
extensive, federally funded, and locally administered, training programs needed to supply 
the shipyard with trained employees during the war, created an excess of skilled workers 
and training facilities when both were in much less demand after the war. In 1945, with 
the war winding down, the city of Portsmouth struck a deal with the state whereby the 
city agreed to rent the Morley Company building, which housed the federal vocational 
school, in return for the state establishing one of the first state trade schools.10 The city 
and state took advantage of the machinery and equipment in the federal vocational school 
that was already under the control of the state board of education, to launch the state trade
10 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Jul 1945, “Portsmouth is Chosen site for Trade School,” 1.
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school system that evolved into the New Hampshire Technical Colleges. Thus, the city 
insured a steady supply of skilled workers for the future.
Women were transformed from housewives to become valuable employees of the 
shipyard shops and community, during the war years. They gradually, but steadily, 
progressed from helpers and clerks to machinists, welders, and trained supervisors. Many 
of the women employees of the shipyard returned to their housewife duties after the war, 
as was the custom across the nation. From a peak of 19,000,000 working women in the 
United States during the war, the total in January 1946 had dropped to 15,630,000.11 The 
number of Portsmouth Navy Yard female employees also dropped precipitously after the 
war, but women had definitely made their mark and proved their worth. The local 
transformation of women to the workplace may have been put on hold at the end of the 
war, but it returned even stronger twenty years later.
The transformation that Mary Dondero brought about in the Portsmouth city 
government was more immediate and permanent. Dondero’s election in November 1944 
as the first female mayor of Portsmouth, and the first ever in the state of New Hampshire, 
ousted the city’s traditional male dominated, conservative, Republican government and 
set in motion a change in Portsmouth politics that saw women and Democrats fill 
influential positions in city government for much of the next half century .
At the start of Dondero’s second term, in January 1946, her 26 year old daughter, 
Eileen Dondero, was elected by the city council to serve as city clerk, the first female city 
clerk in the history of the city. Eileen Dondero, a painter’s helper at the shipyard during 
the war, has been a strong and loyal supporter of the yard ever since. She went on to
11 Portsmouth Herald, 4 Mar 1946, “Rosie the Riveter Swaps Her Coveralls for an Apron,” 1.
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serve 18 years as the mayor of Portsmouth, 1968 to 1972 and again from 1984 to 1998. 
Her election in 1984 marked the beginning of twenty-two continuous years during which 
women held the position of mayor in the city of Portsmouth. Since 1944, Portsmouth has 
been largely a progressive Democratic city with women filling many important political 
offices. Much of the credit for that transformation is due to Mary Dondero and Eileen 
Dondero Foley, both of whom maintained strong ties to the yard during their political 
careers as the result of being employed there during the war.
Other Transformations
Three other transformations deserve mention to complete the picture of events at 
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. These include a sudden and unfortunate career 
crisis for Rear Admiral Withers in the summer of 1945, the further consolidation of 
responsibilities in the Bureau of Ships for management of navy yard affairs in late 1945, 
and the EPA studies of the shipyard that resulted in Superfund status in 1994.
Rear Admiral Withers enhanced his well established, prewar reputation even 
more with the outstanding performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard under his command 
during the war. However, despite a distinguished naval career of almost forty years and 
an illustrious record at Portsmouth, his tour of duty and his career ended on a sour note in 
June 1945, when the Naval Inspector General found Withers to be derelict in the 
performance of his duties involving the handling of surrendered German submarines and 
prisoners of war.
Four German submarines, U-805, U-873, U-1228, and U- 234 had been escorted 
to Portsmouth Navy Yard by U.S. destroyers between 15 and 19 May 1945 for
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observation, selective stripping, and processing of prisoners in accordance with guidance 
from the Chief of Naval Operations, in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention. It 
soon became apparent that irregularities had occurred during the interrogation of German 
prisoners and, on 24 May 1945, Commandant Withers appointed Captain Armand M. 
Morgan to head a Board of Investigation “to inquire into and report upon the handling of 
German prisoners of war” including “the alleged extensive looting of personal baggage of 
these prisoners while at the Naval Prison, Portsmouth N.H., during the period 16 May
t
1945 to 21 May 1945.” The investigation was quickly elevated to the Naval Inspector 
General’s office and Commandant Withers became one of the accused rather than the 
senior investigating officer.
In a classic case of the Commanding Officer being held responsible for the
actions of his subordinates, the investigation of the Naval Inspector General found
Withers ultimately responsible for the looting of the surrendered German submarines and
the robbing and maltreatment of German prisoners of war:
That the Commandant of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Rear Admiral Withers,
U.S Navy, was derelict in his performance of duty in that he failed to 
recognize and accept his command responsibility to issue clear, concise 
instructions to his subordinates with regard to receiving, securing, 
safeguarding, and stripping U-boats surrendered in the Navy Yard,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and to safeguard the persons and property, both 
private and public, of German prisoners who were in his custody. He further 
failed to take effective action when violations of the Chief of Naval
11Operations’ order and the Geneva Convention were brought to his attention.
12 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral T. Withers memo o f 24 May 1945 to 
Captain Armand M. Morgan, USN, Subject: Board o f Investigation to inquire into and report upon the 
handling o f  German prisoners o f war. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 1930-1950, Box 
14, Folder A17 “Boards o f Investigation 1925 tO 1946.”
13 www.uboatarchive.netU-873NIGReport.htm. Report o f  the Naval Inspector General Regarding 
Irregularities Connected with the Handling o f  Surrendered German Submarines, Serial: 01783 o f 19 June 
1945,2.
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Appropriate administrative or disciplinary action was recommended for Rear Admiral 
Thomas Withers, Captain Clifford H. Roper, three Marine Corps Officers attached to the 
Naval Prison, two Medical Officers, and one civilian of the Office o f Naval Intelligence, 
Mr. Jack Henry Alberti.
Three hundred and eighty three pages of testimony led to the conclusion that U- 
805 had been looted by sailors and marines, U-boat liquors were “breached,” German 
prisoners were robbed of Swiss francs, wrist watches, uniform ribbons and decorations, 
and other personal effects. In addition, Mr. Alberti, dressed as a Lieutenant Commander, 
USN, had interrogated the Commanding Officer of U-873, Captain-Lieutenant Fritz 
Steinhoff, in a humiliating manner by having an enlisted man slap him to obtain 
information. Steinhoff later committed suicide after he had been transported to Boston for 
confinement pending transfer to a prisoner of war camp. According to a report in the 
Portsmouth Herald of 19 May 1945, “Steinhoff slashed himself with a part of an eyeglass 
which he shattered in his cell in Charles Street jail.”14
Just to be clear, the looting was attributed to enlisted marines and sailors assigned 
to the advance boarding parties and not to any Industrial Department personnel. In fact, 
the report of the Naval Inspector General found “That the Industrial Division of the Navy 
Yard, Portsmouth performed in a satisfactory manner the receiving, safeguarding, and 
stripping of the U-boats after the boats were turned over to them for that purpose.” 15 
There was no press coverage of the investigation at Portsmouth Navy Yard in
14 Portsmouth Herald, 19 May 1945, “U-234 Brings Air Force Gen. Ulrich and 2 Dead Japs,” 1.
15 www.uboatarchive.netU-873NIGReport.htm. Report o f the Naval Inspector General Regarding 
Irregularities Connected with the Handling o f  Surrendered German Submarines, Serial: 01783 o f 19 June 
1945, 3.
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1945.16 Perhaps, like the presence of British submarines at the yard in the summer of 
1941, the press had been asked by navy officials to refrain from reporting a controversial 
event at the shipyard. Whatever the reason for the lack of coverage, it is difficult to 
imagine that today’s press would not exploit a similar news event.
The Inspector General’s report was especially critical of the officers who had
accommodated and allowed Mr Alberti to abuse prisoners. The report found:
That the supine attitude of the Commanding Officer of the Naval Prison,
Colonel Rossell, USMC, and of Lieutenant Commander Hatton, USNR,
Office of Naval Intelligence, in permitting Mr. Alberti to conduct himself in 
the manner which he did, with the German prisoners of War, is most
• 17reprehensible.
In the United States Navy, the Commanding Officer is ultimately held responsible, when 
his ship goes aground, for whatever reason, and usually pays the price with an 
abbreviated career. Rear Admiral Withers’ command had gone aground, with the 
maltreatment of the German prisoners, and Withers bore the responsibility. His career, 
which began in 1906, could hardly be termed abbreviated, but it was essentially over in 
June 1945 when he was found to be derelict in his performance of his duties.
Rear Admiral Withers remained as commandant until he was relieved by Rear 
Admiral J.H. Brown on 15 November 1945.18 Withers’ problems continued in the fall of
16 A careful review o f the Portsmouth Herald during the entire year o f  1945 found no mention of 
the investigation at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. Furthermore, extensive research into Portsmouth Navy 
Yard files at NARA Waltham, Ma., NARA at College Park, and the other sources cited under the 
bibliography o f this study revealed nothing about the investigation. A routine internet search for “Withers” 
produced the “Report of the Naval Inspector General Regarding Irregularities Connected with the Handling 
o f Surrendered German Submarines.”
17 www.uboatarchive.netU-873NIGReport.htm. “Report o f the Naval Inspector General 
Regarding Irregularities Connected with the Handling o f Surrendered German Submarines,” Serial: 01783 
o f 19 June 1945,4.
1R
Portsmouth Naval Base Order No. 20-45 o f 15 November 1945. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 9, Folder A7-1 “Notices Navy Yard and Naval Base 
Jan 1 1945- t o  1950.”
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1945 as he spent considerable time in the Portsmouth Naval Yard hospital in ill health. In 
October 1945, the Portsmouth Herald noted that Captain Sidney E. Dudley was the 
acting commandant because “Rear Admiral Withers is presently in the Portsmouth Naval 
Hospital where he is recovering from a long illness.”19 The article added that Withers 
“will undoubtedly remain in that capacity [in the hospital] until Admiral Brown 
arrives.”20 There was no celebratory change of command ceremony as is typical for such 
occasions. Withers retired on 15 November 1945 while in the Portsmouth Naval Hospital 
and faded from the shipyard scene with far less recognition than he should have gotten 
for his remarkable tour of duty at Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Withers continued to be confined to the Portsmouth Naval Hospital “suffering 
from a serious illness’ until January 1946 when he was transferred to the Brooklyn Naval 
Hospital and then to the West Coast where he was “hospitalized much of the time” until
9 1his death on 25 June 1953. The last years of this submarine hero and shipyard 
commander extraordinaire were filled with far more angst and misery than deserved.
A central theme of this study is that navy yards, to a large extent, were left to 
manage their own affairs during the war, because the newly created Bureau of Ships was 
overwhelmed with other responsibilities, and that Portsmouth Navy Yard thrived in this 
entrepreneurial environment. The establishment of the Bureau of Ships, in June 1941, to 
replace the competing Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
clarified many navy yard organizational and administrational issues. However, other
19 Portsmouth Herald, 16 Oct 1945, “John L. Brown Assigned Here,” 1.
20 Ibid.
21 Portsmouth Herald, 27 Jun 1953, “Rear Adm. Withers, Ex-Yard Head, Dies in California,” 1.
413
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
agencies and bureaus continued to direct various fragments of operations at navy yards.
In addition to the Bureau of Ships, the offices of the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of 
Naval Operations, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery and others issued directions to navy yards during the war. As late 
as December 1944, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who continued to be frustrated 
with the inefficient administration of the navy yards, wrote, “What I want is some man 
whose sole job is to examine the functions, to compare operations and handle difficulties 
[at navy yards.] We should have one man to go to.”22
With the war winding down in the summer of 1945, a move developed to improve
the overall operating efficiency of navy yards by further clarifying organizational
responsibilities and putting one man in charge, as Secretary James Forrestal had directed.
A Survey Conducted by the Industrial Survey Division in the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy in July 1945 concluded that:
The attainment of greater and enduring improvements in the operating 
efficiency of the Navy Yards and Naval Drydocks will be materially 
facilitated by a realignment and clarification of the organization and 
administration of these establishments . . .  by concentrating full authority and 
responsibility for Departmental administration of these establishments in a 
single agency of the Navy Department.23
By the end of 1945, a full scale reorganization of navy yard administration and
management was in progress, that ultimately resulted in increased responsibilities for the
Bureau of Ships, and a reorganization of navy yards that gave the commandant full
22 Organization Planning and Procedures ltr o f  13 July 1945 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy 
Ralph A. Bard. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, 
Folder NY1/A3.
23 “Review o f  the Organization and Administration o f Navy Yards and Drydocks,” A Survey 
Conducted by the Industrial Survey Division in the Office o f the Secretary o f  the Navy dated 13 July 1945. 
NARA College Park, Record Group 38, Chief o f  Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 1182, 
Folder NY/A3-1.
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responsibility for all operations at his navy yard. Name changes accompanied the 
reorganization; commandants became commanding officers and navy yards became naval 
shipyards. In December 1945, Portsmouth Navy Yard became Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard,24 the title it holds today.
The extensive dumping of industrial waste for landfills, and the sewage discharge 
to the Piscsataqua River, continued long after the war. These and other sites became the 
subjects of exhaustive EPA investigations in the 1980s that led to the shipyard being 
included on the National Priorities List (NPL) for Superfund projects effective 31 May 
1994.25
As required by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), an initial assessment of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was 
completed in June 1983. CERCLA (Superfund) is an EPA national program to identify 
and assess past hazardous waste disposal sites posing a potential threat to human health 
or the enviroiiment. The initial assessment of Portsmouth Shipyard examined four sites 
and concluded, “while none of the sites poses an immediate threat,. . .  one site warrants 
further investigation. . .  to assess potential long-term impacts.”26 That site was the 
Jamaica Island Landfill that had been used for disposal of potentially toxic and hazardous
24 Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal ALNAVSTA #38 of 5 Dec 1945. NARA College Park, 
RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY.
25 /bid.
26 Initial Assessment Study o f Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, New Hampshire, NESA  
13-032, Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity, Port Hueneme, California 93043, June 1983, 
iii.
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materials.27 The study also recommended that two mercury burial sites be marked and not 
disturbed. The last site, an industrial waste discharge to the Piscataqua River that was 
discontinued in 1975, was recommended for additional sampling during the next 
dredging activity at the shipyard. Further investigations during the 1980s culminated in 
the designation of the shipyard as a Superfund project.
The initially identified Jamaica Landfill was reported to be the most contaminated 
site on the shipyard. This 25 acre landfill served as the shipyard’s dump from 1945 to 
1975. However, as shown in this study, the Jamaica Island Landfill and the filling of the 
back channel started before the end of the war. It is estimated that 50 acres of the 287 
acre shipyard were designated as Superfund sites. Reclamation projects have included the 
removal of seven underground storage tanks (1994), removal of mercury vaults from 
Jamaica Island (1997 and 2000), stabilizing contaminated shore lines, and capping 
contaminated soils (1999). The remedy for the Jamaica Landfill involved the construction 
of a saltwater marsh (2002) and the capping of excavated debris (2003).28 The U.S. Navy, 
by May 2005, had spent $48.6 million cleaning up the yard and it was estimated that 
another $35 million would be needed to complete the job. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s 
long time practice of recovering lowlands through industrial dumping had come to a 
disruptive and costly conclusipn.
27 Ibid.
28 http://vosemite.epa.gov/rl/nDl pad.nsf. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Waste Site, 
Cleanup & Reuse in New England.
29 http://www.nhpr.org/node/8782. New Hampshire Public Radio Commentary, “Contamination 
A Big Problem at the Shipyard,” by Rebecca Kaufman, 13 My 2005.
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Rather late in the war, on 17 February 1945, USS Redfish limped up the 
Piscataqua River towards Portsmouth Navy Yard, completing a transit from halfway 
around the world. Redfish had been damaged two months earlier by Japanese destroyers, 
after sinking the carrier Unryu in the East China Sea. The crew of the Redfish, one of the 
three submarines launched simultaneously on 27 January 1944 and subsequently 
completed on 12 April 1944, never expected to be back at Portsmouth so soon. After 
transiting back to Pearl Harbor from the East China Sea, the crew had been told that the 
submarine would have to go back to Portsmouth for repairs because Pearl Harbor and all 
the West Coast yards were full. Torpedoman Second Class Dan Maclsaac, who was on 
deck with the line handlers as the submarine steamed up the river, could not have been 
more pleased that his submarine was returning to Portsmouth.
Maclsaac had been in the Forward Torpedo Room, after sinking the Unryu, when 
three Japanese destroyers exploded seven depth charges off the starboard bow of the 
submerged Redfish. No one onboard was closer to the explosions. Maclsaac was thrown 
to the forward end of the compartment where he lay in the bilge, unconscious, for a few 
minutes. The explosions cracked the pressure hull and damaged piping, torpedo tubes, 
and other equipment in the room. Maclsaac awoke to the sound of rushing water, 
realizing that he and his shipmates had to quickly isolate the leaks, as best they could, if 
the submarine was to be saved. Using wrenches, rags, and whatever was available, 
Maclsaac and his mates stopped the leaks as the Redfish laid on the bottom of the East 
China Sea for four hours to escape detection and avoid further attacks.
30 Interview with Dan Maclsaac , 9 Nov 2006, at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum. The 
Redfish events that follow are all from the interview and Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in 
World War II, 407.
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As soon as Maclsaac and his mates had gained control of the flooding, the 
Commanding Officer, Commander L.D. McGregor, came forward from the conning 
tower to assess the damage. Today, over sixty years later, Maclsaac remembers the 
Captain’s exact words to him and his shipmates, “You can thank God that you were in a 
Portsmouth boat.” Such was Portsmouth’s reputation in the submarine fleet. Redfish was 
coming home for repairs but Maclsaac, Commander McGregor, and the rest of the crew 
were coming home to say “Thank you” to the men and women who had built their fine 
ship.
The submarine was greeted at the pier by shipyard officials, and hundreds of 
workers, eager to inspect their workmanship. Maclsaac, who was responsible for the 
Torpedo Room, where most of the damage had occurred, remembers worker after worker 
inspecting damaged pipes, tubes, and equipment to see if  they could, or should, have 
done something differently. As Maclsaac pointed out the damage and told the story of the 
attack, the workers empathized with the crew and delighted in the fact that their work had 
held up to such a pounding and enabled the submarine and crew to survive. Maclsaac, 
who had gained considerable respect for Portsmouth workmanship while his submarine 
was being built, was convinced, more than ever, that the men and women at Portsmouth 
Navy Yard were an unusually dedicated and talented workforce.
The Redfish completed repairs in May 1945 and made the long transit back to the 
Pacific to resume war patrols until the end of the war. A few months after the Redfish 
steamed back out of Portsmouth Harbor, the submarine action in the Pacific began to 
wind down and more and more submarines found their way back to Portsmouth. The 
submarine traffic in the Piscataqua River was heavy in late 1945 and the first half of
418
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1946, as an average of eight submarines a month arrived at the yard for work of some
a  i
description.
By the summer of 1946, the shipyard was inundated with submarines and 
immersed in a potpourri of miscellaneous work assignments. Many of the submarines had 
returned to the shipyard to be scrapped, prepared for sale to foreign nations, or moth­
balled.32 Orders for the construction of new submarines had stopped. The shipyard’s 
finely tuned operation, which had pushed Redfish and seventy-eight other submarines to 
war in record numbers, had come to a sudden and grinding halt. Priorities had changed, 
from construction of submarines to the disposal of submarines, and a remarkable period 
of submarine construction had come to a close for Portsmouth Navy Yard.
31 “U.S. Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N.H. Schedule o f  Ship Repair, Alteration, and 
Decommissioning” o f  21 Jan 1946, NARA, Waltham, Record Group 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General 
Correspondence, 1930-1950, Box 18, Folder 3-7, “Docking -  General.”
32 Portsmouth Navy Yard was considered and rejected as a site for berthing o f  vessels out o f  
commission (a moth-balled fleet). A Memo to the Commandant from R.D. Spalding o f  the U.S. Coast and 
Geodetic Service dated 13 Oct 1944, Subject: Hydrographic conditions at the Navy Yard and in Great Bay 
Area in connection with berthing o f  vessels out o f commission, concluded that a large portion o f the 
waterfront space at the shipyard is developed, but unavailable or unsuitable for berthing medium-draft 
vessels in quantity. Excessive tides and currents and winter ice conditions were also cited as undesirable 
elements for long-term berthing o f ships or submarines. The only feasible alternative was to develop and 
dredge the more sheltered and protected back channel for berthing -  a costly proposition. This U.S. Coast 
and Geodetic Survey presented costs for this option that included locations for “48 submarines, 2 tenders 
and certain minor craft.” The proposal went no further and the East Coast submarine moth-balled 
submarine fleet was ultimately located at Philadelphia Navy Yard. The survey referred to is held at NARA, 
Waltham, Record Group 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, 1930-1950, Box 18, Folder 
3-7, “Docking -  General.”
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Figure A-l: Portsmouth Nuvy Yard (1939). NARA Wa.tham, RG 181, Portsmouth Nava. Base Centra. Fi.es, 















Figure A-2: Portsmouth Navy Yard (1945). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Central Files, Box 20, 
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Figure A-3: Portsmouth Navy Yard Manpower Curves by Work Category, 1940-45. Portsmouth Navy Yard 
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Figure A-4: Portsmouth Navy Yard Manhours per Submarine, 1940-45. Portsmouth Navy Yard 
during World War II Administrative History. Chapter 1: New Construction and Repair, c. Production Graphs.
Figure A-5: Portsmouth Navy Yard Showing Original Islands with Fill. Source cited 
above.
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Figure A-6: Proposed Site Portsmouth Navy Yard (cira 1800). Preble, George 
Henry, Rear Admiral, USN. History o f the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire.
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Figure A-7: PNY w/o Jamaica Island (1941).
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 
Central Files, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l/N l -  “Plans, 
Projects, Policies.”
Figure A-8: PNY with Jamaica Island (1945) and Fill 
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 
Central Files, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l/N l -  “Plans, 
Projects, Policies, PKG 2.”
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